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Marc Owen Jones: Thesis  Abstract
Methods of Repression in Bahrain During the 20th and 21st Century: From the
Civil List to Social Media
Despite being afflicted by cyclical bouts of unrest over the past century, repression
in Bahrain as a concept has not been the focus of considerable academic attention.
This  is  the  first  interpretive  historical  and contemporary study of  repression  in
Bahrain. It addresses the limitations of regime-type analysis and quantitative studies
of  repression,  which  tend  to  focus  on  the  co-variation  between  repression  and
demobilization.   Using  a  template  analysis,  a  virtual  ethnography  and  framing
theory, this thesis offers a new conceptualisation of repression. Several episodes of
contention  in  Bahrain  are  analysed,  including;  tribal  resistance  to  the  British
reforms of the 1920s, the rise of the Higher Executive Committee in the 1950s, the
leftist  agitation of the 1970s, the 1990s Intifada, and the 2001 Uprising.  Using
evidence  from  multiple  sources,  including  recently  released  Foreign  and
Commonwealth Office files, social media, and historical records, this thesis argues
that Bahrain's protecting powers have had a marked impact on the severity, nature
and  type  of  repression  in  Bahrain,  as  well  as  the  structure  of  the  repressive
apparatus.  While  the British mitigated the excesses of Al Khalifa's  treatment  of
political opposition, their declining influence following Independence saw the rise
of  a  Saudi-Al  Khalifa  dual  authority  structure  that  created  a  new  approach  to
repressive choices. Crucially, Bahrain's protecting powers influenced the nature and
type of repression that was applied to political opposition. Yet despite this meta-
narrative of outside influence, this research complicates generalisable theories of
repression, showing that repressive choices are often contingent on a complex mix
of the availability of resources, elite attitudes, strategic objectives of power holders,
and the nature of threat. For this reason, the research sheds light on repression in
Bahrain,  but also highlights the value of conducting case studies and long term
studies  that  allow  researchers  to  compare  and  contrast  the  reasons  motivating
repressive  choices.  The  new  conceptualisation  also  emphasises  the  rising
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The IJMES transliteration has been utilised here with a few exceptions. In
the case of direct quotations, the original spellings have been preserved. In
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certain spelling of their name that does not conform to the IJMES system,
their preferred choice has been used. This is based on the respect for their
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Introduction
Repression in Bahrain in the 20th and 21st Century  
Repression in Bahrain 
When  it  comes  to  repression,  counter-revolution  and  how  social  movements  or
dissidents are ended/inhibited, we have only just begun to 'scratch the surface of the
topic'.1 Even the definition of political repression itself is the subject of much debate.
However, given its contemporary and historical importance in Bahrain, and especially
in light of the Arab Uprisings,  repression is perhaps one of the most 'compelling
conceptual lenses through which to mediate between meaningful happenings in the
past  and the concerns  of  present  day audiences'.2  It  is  also self-evident,  from an
ethical standpoint, that studying repression is important simply by virtue that many
often suffer as a result of it.3 Repression, like collective action, is often treated as a
'subsidiary form of political, social or economic history', and it is something that also
requires  a  history 'in  its  own terms'.4 Yet  repression  has  only received  incidental
references  in  historical  accounts  of  Bahrain.  Key texts  on Bahrain have  retold  its
history using different lenses. Khuri's seminal Tribe and State in Bahrain, for example,
approaches the development of the state from the perspective of 'political authority'
and the  impact  of  colonial  and tribal  rule  on political  structures  in  Bahrain.  Fred
Lawson's history opts for a lens of modernization theory, tracking the development of
Bahrain. Abdulhadi Khalaf explores control strategies in his analysis of contentious
politics on Bahrain,  examining the manner in which tribal rule exerts a system of
patronage related to Rentierism. As Jones and Shehabi note, 'repression and dissent in
Bahrain have generally remained outside of research focus and dominant approaches
1 C. Davenport, How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the Republic of New 
Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 21 of 346. [Kindle Edition]  
2 T. Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology', in T. Skocpol 
(ed), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 
362. 
3 C. Davenport, 'Repression and Mobilization: Insights from Political Science and Sociology',  in C. 
Davenport, H. Johnston,  and C. Mueller (eds), Repression and Mobilization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005,  p. xii. 
4 C. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, University of Michigan, 1977, ch. 8, p. 14. 
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adopted  by NGOs,  think-tanks,  and  international  relations  experts  have  tended  to
focus  through  paradigms  of  sectarianism,  modernisation,  rentierism,  or  even
democratisation,  where  ‘reform’ and  ‘dialogue’ have  become tired  idioms'.5 Stacy
Strobl,  for  example,  examines the importance of  sectarianism in defining policing
outcomes  and  attitudes  towards  the  police  in  Bahrain,  while  Toby  Matthiesen
emphasises  the  importance  of  sectarianism  as  a  regime  survival  strategy.  Justin
Gengler, in his recent PhD, focuses on ethnic mobilization in Bahrain and its relation
to the Rentier State. 
By  using  Bahrain  as  a  case  study,  this  seeks  to  add  to  the  literature  on
repression,  expanding  on  the  need  to  understand  how autocratic  states  repress  in
different ways, while also addressing the issue of the lack of conceptual clarity among
the many manifested forms of repression.6 In particular, it addresses the deficiency on
literature outlying the 'specific contours' of the repressive methods and choices made
in Bahrain over the past 100 years, and fulfils the need that has arisen since the Arab
Uprisings  to  understand  Arab  countries  independently,  especially  Bahrain,  which
Swedler argues is an 'outlier' in a number of respects in the studies of the region. 7
Indeed, scholars such as Justin Gengler argue that Bahrain  has always challenged the
‘prevailing interpretation of politics in the Arab Gulf – the so-called rentier  state
paradigm  –  which  holds  that  regimes  can  buy  the  political  acquiescence  of  the
citizenry through judicious distribution of oil revenues’.8 Those, such as Abdulhadi
Khalaf,  argue  rentierism  only  partly  explains  a  regime's  resilience,  and  that  the
movement of 2011 marked the end of rentierism politics in Bahrain.9  Bellin herself
frequently refers to Bahrain as an exception to her more generalisable explanations of
Arab  State  authoritarianism,  and  thus  it  becomes  clear  that  a  more  in-depth
investigation  will  reveal  more  idiosyncrasies  about  repression  in  the  small  Gulf
Kingdom.
5 A. Shehabi & M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf', in A. 
Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf, 
London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 33. 
6 M. Khawaja, 'Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank', 
Sociological Forum, vol. 8, no. 1, 1993, p. 50.
7 J. Schwedler, 'What should political scientists be doing?', in Arab Uprisings: New Opportunities for
Political Science, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings). p. 57.
8 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Sunni Awakening', Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 
17 January 2012,  http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712, (Accessed 8 August 2015).  
9 A. Khalaf, 'Foreword', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and
Repression in the Gulf, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015.
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Bahrain,  a small archipelago in the Persian Gulf, presents an interesting case
in itself  with regards  to studying repression for  a  number of  reasons.  It  has  been
afflicted by internal political instability and conflict throughout its modern history.
What  began as the feudal oppression of the native  baḥārna  by the conquering Al
Khalifa tribe and their allies has evolved into the general repression by the Al Khalifa-
dominated  regime of  a  number  of  uprisings  spearheaded by different  movements.
These  uprisings  have  had  several  different  characteristics,  from  the  nationalist
movements of the 1950s and 60s and the labour and leftist movements of the 70s, to
the increasingly Islamic movements of the 80s and 90s.  The most recent of these
uprisings began in 2011, when Bahrainis, galvanized by the protests in Tunisia and
Egypt in 2010, took to the streets on 14 February 2011 to demand greater political
rights. However, in all cases, despite political reforms, or reformulations, the ruling Al
Khalifa family have succeeded in preserving their monopoly on the country's material,
political  and  military  resources,  highlighting  what  Eva  Bellin  describes  as
authoritarian 'robustness'.10 All movements, whether organized political societies, or
indigenous groups who are subordinate to the superordinate Al Khalifa, have faced
serious and repeated political repression, a fact that has not been tempered by limited
democratic reform.  
Yet while authoritarian resistance has been examined by numerous scholars,
most notable among them Bellin, who focuses on the extensive will and capacity of
the coercive apparatus in Arab states as making them exceptional, new approaches are
necessary.11 Repression, this research argues, is a useful lens. In particular, there is
little  done  on  how long  term changes  of  repression  occur  in  countries  that  have
experienced a  shift  in  protectors.  For  a  country like  Bahrain,  that  suffers  from a
position of sovereign insecurity, it is important in understanding how foreign factors
influence  internal  repression.  Thus  Repression  and  Bahrain  are  both  relatively
undernourished in the literature, and thus form a marriage of relative convenience in
terms of academic study. 
In addition to an intellectual justification, let us consider too the moral aspect,
most notably the historical continuity of social injustice. In 1829, British naval officer
10 E. Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the 
Arab Spring', Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 127 – 49.
11 M. M. Howard and M. R. Walters, 'Response to Eva Bellin, Ellen Lust, and March Lynch', 
Perspectives on Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2014, pp. 417 – 419.  
15 
Major  Wilson  noted  that  'the  enormities  practised  by the  Uttoobees12 towards  the
original inhabitants of Bahrain far exceed what I have ever heard of tyranny in any
part of the world'.13  The British Captain Taylor also said of the baḥārna under the Al
Khalifa that, 'The aboriginal inhabitants of Bahrein, now subjected to a foreign power,
suffer from the tyranny of their masters more keenly than language can express'.14 In
1878,  Captain  Edward  Law Duran  described  a  group of  Shiʿa  baḥārna from the
village of A'Ali  as a 'broken-spirited helpless lot',  and noted that  one of the most
salient  aspects  of  his  survey of  Bahrain  was  the  'innumerable  complaints  of  the
tyranny of the Sheikhs and their tribe'.15 In 1921, Major Daly submitted a scathing
condemnation of the Al Khalifa, and in particular ʿAbd Allah bin ‘Isa Al Khalifa's16
treatment  of  the  baḥārna community;  'Instances  of  this  oppression  are  far  too
numerous to quote, but details are on record of a large number of cases of recent date,
which include illegal seizure of property, wrongful imprisonment with cruelty, and
political murders, for which no one has been brought to trial, and no effort made to
enforce justice'.17 He added that 'oppression in the past two years has amounted to
terrorism'.18 Political  murders  were  becoming  common,  as  were  'outrages  against
respectable women'.19 Things  reached such a  pitch that  there  was 'no security for
persons or property'.20 Over the course of the century, little has changed, and modern
accounts refer to similar oppression of, not the baḥārna per se, but the Shiʿa, losing
12 The Uttoobees, is the British pluralisation for the Arabic al-ʿUtbī  (plural = ʿutūb ). ʿutūb are the 
name for the federation of Arab clans believed to originate in Najd. 
13 Major Wilson, 'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' [107] (149/733), British 
Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/732, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100022870191.0x000096> (accessed 28 July 2015).
14 Anon, 'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' [23] (60/733), British Library: 
India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/732, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100022870191.0x00003d> [accessed 27 July 2015]
15 E.L. Durand, 'Notes on the islands of Bahrain and antiquities, by Captain E. L. Durand, 1st Assistant
Resident, Persian Gulf', 1878 – 1879, in P. Tuson and E. Quick (eds), Records of  Bahrain 1820-
1960, Slough, Archive Editions, vol. 2, 1993, p. 545.  
16 ʿAbd Allah was the son of the then ruler, ‘Isa Al Khalifa. His brother Hamad was heir apparent at 
the time and the eldest son of ‘Isa. ‘Isa, who was elderly and senile, was frequently referred to by 
the British as being dominated and under the influence of his wife. See 'Administration Reports 
1920-1924' [119v] (243/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, 
IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002c> [accessed 4 November 2015]
17 C.K. Daly, November 21, in P. Tuson and E. Quick (eds), Records of  Bahrain 1820-1960, Slough, 
Archive Editions,  vol. 3, 1993, p. 668. 
18 Ibid. 
19 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [84v] (173/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385510.0x0000ae> [accessed 4 November 2015]
20 Ibid. 
16 
the ethnic identifier. Especially after the 1980s onwards, we see Amnesty International
stating  that  the  'majority  of  protesters,  Shiʿa  Muslims,  have  complained  of  being
politically marginalized by the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family, which dominates all
aspects of political and economic life in Bahrain'.21 This historic continuity highlights
how the need for  social  justice requires  an understanding of the methods used in
maintaining political domination. Repression is an apt conceptual lens, and a relevant
means of exploring Bahrain's unequal political contract. It may also help explain why
authoritarianism in Bahrain may well be, as Steven Heydemann notes, 'stronger, more
flexible, and more resilient than ever'.22  Specifically, this research attempts to answer
the following question; how have the dominant political and social order in Bahrain
prevented, controlled, or constrained potential radical change to their authority since
the end of the First World War?   
This  thesis  contributes  to  knowledge  by  being  the  first  study  of  political
repression in Bahrain, a state with significant (it is argued) foreign intervention in
internal  matters.  By  adopting  a  fine-grained  approach  to  repression,  this  study
addresses a number of deficiencies in the study of repression, which often focus on
creating  general  causal  models  based  on  narrow  definitions  of  repression.  By
broadening  yet  conceptually  refining  different  types  of  repression,  and examining
strategic-decision making processes, this research shows  how repressive choices and
methods  are  often  dependent  on  specific  contextual  and  temporal  factors,  while
highlighting long-term trends in the repressive structure of Bahrain's political system.
The nature of repression and control shifted according not only to the threat to the
ruling Al Khalifa  regime,  but  also a  number of  other  factors,  such as  those tools
available  to  the  government,  and  the  personality  of  those  responsible  for  control
policy, and the nature of institutions themselves. Contextual factors, attitudes of elites,
levels  of  accountability  are  all  important  in  determining  repressive  choices.  In
addition  to  these  micro-level  transactions  that  influence  repressive  choices,  this
research also reveals how the shift from British colonial protection, to Saudi overrule
following 1971, marked a key shift in general trends of repression.  Increasing Al
21 Amnesty International, Bahrain: Reform Shelved, Repression Unleashed, London, 2012, p. 3.  
22 S. Heydemann, ‘Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world’, Analysis Paper 13, The Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, October 2007, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld.pdf, 
(Accessed 20 November 2015).  
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Khalifa and Saudi autonomy following independence in 1971 led to a reassertion of
what sociologist Abdulhadi Khalaf calls the Al Khalifa's 'legacy of conquest',23 and a
de-incentivisation to resort to the public delegation of issues of collective importance.
While the British protected the Al Khalifa, institutionalising their rule, and abetting
their  tribal  authoritarianism,  they  also  tempered  facets  of  their  repressive  nature,
whereas increasing Saudi influence perhaps enabled it.   In others words, repression
got  notably  more  severe  in  many  regards  following  independence  when  British
influence  diminished,  especially  for  the  country's  Shiʿa  population.   Furthermore,
many of these reforms, including the relatively recent democratisation, have lacked
'binding consultation between the agents of the government and the people, inhibiting
a crucial  aspect of democracy: the protection of citizens from an arbitrary state'.24
Like much social history on collective action, or any history for that matter, this thesis
is corrective.
In addition, as repression is, like social movements, a phenomena that   is not
concerned about disciplinary boundaries, the nature of the research expands into fields
of legal research,  politics, and communications.  Through addressing the history of
informational  control,  this  thesis  also  problematises  the  liberating  potential  of
technology, and critically examines how social media in the recent uprising was used
as a tool of social control, propaganda and surveillance. The increased role of online
vigilantiism  also highlights the need to examine further the role of non-state actors as
agents of repression. 
Defining Repression: Breadth or Depth?  
First though, we must define repression, which itself is subject to much debate. This
definition is rooted in conflict theory. All states repress. As Max Weber states, 'conflict
cannot be excluded from social life... “Peace” is nothing more than a change in the
form of the conflict or in the antagonists or in the objects of the conflict, or finally in
the chances of selection'.25 In order to gain and maintain access to material resources,
23 A. Khalaf (2008), 'The Outcome of a Ten-Year Process of Political Reform in Bahrain', Arab Reform
Initiative, http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/ARB.23_Abdulhadi_Khalaf_ENG.pdf,  
(accessed 30 December 2013) .
24 L. Kalmanowiecki, 'Origins and Applications of Political Policing in Argentina' , Latin American 
Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 2, Violence, Coercion and Rights in the Americas, 2000, p. 37.
25 M. Weber 1949, p. 27. Cited A Turk, Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defence of Authority, 
Beverley Hills, Sage Publication,  1982, p. 11.
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both  the  state  and private  actors  frequently use  repression  and control  to  prevent
potential  challenges  to  their  position  of  privilege,  frequently resulting  in  conflict.
Such forms of control may be broad, as in the Durkheimian preservation of cultural,
social or ethnic stratification, or much narrower, such as the use of torture to deter
political dissents or opponents of the regime. Whereas the former phenomenon may
be more broadly termed a form of a social control, the latter might more readily be
considered a form of repression. Yet drawing a distinction between broader forms of
control and repression is not straightforward. Scholars of repression often disagree
about what constitutes political repression. Robert Justin Goldstein provides a useful
starting point, and argues that repression 'consists of government action which grossly
discriminates against  persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental
challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their
perceived political beliefs'.26More recently, and despite other definitions of repression,
Goldstein has reiterated his commitment to his original definition, noting that it can
'defy even the  most  expert  lexicographer'.27 Scholars  such as  Christian  Davenport
have embellished on Goldstein's work28,  defining repression as:
the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose
of imposing a cost on the target as well  as deterring specific activities
and/or  beliefs  perceived  to  be  challenging  to  government  personnel,
practices or institutions29
Such measures may include 'harassment,  surveillance/spying, bans,  arrests, torture,
and  mass  killing  by  government  agents  and/or  affiliates  within  their  territorial
jurisdiction'.30 Brett Stockdill provides a similar definition, and classifies repression as
'any actions taken by [government] authorities to impede mobilization, harass, and
26 R.J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976. 1st Illinois Ed edition.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978, p. XVI, 
27 R.J. Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe,  Oxford, Routledge, 2010 (first 
published 1983). p. xiii. 
28 Ibid. 
29 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 10, 
no. 1, 2007, p. 2.
30 Ibid., p.1 
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intimidate  activists,  divide  organizations,  and  physically  assault,  arrest,  imprison
and/or kill movement participants'.31 
Although  these  definitions  of  repression  have  been  widely  used  by social
movement scholars, Jennifer Earl notes that they place too much emphasis on the role
of the state. For this reason, Earl defines repression  as any 'state or private action
meant  to  prevent,  control,  or  constrain  non  institutional,  collective  action  (e.g.,
protest), including its initiation.'32 Similarly, Charles Tilly defines repression as 'any
action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action'.33 Jules
Boykoff's study on repression emphasises that non-state actors such as the media play
an integral role in vilifying and turning public opinion against social movements. As a
result, Boykoff argues that the role of non-state actors necessitates a broadening of the
concept of repression.34 As Davenport argues, there is a need to include 'alternative
mechanisms'  of  control  when analysing  repression,  including  those  that  might  be
included under normative or material power.35 Luis Fernandez also agrees with the
need to broaden out definitions of repression, arguing that it 'opens up the theoretical
possibilities for broader studies of protest control'.36  For example, private security
firms, software firms, the arms trade, and vigilantes may also play an important role in
repression.  As Earl notes, there is 'very little' study of non-state actors and private
repression.37  
Hendrix too argues that a state's administrative, bureaucratic capacity may be
more important  in  determining a  state's  repressive capacity than the ability to  put
boots on the ground.38 While the line between state and private actors is not always
clear, studies of repression tend to be state-centric. The role of private actors tends to
focus  on national  institutions  such as  the  media.  However,  this  study stresses  the
importance of extra-state, international actors, in determining repression.
31 B.C. Stockdill, Multiple Oppressions and Their Influence on Collective Action: The Case of the 
AIDS Movement. PhD Dissertation, 1996, Evanston, Northwestern University, p. 146. 
32 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control', The Annual Review of 
Sociology, vol. 37, 2011, pp. 261 – 84,  p. 263
33 C. Tilly,  From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 100. 
34 J. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States, Edinburgh, AK Press, 
2007.
35 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order',  p. 19
36 L. A. Fernandez, Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti Globalization Movement, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick, 2008, p. 9.
37 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 265.
38 C.S. Hendrix, 'Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of 
Civil Conflict', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 273-285.
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So on the one hand, over-broad definitions of repression run the risk of making
it a 'theoretical umbrella' as opposed to a useful analytical tool.39 On the other hand,
focusing on one aspect of repression such as the policing of protest runs the risk of
ignoring other aspects of repression that are important in understanding the broader
web of control, and in the case of Bahrain, the reason for the regime's resilience. 
As  well  as  noting  that  repression  is  a  contested  concept,  there  is  also  the
problem  of  the  general  limitations  on  academic  studies  of  repression,  as  social
movement scholars have tended to focus more on the study of the 'emergence, growth
and effectiveness of social  movements'  as opposed to the role the state or private
actors play in preventing or repressing their activity.40 Furthermore, as states move
towards more democratic forms of representation, then more attention must be spent
on  those  institutions  that  do  not  necessarily  form part  of  the  traditional  coercive
apparatus.  As  Davenport  notes,  alternative  mechanisms  of  control,  separate  from
coercion,  'have  not  been  examined  extensively'.41Furthermore,  'The  failure  to
incorporate coercive behaviour with other forms of state influence has hindered not
only the study of repression but also the study of the alternatives'.42On a similar note,
Goldstein notes that repression may be legal and peaceful, or illegal and violent.43
Despite the debate,  defining repression is important for conceptual clarity.  For the
purpose of this study, the definition of repression leans towards to a more inclusive,
open-ended definition,   defined as  the process  by  which  the  dominant  hegemonic
order  attempt  to  maintain  power by  destroying,  rendering  harmless  or  appeasing
those  organizations,  people,  groups,  or  ideologies  that  potentially  threaten  their
position of power or privilege.   The dominant hegemonic power is the Al Khalifa
regime, a regime which Abdulhadi Al Khalaf describes as a 'despotic form of rule that
has gradually evolved in the British-designed political and economic reforms of in the
first decades' of the 21stcentury. 44 
39 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 272.
40 J. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States, Edinburgh, AK Press, 
2007, p. 14. 
41 C. Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, p. 9.
42 C. Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, p. 19. 
43 R.J. Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe, p. xiii. 
44 A. Khalaf,  Contentious politics in Bahrain: From ethnic to national and vice versa, The fourth 
Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in globalizing world, Oslo, 13-16 
August 1998 . http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/khalaf.html, (accessed 7 February 2014). 
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Chapter Outlines
Chapter  One:  The justifications,  concepts  and theories  for  the study are  laid out.
There  are  four  key  issues.  Firstly,  regime  type  analysis  of  repression  yields
unsatisfying results. Secondly, Bahrain exhibits a number of characteristics that make
it an interesting case study, such as the Al Khalifa regime and their reliance on foreign
powers.  Thirdly, studies of repression are often quantitative, and attempts to build
generalisable causal models have reached often divergent conclusions, emphasising
the need for fine grained approaches such as historic ones. Fourth, there are a lack of
nuanced conceptualisations of repression, and this thesis proposes a new one, ideally
positioned to create a rich net for studying repression.
Chapter Two: In addition to discussing sources, this chapter outlines the tenets of the
transformative paradigm, the nature of a template analysis, and the use of interpretive
historical narrative. In order to buttress this historical work,  a virtual ethnography and
framing has been conducted to examine further the role of social media and the media
in the recent uprising.  Drawing on elements of interpretive and comparative historical
sociology, this chapter puts forward the assertion that historical studies of repression
offer the depth required to give the more nuanced analysis needed in the field. It also
makes a case for the need to integrate disciplines to form methodological approaches
that are novel and unconventional. 
Chapter  Three: In  this  chapter,  political  tactics  of  repression  are  detailed  and
examined. In particular, the chapter notes a number of interesting trends. Firstly, the
British desire to sail a Middle Course in Bahrain led to reforms designed to ameliorate
dissent  through  indirect  and  pacific  means,  yet  it  also  ultimately  led  to  the
crystallisation of the Al Khalifa regime. It also notes that in the 1950s, growing Arab
nationalism and a desire to sail this middle course of non-interference  meant Britain
pursued  other  means  in  order  to  repress  the  Higher  Executive  Committee.  Post-
independence diminishing British influence and increasing Saudi ascendency meant
that  tactics  like  democracy  were  eschewed  in  favour  of  methods  centred  around
patronage. This Saudi largesse had the simultaneous effect of binding Bahrain closer
to  Saudi,  resulting  in  long-term  de-democratization  and  rentierism.  Diminishing
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British influence upon Independence also seemed to cause a manifestation of both
Saudi  and  Al  Khalifa  animosity  towards  political  opposition  and  the  Shiʿa.  In
particular, this chapter contributes to knowledge by offering new facts on Bahrain's
transition to Independence, as very little primary document research has been done on
this period. 
 
Chapter Four. First, this chapter details the repressive capacity of Bahrain's security
services,  in  particular  the  police,  for  which  most  historical  and  current  data  is
available.  This  chapter  looks  at  how  personal  integrity  violations  in  Bahrain  are
intrinsically tied up with the institutional and political structures in Bahrain, and how
Al  Khalifa  conservatism  underlined  by  Saudi  fear  of  Iranian  expansionism  has
informed a militant and coercive policy of repression. In particular, the chapter notes
that while the British established and played an important role in the police,  Britain's
desire to keep Bahrain at arms length resulted in the ascendancy of the Al Khalifa ,
who  favoured  a  more  security-orientated  approach.  Following  Independence,
increasing Al Khalifa and Saudi control, coupled with diminishing British influence
led to a more repressive coercive apparatus, one in which the British were less able to
influence  policy in  the  favour  of  less  violent  and broad-brush means.  As well  as
detailing the emergence of the police force, this chapter argues how tactics such as
mass arrests and torture have emerged, not simply because of the criminalization of
the  Shiʿa  threat,  but  due  to  the  embedded  discrimination  and  sectarianism  that
pervades the security forces and the ruling regime. 
Chapter Five: By examining laws, legislation, and legal processes, this chapter argues
that  the legal  system in Bahrain is  becoming an increasingly comprehensive  and
important tool of repression. Despite increasing standardisation of law, the arbitrary
nature  of  its  execution  during  political  unrest  highlights  the  continuity  of
particularistic  features  of  tribal  law  embedded  within  a  standardized  system.   In
addition, legal repression is facilitated by legal structures and processes. Laws are
generally enacted as reactionary measures to control dissent. The extent of impunity
for state officials is also investigated and highlighted. In particular, a re-examination
of historical sources sheds new light on the trial of the al-Madani killers in 1977, and
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the trial of the Khawalid45 in the 1920s. 
Chapter  Six:  The  control  of  information  has  become  increasingly  important,  and
despite British involvement in the censorship of anti-regime material, their general
encouragement to liberalise the media was met again with Al Khalifa hostility to this.
Post Independence this continued, yet despite recent liberalisation, the process of Al
Khalifa  control  has  persevered.  By  undertaking  a  framing  analysis  and  virtual
ethnography, this chapter argues that protesters and opposition are framed as violent,
Iran-sponsored  agents  working  to  install  a  theocracy.  It  also  problematises  the
liberating potential  of  social  media by arguing how it  has  been used as  a  tool  of
surveillance and control in the recent uprising. 
45 Khawalid is a pluralisation of Khalids (the Khalids),. The term is used to refer to a branch of the Al 
Khalifa family descended from Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (1853 – 1925). Khalid bin Ali was the 
half-brother of Isa bin Ali Al Khalifa, whol ruled Bahrain between 1869 and 1923. 
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Chapter One
Bahrain: A Special Case? Shifting Hegemony, Bahrain's Sovereign
Ambiguity, and a Template for Studying Repression 
Repression, Regime Type & Repressive Capacity  
Bahrain's cycles of instability over the course of the past century have rendered it  an
interesting political case study. Despite the growth of political democracy, and the
ratification of a number of international treaties such as the International Code of
Civil and Political Rights, the recent crackdown by the government has been more
brutal than any other in history.  Vincent Boudreau states that one 'way of thinking
about state reactions to social challenges is to argue that different kinds of regimes
have different repressive potentials...',46 or repressive capacity. Davenport argues in
his uses of Giddes' typology of different types of regimes that 'autocratic governments
repress in different ways',47 and that a concerted effort must be made to understand the
nature of this repression and reasons for its occurrence; 'for research, the implications
are clear: in the future, there must be an effort extended to disaggregate regime type
so that we can understand the circumstances under which civil liberties are restricted
and  human  rights  are  violated'. 48  It  is  therefore  incorrect  to  treat  all  autocratic
governments in the same manner.49 As such  'we would not expect repression to be
comparably  applied  across  all  types  of  autocracy'.50 The  logical  implications  of
Davenport's  statement  are  clear,  and  suggest  that  the  most  comprehensive
understanding of repression on a state level is naturally an examination on a case-by-
case basis.
46 V. Boudrea, 'Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy',  
in C. Davenport, H. Johnston,  and C. Mueller (eds), Repression and Mobilization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005, p. 36.
47 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 
4, 2007, p. 486. 
48 Ibid., p. 486.
49 Ibid., p. 500.
50 Ibid., p. 489. 
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Most  recently,  Ala'a  Shehabi  and  Marc  Owen  Jones  argue  that  what  has
emerged in Bahrain is essentially a kleptocratic ethnocracy, where one ethnic group,
the Sunni Al Khalifa51, has captured the instruments of state in order to protect their
position of material and political privilege.52 At the heart of this regime is a 'ruling
core' of mostly Al Khalifa family members, who have a great degree of personalist
influence in  internal  policy.  As a  result  of  this,  a  system of  domination has  been
created, and is reproduced through social,  political,  coercive,  and legal institutions
that reflect the ‘norms, values and interests of the dominant ethnic group’.53 This has
led to a tribal state structure that is institutionally repressive, as the disparities in life
chances which it generates fuel social conflict. These are further exacerbated as the
regime attempt to continually consolidate and protect their position. 
 The despotic rule that has emerged has, in part, been shaped by the 'settler-
ruler' mentality of the Al Khalifa. Unlike in the neighbouring shaykhdoms such as
Qatar and Kuwait,  where the ruling families assimilated into the local population,
forming a more cohesive political entity, the Al Khalifa continue to 'jealously guard
their  identity/image  as  'settler-rulers'”.  Khuri  expands  on  this,  and  notes  the
'exclusiveness and non-assimilative character'54 of' the Al Khalifa, whose legitimacy
was based on historically claimed rights of conquest devoid of any substantial public
delegation.55 This settler ruler mentality is embedded within the Al Khalifa 'legacy of
conquest', which relates to how, even to this day, 'the ruling family in Bahrain...refer
to their conquest as the basis for establishing legitimacy of their dynastic rule'.56In
short, Bahrain, its wealth, and its people, are seen as possessions or subjects of the
conquering Al Khalifa. With this in mind, and even within the assumed homogeneity
of the Gulf monarchies, and their autocratic nature, Khalaf makes a convincing case
for regime nuances.
51 The Al Khalifa, originally from Kuwait, migrated to Qatar. From here they invaded the island of 
Bahrain in 1781/2, ejecting the Persians who had previously ruled. 
52 A. Shehabi & M.O. Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf'.
53 T. Sellin, Culture conflict and crime, New Jersey, Social Science Research Council, 1938. 
54 F. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transition of Social and Political Authority in an Arab 
State, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981. p. 236 
55 Ibid.
56  A. Khalaf, 'Opening remarks, Bahrain: 30 years of unconstitutional rule’, Parliamentary Human 
Rights Group, House of Lords, 25 August 2005, http://jaddwilliam2.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/royal-
dream.html, (accessed 22 November 2015). 
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Regime Distinctiveness: Between the Sovereign and Suzerain, the Emergence of
a Dual Authority Structure 
While  this  tribal  kleptocratic  ethnocracy led  by the  Al  Khalifa  tribe   might  be  a
suitable shorthand for Bahrain, it is imperative with Bahrain to acknowledge too one
of its most notable features - the role of external actors. Toby Craig Jones argues that
the Al Khalifa have only managed to perpetrate such continued repression against the
indigenous people due to the protection afforded to them by outside powers57. On the
recent uprisings, Curtis Ryan notes that 'the outcome of almost every case within the
Arab uprisings  has  turned at  least  in  part  on the action and decisions  of  external
powers'.58 Originally, this was Britain, who in order to secure their domination of trade
routes to India,  conducted a series of treaties with tribal leaders along the Persian
Coast in the 1800s. The first of these agreements was the General Maritime Treaty of
1820,  which  recognised  the  Al  Khalifa  as  the  legitimate  rulers  of  Bahrain.  A
subsequent agreement in 1861 turned Bahrain into an informal protectorate of Britain,
and  the  Al  Khalifa,  and  Britain  were  now  bound  to  provide  'security'  of  his
'possessions against similar aggressions directed against them by the Chiefs and tribes
of this Gulf'.59 In 1880, the British completed an agreement with the Chief of Bahrain
in which they forbade the Al Khalifa from engaging in negotiations or treaties without
the consent of the British.60 This was updated again in 1892.61 However, in exchange
for  control  over  Bahrain’s  foreign  policy,  Britain  were  now bound to  protect  the
Bahraini government from external aggression. 
Since the 1800s, “special relations” with Britain provided the regime with a
important source of legitimacy. Britain, as an external source of power 'warded off
external threats and helped the regime suppress its internal opposition. For more than
57  T.C. Jones, ‘Time to disband the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet’, The Atlantic, 10 June 2011, 
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/ time-to-disband-the-bahrain-based-us-fifth-
fleet/240243/, (accessed 20 November 2015).
58 C. Ryan, 'New Opportunities for Political Science: IR Theory', in Arab Uprisings: New 
Opportunities for Political Science, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings), 
2012, p. 56. 
59 1861 Agreement between Shaykh Mohamed bin Khalifa, independent ruler of Bahrain, on the part 
of himself and successors, and captain Felix Jones, Her Majesty's Indian Navy, political resident of 
her Britannic majesty in the Gulf of Persia, on the part of the British Government, 1861, in P. Tuson 
and E. Quick (eds), Records of  Bahrain 1820-1960, Slough, Archive Editions,  vol. 1, 1993, p. 725.
60 Translation of agreement signed by the Chief of Bahrain, dated 22 December 1880,  Records of 
Bahrain, vol. 2, p. 409. 
61 Exclusive Agreement of the Shaykh of Bahrain with the British Government,  dated 13 March 1892.
Records of Bahrain, vol. 2, p. 456. 
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a century, but especially since the discovery of oil, British might, including military
force,  was  ready at  hand to  rescue  the  Al  Khalifa  from attacks  on  its  opponents
whether  these  were  tribal,  confessional,  or  nationalists'.62 Tellingly,  King  Hamad
highlighted  Al  Khalifa  reliance  on  the  British,  noting  his  father's  sadness  at  their
departure, stating 'Why, no one asked you to go?”63
Khalaf  argues  that  Britain's  motives  of  what  seemed  to  be  'wholehearted
support'  of  the  Al  Khalifa  was  due  to   her  'apprehension  of  the  geopolitical
consequences of Saudi ambitions, Iranian claims, and, later, as part of its region-wide
actions to restrain the growth of the Arab national liberation movement'.64 As Khuri
notes,  Al  Khalifa  'rulership  did  not  depend  on  the  support,  material,  political  or
otherwise,  of  their  subjects'.65  He  adds,  'alliances  with  outsiders  were  meant  to
strengthen  the  family's  grip  over  internal  affairs  while  retaining  its  local
exclusiveness'.66 Yet  this  externally  bolstered  strength,  and  the  exclusivism it  has
facilitated,  has  meant  that  the Al Khalifa  suffered from limited  legitimacy among
ethnic groups that were excluded from political power.   Indeed,  as Nakhleh states,
places  like  Bahrain  'cannot  be  an  independent  actor  in  the  international  arena.
Whether Bahrain wills it or not, by its very location it will be caught in the squeeze of
international politics'.67 Crises in Bahrain have impinged upon the interests of outside
powers,  and thus invited significant external involvement in repression.  So just  as
shifts in 'international political re-aligments'68 impact upon the political status quo and
opportunities  available  to  social  movements,  they too impact  upon repression,  the
repressive capacity and repressive choices.  After all, Bahrain's crisis of sovereignty
implies  an  inability  by the  regime to  have  full  autonomy over  state  actions,  thus
regime type is perhaps a disingenuous category, as it applies responsibility to an entity
that is very much contingent for its definition on the actions of other regime types (i.e.
Britain and Saudi). A writer in the Economist eloquently summed up this interference.
62 A. Khalaf,  1998. 
63 Bahrain News Agency, 'HM King Hosts Reception Ceremony in London', 12 May 2013, 
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560364, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
64 A. Khalaf,  1998. 
65 F. Khuri, p. 238
66 F. Khuri, p. 238
67 E. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society, New York, Lexington 
Books, 2011, p. 111.
68 D. McAdam, 'Political Process and The Development of Black Insurgency 1930 – 1970', in  V. 
Ruggiero and N. Montagna (eds), Social Movement: A Reader, London and New York, Routledge, 
2008, p. 179.
28 
For a tiny country, without even much oil to recommend it, Bahrain has an
unusual number of big friends ready to rally enthusiastically to the ruling
family's sides as it cracks down, yet again, on dissent. Several have their
own  reasons  for  doing  so:  dislike  of  the  democracy  (Saudi  Arabia);
eagerness to ingratiate itself with the Gulf states (Jordan); the desire to
protect a useful military base (America and Britain). And most are happy
to form a phalanx against Iranian meddling – if that is, indeed, what is
happening.69
Yet  the  question  of  how  Britain  and  Saudi  Arabia  have  demonstrated  extensive
interference  in  quashing political  opposition  designed to challenge  the  Al  Khalifa
regime remains understudied. Inevitably, the international realignments that followed
independence are important to Bahrain, whose ruling regime has sought to placate and
be amenable to international players with varying ideologies and foreign policies, at
least to give the illusion of sovereignty. As King Hamad noted recently,' the blessed
and appreciated efforts and initiatives of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King Salman bin ʿAbd al-Aziz Al Saud have had a profound impact on sparing the
region a lot of risks'.70Yet a regime that has summarily relied on outside forces  to
maintain its power does not necessarily fall neatly into any pre-defined category, and
will never be a leading player, or ultimately determiner of its own destiny. While it is
a  truism  now  that  international  linkages  have  been  important  in  bolstering  the
resilience of Arab states71,  the existence of the literature on how repression changes
temporally in countries like Bahrain is virtually non existent. Yet, if such changes do
exist, they may be more discernible in a country like Bahrain, that has been subject to
two,  arguably  contrasting  spheres  of  influence;  British  colonialism  and  Al
Khalifa/Saudi Arabian authoritarianism, itself coinciding with a rise of US influence
in the region. Indeed, the argument is that repressive action is defined in part by the
differing dual authority structures that have emerged in Bahrain, from an Al Khalifa
Britain coalition, to a Saudi Al Khalifa coalition.  
69  The Economist, 'Spot the villain', 3 February 1996, issue, 7951, p. 44. 
70 Gulf Daily News, 'Saudi Role Vital', 17 April 2015, http://www.gulf-daily-
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=400151, (Accessed 12 November 2015). 
71 See, for example, Bellin and Heydemann
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The Case for Historical,  Fine-Grained Studies of Repression
With a definition of repression outlined, and Bahrain outlined as an interesting unit of
analysis, it is important to address  how one can approach studying repression when
simple measures of regime type may be determined too encompassing, as repressive
capacities  are  dependent  on  a  myriad  of  interacting  factors.  While  there  may  be
similarities in how different states control dissent,  it is useful to examine them on a
case by case basis to best understand how regime response to control are dependent
on specific temporal, geographical and political factors. Aurel Braun acknowledges
this, stating; 'it is vital not to divorce intellectual history from its national, historical,
and  social  bases'  when  examining  dissent  and  repression.72  Indeed,  the  systemic
features of political organization and the historical context are necessary in having
sociologically  informed  understanding  of  repression.73 Furthermore,  as  repression
changes according to time, space and context,74 focusing on one country will allow a
more 'fine-grained' approach in which similarities and differences can be identified as
to why the state or other actors chose specific courses of repressive action at specific
times. As Charles Tilly argues, 'the repressiveness of a government is never a simple
matter  of  more  or  less.  It  is  always  selective,  and  always  consists  of  some
combination  of  repression,  tolerance  and  facilitation'.75 This  focus  on  nuance  will
address shortcomings that arise from creating generalisable explanations about, for
example, the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East, and be more akin to
historical studies of repression  undertaken by the likes of Goldstein and Boykoff,
who examine multiple incidents of contention across national or regional histories.76 
 The need for a historical understanding of repression also stems from the
divergent findings and limitations of those studies that attempt to create overly broad
explanatory models or grand causal theories. Indeed, quantitative studies of repression
or studies that focus on covariance between repression and other variables tend to
produce very different  results. For example,  Douglas Hibbs argues that  repression
increases  dissent,  whereas  scholars  such as  Mark Lichbach and Ted Gurr  believe
72 A. Braun, 'Dissent and the State in Eastern Europe', in C.E.S. Franks (ed.) Dissent and the State, 
Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1989, p. 113.
73 A Turk, Political Criminality, p 202. 
74 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order'.
75 C. Tilly, 1977, ch. 4, p. 1 4 
76 See Boykoff, 2007; Goldstein, 1978.
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repression decreases dissent.77 Although there tends to be general consensus on the
idea  that  liberal  political  democracy  decreases  state  repression,  there  is  also  the
argument that 'mixed and transitional regimes, which combine elements of autocracy
and democracy are the most coercive'.78 Also, Daniel Hill finds that the link between
'democracy and torture to  be quite  tenuous',  particularly during periods  of violent
dissent'.79  In fact, one of the few relationships to have stood the test of time is the fact
that states are more likely to resort to repression when faced with a domestic threat.80
Other quantitative measures like the Political Terror Scale,81 seem to have misleading
results on Bahrain. Similarly, Lawson's82 quantitative work on the contentious politics
in the 1990s Bahrain  Intifada,83 is ambiguous in its attitudes to the motivations for
state repression.  
The limitations of quantitative studies are also apparent in their failure to offer
an  explanation  of  why repression  and  control  might  occur.  For  example,  do  elite
attitudes  impact  upon  type/frequency/consistency  of  repression?84 -  an  interesting
assertion  if  we  argue,  as  Davenport  does,  that  'ideas/beliefs  also  play  a role'  in
determining response to threats. Recent political scholarship on Bahrain, for example,
has argued that power in the palace in Bahrain shifted to the hardliners during 2011,
and  it  was  this  that  led  to  a  far  more  violent  and  coercive  crackdown  by  the
authorities. Frederic Wehrey, for example, states that 'Conservative figures within the
Bahraini royal family are redoubling their efforts to subdue the opposition. This is
plainly visible in new arrests, media censorship, warnings to Shiʿa clerics, and more
aggressive  counter-demonstration  tactics'.85  Jane  Kinninmont,  too  notes  that  the
77 C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order',  p. 8
78 Ibid., p. 11. 
79 D. W. Hill,  The Concept of Personal Integrity Rights in Empirical Research, PhD Thesis, 
University of Georgia, 2013, from 
http://myweb.fsu.edu/dwh06c/pages/documents/pi_concept13Aug13.pdf, (accessed 2 November 
2015). 
80 C. Davenport, Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics,  New 
York, Rowman and Littlefield', 2000, p. 1.
81 The Political Terror Scale, Retrieved from http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?
region=Eurasia&country=Syria&year=2010, (Accessed 20 November 2015).  
82 F. H. Lawson, 'Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain', in Q. Wiktorowicz (ed) Islamic
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 
89 – 111.
83 Intafada [Arabic]; uprising [English]. 
84 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...'  p. 263. 
85 F. Wehrey, 'The March of Bahrain's Hardliners', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 
May 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/march-of-bahrain-s-hardliners. (accessed 10 
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unrest  shifted  the  country  'towards  a  more  hardline,  security-oriented',86 form  of
governance.  But  does  this  hold  up?  How  are  decisions  to  use  certain  types  of
repression  limited  by  available  resources?   Are  authorities,  like  Gamson  argues,
opportunists who repress groups when they are weak or do they only repress when
they  perceive  themselves  to  be  more  threatened?87 Is  it  correct  to  make  this
generalisation?  Tilly, for example, argues that states will not repress groups if they
fall below a certain threshold of weakness,88 and that the power of challengers and the
size of demonstrations will influence the use of repression.89 In Tilly's analysis, strong
threats will more likely be co-opted. Conversely, Paul Gregory and Phillip Shroder
argue that Stalin exacted more repression when enemies were perceived to increase
above a threshold where they represented a challenge.90 While this does not contradict
Tilly, it also implies an upper threshold above which coercion becomes facilitation. As
Pion-Berlin notes, 'it may be more important to study government perceptions about
oppositional  violence  than  to  study the  opposition  itself'.91Yet  how objective  is  a
perceived threat, and to what extent does that perception rest on the attitudes of those
in power? Will regimes repress even when not threatened with an existential threat?
Similarly,  can  these  personal  attitudes  of  those in  power  impact  on the  nature  of
repression? Can internal political battles impact upon the nature of repression? Can
international actors play a role in influencing repression?
These questions can be rarely addressed by quantitative studies or facile causal
models. Even Charles Tilly notes that scholars of social movements and sociologists
should  focus  on  'sources  rather  than  theories  in  their  effort  to  overcome  their
'unawareness of the historical limits to their observations'.92 Indeed, 'because history is
not  often  readily  available  for  quantitative  comparative  analyses,  cross-country
86 J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, Chatham House, London, 2012, p. 1, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle
%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf ,(accessed 6 October 2015)
87 W.A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest,  Homewood, IL, Dorsey, 1968. 
88 C. Tilly, 1977, ch. 4, p. 22. 
89 Ibid. 
90 P.R. Gregory, P. J.H. Shroder and K. Sonin, 'Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An 
“Eliminations Model” of Stalin's Terror', Working Paper No. 91, CEFIR/NES Working Paper Series,
2006. 
91 D. Pion Berlin, 'Theories of Political Repression in Latin America: Conventional Wisdom and an 
Alternative', American Political Society Association , vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 51. 
92 Cited in  B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 'Historians and the study of protest', in B. Klandermans and C. 
Roggeband (eds), Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines, New York, Springer, 2007, p.
305. 
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analyses  that  treat  countries  as  “like  units,”  conditional  on  a  few  contemporary
observables  such  as  per  capita  income,  are  likely  to  suffer  from bias  due  to  the
omission of historical factors'.93 Therefore in order to better understand the control of
dissent in Bahrain, it is important to study the country's historical experience of social
conflict and hegemonic responses to it, even if these insights may only be fleeting,
temporally limited,  and confined to very specific situations.  Yet they are insights
nonetheless. As Skocpol notes, 'the whole story can never be told in any work of
history or historical sociology. But interpretive works can convey the impression of
fullness  much  more  readily  than  works  of  historical  sociology that  aim to  apply
models or establish causal connections of relevance to more than one case'.94 
`What  the  literature  highlights  though,  as  Davenport  notes,  is  that  'amid
varying  contexts,  methodological  approaches,  and  model  specifications,  different
findings abound'.95 For this reason, hypothesis testing is eschewed in favour of more
interpretive approaches.  To simply focus on whether states are democratic or not, for
example, is to miss the nuances that may define why or how repression occurs. As
Turk argues, 'the perception of threat and the specifics of the control response will be
determined  by  the  knowledge  and  instruments  available  to  them'.  96 Thus  in
addressing questions like this, one must be prepared to qualitatively address historical
studies of repression in order to see what repression existed, how it has changed, and
why it  might  have  changed?  Indeed,  'if  neither  the  systemic  features  of  political
organization nor the historical context'97 of  repression is  specified,  'inquiry is very
likely  to  flounder'.98 Ultimately, one  'cannot  assume  but  must  establish  the
applicability to particular cases of any general conclusions about trends and prospects
in political policing'.99
The temporal range of this study then is important for a number of
reasons. Firstly, to track change, and examine how and why repression has shifted, it
is  necessary to  consider  a  time period  spanning a  significant  number  of  years.  A
93 J.G. Hariri, 'A Contribution to the Understanding of Middle Eastern and Muslim Exceptionalism', 
The Journal of Politics, vol. 77, no. 2, 2015, p. 489. 
94 Skocpol, p. 371. 
95  C. Davenport, How Social Movements Die..., 2015,  p. of 346. 
96 A Turk, Political Criminality, p. 117. 




temporally large study can help 'prize' open the authoritarian play book. Secondly, it is
acknowledged that repression in an autocracy does not necessarily remain stable over
time. While it has been argued that the demise of the Soviet Union made autocracies
less repressive, due to their desire to appease the democracy espousing principles of
the singular global hegemon (USA), it is  equally reasonable to assume that regimes
had to repress more after the Cold War in order to stymie greater demands for liberty
and democratisation.100  A temporally large study will offer a more likely chance of
finding these occasional sparks of insight into processes that are generally secretive
and  opaque.  The  aim,  similar  to  works  of  interpretive  historical  sociology,  is  to
present  an  account  that  is  'vivid  and  full,  like  a  good  Flaubert  novel'.101 As  an
interpretive work, the aforementioned questions can be subsumed into the following: 
1) What methods have been utilised in order to resist these changes, and how
have these methods evolved over time? 
2) When possible to identify, why did the authorities choose specific methods of
repression in certain contexts, and what influenced those choices?
3)  To what  extent  have  Bahrain's  protecting  powers   had  an  impact  on  the
nature, and type of repression, repressive choices and repressive capacity made?
A Template for Understanding and Categorising Methods of Repression 
How do we determine what constitutes a method of repression? After all,  as Turk
states,  'how  political  resistance  is  neutralized  is  as  important  to  authorities  as
neutralizing it.102   Many studies of what could be deemed repression focus on limited
facets such as protest policing, and fail to consider 'the variety of subtler ways the
state attempts to exert social control'.103  Similarly, Marwan Khawaja notes that few
studies of repression 'provide clear criteria for conceptually distinguishing among the
many manifested forms of repression'.104 More recently, Earl notes that there are a lack
100C. Davenport, 'State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace', 2007, p. 500. 
101T. Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology', in T. Skocpol 
(ed), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 
371.  
102A Turk, Political Criminality, p. 137.
103J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent: The Mechanisms of State Repression in the USA', Social Movement 
Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, vol. 6, no. 3, 2007, p. 284.
104Cited in J. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 15. 
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of  'refined  and powerful  conceptualization[s]  of  repression'.105 The  first  was  Gary
Marx106 in 1979, yet others have followed, such as Jennifer Earl and Jules Boykoff
who have enumerated different methods for studying repression.  Jennifer Earl's 2011
work  on  political  repression  sets  out  a  typology  based  on  the  following  core
distinctions: '(a) whether the repressive actor is a state, private or hybrid actor; (b)
whether  the repressive action  is  coercive or  uses  more  carrot-based “channelling”
(McCarthy et al.  1991, Oberschall,  1973); and (c) whether the repressive action is
observable/overt or unobserved/covert'.107 Boykoff outlines ten action modes, each of
which refers a specific method of repression. 
However, even a cursory glance at such typologies highlights that they are not
pertinent  to  Bahrain.   Preliminary  inductive  research  on  Bahrain  has  highlighted
methods of repression that  were missing from these typologies,  such as exile,  the
removal  of  citizenship,  or  demographic  engineering  to  create  a  cordon  sanitaire
around the regime. With regards to Bahrain, Omar Shehabi outlines an  incidental
summary of state responses to dissent, noting the rulers dealt with existential threats
by sowing divisions, stalling, co-opting, and then using force.108 Abdulhadi Khalaf too
in the foreword of Bahrain's Uprising outlines three key elements of repression, '1) the
security services’ use of brutal  force to  disperse protesters,  followed by sweeping
police raids to arrest known activists and leaders of protest; 2) use of the media and
traditional  notables  to  discredit  protest  leaders  and  their  lack  of  “patriotism”;  3)
dispensing  promises  of  political  reforms  in  combination  with  offering  lavish
makramat to protest leaders perceived as “moderate”'.109 When taken together these
complement one another to form a richer net for conceptualising repression. Yet this
105J. Earl, 'Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Towards a Theory of Movement Repression', Sociological 
Theory, vol. 21, no. 1, 2003, p. 44. 
106Marx highlights the main purpose of repression as to; 'inhibit capacity for corporate action, direct 
energies of movement of defensive maintenance needs and away from pursuit of broader social 
goals, create unfavorable public image and counter-ideology, gather information on movement, 
inhibit supply of money and facilities, inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and action; create 
myth and fact of surveillance and repression; apply legal sanctions, damage morale, derecruitment'; 
in G. Marx, 'External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements:  Some Patterns, 
Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications' In M. Zald and J. McCarthy (eds.),  The Dynamics of 
Social Movements, Cambridge, MA, Winthrop Publishers, 1979, pp. 94 – 125. 
http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/movement.html, (accessed 4 February 2014).
107 J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...', p. 264.   
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of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising', Historical Materialism, vol. 21, no, 1, pp. 
94-127
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net can be improved further. Repression, whether by that name or something else,
(e.g.   political  policing,  control),  has  been  addressed  by  scholars  from  different
disciplines, from criminology to history and political science. As Davenport notes:
 At  present,  an  unwritten  division  of  labor  appears  to  exist:  Scholars
concerned with civil  liberties, protest  policing, human rights violations,
and genocide/politicide focus on repression, while scholars interested in
rhetoric,  communication,  and  propaganda  focus  on  persuasion,  and
scholars  concerned with selective incentives,  wages,  bribes,  oil  profits,
and welfare systems focus on material benefits. Clearly, however, there is
some overlap.110
It  would  therefore be useful  to  aggregate theories  and concepts,  and in  particular
typological approaches to repression to create a more thorough and richer template for
analysing repression.  In addition to this, studies of repression that focus on just one
aspect of repression, such as protest policing, risk sacrificing 'breadth on the altar of
depth'.111 As this  historical  work seeks  to  'use concepts  and theories  to  develop a
meaningful  historical  interpretation',112 this  section,  in  line  with  many interpretive
works,  presents  the  'relevant  concepts  and  theories  at  various  levels  of
abstraction...from various fields'113 to create the basis of the lens through which to
interpret  Bahrain's  history.  We  have  defined  repression  generally,  but  by  parsing
different concepts of repression across disciplines, the nature of their change across
different  categories  can  better  be  assessed,  as  can  the  evolution  of  the  repressive
capacity. Davenport highlights the utility of delineating categories of repression, and
states that 'disaggregation is specifically useful if we expect governments to respond
to different challenges with distinct repressive strategies'.114  There is the temptation in
such a review of methods of repression to review every facet on literature on any
subcategory of control. Yet while these have been looked at where possible in order to
add more insight into particular aspects of repression, scholars who have approached
110C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 9. 
111J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 284.
112T. Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. xxi.
113Ibid. 
114C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', p. 18.
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categorisations  of  repressive  methods   have  been focused on in  order  to  create  a
clearer focus.115 
As this is a political historical study mediated by the concept of repression, the
most useful approach in studying repression is to acknowledge its complexity,  but
discern categories of  repression that combine methods of repression with their aims
and  intended  outcomes.  With  this  in  mind,  it  is  important  to  review  theories  of
repression,  and in  particular  typologies,  with  a  view to  creating  a  comprehensive
template that can then be used to select empirical data. It is important to note that in
this  thesis, the term 'template'  is preferable now to typology or taxonomy. This is
because taxonomies rely on empirical observation while typologies are ideal-typical.
Given this rather rigid a posteriori  and a priori  binary,  a template analysis,  which
combines  elements  of  both  empirical  and  theoretical  influence  for  its  definitions,
bridges  both.116 In  light  of  this  overlap,  this  study  codes  different  theories  of
repression to identify common aspects of repression in order to create a template for
which to select data that can be deemed to be repressive.117 As well as approaching
repression  through  'multiple  lenses',  118 the  purpose  of  what  could  be  considered
disciplinary triangulation is to create a clearer, more complete lens with which to view
Bahrain's  history  through.119 While  some  may  level  accusations  of  'theoretical
“eclecticism”',120 this, as Tang Tsou argues, is 'a  matter of necessity in an endeavour
115For this reason, useful reading, such as the literature on the National Security State, has been 
important rather than integral to the construction of the template. Indeed, the useful outline 
provided by Jack-Nelsen Pallmeyer in his 1992 book a Brave New World Order, provides 
characteristics of the National Security State, which describe the nature of a specific state, as 
opposed to focusing on methods of repression. While these seven characteristics do include the 
ways such statea behave, and include methods, they focus more on regime-type rather than regime 
methods. Pallmeyer's description of the state  emphasises the role of the church in mobilising 
ideology, making it an unusual point of reference for the Persian Gulf. In addition, such literature 
can be too state centric, focusing on the role of the state and not necessarily the bottom-up notions 
of control increasingly recognised by scholars of repression. Furthermore, other important texts, 
such as Michael Hogan's work on the National Security State, is very much specific to the political 
development of America vis a vis its constitutional demands, and not necessarily any more pertinent
to Bahrain than literature on the authoritarian states. 
116J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.), 'Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict', in
The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, Oxford, Routledge. 1993.
117 (It also, inductively, harvests categories from empirical observations but this will be discussed 
later). 
118Z. Hoque , M. A. Covaleski , T. N. Gooneratne , (2013) 'Theoretical triangulation and pluralism in 
research methods in organizational and accounting research', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 26, no. 7, pp .1170 - 1198 
119To further the analogy, the process of this theoretical triangulation resembles white light going into 
a prism; the object is to disperse it into its myriad colours, each of which represents a facet of 
repression. 
120T. Tsou, 1986, p. xxi.
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to  achieve  an  informed  understanding'121 of  repression  in  Bahrain.  Studies  of
repression that focus, or at least are clear on delineating methods have been the focus
of the literature review as these provide a richer and more comprehensive means of
parsing  repression.  However,  many  studies  of  repression,  political  policing,  or
political power, have been referred to when they offer useful definitions or insights 
By conducting  a  template  analysis  of  theories  of  repression,  four  broader
categories  of  repression  and  control  have  been  identified.  These  are  political
statecraft, personal integrity violations, legal repression, and information control. The
diagram  below  highlights  how  these  categories  are  a  useful  heuristic,  but
acknowledges  that  there  are  overlaps  in  categories.  For  example,  creating  visa
restrictions  to  prevent  political  dissidents  entering  or  leaving  a  country  may  be
considered an aspect  of statecraft,  yet  if  it  were legislated it  would fall  into legal
repression too.
Fig 1.  This  heuristic illustrates the interconnected nature of different types of repression (and the
overlapping of some codes). A similar model was used by Luis Fernandez in his work on policing
protests in Seattle, though his were generated using grounded theory and participant observation as
opposed to being derived from the aforementioned methods.122
Political Statecraft 
Criminologists such as Austin Turk use the term statecraft to describe the broader way
in which political policing occurs. Statecraft is defined as the art and science of social
control as developed and used in the political organization of social life123. Building
121Ibid. 
122L. A. Fernandez, 2008, p. 32





on sociologist William Gamson's 1968 work, Turk summarises three of the four major
strategic  operations  of  statecraft  as  insulation,  sanctioning,   co-optation  and
persuasion (see section on Information Control). Insulation is essentially the blocking
of access to those perceived as a threat to positions or authorities that control those
resources 'that can be brought to bear on authorities'.124  Methods include restricting
visas, modifying immigration policies, exile, deportation, screening employees from
potentially  sensitive  positions,  gerrymandering,  or  restricting  the  movements  of
dangerous groups.125 In this sense, dangerous groups may include political dissidents,
or groups perceived in many spheres to be subordinate, such as women. In the former
USSR, Robert Sharlet calls a similar process 'bureaucratic deprivation', which ranges
from  'petty  harassment,  such  as  the  suspension  of  telephone  service,  to  more
consequential deprivations such as job dismissal, eviction, and preventing a dissident's
child from entering the university'.126Sanctioning is the general  system of punishment
or  rewards.  For  the  deserving,  rewards  may  include  job  offers,  promotions  and
increased  salaries.  For  the  troublesome,  this  may involve  the  loss  of  jobs,  or  the
withdrawing of status (perhaps even nationality).127 As McCarthy and Zald note, 'the
more than  subsistence income,  fringe resources,  leisure,  and flexibility offered  by
many jobs can indirectly be important in facilitating social movement participation.
Conversely the denial of such employment to activists can be a means of indirectly
damaging a movement'.128 Gary Marx adds that the removal of employment of jobs
'can  damage  morale,  shrink  resources,  and  make  sustained  actions  difficult  or
impossible. For some activists, the cost of continued participation may become too
great,  and  they  may  quit.  But  more  direct  efforts  toward  this  end  may  also  be
undertaken in the form of explicit de recruitment activities'.129Co-optation, perhaps
potentially  the  most  dangerous,  involves  including  former  dissidents  or  trouble
makers in the internal apparatus so that they have a say and responsibility in decision
making. This can  diminish social movement strength by removing structural support
from former followers. Alternatively,  newly co-opted agents can  influence former
124W.A. Gamson, 1968, p. 117. 
125A. Turk, Political Criminality, p. 160. 
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followers into supporting the status quo.130  
Political scientists too have have examined strategies of repression and control
in authoritarian states. Aurel Braun's work on the control of dissent in Eastern Europe
offers a framework for studying how the dominant social order respond to dissent, and
overlaps  with the work of Gamson and Turk.  Braun includes  the concepts of  co-
optation, containment, coexistence in his outline of political control.131 Lustick too, in
the  area  of  political  science,  offers  shorter  hand  for  talking  about  Israel's  control
strategies of the Arab minority, describing the 'three components of Israel's control
system as  segmentation,  dependence  and co-optation.   Segmentation  refers  to  the
isolation of the Arabs from the Jewish population and to the internal fragmentation of
the Arab community; dependence means the forced reliance of the Arab population
upon the Jewish sector for economic and political resources; and co-optation refers to
material, social and political enticements to elites to elicit their cooperation'.132 Co-
optation is  similar to  Gamson's  co-optation,  whereby elites  or the state attempt to
pacify  dissenters  by  offering  them  positions  in  the  public  administration  or
government  (similar  to  co-optation).  Similarly,  inclusion  and  co-optation  contain
considerable  overlap  with  Tilly's  concept  of  'facilitation',  which  is  the  process  of
legitimatising a group, by giving it publicity, paying it off, or doing anything to lower
the group's cost of collective action.133  These strategies of co-optation ultimately aim
to achieve pacification through partial inclusion134 and form part of a general political
strategy pursued by Middle Eastern states in which they appropriate and contain civil
society,  managing political  contestation135 by  limiting  its  ability  to  flourish
independently. As Wiktorowicz notes in his work on Jordan, the Middle Eastern 'state
attempts  to  limit  the  possibility  of  collective  action  in  the  niches  of  society  by
requiring  that  all  group  work  is  performed  in  the  open  through  civic  society
organizations and are within the reach of administrative practises'.136 
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6/book-review-arabs-in-the-jewish-state-israel-s-control-of-a-national-minority.html, (Accessed 10 
November 2015). 
133C. Tilly, ch. 4, p. 3.
134J. I. Ross The Dynamics of Political Crime, London, Sage, 2003 p. 159.
135S. Heydemann,  2007.  
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Although  labelled  types  of  'power',  Dallin  and  Breslauer's  concepts  of
normative  and  material  power  outline  similar  strategies  used  by  authoritarian
governments in repressing dissent: 'Normative power (also referred to as positive or
symbolic power), commonly called persuasion and including socialization, education,
and the offer of prestige, recognition, or love; 'material power'  (also referred to as
technical or utilitarian power), commonly called incentives and including such forms
as wages, rewards, bonuses, bribes, and promotions;137  Sociologist Abdulhadi Khalaf,
whose research has explored the repression of labour movements138 and contentious
politics139 in  Bahrain,  draws  on  the  work  of  Mann  to  examine  various  political
strategies adopted by the 'Al-Khalifa regime' to contain challenges to its authority.
Khalaf's work focuses more on statecraft, or what Mann calls 'infrastructural power',
that  is  to  say,  the  'capacity  of  the  state  actually  to  penetrate  civil  society and to
implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm'.140 There is less focus
on the state's coercive apparatus,  or 'despotic power'.  
This  study  adds  to  Khalaf's  work  by  giving  a  more  theoretically  broad
emphasis on repression, while also using updated data.  Khalaf argues that the Al
Khalifa regime is a 'ruling-core' who use a system of patronage and makramāt (gifts
or rewards or sanctioning)  to both give and remove privileges from different social
groups, taking advantage of Bahrain's oil revenues which facilitate this process. This
system  of  granting  and  withdrawing  privilege  is  supported  by  the  Al  Khalifa's
monopoly ownership of the country's resources, both materially and militarily. Khalaf
also notes the importance of inclusion strategies in Bahrain, which include the giving
of 'gratuities and favours in form of employment, cash, and plots of land' via regime-
sponsored patrons141.  Yet by providing incentives or rewards to some members of the
group but not others, these methods may foster schism and disunity, leading to the
fragmentation  and  weakening  of  certain  groups,  and  the  general  stratification  of
society where the have and  have not divide falls along religious, gender ethnic, or
identity-based cleavages. 
137A. Dallin and G. W. Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, Stanford: Stanford 
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 Statecraft in particular contributes to repression by 'Problem depletion', which
works by 'removing (1) the perceived need for the movement and/or (2) the perceived
relevance of claims-making effort within the relevant population'.142The government
may, for example, create 'front SMOs; that 'actually represent the status quo's interest
but  that  maintain  the  veneer  of  a  challenger'143 in  order  to  compete  with  the
threatening organization, and convince others the issue is being dealt with on official
terms. Similarly, the creation of committees, investigatory panels on terms defined by
the  regime  may  undermine  the  perceived  need  of  joining  other  political  forces.
Demonstrable commitment to issues addressing key grievances such as corruption,
land reform, injustice (as examples), is argued to be the most effective way of splitting
support  away  from  insurgent  groups  in  particular.  In  this  sense,  reform  can  be
considered  repression.  Limited  democratisation,  for  example,  falls  into  repression
according to the definition, as it serves  to diffuse general discontent by providing a
forum for grievances, but not to the extent it significantly alters the status quo. While
such an assertion that democratisation can be seen as a form of repression may seem
counter-intuitive  to  some,  democratisation  is  a  continuum.  At  one  end  of  this
continuum, where one can consider a certain level of political democracy to have been
achieved, scholars such as Davenport  and Armstrong144 argue that  there is  often a
decrease in  violent repression. However, this is based on the normative assumption
that repression is necessarily an act of physical violence, a definition that this thesis
rejects. Furthermore, given the importance of repression as a tool of hegemonic power
maintenance, acts of 'democratic' reform that can be shown to be a deliberate tool
designed  to  weaken  social  movements  or  opposition  while  disproportionately
preserving the status quo can be considered repression. Until the level of democracy is
achieved where the people are theoretically, and in practise, the source of power, such
as in what Gerardo Munck calls high-quality democracies,145 then one must always be
142 C. Davenport, How Social Movements Die..., 2015, p. 23.
143 Ibid., p. 27.
144 Davenport C, Armstrong DA II. 2004. Democ- racy and the violation of human rights: a statistical 
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diminished by counter majoritarian institutions, such as (i) presidents with strong legislative 
powers, (ii) upper chambers with strong powers, (iii) rigid constitutions, and (iv) courts with the 
power of judicial review regarding matters of normal politics'. See  G.L., Munck, 'What is 
democracy? A  reconceptualization of the quality of democracy.   Democratization,  vol. 23, no. 1, 
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critical  of whether those institutions are tools of power maintenance or otherwise.
Indeed, just as there is a difference 'between violence practised by the oppressed and
by the oppressors',146 there is a difference between democracy from and for the people,
and  democracy  from and  for  the  continued  maintenance  of  dominant  hegemonic
order. 
Fig 2. Summary of Methods of Statecraft 
Statecraft Insulation Exile, restricting immigration policies, screening 




Cutting off access to essential resources,  mass lay-
offs, removing scholarships,  
Rewards & 
makramāt 
Jobs, increased salaries, promotions, co-optation
Selective 
Reform
Grievance removal, reform stalling/temporary 
tolerance, superficial reform that fails to threaten 
distribution of resources, limited democratisation
Personal Integrity Violations 
Pamela Oliver defines two of the three main goals of repression as deterrence and
incapacitation.147 Perhaps most obviously, such measures can be understood as torture,
police violence, or incarceration.  Dallin and Breslauer call this 'coercive power' or
'physical power',  noting that it  'includes such forms as fines,  penalties,  terror,  and
regulatory  and  police  power'.148 The  literature  on  Latin  America  too  notes  the
importances of disappearances,149 while more extreme examples might include mass
executions  or  assassinations.150 Austin  Turk  notes  the  importance  of  violence  in
146H. Marcuse, 'Repressive Tolerance', in R. P.  Wolff, B. Moore, jr., and H. Marcuse, A Critique of 
Pure Tolerance, Boston, Beacon Press, 1965, pp. 95-137. 
147 P. Oliver, 'Repression and crime control: why social movement scholars should be more attention 
to mass incarceration as a form of repression', Mobilization, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1- 24
148Dallin and Breslauer,  p. 2.
149 J. Nieto, 'U.S. Security Policy and United States-Colombia Relations', Latin American  
Perspectives, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 112 – 119. 
150 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four 
Terrorism', Chitty's Law Journal, 32-35, 1984-1987, pp. 14 – 33. 
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political policing, arguing that 'neutralization of resistance by violence and or other
means, and intimidation tactics aimed at general deterrence' are the ultimate goals of
political  policing.151 Personal  Integrity Violations  generally include  repressive  acts
such as 'acts of harassment,  intimidation,  physical assault,  arrests'.152 Among these
varied  definitions  of  police  power,  or  coercive  power,  lie  numerous  similarities.
Daniel  Hill  summarises  them  succinctly  in  his  definition  of  personal  integrity
violations as; '1) state-imposed deprivations of life, 2) physical harm at the hands of
state agents, and 3) state-imposed detention'.  153 In addition to these three concepts,
there  are  the  more  nebulous  aspects  of  personal  integrity  violations  that  may not
constitute obvious harm, but may include harassment or intimidation designed to deter
activists from engaging in group action. These are not deprivations of liberty per se,
but might include curfews, or other restrictions on movement that serve to physically
contain the opposition in meatspace.
While  governments may be seen to enforce certain forms of personal integrity
violations  in  situations  that  may be  seen as  legitimate,  this  is  based on laws and
criminal codes as defined by a particular government. Hill notes, 'The fact that there
are many instances of government violence that conform to domestic legal procedure
has led some (e.g., Stohl et al., 1986) to suggest that “illegal” (i.e., not conforming to
domestic  legal  code)  is  a  useless  category  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  and
measuring violations of personal integrity'.154 Thus personal integrity violations here
refer to those actions, legal or illegal, that fall into the definition used by Hill, and that
are  deployed  by  the  Bahrain  government  or  its  supporters  to  deal  with  political
dissent.
Arrests  too  are  a crucial  method  for  decreasing  the  efficacy  of  social
movements, as they reduce the number of opposition bodies in meatspace and disrupt
the organizational capacity of political movements.  Arrests 'divert activists from their
social-change  goals,  undermine  morale  of  social-movement  participants,  and
discourage support from potential recruits or bystander publics'.155  The targeting of
leaders  can  be  particularly  significant;  'Because  social  movement  leaders  are
151A.T. Turk, . Social Control and Social Conflict in J.P. Gibbs (ed) Social Control: Views from the 
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152 Fernandez, p. 8. 
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symbolically and instrumentally important, movement-damaging activities often focus
on weakening them as the most visible and presumed central part of a movement'.156 
Furthermore,  arrests  also  exacerbate  paranoia  among  activists,  while  tying
them up in lengthy and costly legal proceedings that drain valuable resources.157 These
form part of what Isaac Balbus calls 'legal repression', which is a means of repressing
dissent by the 'formal rationality' of legal methods that 'depoliticize the consciousness
of  the  participants,  deligitimate  their  claims  and  grievances,  and  militate  against
alliances between participants and other  non-elites or elite  moderates'.158Earl notes
such  arrests  can  be  challenging  and  painful  experiences  that  increase  costs   by
entangling the victim within the criminal justice system, thereby raising the costs of
dissent.159 Thus,  in order to avoid such actions like violence,  activists, citizens,  or
protesters  will  withdraw from organizations,  institutions,  or  actions  deemed to be
dissident  (e.g.  Olson,  1965,  Davenport,  2015).    Personal  integrity  violations  are
important in the role of deterrence; 'general deterrence is the ultimate goal of political
policing; it is the anticipated product of intimidation'.160 
While some personal integrity violations, such as arrests, may more easily be
the domain of state institutions such as the police, violence and intimidation can be
undertaken by multiple agencies, whether official, quasi-official, or unofficial. Indeed,
vigilantism can emerge in an environment where the state refuse to, or is unable to,
deploy means of  coercion to  prevent  it.  In  this  regard,  the state  may deliberately
facilitate or turn a blind eye to vigilantism if it serves useful social control purposes.
As Lopez and Stohl argue, the government may participate in repression through the
'(covert) employment of the security forces and the condoning of unofficial vigilante
groups or death squads against groups or individuals for the purposes of intimidation
and compliance with state or majority interests'.161
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Containment Targeted or mass arrest of leaders, organisers, or 
activists, road blocks, curfews, kettling, kidnap.
Physical 
Harm
Mass arrests, torture, disappearances, use of mass 
harm weapons, e.g. tear gas, collective punishment, 
extra judicial killings, police violence, genocide
Threats  threats of violence, other threats, general 
intimidation. 
Legal Repression 
The law can also used as an instrument to extend control over  society, subjecting  all
persons to rules laid down through certain institutions. In particular, repressive laws
and  legal  systems  can  can  be  characterised  when  'law  is  subordinated  to  power
politics'.162 As  Tilly  notes,  legislation  and  law  can  be  a  good  index  of  a  state's
repressiveness.  Indeed,  'legality  matters  because  laws  state  the  costs  and  benefits
which governments are prepared (or at  least  empowered) to apply to one form of
action  or  another'.163 In  this  context,  law is  an  increasingly important  category in
repressing dissent. Laws are complemented by administrative actions and breaches of
due process164 that also should be considered repression.  Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri state that emergency laws in particular allow the state to define the demands of
interventions, as well as the 'capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that
in  various  ways  can  can  be  applied  to  the  diversity  and  the  plurality  of  the
arrangements in crisis.'165 Given that Bahrain has been subject to the emergency laws
for about half a decade, it can be argued that political activity in Bahrain has been
subject  to what Georgio Agamben describes as a 'state of exception that has now
become the rule'.166 In other words, political activity has been criminalised, or at least
has the potential to be easily criminalised so that   'increasingly numerous sections of
162 P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law, 2009, Ebook. 
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residents [are] deprived of political rights'. 167 As James L. Gibson argues, such laws
can reflect a 'repressive public policy', which is defined as 'statutory restrictions on
political  activities  through  which  citizens,  individually  or  in  groups,  compete  for
political power'.168
Non-emergency laws are important too. Dictating when people can and cannot
meet, who they can meet, and for what purpose is critical in controlling the outcomes
of those meetings.  Although such laws may seek to mitigate the use of coercive force
by creating a more palatable framework for organising dissent, the replacement of
force by law simply serves to make repression less visible.  By defining when, where
and  what  is  discussed,  the  state  are  better  able  to  control  and  repress  potential
challenges to its authority.    Drawing on Foucault,  Quentin Wiktorwicz states that
'discipline orders individuals in spatial settings to maximize the ability of the state or
those  in  power  to  maintain  constant  observation.  By  dictating  when  and  where
individuals are present and even their relations with one another, the state enhances its
social control'.169 
The removal of legal outlets  for opposition movements was common in Latin
America,  with  Patricia  Weiss  Fagen  noting  how  the  Brazilian  government,  for
example, 'enacted a series of Institutional Acts and decrees that banished individuals
from political  participation;  curtailed political  activities;  outlawed political  parties,
student  organizations,  and  trade  unions;  ended  direct  elections;  and  reduced
Congressional powers'.170 Many of these laws, or forms of 'channelling', as described
by Jennifer Earl, have been used in Bahrain in an attempt to limit, control or constrain
the activities of social movements or political activists. The absence of coercive force
also,  as a  corollary,  imbues those whom the law benefits  with the credibility that
results from their resort to repression without the stain of violence.  Although their
focus is on states of exception, George Lopez and Michael Stohl also note in their
typology of state terror the importance of legal methods of repression, including 'the
use of legislative and extra-constitutional or extra-systematic acts and policies; the
adoption of martial law; a state of siege; a state of emergency, or other decrees which
167G. Agamben, Means Without End, p. 133.
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Vietnam War Era', The Journal of Politics, vol. 51, no. 1, 1989, p. 15. 
169 Q. Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 48. 
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provide for a suspension of the normal protection of constitutional rule'.171
 Legal processes are also important. Otto Kercheimer, for example, argued that
the objective of the classical political  trial is to 'incriminate its foe's public behaviour
with a view to evicting him from the political scene'. 172He adds that in the derivative
political trial perjury, defamation and contempt are 'manipulated in an effort to bring
disrepute upon a political foe'.173 Ultimately, the objective of political trial is not the
execution of impartial justice, but rather a means of undermining or destroying power
relations,  and  may  be  a  means  by  which  to  discredit  political  leaders  or  social
movements. In this sense, truth, evidence or standards of due process are subverted in
favour of achieving political goals. These goals may be to assert the supremacy of the
dominant  order  by giving  them the  authority  to  punish  or  sanction,  or  to  simply
remove  potential  threats  to  their  authority.   Indeed,  the  process  represents
'differentiated political justice',174 in which justice is meted out according to the nature
of the threat, its intent, and the government's objectives.
 In describing his modes of repression, Jules Boykoff includes  legal processes;
'public prosecutions and hearings', and 'extraordinary rules and laws'.175 Boykoff notes
that such trials, in addition to being part of a legal process that embroils activists in
legal labyrinths, is primarily a form of dissuasion,  in which negative association are
'attached to the character, nature, or reputation of an individual or group based on
perceptions of that individual or group'.176  Although many will not be deterred, or
aware of government attempts to stigmatize or demonise activists,  people may be
discouraged  from  engaging  in  dissent  if  the  consequences  are  publicized.
Furthermore, while those who are further radicalised by such action may play into the
government's  strategy by endorsing  a  more  brutal  government  response,  this  high
profile  stigmatization  allows  international  actors  or  government  supporters  to
potentially rationalize and justify their support. The establishment of certain laws and
the use of legal repression in authoritarian regimes can result in 'rule by law' instead
of 'rule of law'.  In 'rule by law', or repressive law, 'there is little or no separation
171 G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four 
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between law and politics, and the dictates and policies of the rulers trump laws'.177
Nonet and Selznick conceptualize repressive law as those laws and systems in which
law is  designed to uphold the social  order.  It  is  often ad hoc,  designed to  punish
disobedience, and demands conformity.178 
 Facilitating this repression is the impunity of state officials guilty of egregious
or illegal acts. As Turk states, 'Court and administrative decisions exonerating legal
control agents are to be expected in any polity.  For official  repression even to be
subjected to legal review is an accomplishment; and for a regime to punish its own
agents  for  using  harsh tactics  against  its  political  enemies  is  unthinkable  in  most
countries'.  179 Impunity can  be  intimidating,  for  it  demonstrates  that  the  state  can
repress  in  an  egregious  fashion  without  fear  of  consequence.  Impunity  is  also  a
fundamental  function  in  the  persistence  of  repression,  for  in  the  'absence  of,
meaningful oversight, crimes of power are likely to persist.180 It also immunizes state
actors while obstructs victims from seeking justice and/or compensation.181 
Given the social context, an argument could be made about how the role of
Sharia  law  and  Islamic  jurisprudence  play  out  in  the  use  of  legal  repression.
Unfortunately,  the  nature  of  Islamic  jurisprudence  and  the  extent  of  the  research
required to delve adequately into this sphere is beyond the scope of this thesis. Having
said that, Bahrain's Sharia courts mostly have jurisdiction over matters of personal
status relating to Muslims of all nationality. Furthermore, while Bahrain's legal system
is influenced to a large extent by British common law, the predominant influence is
Islamic law. Thus analysis of legal repression inevitably takes into account aspects of
Islamic legal rulings.182 
177R. Peerenboom, China's Long March to Rule of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge Universit
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Fig 4. Summary of Methods of Legal repression 
Legal 
Repression 
Specific Laws Laws that render collective action difficult, e.g. public 
gathering laws, laws that give security apparatus broad 
powers of arrest and incarceration such as emergency 
laws, laws that criminalize freedom of expression and 
civil liberties, suspension of constitutional protection, 
Legal 
processes
Summary trials, leniency for state control agents, show 
trials, unaccountability for elite officials, secret trials, 
refusal of access to lawyers, failure to adhere to standard 
of due process, police witnesses. Limited inquiries or 
inquiries launched after control objective released
Informational Control 
Turk  emphasises  the  importance  of  information  control  techniques  in  repressing
dissent,  highlighting  the  role  of  'intelligence  gathering,  information  control
(censorship propaganda)', in responding to dissent. Turk states; 'Information control is
indoctrination.  Free  thinking  and  criticism are  to  be  suppressed;  celebrations  and
apologies are to be broadcast.  From the perspective of authorities, the ideal is for
educational,  research,  religious  and  media  institutions  to  accomplish  such  social
control without police assistance'.183 Gamson notes that such strategies, if they achieve
their utmost efficiency, aim to 'control the desire and not the ability'184 to challenge
authority. Gary Marx also emphasises the importance of informational strategies to
repress dissent, and stresses how key methods are the creation of an 'unfavourable
public image' of the perceived dissidents.185 He also noted that it was important to
mobilise  a  strong 'counter-ideology',  to  'gather  information  on movements'  and to
'inhibit  freedom  of  movement,  expression,  and  action',  Marx  suggests  a  similar
process,  and argues that authorities may attempt to  create an 'unfavourable public
image' of social movements deemed threatening.186 
Jules  Boykoff  emphasis  the  role  of  informational  control  strategies  in
suppressing  dissent,  arguing  that  surveillance,  infiltration,  the  use  of  agent
provocateurs,  black  propaganda,  mass  media  manipulation  and  mass  media
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deprecation work to compliment each other to crush movements.  Ruud Koopmans
stresses  that  in  modern  democracies  in  particular,  the  interaction  between  violent
agencies   and  protesters  is  less  important  than  the  act  of  repression  as  a  for  of
'strategic  communication  in  the  public  sphere'.187 Cottle  too  notes  the  changing
imperatives of protest in the public sphere; 'Unlike in earlier times, the co-present
public at demonstrations no longer count the most (Tilly, 2005); rather, it is the mass
audience watching and reading the media coverage at home, and some-times elites
and authorities  watching and coordinating responses,  from afar  (Koopmans,  2004:
368)'. Here, it is 'public discourse and the mass media [that] play a crucial role', and
that it is futile to consider the impact of repression without examining the media and
its relationship to the public sphere.188 The media in particular plays a role in 'Problem
depletion' which works by 'removing (1) the perceived need for the movement and/or
(2) the perceived relevance of claims-making effort within the relevant population'.189
There are numerous paths to this. States may use propaganda or ideological methods
to convince people there are no problems. Boykoff argues that such tactics contribute
to  'stigmatization',  a   'relational  mechanism  whereby  discrediting  attributes  are
attached to the character,  nature,  or reputation of an individual or group based on
perceptions of that individual or group'190.  The 'use of certain phrases and specific
imagery tends to strip dissidents of credibility and make them appear irresponsible,
fringe-like,  and  sometimes  even  violent'.191He  adds  that  stigmatization  creates  a
bifurcated world-view amongst publics that seeks to establish groups of both insiders
and outsiders, separating deviant actors from conformists.  By doing they may prevent
those  movements  from  gaining  additional  followers,  adherents  or  supporters.  192
Similarly,  as  Pallmeyer  notes  that  this  stigmatization  reflects  an  obsession  with
enemies that is a defining characteristi of the National Security State.193
The mass media,  for example,  play a  role  in  stigmatizing movements,  and
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Gamson argues the rise of mass media contributed to the single most largest shift in
the  nature  of  repression in  the  USA.  This  persuasion  is  an aspect  of  information
control,  in  that  it  attempts  to  induce a  state  of  compliance or  indifference  via  all
available ideological resources, whether educational, religious, or mediated. It is an
imperative  aspect  of  control  as  perceived by Middle  Eastern  governments,  where
traditional  values  of  respect  and  deference  are  encouraged.  As  Steve  Heydemann
notes, controlling new communications technologies, is one of the key factors that
allows authoritarian regimes to keep power.194 
Boykoff also argues that information control strategies, such as encouraging
the emergence of suspicion and discord through the use of infiltrators or saboteurs,
can divide, split and weaken movements. Such division may be intra or inter group,
and  can  break  up  individual  movements  or  prevent  co-operation  and  solidarity
between  movements.  However,  while  Davenport  suggests  that  such  issues  are
internally related to social movements, internal schism is often intricately connected
to  the  outside.  Thus  surveillance,  for  example,  which   seeks  to  not  only provide
authorities  with  information  conducive  to  undermining  social  movements,  is  also
meant to modify the behaviour of those being monitored.  Setting the foundations for
modern  surveillance  studies,  Michel  Foucault  used  the  notion  of  Bentham's
Panopticon to explain the mechanism of surveillance, arguing that ‘[the] major effect
of  the  Panopticon is  to  induce  in  the  inmate  a  state  of  conscious  and permanent
visibility  that  assures  the  automatic  functioning  of  power’.195 In  this  regard,
surveillance  should  be  'permanent  in  its  effects,  even  if  it  is  discontinuous  in  its
action’.196 Thus 'it is not just being watched that is enough to induce obedience to
authority, but rather the possibility of being watched'.197 Ben and Marthalee Barton
stress  the  importance  of  surveillance  as  a  form  of  repression,  arguing  that  the
‘asymmetry of seeing-without-being seen is, in fact, the very essence of power’, and
the ‘power to dominate rests on the differential possession of knowledge’.198
194S. Heydemann, 2007.  
195M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Sheridan A. New York: 
Pantheon, 1997, p. 201.
196 Ibid. 
197  M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising’, Westminster 
Papers in Communication and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and 
Present, vol 9, no. 2, April 2013, p. 75.
198B.F. Barton and M. Barton, 'Modes of power in technical and professional visuals', Journal of 
Business and Technical Communication, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 138–162, 1993.
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Even where surveillance does not occur,  Marx notes that it  is  important to
'create  myth  and  fact  of  surveillance  and  repression',199 which  can  be  done  by
publicising incidences of surveillance or egregious acts of repression. Pamela
Oliver  describes  one  of  the  three  main  goals  of  repression  as  surveillance.200
Surveillance, as with other methods,  can contribute to burnout, where those engaged
in struggle are worn down physically,  emotionally,  and psychologically from their
struggle.201 Earl too notes the importance of surveillance, and argues that 'with more
and more protest-related activity happening online, it will be increasingly important
for scholars to consider how repression may work online'.202  Mann et al too note that
‘surveillance techniques have increasingly become embedded in technology'.203 With
this in mind, social media as a tool of repression is a particular focus in chapter six, as
it represents the zeitgeist of the Arab Uprisings.   





Censorship, stigmatization of movements or leaders, 




Surveillance, agent provocateurs, infiltration of 
political/activist groups,
Ideological Indoctrination, education, general mobilisation of 
ideological resources through media, religion, culture
etc. 
Stylized Relations between Repressive Methods and their Effects 
Although it is important to delineate the types of repression, it is also important to
theorise  how these  elements  might  impact  upon dissent.  After  all,  repression  can,
according its definition, only be considered repression if it foreseeably plays a role in
allowing the dominant hegemonic order to fend off challengers. Although some of
199 G. Marx, 'External Efforts...'
200P. Oliver, 2008. 
201 J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...'
202 Earl, J., 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...'. p. 278.
203 S. Mann, J. Nolan and B. Wellman, 'Sousveillance: inventing and using wearable computing 
devices for data collection in surveillance environments', Surveillance & Society, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 331–
355, 2003. 
53 
these aspects have been referred to above, a further discussion will enrich our concept
of repression, and also provide more insight into those methods of repression suitable
to  insert  into  the  template.  Many  processes  inherent  within  statecraft,  personal
integrity violations, legal repression  are designed to be repressive, and contribute to
resource deprivation,204 that is,  the 'hindering of SMO efforts to generate the human
and financial resources necessary to continue engaging in channelling behaviour'.205
This may be through deportation or exile, arrest, murder, depriving members of their
livelihood, preventing them from accessing institutions that could give them political
leverage  to  impact  change.    It  may also  involve  cutting  funding  to  movements,
limiting  personal  advancement  by preventing  access  to  employment,  scholarships,
positions of office etc. Such acts may eventually demoralise or weaken movements,
leaving them unable to function efficiently or effectively. Indeed, without resources,
movements  cannot  'pay  rent;  travel;  offer  decent  salaries;  training,  seminars,  and
workshops; obtain equipment,  food, and medicine; and engage in a wide range of
dissident  activities,  such  as  strikes,  demonstrations,  petitions,  sit-ins,  teach-outs,
terrorism, guerilla warfare, and insurgency'.206 
 While methods describe what the state do, scholars like Boykoff have argued
that so-called mechanisms of repression theorise how and why these state actions have
their  effect.207 There  is  much  appealing  in  Boykoff's  description  of  mechanisms.
Social mechanisms are explanatory accounts of a series of events that bring about a
change between two variables. As Hedstrom and Swedberg state: 'Assume that we
have observed  a systematic relation between two entities, say I and O. In order to
explain the relationship between them we must search for a mechanism, M, which is
such that occurrence of the case or input, I, it generates the effect or outcome, O. In
the case of this study, I is repression, and O is demobilization. Accordingly, focusing
on mechanisms allows one to 'move beyond covariation' (i.e. the positive or negative
relationship  between  two  variables)  208 and  identify  the  'cogs  and  wheels'209 that
explain why cause and effect relationships come about between variables. The study
of mechanisms moves away from the study of  grand theory,  and towards  a  more
204C. Davenport, How Social Movements Die..., 2015.
205Ibid. p. 23.
206 C. Davenport, How Social Movements Die, p. 24. 
207J. Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...' p. 288.  
208J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...'
209J Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, p. 3. 
54 
middle level approach that seeks to identify similar processes that can occur within
different historical and political contexts. For this reason, social mechanisms 'inhabit
the  intermediate  space  between  laws  and  descriptions,  between  grand  theory  and
historiography'.210  Given that the explanatory power of social mechanisms lies in the
fact they ought to achieve a certain level of generality, they serve as an important
underlying theoretical assumption of how the state repressed dissent. Furthermore, 
when working with mechanisms, one is not necessarily in search of a one-
to-one,  mechanism-to-outcome  causal  relationship  (Bhaskar,  1978).
Mechanisms are dependently connected: they intersect with, play off of,
and in some cases amplify each other in interlocking configurations, or
‘concatenations of mechanisms’ (Gambetta,  1998).  Such concatenations
constitute the ‘workhorses of explanation’ that McAdam et al. (2001, p.
30)211
Yet, mechanisms are inherently problematic because, by their very nature, they invite
one to criticise them on the account that there may be sub-mechanisms that operate
within the mechanisms. This could lead to a zero-sum game in which the search for
mechanisms is subordinated by a never-ending quest to expose the 'nuts and bolts'. As
Lichbach states, it is difficult to identify in any one situation what mechanisms are
fundamentally  at  play.212  As  such  it  is  important  to  add  the  caveat  that  while
mechanisms may offer  some explanatory power,   it  is  perhaps  better,  albeit  more
modest,  to  adopt  stylized  explanations  of  causal  relations.  In  this  sense,  we  can
theorise the way in which methods of repression contribute to a number of outcomes,
for example, short and long-term demobilisation, nascent mobilisation, escalation and
radicalisation. 
Not  all  methods  lead  to  the  single  outcome  of  demobilization.  Some,  for
example, may lead to short or long term escalation.  Violent or not, repression can
simply breathe life into social movements or causes by imbuing in people a sense of
210J Boykoff, 'Limiting Dissent...', p. 286. 
211Ibid. 
212 M. Lichbach, 'How to Organize your Mechanisms: Research Programs, Stylized Facts, and 
Historical Narratives',  in C. Davenport et al (eds),  Repression and Mobilization. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
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anger  or  indignation.  The  benefit  of  talking  about  how  these   methods  lead  to
repression is simply to offer a more thorough justification  for the selection of these
repressive  methods.  The term mechanisms might  be  better  described  by the  term
stylized categories of repression, in other words, simplified notions of processes that
theorise  how  repression  works  to  squash  protest  movements.  Like  mechanisms,
stylized categories are perhaps more modest, providing  'a how-possible explanation;
[they  tell]  us  how  the  effect  could  in  principle  be  produced'.213The  reasons  for
preferring stylized mechanisms is that they acknowledge their lack of generality, and
by  doing  so,  do  not  run  the  risk  of  creating  an  'endless...inventory  of
mechanisms'.214Stylized categories then show how the methods within the categories
of Statecraft, Personal Integrity Violations, Legal Statecraft and Informational Control
may do a number of the following. The below table represents a table of 'stylized
categories',  which  are  essentially  regularities  distilled  from a  range  of  theoretical
explanations of how repression impacts upon dissent. They illustrates how repressive
processes may impact psychologically or physically on group or individual processes. 
213P. Hedstrom & P. Ylikoski, 'Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences', The Annual Review of 
Sociology, vol. 36, 2010, p. 52.
214M. Lichbach, 'How to Organize your Mechanisms', p. 233.
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Fig 6.215 Summary of stylized categories of repression 
Intimidation Frightens people into stopping
Incapacitation and 
Containment 
Physically restrains or prohibits people from protesting, 
physically removes people from space, including arrests 
of leaders, roadblocks etc, killing.
Embroilment & 
Regulation
Puts people into complex processes or situations that 
prevent or hinder them from protesting. Can drain 
resources, reduce morale, divert time away from 




Make those more amenable to certain course of action 
through incentivising actions and disincentive others. 
Persuasion/Dissuasion Dissuades people from getting involved in such activity, 
whether educationally or ideologically, through 
demoralisation. or through surveillance 
Fragmentation Reduces cohesive solidarity of movement as a whole, 
and even whole social groups, facilitating control 
through disunity
Strengthening Augment forces designed to protect status quo. 
Escalation Creates resentment, anger, and fuels protest 
215It is important to note the distinction between categories. Not all methods will intimidate people 
into stopping, nor may those who are intimidated actually want to stop, for example. In these cases, 
incapacitation, embroilment, co-optation or persuasion may provide alternative strategies. 
Fragmentation may occur when groups are targeted through legal procedures, or if a number of its 
members are incapacitated or intimidated into withdrawing their support. The potential interactions 
or concatenations are large, but it is important to note them. In other instances we may have an 
overlap of nomenclature. For example, should co-optation be a method of repression, or does it 
explain why repression works? 
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Fig 7: Summary of types of repressive action and how they impact upon dissent 






Co-optation and Placation 
Persuasion/Dissuasion 
Strengthening 
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Methodology: Template Analysis, Social Justice,
 and Interpretive History
In order to explore both modern and historical incidents of repression, this research
adopts a methodological framework that is inherently interdisciplinary. The research
paradigm is transformative; highlighting the relevance of social justice to this study.
The methodological considerations of the transformative paradigm encourage mixed
methods, as long as qualitative research forms an important part. The methods chosen
for this study draw mostly from interpretive historical sociology, yet data is organised
and coded using a template analysis, while the more contemporary events have been
embellished   using  a  framing  analysis,  and  a  virtual  ethnography,   However,  the
objectives  and  presentation  are  akin  to  those  deployed  by  interpretive  historical
sociologists. While they all may be associated with different disciplines,  I believe
they are conducive to 'integrated disciplinarity',216 that is to say, integrating approaches
in  innovative  ways  in  a  manner  that  best  suits  the  object  under  research.217 As
historical sociologist Theda Skocpol argues, sociologically informed studies of history
are not 'hermetically sealed' from one another.218 While the overarching method will
be  template  analysis,  a  discourse  analysis  and  virtual  ethnography  have  been
undertaken to produce data that can than be fit within the study itself. The data  is
used to flesh out the narrative of historical events, and development of repression. 
Transformative Paradigm and Evidence-Based Activist Research 
Integral to the transformative paradigm is its axiology. That is to say, it is a paradigm
shaped  as  much  by  ethical  concerns  as  it  is  anything  else,  and  its  intellectual
justification is itself the need to focus on social justice. It is this axiology which forms
an  important  part  of  defining  other  considerations  of  ontology,  epistemology and
216R. Wodak, 'What is Critical Discourse Analysis? Interview with Gavin Kendall', Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, vol. 8, no. 2, art. 29, 2007 http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/255/561 (Accessed 03/02/2014) 
217 Wodak, 2007.
218T. Skocpol, 1985, p. 362. 
59 
methodology.  Axiological  considerations  include  respecting  cultural  norms  of
interaction, while beneficence is 'defined in terms of the promotion of human rights
and  increase  in  social  justice'.  219 Axiomatic  within  this  is  the  tenets  of  the
transformative ontology, which rejects 'cultural relativism and recognises influence of
privilege' in shaping what is real.220  Furthermore, 'multiple realities are shaped by
social, politcal, cultural, economic, gender, disability and other values'.221Additionally,
there is  no one method associated with the transformative paradigm, meaning the
salience of axiology is paramount, and does not limit the scope of research inquiry. 222
Like  much  activist  research,  I  hope  that  shedding  more  light  on  the  extent  of
government  repression  will  empower  the  powerless,  expose  the  inequities  of  the
status-quo,  and  promote  social  changes  that  help  'equalize  the  distribution  of
resources'.223The transformative paradigm can be applied to a study in any discipline
so  long  as  it  is  related  to  important  social  issues  of  the  day,  such  as
empowerment,injustice,  inequality,  oppression,  domination,  and  alienation  are
important  objects  of  study,  whether  framed  historically  or  in  a  contemporary
context224. 
Arguably, such an approach is especially important with relation to history, as
more  traditional  historical  enquiries  have  'silenced  members  of  oppressed  and
marginalized  groups'.225 Indeed,  a  vital  part  of  the  transformative  paradigm's
methodological stance is to acknowledge 'contextual and historic' factors, 'especially
as they relate to discrimination and oppression'.226 This study therefore seeks to revise
current historical work on  Bahrain, placing state repression and control as the focal
point. By doing so,  it hopes to raise awareness of methods of control that Bahrainis
have been, and still are, subjected to. It is emancipatory in the sense that it contributes
towards  narratives  of  resistance,  further  positioning  current  claims  of  oppression
within an expansive historical account of subordination and domination. Lastly, and
219D. M. Mertens 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching: The transformative paradigm as 




223F. M. Cancian  'Conflicts Between Activist Research and Academic Success: Participatory Research
and Alternative Strategies', The American Sociologist, vol. 24, no. 1, 1993, p. 92.
224J.W. Creswell, (2003). Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches,
London, Sage.
225 Ibid. 
226D.M. Mertens, 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching...', p. 11.
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perhaps it  is  this  researcher's  own naivety or waning optimism, that revealing the
structures of control may force some to question and revise certain assumptions that
cause them to resist change and support oppression.227
It should be evident then that the nature of this research is not devoid of the
researcher's  own ideological  and political  inclinations,  and this  thesis  is  based on
ideological  opposition  to  structures  of  power that  lead  to  exploitation  or  promote
inequality. As Sara Roy says, ' any claim to neutrality, or, for that matter, objectivity,
is  in  my  experience  nothing  more  than  calculated  indifference'.228  Given  that
repression often prevents marginalised groups  from better positioning themselves in
society,  understanding  how  it  operates  is  a  fundamental  issue  within  the
'transformative'  paradigm,  which  aims  to  enhance  social  justice  and human rights
whist respecting cultural norms .229So unlike Howard Brown's230 history of repression
in France, for example, which claims to be 'neutral' on issues of violence, this work
acknowledges that violence should not be condoned when used to uphold exploitative
and unequal political and social relationships. 
Template Analysis and Interpretive Historical Sociology   
History and Current Events through the Conceptual Lens of Repression 
As with interpretive historical sociology defined by Theda Skocpol, a concept is used
as a  heuristic  device to  'facilitate  the selection,  organization,  and interpretation of
227It is important to note that in the context of this study, repression is predominantly the result of 
dominant groups attempting to maintain their monopoly of power, wealth and resources. Studying 
repression does not necessarily imply support for any of the individuals, social movements or 
groups attempting to create political change. Indeed, in some instances the wishes expressed by 
some social movements may not be conducive to the betterment of certain marginalised or 
oppressed groups. However, when social movements are fighting a system that deprives them of 
rights enjoyed by others, there is an immediate issue of social justice that must be addressed. It is 
unreasonable to refrain from such critique on the basis of fears that a new social order may be more 
repressive than the preceding one. To adopt such a mentality would negate any form of change, as 
people would accept inequality and marginalisation on the premise that no one can anticipate future 
outcomes. Furthermore, in many cases, extreme manifestations of certain groups may derive 
themselves from government policy, thus the creation of radical groups can be contingent on acts of
state and non-state repression – so one must oppose repression on principle, for it is often state 
repression that creates groups whose end goals may seem counter-productive to the promotion of 
social justice. 
228S. Roy, 'Humanism, Scholarship, and Politics: Writing on the Palestinian Israeli Conflict', Journal 
of Palestine Studies, vol. 36, no. 2,2007, pp. 54-65
229D.M. Mertens, 'Tansformative Mixed Methods Enquiry',  Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 16, no. 6, 2010, 
p. 470.
230H. Brown, 'Domestic State Violence: From the Croquants to the Commune', The Historical Journal, 
vol. 42, no. 3, 1999, pp. 597-622
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empirical material'.231 In this case, the relevant concept is 'repression'. This is because
repression continues to negatively impact the lives of thousands of Bahrainis – many
of  whom have  suffered  and  still  suffer  from the  excesses  of  state  and  non-state
repression.   In  line  with  the  emphasis  on  social  justice,  interpretive  historical
sociology attempts to be meaningful in the sense that it is significant to the present
and relevant to audiences beyond academia, tying it to the notion of impact. With
regards  to  Bahrain,  the  study  of  control  and  repression  is  highly  relevant  and
meaningful.
Following the  outline  of  the theoretical  framework in  the  introduction,  the
'common-sense device of narrative storytelling'  is frequently employed, accounting
for the impetus for those repressive choices.  As for the use of narrative, Lichbach
notes that 'there are many ways in which a narrative “seeks to use history to construct
the theory and to flesh out its implications” (Rosenthal 1998, 2)'.232Out of the narrative
stream of happenings, that begin in the 1920s, Bahrain's cycles of unrest represent a
'set of chronologically linked strategic situations'.233 From this historical trajectory, we
can 'derive many observable implications about the recurring pattern of politics (i.e.,
strategising)  manifested in  the case's  particular  events,  individuals,  issues,  groups,
conflicts, regions or time periods'.234This 'overall thesis, or meta-narrative, illuminates
the  general  pattern  or  overall  stylized  facts  of  the  case'.235  The  instances  of
contestation  selected  across  the   20th and   21st century  represent  the  'short-run
equilibria' that 'compound to produce a long-run equilibrium as the series of within-
case studies compounds to produce the overall case study'.236 
The episodes under scrutiny are baḥārna resistance to tribal repression in the
1920s,  the  Higher  Eduction  Committee   movement  of  the  1950s,  the  leftist
movements  of  the  1960s  and 70s,237 the  religious  unrest  of  the  1980s,  the  1990s
Intifada, and the  Uprising of 2011. By focusing on these particular episodes of unrest,
it is possible to offer more analytical focus to the study rather than examining every
231V.E. Bonnell, 'The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison, in Historical Sociology',  
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 22, no. 2, 1980, p. 166.
232M. Lichbach, 2005, p. 241.
233 M. Lichbach,2005, p. 241 – 242.
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., p.  240.
236 Ibid. 
237These include the National Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf and various trade union movements.
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conceivable aspect of social  control. As these episodes of unrest have acted as an
opportunity for the regime to repress dissent, they are a logical unit of analysis for
studying  repression,  and  represent  what  Mark  Lichbach  calls  'episodic  crises,
recurring problems, periodic challenges, or key turning points in the case's history' 238
which form 'linked strategic situations'.239 Although  these  situations  remain
separate,  the  recurring   patterns  of  politics,  highlight  both   nuance  for  each
occurrence,  but  also  a  more  generalisable  trend.   These,  combined  with  other
contextual  factors,  elite  attitudes,  resource  availability,  institutional  capabilities,
organizational structure, have had a large implication for strategic choices and the
repression of dissent Fundamentally, this approach seeks to address the deficiency in
historical work on contentious politics, which tends to be very restrictive in focusing
on temporally limited events, such as a singular strike or episode of contention.240 
An Emergent Academic Tradition?
Similar to Goldstein's work on America,  this is a 'history and analysis of political
repression, so naturally it stresses events relevant to this subject'. 241 Emphasis is also
placed on the shift to Independence in 1971, as it is at this time regional hegemony
transfers from British hands to Saudi and American influence.  While there has never
been a historical study on repression in Bahrain, other qualitative studies on the topic
are worthy of note. Jules Boykoff pulls data from a number of sources across a 50
year  history  in  order  to  create  his  taxonomy of  repression  in  the  USA.  Boykoff
categorises different types of repression, 'systematizing an array of cases ranging from
the  early  twentieth  to  the  early  twenty-first  century'.242 Austin  Turk's  research  on
political  policing  pulls  data  from  a  wide  range  of  sources  (including  Amnesty
International reports for example) in order to create a taxonomy of different methods.
Turk, however, does not simply focus on the USA, and his taxonomy of methods of
repression is more frugal than Boykoff's.243 Robert Goldstein's history of repression in
America between 1870 and the (then) present (1978) covers a similar broad expanse
of time, yet it is organized accordingly, as does his 1983 study on Political Repression
238 Ibid., p. 239. 
239 Ibid. 
240 B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 2007, p. 269. 
241 R.J. Goldstein, 1978, p. xxii. 
242 Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p, 9.
243 A. Turk, Political Criminality.
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in 19th Century Europe.244 Gary Marx too does the same,  though is  time frame is
admittedly shorter.245  So while there is an emerging academic tradition of doing long-
term studies of repression, their approaches differ somewhat. While Goldstein's work
was organized according to movement, this work, for example, is organized according
to repressive categories, to see how they evolved in all spheres. 
Template Analysis: Codes of Repression 
Firstly, the primary method resembles thematic analysis, although strictly speaking, it
is template analysis. Template analysis is a 'varied but related group of techniques for
thematically organizing and analysing textual data'.246It involves the combination of
deductive and inductive approaches, whereby a 'template'  is produced that contains
codes  determined  both  before  and  during  the  interpretation  of  data.  Usually,  the
template of codes is either formed from the researchers own ideas, or from ones that
emerge from theoretical reading and/or preliminary research. Simply put, 'a code is a
label attached to a section of text to index it as relating to a theme or issue in the data
which the researcher has identified as important to his or her interpretation'.247 Codes
may be simple or complicated, and may overlap with each other. There also tends to
be  a  hierarchy  to  the  codes,  with  groups  of  similar  codes  'clustered  together  to
produce more general higher-order codes'.248 In this  research,  the codes have been
generated from  aggregation of theories on repression and social control, mixed with
codes that have emerged from the data. Combining empirical evidence and theory
avoids overcoming the 'facile distinctions' between inductive and deductive methods,
a problem that often characterises the somewhat artificial gap between sociological
versus historical enquiry.249 Unlike Boykoff's action-modes, these codes, while non-
hierarchical, are more cogently organized. 
Among the benefits of template analysis is that it is not tied to any particular
epistemological  outlook,  making  it  an  appropriate  method  that  fits  into  different
244 See Goldstein, R.J., Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, 1978; R.J. Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe,  
Oxford, Routledge, 2010 (first published 1983). 
245 G. Marx, 1978.
246N. King, 'Using templates in the thematic analysis of text'  in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), 
Essential Guide to Qualitative Research in Organizational Research, London, Sage, 2004, p. 256.
247 Ibid., p. 257. 
248 Ibid. p. 258.
249V.E. Bonnell, 1980, p. 158. 
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disciplines. Although similar to content analysis, template analysis is more flexible as
the  salience  of  themes  need not  define  their  importance,  nor  do  they have  to  be
defined beforehand for example.  There may also be as many themes as one finds
useful, as opposed to some thematic approaches which are more proscriptive in the
number of  levels  they determine.250 Furthermore,  unlike approaches  like  grounded
theory, template analysis allows a more dynamic relationship between data and theory,
and affords the researcher the freedom to go between the two to modify, add and/or
delete  codes  or  themes.   It  also  allows  a  more  rigorous  way of  constructing  the
conceptual  outline  important  to  interpretive  historical  sociologists.  While   not
traditionally a means to analyse and organise data gathered from historical textual
sources, the use of such a method highlights the inherent interdisciplinary nature of
this study. Nigel King too notes that template analysis is a flexible approach, and can
be used in a number of disciplines. While there is little evidence of template analysis
being used specifically to  organize historical data, history has often been criticised
for a lack of methodological reflection.251 Given the interdisciplinary nature of this
research, the transformative paradigm and its absence of a proscribed method gives
considerable scope for methodological experimentation. While some of the codes may
seem  descriptive,  there  is  arguably  no  such  thing  as  mere  description  or  even
narrative.252 According to King, description and narrative are inherently interpretive
acts,  as  descriptive  codes  stem  from  an  interpretation  based  on  theoretical  and
conceptual considerations that have been defined by a specific research question. 253   
The template  detailed  in  the  previous  chapter  also  has  the  benefit  of
functioning as  a  heuristic  guide  to  facilitate  the  collection  of  empirical  data,  and
serves to roughly guide the structure of the PhD. Through each chapter, the narrative
moves between the type of repression and the motivation for its action. Embedded
within the narrative are assumptions that those methods of repression do adhere to the
250N. King, 'Constructing the Template', [online video], 2008, 
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/_REQUALLO/FR/Template_Analysis/The_Template.php  (Accessed 
17/12/2013)
251M. Rowlinson, 'Historical Analysis of Company Documents'  in Catherine Cassell and Gillin 
Symon (eds.), Essential Guide to Qualitative Research in Organizational Research, London, Sage, 
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theoretical assumptions of how repression impacts upon dissent. As Skocpol states,
interpretive historical sociologists can almost always be faulted for their
insouciance  about  establishing  valid  explanatory-arguments.  Both  the
concepts  deployed  by  interpretive  historical  sociologists  and  the
descriptive narratives on which they rely so heavily assert or imply all
sorts  of  causal  connections.  Yet  these  historical  sociologists  are  not
concerned to establish explanations that hold good across more than single
cases.254
Gathering Data
From Historical Documents, to Statutes, Ordinances, Tweets  and NGO Reports 
As noted, this research has explored a number of studies of repression to create a
template with hierarchies that serve as a means by which to organise the empirical
data.  In addition to secondary sources on Bahrain much of the research here relies on
primary documents:  For  the  section  of  this  study dated  between  1918 and  1947,
primary documents from the India Office in the British Library in London are the
main sources of empirical data. Chief among these is the correspondence between the
British  Political  Agent  in  Bahrain,  the  Political  Resident  in  the  Gulf,  and  the
Government of India. India Office records also include newspaper clippings from the
periods in question, petitions by members of the Bahrain public, statements from the
Higher  Executive  Committee/Committee  of  National  Union  (HEC and CNU),  the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), and letters from members of the
ruling  family to  British  officials.  Such documents  are  a  useful  supplement  to  the
correspondence between British Officials. Other important sources for this period are
the personal diary and papers of Charles Belgrave, financial adviser to the Ruler of
Bahrain  between  1926  and  1957.  These  papers  have  been  underutilised  in  most
accounts of Bahrain's history,  with the exception of Nelida Fuccaro, who uses the
Belgrave papers. Most of the India Office Records are housed in the British Library in
London, while  Durham has bound collections  of these related to Bahrain.  For the
periods between 1947 and 1982, correspondence from the Foreign Office and later the
254 T. Skocpol, 1985, p.  371. 
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Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office  (FCO)  has  been  used.  This  mainly  includes
dossiers  from the Political  Agency in Bahrain and later  the British Embassy after
Bahrain independence in 1971. 
To complement the British records before 1956, accounts given by Belgrave in
his memoirs were a useful means of comparing with the documents written by the
British administration. However, data from so long ago can only be cross-verified to a
limited extent. It would be, difficult for example, to interview or conduct focus groups
with  members  of  the  Bahraini  Government  given  the  sensitivity  of  the  topic.
Following the seventies, reports by Amnesty International on human rights concerns
on  Bahrain  could  be  usefully  cross-checked  with  British  documents  at  the  time.
Generally they matched up, though in cases where there seemed to be discrepancies,
the greater access afforded to the British meant that their reports were deemed more
reliable. From the 1970s – 1980s, many of the primary documents from the British
Embassy in Bahrain  can be  read alongside reports by Human Rights organizations.
Wikileaks  cables  from the  1990s  and  1970s  detailing  conversations  between  US
government officials and high level Bahraini officials are also a useful source of data
to gain insights into strategic decision making. 
Much of the empirical data for the 1990s Intifada and 2011 Pearl  Uprising
comes from documents produced by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. These have been supplemented with
newspaper articles, documentaries and news broadcasts where available. In addition
to this, much of the evidence of repression and deviance comes from the Bahraini
Independent Commission of Inquiry Report, a document written by international legal
scholars about the events of 2011. As Turk states,  such documents are 'the  most
defensible  sources  of  empirically  usable  criteria  for  defining  illegalities  are  the
published  findings  of  official  legislative  committees  and  judicial  commissions'.255
Second only to this, are the reports of 'fact-finding organizations such as Amnesty
International  and  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists'.256 David  Pion-Berlin
concurs,  arguing  that  in  a  discipline  where  empirical  data  is  hard  to  come  by,
organisations  such  as  Amnesty  provide  'valuable  documentation  of  human  rights
255A. Turk, 'Organizational Deviance and Political Policing', Criminology, vol. 19, no. 2, 1981, pp. 
235 - 236
256 Ibid., p. 236. 
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abuses'.257 As has been mentioned, the data for this work relies heavily on these.
It should be noted that British records are useful for studying repression, not
least because Britain was the protecting power of Bahrain and had a great deal of
influence in the administration of affairs.  Documents from this period also contain a
number of  ordinances,  laws,  and statutes.  These were complemented by finding a
comprehensive  list  of  laws  from  the  Bahrain  government  through
www.legalaffairs.bh,  both in English and Arabic.  Scholars  from James Gibson,  to
Luis  Fernandez  have  examined  legislation  as  a  means  of  gauging  repressiveness.
British  primary documents  have  all  been used  to  get  an  insight  into  the  political
decisions and the strategic decision making of the both the British and Al Khalifa
government. Given the nature of the study, which may be considered by some to be
subversive, access to official government statistics or personnel would not be deemed
a way of  gaining  valid  data  – especially given that  part  of  this  research is  to  de
construct government propaganda and myths. Furthermore, the events that may play
'a key role in strategic decision-making or framing processes may become available
only long after the demise of the movement or it protagonists, as memoirs, letters, and
other documents that record divisions and conflicts among those struggling for change
become  available  for  scholarly  analysis'.258 Given  that  the  FCO  usually  keep
documents for thirty years, they are not available between1982 -3 and 2015. 
In addition to reports by NGOs, more empirical data was pulled through the
process  of  conducting  the  online  ethnography.  This  includes  tweets,  videos  from
YouTube (especially ones documenting examples of security service repression), news
articles, and conversations with those people on Twitter and other social media. State
sources of information, especially with regards to propaganda and censorship have
been utilised. Indeed, the advances of technology mean that many of these forms of
repression  or  human  rights  abuses  are  captured  on  camera.  These  include:  press
releases  from the  Ministry of  the  Interior,  articles  from local  newspapers  in  both
English and Arabic. Such papers include the Gulf Daily News, the Daily Tribune, Al
Wasat  (the  Centre),  Al  Ayam (the  Days),  Akhbar Al  Khaleej  (Gulf  News),  and Al
Watan (The Nation).  International news sources and documentaries have also been
used to pool data and obtain useful information and insights from Bahrainis involved
257 D. Pion, Berlin, 1986, p. 49. 
258B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 2007, p. 269. 
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in the uprising. Using a plurality of sources for a data corpus is entirely legitimate
within thematic or template analysis. 259
However,  the  main  emphasis  of  this  multi  method  project,  is  to  form  a
historical and contemporary account of repression in Bahrain organized according to a
template  derived from the  coding of  different  approaches  to  studying methods  of
repression. While some of the data can be cross-checked, allowing us, to an extent, to
validate 'the consistency of specific and factual items from various sources', much of
it exists only in primary sources. However, despite all this talk of triangulation, we are
not  subscribing  to  a  naïve  realism  whereby  we  are  assuming  there  is  a  'single
definitive account of the social world'.260 Instead, as per the transformative paradigm
and its constructionist epistemology, triangulation, where possible, is used to add a
'sense  of  richness  and  complexity  to  an  enquiry'.  261 Figure  8  shows  the  relative
availability of the different sources across the decades under study. 
Fig 8: General Availability of Sources for the Study 
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In addition to gathering data from historical sources, primary documents and human
rights  reports,  other  data  was derived through immersing  myself,  both  online  and
offline,  in the Bahrain activist  community.  This combination of activities could be
described as a mixture of both traditional and virtual ethnographies. For the most part,
the community was not the focus of the study, but merely the impetus for action and a
repository for knowledge on Bahrain. Much like a traditional ethnography, a virtual
ethnography involves the 'ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly in people's
daily lives for an extended period of time, listening to what is said, asking questions –
in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the
focus  of  the  research'.263 Unlike  a  traditional  ethnography,  however,  a  virtual
ethnography takes places online. The social networking site Twitter was crucial to the
carrying out of the research. Instead of using it to just  gather useful commentary from
key  players,  or  useful  links  to  relevant  articles,  videos  and  information,  this
ethnography was a natural part of life, participating in the Bahrain online community
irrespective  of  research  being  undertaken.  It  bridged  the  gap  between  academia,
activism and investigative work. Twitter allowed me to become part of a transnational
activist community, one that included both Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis alike. Like
most research within the transformative paradigm, or most activist-based research, the
inclusion of marginalised or oppressed groups from the community being researched
(in this case Bahrainis)  is an integral part  of the research approach.264 Indeed, the
transformative  epistemological  approach  requires  an  interactive  link  between
research/co-researchers  and/or  participants  where  possible  (we  are  part  of
knowledge).265Becoming  more  involved  in  the  activism was  an  important  step  of
deepening my relationship with other activists. Indeed, the very act of engaging in
activism and making it a part of the research is an important part of the transformative
262This virtual ethnography was the methodology of a paper I published;  M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, 
surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising’, Westminster Papers in Communication 
and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and Present, vol 9, no. 2, April 
2013.  
263M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, London: Routledge, 1995, 
p. 1. 
264D.M. Mertens, 'Philosophy in mixed methods teaching...', p. 15.
265Ibid. p. 11. 
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paradigm,  as  it  highlights  not  only  the  relevance  of  research  to  the  process  of
activism, but  also that  research is  itself  activism.  In essence,  it  is  not  so much a
research method, but a way of life. Such an approach cannot be rushed. The issue of
establishing  trust,  particularly  in  an  online  environment  where  people  became
increasingly suspicious about government surveillance, was of particular importance. 
The importance of building trust within what can only loosely be termed a
Twitter  ‘community’ cannot  be  overstated,  for  it  formed  the  basis  of
establishing relationships that led to interviews, discussions and chats. It
was  also  these  relationships  that  developed  through  the  virtual
ethnography that formed the basis of investigative collaborations that were
important in identifying potential surveillance tactics used by hegemonic
forces.266
The virtual ethnography was especially useful in fulfilling evidential requirements of
this  study,  understanding  the  role  new technologies  such  as  social  media  play  in
surveillance  and  political  repression.  This  growing  awareness  of  surveillance  via
social media, coupled with the video of evidence of more coercive state repression
that was increasingly common on YouTube, promoted an interest in repression as a
concept and thus helped flesh out a preliminary template of state repression. 
As part of my ongoing activism and research that began online, I was also
invited  to  join  Bahrain  Watch,  a  cloud-based  NGO  run  by  activist  volunteers
advocating transparent governance in  Bahrain.  Many of my own research projects
fused with the goals of Bahrain Watch,  and some of the some subsequent  reports
published  as  collaborations  are  important,  yet  separate,  source  material  for  this
research.  All  information  produced  by  Bahrain  Watch  is  referenced  as  normal.
However, one must acknowledge that research on the recent uprisings is thanks to the
collaborative efforts and interactions afforded by the increased connectivity allowed
by  sites  like  Twitter  and  Facebook.  Even  much  of  the  historic  work  has  been
augmented by establishing relationships with scholars on Bahrain who used Twitter,
and  who  engage  in  online  public  discussion  and  debate  on  certain  topics.  Such
266 M.O. Jones, 'Social Media, Surveillance and Social Control in the Bahrain Uprising', Westminister 
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interactions have led to the discovery of certain documents, the correction of small
errors, and the fine-tuning of some arguments. 
Crucially,  the  virtual  ethnography allowed me  to  experience  first  hand  the
impact of surveillance on my own behaviour, and this formed the foundation for me
discussing it with other. For this reason, the virtual and traditional ethnography was
very much the corner stone of this study, prompting rigorous discussion and creative
research with activists from Bahrain's marginalised community. I do feel indebted to
all  those  activists  and  academics  who  have  helped,  and  it  feels  as  much  of  a
collaborative  project  as  anything.  Perhaps  interesting  about  the  initial  virtual
ethnography is that it was the stepping stone into a Bahraini activist community. This
group, with often slightly differing political  agendas,  were bound by the common
theme of desire for political reform. Indeed, this community of activists, marginalized
and repressed in Bahrain, became the basis of what might be called a  collaborative,
critical ethnography. As per the transformative paradigm, 'a critical ethnographer will
study  issues  of  power,  empowerment,  inequality  inequity,  dominance,  repression,
hegemony and victimization'.267 This informal networks of dissidents, activists, and
academics  flitted  from being  objects  of  research  in  themselves,  interviewees  and
informants, to inspiration and instigators of ideas, threads, and experience.  So while
this is a PhD authored by myself, it is vital to 'acknowledge the collaborative context
in which [it was] produced',268 especially in terms of support and guidance offered by
members of the community.  This is not to downplay my own role, but merely to
express my own discomfort with not acknowledging the inspiring people I was lucky
enough to encounter. 
However, researching the surveillance aspect of social media, and the process
of doing an ethnography itself raised an important number of ethical considerations.
For example, how much does conducting research on social media sites constitute a
type of surveillance itself. In many ways, monitoring and observing social spaces is
itself a kind of surveillance. Furthermore, engaging with people who were themselves
the targets of state repression may expose them to more attention than is desirable. For
this  reason,  those  activists  who  are  quoted  are  named  only  with  their  explicit
267J.W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 
London: Sage, 2013, p. 94.
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permission. Efforts to protect data have also been made, including encrypted email
and the use of secure browsing through Tor. Where desired, interviews or exchanges
with  activists  or  opposition  have  occurred  across  encrypted  emails  or  locations
deemed suitable by them. In terms of obtaining what might be considered valid data,
the narrative of activists, journalists and evidence depicted in videos or tweets was
often cross-checked so as to ensure the veracity. While this  'cross-verification' may
constitute some form of between method methodological triangulation,  it  is  by no
means fool proof.  For example, and for reasons that become clear in the chapter on
surveillance, I would never take an account of an event from an unknown source at
face value.  Certain activists' accounts became notable as reliable spokespersons of
movements – though one must always be wary.
Framing
For the section on information control, in addition to historical sources, a number of
social  movement  scholars  have  looked  at  how  the  media  have  played  a  role  in
assisting  the  repression  of  dissent.  Boykoff  enumerates  the  different  methods  of
repression  that  the  media  use.269  Cottle  too  maintains  that  the  way  in  which
information is portrayed by the media is important.  Indeed, 'how demonstrations are
variously  selected,  sourced,  narrativized,  visualized,  discussed,  contested  and
elaborated in the news media remains worth struggling for'.270 In an era where social
media have challenged the state monopoly on media in authoritarian regimes, this is
particularly worth exploring.  Yet crucially,  it  is  interesting to see in terms of how
movements are stigmatized by the regime. To what extent are they framed in order to
draw popular support away from them? The mass media in particular shape public
perceptions of threats, or social movements through framing. A 'frame', according to
Goffman  (1974),  is  a  means  of  organizing,  classifying  and  interpreting  our  life
experiences.271 The frame, or 'schemata of interpretation', enable individuals to label
and perceive certain events, protagonists, or information, and make sense of them.
Gamson notes that a frame is a 'central organizing idea or story line that provides
269 J. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets. 
270 S. Cottle, 'Reporting Demonstrations: The changing media politics of dissent', Media, Culture and 
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meaning'.  'There are five such devices that signify the uses of frames: metaphors,
exemplars,  catchphrases,  depictions,  and  visual  images  (Gamson  & Lasch,  1983;
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). '272A frame is an 'interpretive schemata that simplifies
and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects,
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's past or present
environment'.273 Crucially  framing  is  about  salience,  and  'involves  selection  and
salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation
for the item described'.274 Halloran et al for example argued how the media coverage
of anti-Vietnam War protests served to 'concentrate attention on the forms of actions
to the neglect of underlying causes' and portray it as violent. Similarly, Gitlin's study
argues how media framing 'trivialized, polarized, marginalized, and disparaged275' the
Students for a Democratic Society in the US.  An assessment of how protesters and
dissent has been framed is useful in order to process the nature of stigmatization.  In
his work on repression in the UA, Jules Boykoff conducts a frame analysis and notes
that  protesters  are  often  framed  as  violent,  freakish,  disruptive,  ignorant,  and
amalgamating their grievances.276 
In countries like Bahrain, a remotely critical media is a recent phenomenon.
The centralisation of state power often means that there is much homogeneity in state
discourse, rhetoric, and media.  Yet by identifying these discourses, whether in visual
images or text, we can see how social movements are 'framed' by the Bahraini regime
and,  in  some  cases,  the  international  media,  and  to  what  extent  the  government
attempts  to  frame them.  Like  Critical  Discourse  Analysis,  this  Frame  Analysis  is
designed the 'unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so
naturalized over time that we begin to treat them as common, acceptable and natural
features  of  discourse'.277A  'critical'  approach  often  involves  addressing  data  in
272 Ibid., p. 56. 
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newspaper  articles,  or  political  texts,  or  any form of  communication  that  involve
'manipulative strategies' that seek to reinforce the dominant ideological norm.278 As
Fairclough and Wodak279 (1997:  258)  argue,  'discursive  practises  may have  major
ideological  effects  and  help  produce  and  reproduce  unequal  power  relationships
between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities
and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people'.280
Indeed, a critical discourse can reveal the structures of inequality, and with regards to
repression, see how the state and private actors 'pathologize those who hold views
different from their own'.281
For the 2011 Uprising,   a frame analysis  of  over  3000 MoI Tweets,  BNA
statements, newspaper articles and video statements relating to protests was conducted
between 2011 and 2014. Coverage of political issues related to dissent in articles of
both Arab and English dailies were assessed; these included Al-Wasat, Al-Watan and
the Gulf  Daily  News.  Videos  and  statements  served  by  non-official  but  pro-
government sources were also looked at. The manner of sampling really stems fro the
ethnographic research, which involved the daily readings of newspapers, viewing of
videos on Twitter, and scouring of YouTube for videos published related to Bahrain. 
Where  data  is  available,  news  articles  contained  within  Foreign  Office
documents offer useful additions to the sample. During times of political upheaval,
there are a significant number of press clippings contained within the archives that are
useful. Generally speaking though, the frame analysis relies on information harvested
during recent uprisings that began in 2011. Although this may be problematic in terms
of  trying  to  identify historical  trends  in  media  repression,  newspapers  are  only a
relatively recent  phenomenon,  and have  historically been heavily censored,  which
suggests  that  official  publications  would  of  course  have  been  ideologically
predisposed to supporting the state. The proliferation of new media forms and the
relative liberalisation of 2001 makes issues of discourse more relevant, and seeing
how  state  media  reports  on  violence  will  highlight  the  extent  to  which  media
Newspapers', Discourse & Society, vol. 11, no. 1, 2000, p. 12.  
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liberalisation has impacted upon the deprecation of political dissidents in the press.
On the other hand, the advantages of sampling articles and sources from over a broad
time frame will allow the possible identification of meta-themes of repression. That is
to  say,  forms  of  possible  ideological  bias  in  the  official  rhetoric  that  has  existed
through decades. 
Such  methodological  experimentation  is  common in  the  field  of  historical
work on  social movements studies. Sociologically informed studies of long periods of
contentious politics have often been innovative. Tilly for example, used administrative
reports,  newspaper  clippings,  and  secondary  sources  to  analyse  large-scale  social
change. In The Contentious French, for example, Tilly covers the evolution of dissent
over a 400 year period.282 Unlike Tilly though, whose work on contentious politics in
France adopted a more quantitative approach, this research uses qualitative data taken
from  primary  and  secondary  textual  sources.  Tilly  too  focused  on  the  nature  of
changes in contentious activity, and focused less on repression. The discourse analysis
and the virtual ethnography are particularly relevant to chapter six on information
control.  This  extra  weighting  to  the  chapter  six  was,  in  many ways,  a  pragmatic
assumption.  The  research  started  with  a  focus  on  social  media,  yet  in  terms  of
interdisciplinary methods, the field of social media and internet was identified as an
area requiring further academic exploration. From deductive methods we create our
net,  which  we  use  to  drag  through  the  myriad  of  data  collected  from  virtual
ethnography and archival research. However, the net has some holes in it, and new
evidence emerging from the data allows us to refine the net. So while the overarching
method and data organisation of this research relies on template analysis,  a virtual
ethnography and discourse analysis have been used for the purpose of producing extra
data that can then be fit within the template. In this sense, the template analysis forms
an important tool in the actual structuring and presentation of the data in the research.
While  template  analysis  is  a  method  in  itself,  it  is  complemented  by the  virtual
ethnography and discourse analysis in that they provide extra insights, which can be
evidenced by supporting categories of repression delineated in the template.
Inevitably, a large historical time-scale will limit the depth to which research
can reveal. Quoting E. J. Hobsbawn, Goldstein notes that 'it is frequently necessary to
282 C. Tilly, The Contentious French, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1989.
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reduce...extremely important information “to a paragraph or two, a line,  a passing
mention or a mere nuance of treatment”'.283
283R.J. Goldstein, 1983, p. xi. 
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Chapter Three
Political Statecraft: Between Democratisation,
 Discord and Division
Unfortunately some members of the ruling family still  think in the old
way – that Bahrain is the spoils of war 'gained by the sword', where the
land, wealth and positions of authority are to be distributed amongst the
sons of the victorious tribe and its supporters.284- Ibrahim Sharif 
The process  of  politics,  including the  allocation  of  resources,  the  management  of
communal  issues,  and  the  calculations  of  institutional  figures  all  form a  part  of
explaining why certain repressive choices  have  been made.  Repressive  choices  in
Bahrain are often contingent on specific contextual factors, such as the inclination of
hawkish groups, or certain individuals, regional politics, the availability of resources,
and crucially, the political objectives of Bahrain's protectors. Indeed, the change in
suzerain from the United to Kingdom to Saudi Arabia in 1971 resulted in changes to
strategic  decision-making within the Al Khalifa  regime,  prompting changes  in  the
nature,  intensity  and  type  of  repression.   This  shift,  compounded  by  resource
availability  and  ideological  inclination,  has  resulted  most  notably  in  political
strategies designed to exclude Bahrain's Shiʿa from political life.
Feudal Entitlement, Internal Factionalism, Co-optation and the Civil List
In 1898, the British, Bahrain's protectors, had already acknowledged that they would
recognize a system of primogeniture, and Hamad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa, Shaykh ʿIsa's
eldest son, would become successor.  When the Ruler, Shaykh ʿIsa, proved unable to
control belligerent elements of his family,  the British deposed him putting his son
284 E. Sharif, 'A Trial of Thoughts and Ideas',  in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), Bahrain's 
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Shaykh Hamad in his place in 1923.   This, they argued, would 'bring the affairs of
Bahrain more under our [British] control and aid towards securing the inhabitants
against a despotic rule'.285  Despite this strong move, the British had long stressed,
particularly in the early half of the 20th century,  that their influence in Bahrain should
be brought about by 'indirect and pacific means, and through the increase of influence
with the Shaykh by gaining his confidence and trust'.286 This reflected a desire to sail a
middle course between protection and colonial control, in which Britain would only
interfere in a limited capacity. 
The British desire to bring stability to Bahrain required a strong response to
belligerent members of the Al Khalifa family, the control of whom was necessary in
preserving Pax Britannica in the Gulf.  Britain's invidious position was highlighted by
the  fact  that  they  were  treaty-bound  to  protect  the  Al  Khalifa  from  external
aggression, but it was members of the Al Khalifa family, mainly led by the Ruler's
son, ʿAbd Allah bin  ʿIsa Al Khalifa, that were the prime fomenters of intrigues and
resistance to  British reforms.  Together  with their  tribal  allies  the Dawasir,  this  Al
Khalifa faction was engaged in the oppression of the indigenous baḥārna population. 
However,  because Britain acted as a deterrent  against  resisting feudal  rule,
they were very aware that it was only British protection of the ruling family that made
the  baḥārna fearful  of  resisting  the  Al   Khalifa.   As  Clive  Daly  noted  in  1921,
'Bahrain subjects are afraid to take the law into their own hands as the Sheikh is under
our protection, and they urge, with some reason, that we ought in consequence to take
steps to prevent the Sheikh from abusing his authority'.287 Daly even went as far as to
say that the pitch of misrule was Britain's failure as a protecting power.288 Despite
sympathy from the likes of Daly and other British Political Agents, the baḥārna  pleas
for extensive reform were generally rebuffed by the Government of India, who, unlike
agents on the ground in Bahrain, believed that they should continue to sail a 'middle
course' between treating Bahrain as a full 'British protectorate' and 'an independent
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principality'.289 
Yet Britain's position was ambiguous on what exactly this was. What was clear
was that agents in Bahrain were advised to avoid interfering reforms and focus on
Customs  reform  and  currying  influence  with  the  Shaykh,  reflecting  the  trade-
orientated  nature  of  the  British  colonial  project.  However,  despite  egregious  acts
undertaken  by  members  of  the  Ruling  Family,  British  policy  towards  repressing
dissenting  members  of  the  Al  Khalifa  was  primarily  co-optation  and  monetary
incentivisation, as the Government of India still wished to pursue direct and indirect
means  of  pacification.  Following  repeated  pressure  by  Major  Daly  for  the
Government of India to do something about the ruling family tyranny, it was generally
agreed that  only in 'glaring cases of oppression' could the political agent intervene,
yet this brought with it a great deal of subjectivity in what was termed oppression.290  
The root of the Al Khalifa's terrorisation of the baḥārna lay in their extortive
practises.  Members  of  the  family who found themselves  hard  up for  cash,  would
either draw money from the customs revenue, or make demands of the baḥārna. As
the Al Khalifa had, prior to the reforms, drawn money without check from customs
revenues291, customs reforms were seen by the British as imperative, as they would
limit  the  shaykhs'  unfettered  borrowing,  and thus  help  to  prevent  them arbitrarily
extorting  baḥārna in order to pay back ever-increasing debts. Various changes were
made. The Director of Muharraq Customs, Jasim al-Shirawi, a good friend of ʿAbd
Allah bin ʿIsa and pecuniary beneficiary of the status quo, was illegally deported by
Major Daly for an 'alleged conspiracy against the Bahrain Order in Council'.292  Now,
on the orders  of the British,  money earned through customs would be distributed
solely  through  the  Privy  Purse  of  the  British-appointed  Hamad.  Members  of  the
Ruling Family who did not step in line would receive no income, a repressive policy
that reflected both a desire to secure control indirectly and pacifically, yet tailored to
undermine the exploitative aspects of Al Khalifa feudalism.
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 In his speech to a Majlis convened to announce Shaikh Hamad's accession as
the Ruler of Bahrain, Political Resident S.G. Knox warned that those [Khalifas] who
did not work in supporting Hamad would live on a 'bare pittance for subsistence', and
those  those  who  committed  mischief  would  be  'cut  off  absolutely  and  punished
accordingly'.293 This had notable impacts in the future. In 1929, for example, the Amir
did not want to reduce Shaykh ʿAbd Allah's payment from the civil list for fear he
would cause trouble.294 The effectiveness of the Civil List in co-opting the Al  Khalifa
was evidenced in 1959, when. in a private meeting with British official H.C.G. Lian,
Khalifa  bin Muhammad said  that  none of  the Al Khalifa  dared  put  a  foot  wrong
because the Ruler 'held the purse strings and could cut off an allowance when he
pleased'.295 
By introducing the Civil List, and by deposing ʿIsa and instating Hamad as
Amir, the British mitigated the Al Khalifa's ability to extract wealth arbitrarily and
violently as they had done in the past.  Yet ultimately the Civil List was a form of
socialism for the rich and corrupt, for it sought to repress the elite classes by giving
them access  to  funds on the  explicit  condition  that  they;  a)  ceased to  oppose  the
British reforms b) fall in line with Hamad's rule and stop oppressing the  baḥārna.
The Civil  List was also a form of material repression, the purpose of which was to
ameliorate  dissent  by  giving  the  tribal  shaykhs  other  sources  of  income  beyond
extortion and customary privileges, and by limiting the improvidence of Al Khalifa
shaykhs by defining a fixed income. 
While  the  British  believed  ensuring  the  unity  of  the  Ruling  Family  was
imperative in creating a functioning government, and ending anti British agitation and
the oppressive practises of the tribal shaykhs, it also created a vested interest group
with access  to  massive power and wealth.  In  the future,  revenues accruing to  the
ruling family, and their protectiveness of this now British-created right, would be a
key  grievance  among  Bahrain's  increasingly  politically  aware  population,  itself
highlighting the short-sightedness of British policy in Bahrain. In fact, the Civil List
and  payment  to  the  Privy  Purse  accounted  for  about  25% of  mean  annual  state
revenue between 1922 and 1971.296 
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Legacy of the Civil List and other Forms of  Restraining the Al Khalifa
The  payments  to  the  Ruler  and  the  Ruling  Family  were  certainly  a  source  of
contention, especially in the 1950s, when the Ruler asked that his personal income be
removed from annual financial reports to avoid embarrassment.297 Even in 1942, the
Privy Purse was explicitly mentioned as a source of tension. Indeed, social problems
as  a  result  of  economic  stagnation  were  particularly  outrageous  given  the  ruling
family's  share  of  the  state's  revenues.  As  a  form  of  repression,  the  cost  of  this
particular method was exorbitant. While some British agents believed in limiting the
Civil List, it was generally believed that tolerating the costs associated with it were
better than generating dissent within the ruling family. Indeed, it was acknowledged at
the time that the main source of trouble in the Gulf at the time came from within
ruling  families  themselves,  and  that  overall  political  stability  often  came  from
securing the unity of the ruling elite. For the British, preserving the material power of
the Ruling Family facilitated a social structure in Bahrain conducive to British needs.
Although this enforced fiscal responsibility came at a great cost to Bahrainis,  Charles
Belgrave felt that aggressive attempts to limit the Civil List would risk ceding his
influence  over  Hamad.   Certainly,  for  a  social  group who had sought  power  and
extracted wealth through means of piracy and feudalism, fiscal forms of repression
were an effective means of ensuring the unity of the Al Khalifa family and ensuring
continued British influence until Independence.
In addition to the Civil List, the British took other measures to force an end to
Al Khalifa agitation. The Al Khalifas were banned by the British in the 1930s from
selling their land to anyone else but other Al Khalifas.298 This was done to stop Al
Khalifa shaykhs selling off their ancestral land at low prices, an issue which led to
them becoming destitute and either pestering Shaykh Hamad for more money from
the Civil List or extorting members of the public. Gifts of land given by the ruler to
his relatives were also an issue, as they included large villages and districts, and the
same plots were often  re-gifted, leading to confusion as to who actually owned what.
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This  reform  would,  the  British  believed,  'do  more  than  anything  else  to  stop
oppression of Shiahs', owing to the fact their land would not be constantly usurped
and regifted to the Al Khalifa's tribal allies.299 
It was eventually decided that gift holders could only keep the property in their
lifetime, and that after death the property should revert to the ruler. This Belgrave
noted, would help Hamad 'establish his authority over his family', and strengthen his
ability to continually reaffirm his patronage networks.300 However, this issue would
sew the seeds for a future of contention, for it was Al Khalifa land ownership and
expropriation  that  formed  the  basis  of  modern  day accusations  of  corruption  and
greed.  The Civil List and the Privy Purse represents the vestiges of political control
rooted in Britain's  ambiguous position towards Bahrain.  They were a  product  and
repressive choice born from the 'middle course'  between stronger intervention and
allowing the Al Khalifa to run rampant. Yet while originally designed to 'remove the
worst features of Arab misrule',301 the reform 'overran its original limited objective'.302
The British lack of desire to take an even firmer stand has prompted a
legacy of problem. In the case of land, the Agency accepted that all they could do was
mitigate future damage, rather than rectify old wrongs;  'Nearly all the property of the
Shaikss [sic] has been looted from Bahrainis in the lifetime of Shaikh Easa. It would
be impossible and undesirable to try to right these old cases now but sufficient we
could put a stop to further exploitation of the shaih [sic] subjects'.  303 Indeed, Daly
noted that most gardens confiscated from the 'original owners'  [baḥārna] occurred
under ʿIsa's rule, and that they new now owned about two thirds of the gardens, very
few of which had been obtained legally.304  The land policies designed to benefit the
baḥārna and police the Al Khalifa have now resulted in an Al Khalifa monopoly of
land ownership that reflects their initial conquest. 
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Rewards, Makramāt and Sanctions
Rentierism and Patronage 
Despite the curtailing of the Civil List in 1971, the Al Khalifa family has grown, a
problem once foreseen by British official C.G. Prior, who noted they were 'breeding
like rabbits'.  305 Thus maintaining the unity of this power elite has necessitated the
bestowing of privilege to other family members, this time via institutions of state,
whether in the forms of ministerial roles, land, or other favours. The need to ensure
the unity of a power elite with ever dwindling resources has led to a form of Al
Khalifa cronyism that is itself a source of tension with the public, but also a means of
ensuring their continued position of power.  Interestingly, this form of repression has
resulted in an underlying structure of kleptocratic ethnocracy. That is to say, the ruling
family continue to maintain unity through the disbursement of privilege to mostly
Sunni allies, and by doing so antagonise large swathes of the population who are not
beneficiaries of  what they feel  entitled to.  Whereas personal  financial  difficulties
impacted upon the baharna, there is evidence to suggest that post-independence, the
Saudis bore the brunt of this cost, thus helping continue the consolidation of the unity
of the ruling family. As Francis Trew noted in 1985, 'Apart from the official economic
support, the Saudis helped the Amir and other members of his family out of some of
their personal financial difficulties'.306 
Upon the consolidation of the Al Khalifa regime under the British, the process
of state building necessitated the creation of social services, specialised offices, and
institutions.  Inherent within this process is inevitably the provision of opportunities,
jobs, and life chances to members of the public. While the provision of such 'rewards'
to ward off discontent can be framed within broader aspects of problem depletion, the
Bahrain example often highlights how such benefits are a common form of repression
designed to divide or maintain loyalties, fragment opposition, or remove the brunt of
popular discontent.   The ruling core has an unrestricted discretion that can enhance or
weaken the influence enjoyed by intermediary patrons. This has been enabled by the
regime's monopoly on positions of power and government, which have allowed them
to be the ultimate arbiters in this system of selective patronage.   As Khalaf writes,
'Loyalty to the regime of divergent, and among themselves conflicting, forces have
305C.G. Prior to the Political Resident, '28 July 1929, RoB, vol. 4, p. 483. 
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been maintained through an elaborate segmented system of intermediary patrons. On
the top of the segmented pyramid of patrons stands the Amir himself, as a supreme
patron'.307  
The  acquisition  of  oil  was  particularly  significant,  as  it  allowed  the
government to ward of discontent by investing in social welfare programs that attempt
to positively 'privilege' citizens, assuming their loyalty did not waver. Oil also made it
possible for the Al Khalifa to allocate a monthly stipend to the  '2500-3000 members
of  the  ruling  family  according  to  an  elaborate  classification'.308 In  addition,  these
resources allowed the ruling family to disburse rewards in the  'form of employment,
cash, and plots of land'.309 This administrative reform was constantly pushed forward
under British protection, who were particularly mindful that the benefits accruing to
the Ruling Family could not continue without some semblance of wealth sharing.  It
follows then that the British would occasionally warn the Al Khalifa that they were
not obligated to help them should they face internal dissent.310 
Declining British Influence 
The build-up to  Bahrain's  Independence  in  1971,  and the  resultant  withdrawal  of
British military forces prompted much concern about Bahrain's security,  especially
given that British protection had hitherto restrained the Al Khalifa, and deterred or
contained  oppositional  movements.  While  the  Al  Khalifa's  used  Independence  to
promote the idea that, now unfettered from the strictures of British colonialism,  they
were better able to meet the needs of their people through the announcement of a
constitution,  the  use  of  makramāt to  placate  potentially  restive  citizens  was  not
abandoned.   Indeed,  it  was  still  encouraged by  the  British.  Andrew Sterling,  the
British  Ambassador  to  Bahrain  in  1970,  noted;  'Bahrain's  attainment  of  full
independence, a 12.5 per cent pay rise of Government employees, the redemption of
the Amir's debts and the waiving of instalments due on the purchase of Government
houses  took  the  edge  off  discontent'.311 Britain  felt  that  these  moves  to  stave  off
revolution had to  be pushed  'hard...if  anything is  actually to be done'.312 Andrew
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Sterling  also  noted  that,  'these  domestic  reforms  cannot  be  a  sure  guard  against
revolution but they can make the revolutionaries' task longer and harder'.313 
These comments came at a time where Britain acknowledged that its already
limited internal influence was further giving way in light of Bahrain's sovereignty.
Instead, British attempts at retaining stability in Bahrain, and dousing revolutionary
urges  centred  around  the  encouragement  of  certain  factors.  They  argued  that
economic  conditions  needed  to  remain  good  and  that  the  Government  needed  to
identify  itself  more  closely  with  the  people.  They  also  hoped  for  no  hostile
propaganda  campaigns  from Egypt.  If  these  conditions  could  be  maintained,  'the
present regime's chances of survival appreciably beyond are none too bad'.314  The
lack of a military deterrent meant that British influence was best achieved through
diplomacy.  Sterling stated that although these 'non-military means of influence were
disrespectfully christened Operation Figleaf....a fig leaf is not to be despised when it
covers the awkward evidence of castration'.315Despite this fig leaf, the British stressed
the  importance  of  British  personnel  in  the  police,   noting  that  if  Colonel  Ian
Henderson were to leave, then subversion would be 'more difficult to contain'.316 
Growing Saudi Influence 
Methods of repression through patronage were assisted by the sky-rocketing of oil
prices after the oil crisis of 1973. The subsequent revenue accruing to oil producing
states,  like  Bahrain,  allowed  the  Al  Khalifa  regime,  now  increasingly  under  the
patronage of Saudi, to fall back on policies of rentierism and patronage. With  this
Saudi  patronage,  came  Saudi  influence.  As  was  noted  in  1974,  'Bahrain  is
economically,  and  therefore  politically,  very  dependent  on  Saudi  Arabia'.317 This
method was described as  'Ian's recipe'. As Tesh Notes; 'Ian's recipe, incidentally, is a
Saudi  –  Bahrain  Treaty  of  Friendship  specifying  the  right  of  each  to  help  other
maintain law and order, followed by a big programme of social welfare spending'. 318 
Broadly speaking, in 1974, the British noted that the 'increase in revenue has
enabled  the  Government  to  embark  on  a  whole  range  of  additional  social  and
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infrastructure projects as well as schemes for development aimed at the “formation of
a modern industrial state”'.319National minimum wage was increased, food subsidies
increased,  and  the  cost  of  living  controlled.320  While  the  Bahraini  government's
policy  was  still  to  'deal  firmly  with  the  political  labour  agitators',  until  further
modernization had taken place,321 agitators engaged in some short stoppages were not
treated simply with force. Tesh notes that in 1974, 26 of the 27 labour disputes ' had
been settled, or were in the process of being settled, by the processes of mediation,
statutory conciliation, and statutory arbitration provided by the Labour Ordinance of
1957'.322In  1975,  the  salaries  of  Civil  Servants  and  parastatal  employees  (ALBA
,BAPCO, Aviation)  were  increased  by 15% to  defuse  'the  main  source  of  labour
discontent'. 323The increase in oil revenues also allowed electricity bills to be halved,
and it was hoped that such measures would 'convince the Bahraini man in the street
that he is better off with this regime than with any conceivable alternative'.324 
Where ideological confrontations were necessary, Shi‘a Islamists were often
appeased with token gestures that were 'patently paternalistic and designed to secure
their quiescence',325  such as the tightening of alcohol provision during Ramadan.326
Likewise, the government allowed them to 'blow off steam'  through protests even if
they  had  no  intention  of  meeting  demands.327  However,  this  superficial  reform
marked a reassertion of Saudi-facilitated tribal  makramāt, as opposed to continued
commitment to democratic reform and a closer identification with its people through
democracy, which had been encouraged strongly by the British since at least 1963.  In
1976 the British noted that with the 'sycophantic attitude of the local press towards the
country [Saudi]',328   and the 'stream of official visits',329   and the 'proliferation of
projects built with Saudi aid' that Bahrain was 'rapidly becoming a Saudi pensioner'.330
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For oil-poor Bahrain, moving closer into Saudi's orbit meant the resurgence of
Rentier  politics.   Without  Saudi  largesse,  and  the  money  from the  economically
shared,  but  Saudi-controlled  oilfield  Abu  Safah,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to
implement these costly policies, which have deferred or depleted some demands for
further political pluralisation. Yet, as Given notes, 'Circuses to supplement bread are a
very  old-fashioned  remedy for  discontent,  but  notoriously  ineffective  in  the  long
run'.331   It is difficult to determine how effective these  makramāt were, but they at
least reflect perhaps the intentions of the regime. After all, it was 'Saudi displeasure at
Bahrain's parliamentary experiment',332 that preceded Saudi agreement 'to help finance
certain  economic  reforms and development  schemes',333 indicating  that  such goals
were pursued in order to mitigate demands for democracy.  
The oil boon also allowed Saudi Arabia, described by 'GoB leaders'  as 'the
“backbone” to stability on the Arab side of the Gulf',334 to finance or underwrite arms
sales for Bahrain, including the procurement of rockets, or the retransfer of military
equipment. Yet while the procurement of arms for military purposes may be seen as a
means  of  buttressing  newfound sovereignty without  British  protection,  the  Saudis
made it clear that they wished to buy the arms themselves, as they could then gain
political  leverage  by being the parties  to  give  over  the  weapons to  Bahrain.  In  a
discussion on Bahrain's desire to purchase 2.75 inch rockets,  one US cable reported
in  1978,  'Mansouri  [Foreign  Ministry  Undersecretary]  said  SAG  [Saudi  Arabian
Government] would prefer to purchase the rockets themselves since SAG is footing
the bill.  This  was so SAG could have the benefit  of some political  leverage over
GOB'.335 Indeed, even Bahrain's defence purchases were kept on a tight Saudi leash.
As Roger Tomkys noted about the BDF's decision to buy British-made Hawks; 'The
contracts may still come as the Amir wishes but Saudi Arabia holds the purse strings
tight and will continue to have the real say'.336 In the end, the Saudis handed down
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their 'superseded F5s', implying that they did not want the Bahrainis to have superior
equipment. Unsurprisingly, this lack of independence,the inevitable consequences of
which were a lack of a strategic depth, meant that Bahrain 'looked to Saudi Arabia,
and  particularly the  Saudi  Air  Force,  to  protect  it  against  any overspill  from the
[Iran/Iraq]'.337 
For their part,  the British certainly believed post-Independence that positive
economic performance led for less agitation. While this largesse cannot be ignored in
terms of its effect on placating the population, the main issue is that the distribution
of these resources was uneven, discriminatory, and plagued by corruption. In many
cases, it  simply increased the Al Khalifa monopolization of land and commerce, a
problem that was growing more acute through the 1970s and 1980s338. As a result,
underlying grievances such as discrimination were not addressed, and the oil price dip
in the 1990s exposed this, forcing spending cuts and reducing the government's ability
to fight contentious activity with a carrot-only policy.339 The failure to secure funding
for modernization projects in sectors such as Bahrain's heavy industry also shrank
opportunities for employment, generating protest.340 Meanwhile, the Shiʿa continued
to face alienation. As one merchant told the Washington Post, 'We are totally kept out
of all the major ministries. . . . If you switch on the TV, there is not a single program
that refers to us, our history, our folklore, our geography. We are nothing'.341
The growth of the GCC and the combined fears of traditional monarchies of
Bahrain's  unrest,  has  resulted in  Gulf  regimes attempting to  salvage the policy of
makramāt and blatant  paternalism in order  to abrogate any true form of  inclusive
politics.  As a reaction to the beginning of unrest in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia raised
Bahrain's  allotment  from  Abu  Safah  from  70,000  barrels  a  day,  to  100,000.  An
increase  in  intensity  of  unrest  simply  resulted  in  Saudi  giving  Bahrain  the  full
allocation of 140,000.342  In addition to this, 'Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates reportedly resumed annual subsidies of $50 million each to Bahrain's
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rulers343 following the onset of the political unrest at the end of 1994'.344 In addition,
the recommendation of a consultative council was put forward, an idea believed to
have  been  '95  percent  made  in  Saudi  Arabia',  according  to  one  businessman
interviewed by Human Rights Watch.345 The proposal reflected Saudi's own attitude to
domestic trouble, as they were, according to Pascal Menoret, rejecting any political
infitah (opening) at the time. 346
This  policy of  'ignoring the protests  while  trying to improve standards  of
living'347 has had a questionable impact upon unrest, yet reflects the Gulf monarchies'
fear of democratic empowerment.  Following the outbreak of the unrest in 2011, the
ruling family offered 1,000 dinars to every family in March 2011, shortly after the
outbreak of protests.348  Concerned Bahrain's instability may be a bellwether for their
own autocratic regimes, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offered a $21 billion aid
package (“Marshall Plan”) to Bahrain.349 Given the salience of housing grievances,
$5.56 billion of this was earmarked for the building of 47,000 – 57,000 houses.350 
Although this general policy of patronage has continued to the present day, it
has clearly not been enough, especially when the ideological inclinations of protesters
have  constantly  moved  beyond  simple  demands  for  improved  living  standards.
Indeed,  as  al-Naqeeb noted,  'the effective  monopoly of  the  sources  of  power and
wealth which the ruling elites practise, creates “mobility closures” in society which
will lead, with the passage of time, to increasing friction between social classes and
ranks'.351 Yet despite these internal interventions promoting this  form of repressive
rentierism, it is questionable how sustainable it is.  Not only does the reliance of the
343It is interesting that unrest in Bahrain often results in the GCC pouring money into Bahrain, via the 
rulers. It would be interesting, yet difficult given the ruling family's secretive accounts, to see how 
such money was distributed, or found its way into the pockets of elites. Rampant corruption could 
make unrest in Bahrain a lucrative business. 
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Al Khalifa on traditional makramāt and patronage highlight the deficit of democracy
in Bahrain, but also the unwillingness to rectify it. 
Sanctioning and the Withdrawing of 'Privilege' 
'My third piece of advice is in regards to rewards and punishments, the
two principal functions of a ruler'352
Just as state benefits have been framed as a benevolent form of gratuity in exchange
for loyalty, the imbibing of a reward and punish culture among Bahrain's Al Khalifa
dominated institutions have meant that a failure to be loyal has prompted a withdrawal
of these 'privileges'. The importance of loyalty as a particularistic form of repression
is evident in the statements of the government, and in particular the Al Khalifa, who
constantly emphasise the importance of 'loyal citizens'.353During the 2011 Uprising,
the Sayeghra family set up a campaign and encouraged people to come and pledge
their loyalty to the King by signing an allegiance oath. Bahrainis were invited to the
National Stadium to sign the pledge, with many fearing that if they did not, there
would  be  recriminations.  These  fears  were  underlined  by  the  fact  many  of  the
signatures  would  be  engraved  on  a  'sword  of  allegiance',  which  would  then  be
presented to the King.354
Such  tactics  existed  as  early  as  the  1920s,  when  Manama  residents  were
'coerced' into signing a pledge showing their approval of Shaykh ʿIsa Al Khalifa to the
British.355 Similarly,  in  the  1920s,  co-opted  baḥārna  tried  to  force  disgruntled
Bahrainis  to  sign these documents,  at  least  to  give  the impression  that  they were
content.356 While  such  petitions  were  discouraged  under  the  British,  their  re-
emergence in the 1990s has highlighted a reassertion of tribal politics. In one instance,
Rashid bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa, the head of the General Organization for Youth and Sports,
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forced Shiʿa clubs based in Sanabis and Diraz to sign loyalty pledges to the Amir, in a
move  designed  to  humiliate  them.357 Reflecting  an  animalistic,  dehumanising
discourse,  itself  indicative  of  the  Al  Khalifa's  perception  of  the  Shiʿa  underclass,
Shaykh  Rashid  bin  ‘Isa  Al  Khalifa  was  reported  to  have  said  about  the  eventual
acquiescence to the petitions, 'You see, they came like dogs'.358
This  punishment  highlights  the  continued  existence  of  a  sense  of  feudal
entitlement within the ruling elite. Often, this withdrawal of privilege as formed the
basis  of collective punishment, a fact spurned on by the rise of a number of factors,
mostly notably an increase in sectarianism following Saudi's growing influence, the
reassertion  of  Al Khalifa  dominance without  British  control,   and an increasingly
belligerent  stance that resulted from post revolutionary Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War.
Yet,  discrimination  against  the  Shi‘a  and  baḥārna predated  this,  and  collective
punishment is perhaps more a reversion to the pre-British age of Al Khalifa tyranny,
rather than something new.  
Privilege  Deprivation 
Over the years, and due to the changing nature of the modern state,  withdrawal of
privilege  has taken the form of employment deprivation  and other means of lowering
life chances of oppositional elements. During the 1990s, when the Islamist nature of
Bahrain's largely Shiʿa opposition was more prevalent, collective punishment in the
form of withdrawing state  utilities was a form of repression enabled by Bahrain's
inherently  sectarian  topography.  This  topography  was  the  result  of  Sunni  urban
centres  such as  Manama and Muharraq  being prioritised in  development  over  the
more historically rural baḥārna. Villages like Jidd Hafs and Bilad al-Qadim  became
suburbs of Manama that lacked both modern housing and adequate public services.
Indeed,  this  urban  manipulation  decreased  the  chance  of  the  Shiʿa  underclass
integrating into the socio-economic fabric of modern Bahrain, which in turn has led to
a culture of  marginality,  underdevelopment  and political/religious  militancy whose
capacity for mobilisation draws on the historical memory of old rural and agricultural
357 Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in 
Bahrain, 1997. 
358 Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in 
Bahrain, 1997.  
92 
communities.359 Unsurprisingly,  this  culture  of  marginality  has  resulted  in  the
ghettoisation  of  some  Shi‘a  villages,  a  feature  which  facilitated  certain  forms  of
communal/collective punishment. For example;
By the fall of 1997, the security services started punishing communities
that provided material  and moral support  to the protesters.  Supplies of
electricity and water  were periodically shut  off  to  predominantly Shi"i
residential districts. Mysterious fires destroyed the homes and businesses
of suspected dissidents. The military commander in charge of the National
University abruptly cancelled mid-year examinations, disrupting students’
progress to- ward their degrees.360
Employment and Educational
As Bahrain moved towards industrialisation, those who had formerly been involved in
more subsistence  forms  of  income generation such as  farming or  fishing,  became
reliant on salaried labour. These big changes, as Tilly argued, affect 'the interests and
the  organization  of  various  contenders  for  power,  and  thereby  affected  their
mobilization and collective action'.361 In this instance, these changes created greater
dependency of the new industrial classes on the benevolence of the tribal overlords,
who maintained extensive influence on the offices and industries of state. As a result,
employment deprivation has become a more noticeable tactic, especially when non-
existent or weak unions were unable to resist state-sanctioned actions, and especially
when certain professions are dominated by Shi‘a employees. 
In 1956, the government threatened to cut the salaries of employees who did
not go to work during strikes by the HEC.362 In June 1974, 113 employees of ALBA
were dismissed after the Ministry of the Interior declared the strikes illegal.363 As well
as being prevalent in the public sector, which is perhaps less surprising, it is also true
of  the  private  sector.  There  have  also  been  examples  of  high  level  Al   Khalifa
complicity in enabling foreign companies to rid themselves on unruly labour. In one
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instance,  an  American  construction  firm,  Brown and  Root,  and  its  'local  civilian
labour contractor...were allowed to by-pass the Labour Ministry, involve the Prime
Minister, and lay off, with doubtful legality a number of labourers'.364In this case we
see corruption and cronyism influencing repressive choices, especially at a time when
the ruling family, through their business practises, were acquiring more of a stake in
aspects of Bahrain's  commerce,  industry,  and trade.  As Franklin notes,  'As the oil
industry developed, the ruling family acquired a source of revenue sufficient to make
it the wealthiest segment of society. In recent years this gap between the rulers and the
people has greatly widened. The ruling family and its allies are now well integrated
into the administrative machinery, and are in a particularly good position to exploit
the  growth of  the  real  estate  market'.365 As  a  consequence,  this  personal  stake  in
Bahrain's  commercial  success  resulted  in  perhaps  a  more  conservative  attitude  to
dissent, especially when that dissent impacted on an increasingly wider net of vested
interests. 
 The tactic of removing people from their jobs became more acute in the 1990s,
when people were dismissed from their jobs simply for making political demands,
highlighting this reassertion of a  makramāt for loyalty mentality in the provision of
jobs and services.   In 1995, a number of the sponsors of a popular petition demanding
the reinstating of the 1973 National Assembly were arrested, including, Shaykh ‘Abd
al-Amir  al-Jamri  and  ‘Abd  al-Wahab  Husayn  ‘Ali.  Others  faced  non-custodial
punishments. For example, Sa‘id ʿAbd Allah 'Asbul, was dismissed from his job at the
Ministry of Works and Electricity after resisting pressure by the authorities to take his
name  off  the  petition.366 At  the  end  of  March  1995,  a  petition  sponsored  by  20
professional women and signed by 200 others was handed to the Amir. Although its
requests were reasonable, calling for the Amir to initiate a national dialogue, and 'to
restore democratic rights and to ensure that the rights of those held in custody are
respected....a number of them were threatened with dismissal from their jobs if they
failed to withdraw their names from the petition and to "apologise" for their action'.367
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At least two of them, ‘Aziza al-Bassam and Hasa al-Khumayri, were dismissed368 On
April 1995 seven teachers369 and several of their pupils were arrested at Madinat 'Isa
Secondary School for Girls, and then dismissed from their jobs, reportedly when the
authorities discovered that a demonstration was to be held at school. 370 Others, such
as Sa'id al-Asbul, were dismissed from their work for being involved in the petition
campaign,  and  also  blacklisted  from obtaining  other  work  following  government
intervention.371
As a matter of policy, the unrest in the 1990s prompted measures to securitise
the  Shiʿa  problem,  enforcing  discrimination  through  institutional  changes.  Most
notably, the reformist technocrat ‘Ali Fakhro was replaced as Minister of Education
by General ʿAbd al-Aziz al-Fadhil, who had been previously in charge of training in
the  BDF.  Soon,  al-Fadhil,  along  with  another  former  BDF  Officer,  Colonel
Muhammad  Jasim  al-Ghattam,  replaced  Dr.  Ibrahim  al-Hashmi  as  president  of
Bahrain University. After this change, increased discrimination of Shiʿa applications,
as well as the purging of Shiʿa from senior positions was evident.372 Unconfined to the
educational sector, Human Rights Watch noted numerous unconfirmed reports of new
hiring and firing policies designed to reduce the number of Shiʿa in ministries and
state companies formerly considered to be Shiʿa employment redoubts, such as the
Ministry  of  Electricity  and  Public  Works  and  BATELCO,  the  state
telecommunications company'.373 
While documentation and the circulation of information has improved since
the 1990s, the Uprising in 2011 saw on an unprecedented scale the use of mass lay-
offs  to  punish  those  who  had  engaged  in  strikes  that  were  actually  'within  the
permissible bounds  of the law'.374  The BICI report notes that 'during the events of
February/March  2011,  2,075  public  sector  employees  and  2,464  private  sector
employees were dismissed'. 375 According to the ITUC, many of those dismissed were
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prominent trade union leaders, further diminishing the organizational capacity of the
movement.376 While  the government  now claim to have reinstated the majority of
those who have lost jobs,  in 2013, two years after the firings, the GFBTU claimed
that 657 workers still had not been reinstated.377 There is little doubt that the purpose
of the lay-offs was to intimidate those engaging in strikes, and to reassert the premise
that the life chances and livelihoods of civilians are dependent on loyalty to the Al
Khalifa-dominated government. 
 In addition to firing, and requiring private companies to fire those accused of
'absenteeism', students, an integral part of the protest movement, were targeted. As
early as 1956, the Bahrain government were reported to have removed the tuition fees
of a critical Bahraini student studying law in London.378 In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Prime  Minister's  conservative  streak  was  was  riled  by  Kuwait's  leniency  with
subversive  elements  generating  unrest  in  Bahrain  and  disappointed  at  Kuwait's
'softness' to its own radicals, the majority of whom were Bahraini nationals studying
at  Kuwait  University.379 As  a  result,  in  1974,  the  Bahraini  government  pressured
Kuwait to expel a Bahraini leftist from University in Kuwait. 
2011   marked  a  deepening  of  this  targeting  of  students,  who  formed  the
mainstay of the opposition, and to whom the government always seemed to have had
an antipathy.  In order to intimidate and raise the costs  for students taking part  or
planning  to  take  part  in  the  protests,  the  government  ordered  the  expulsion  of
hundreds  of  students  from  university,  taking  the  repression  of  students  to  an
unprecedented level  in   Bahrain's  history.  Between March and June of  2011,  427
students were expelled from the University of Bahrain, while another 54 had been
expelled from Bahrain Polytechnic.380 Many of those expelled found it hard to obtain
work or study in universities in the region due to the fact they had been expelled. In
line with the idea of loyalty in exchange for makramāt, UoB later required that that all
students sign a loyalty pledge to the King and the Kingdom of Bahrain. The terms of
the recent pledge stated that those 'who do not sign give up their right to university
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study, and those who break the pledge can be expelled'.381While many were reinstated,
those facing criminal charges were not. The BICI report found too that most students
had  been  expelled  as  a  result  of  investigations  that  relied  on  'hearsay  and
circumstantial evidence'.382In many cases, the only evidence were photographs of the
students attending peaceful demonstrations.383 In addition,  many students had their
scholarships withdrawn as a sanction for engaging in pro-democracy protests. By 31
March 2011, 97 students had had their scholarships revoked.384 Although these were
reinstated with retroactive pay, the message was clear – continue to engage in protest
and face consequences. With many of those students studying abroad, the move also
highlighted the reach of the Al Khalifa-dominated Bahrain government, who could
also exert pressure on students and their families irrespective of their location. While
Mike Diboll attributes this policy to the side lining of a reformist cadre under the
Crown Prince and the rising influence of a cabal of hardliners, including the PM, and
the Khawalid,385 this is debatable. During times of political dissent the ascendency of
hardliners in Bahrainis should be assumed, as matters of security,  especially since
Independence, always seem to be in the hands of the Prime Minister or the anti-reform
cadre that includes the Khawalid. 
The politics  of  loyalty in  exchange for privilege as  a  method to punish or
retaliate  against  those  perceived as  attempting  to  tarnish  Bahrain's  reputation  was
evident in recent democratic elections. Unconfirmed governmental sources announced
that  only those who could prove that  they had voted would be entitled to  certain
provisions and jobs.386 As a result, some people felt intimidated into voting,387 an act
which,  at  the time,  was considered one of support for the government,  who were
attempting to affirm their  democratic  legitimacy to the outside world by flaunting
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high turnout numbers.  Indeed, the scale of the tactic in the recent uprising marks a
new era of state reach into both public and private affairs, highlighting the further
ability of the government to withdraw what are perceived as citizen 'privileges' (e.g.
jobs), as opposed to rights. The fact that democratic engagement directly relates to
one's life chances certainly reflects a punitive nature to the reform process in Bahrain,
one that punishes even the choice of participation. 
Insulation
Exile
While encouraging inclusion in democratic institutions on the basis that they cannot
generate substantive change marks a development in repressive techniques, exclusion
has also been a common method in Bahrain's history.  In the early part of the 20th
century,  the  British  favoured  exile  as  a  form of  repressive  action.  At  a  time  of
relatively poor communication and slow travel, it  was seen as an effective way of
preventing troublemakers from spreading their influence. A main target of these in the
early  days  of  British  reforms  were  fledgling  nationalists  and  members  of  the  Al
Khalifa family not amenable to British influence. Saudi attempts at influence were
also targeted.  Following the Najdi-Persian riots in 1923, in which Knox stated 'it is
unthinkable that Persians are the aggressors'388 the alleged agent of Ibn Saud, Qusaybi,
was arrested and kicked out of Bahrain.
Bahrain's  nascent  nationalism movement  was  also  a  target.  While  scholars
such as Rumaihi believed that representatives of the Bahrain National Congress were
moderates, and tried to reach out to the Shiʿi ʿAbd ʿAli bin Mansur Rajab, Al-Tajjir
argues  that  not  so  much  meeting  took  place.389 Fuccaro  argues  that  the  Bahrain
National Congress (BNC) were inspired by the ideas of governance championed by
the Khilafaat Movement and the Indian National Congress,390 yet the fact that all of
their representatives were Sunni and most of their demands regarded the protection of
traditional  mercantile  privileges  suggests  that  they  were  simply  adopting  a  new
language to resist the British reforms at the expense of the indigenous baḥārna. The
fact that they supported ʿIsa is perhaps the most compelling evidence suggesting their
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desire to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. As a result, the British saw the
Bahrain National Congress as a radical challenge to their reforms, and subsequently
deported its two ringleaders Ahmad bin Lahij and ʿAbd al-Wahab Zayani to Bombay
on  7  November  1923.   Similarly,  when  ʿAbd  Allah  Al  Khalifa  was  working  to
undermine  his  brother  Shaykh Hamad,  Daly exiled two of  his  advisers,  Jasim al-
Shirawi and Hafiz Wahba.391 This process of exile or incarceration of political figures
continued  throughout  the  twenties,  and  while  it  highlighted  growing  British
involvement in Bahrain's internal affairs, it also strengthened their influence vis a vis
the position of Hamad. 
In  the  early days  of  British  reform,  and despite  their  protection  of  the  Al
Khalifa  ruler,  other  members  of  the  ruling family were not  spared  this  treatment,
although stringency on part of the British oscillated wildly depending on what was
seen  as  politically  expedient  at  the  time.  Anti-British  efforts  were  particularly
targeted. In 1929, a man was deported for anti-British propaganda,392 while two men
accused of trying to kill Shaykh Hamad were deported to the Andaman Islands.393
However,  British  attempts  to  punish  the  ruling  family  were  always  met  with
resistance, and some of those expelled by the British returned, such as ʿAli bin Khaled
and  his  brother  Ibrahim.394  Despite  British  anger,  there  was  little  consequence,
highlighting the limitations of British influence.  
 One of the most notable examples of British influence in wholesale exile was
their mass expulsion of the Dawasir, a tribe loyal to the Al Khalifa. They were given
an ultimatum by the British; fall in line with Hamad's rule or leave Bahrain. The tribe,
who would assist the Al Khalifa in overawing the Shiʿa  baḥārna, did not accept the
legitimacy of Hamad's succession. Indeed, they were implicated in a number of gross
acts of terror, including an attack on the village of ʿAli on 19 June  1923 395  that killed
three,  and seriously injured four. They also took 5000 rupees loot (Ibid). Their attacks
were reportedly encouraged by 'Nejd'396, where the Ikhwan were also repressing Shiʿa.
The final straw came after some Shiʿa notables who gave evidence in the case
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against the Dawasir  were murdered, most likely in revenge.  Although some Dawasir
chose to stay in Bahrain and fall in line with Hamad's rule, many left to the Eastern
province of Saudi Arabia. The decision to exile the Dawasir was based on the premise
that they were not falling in line with the British-backed Hamad's rule, and thus their
removal could be justified in accordance with the British treaty with the rulers of
Bahrain.  Resources and the limits of intervention also meant that the  British could
not afford to keep deploying gunboats as a deterrent.  The exile of the Dawasir was
key, as they had been the backbone of resistance to Hamad's rule, and 'their departure
from Bahrain has assisted Hamad to assert his authority more than would ever been
possible had they remained'.397 
While  the  expulsion  of  unreformed  Dawasir  elements  stymied  Al  Khalifa
factionalism by reducing the ruling tribe's military and extractive capabilities over the
baḥārna,  the  emergence  of  political  opposition  with  reformist  and  nationalistic
agendas posed a new challenge for the emerging regime. In particular, the Al Khalifa's
gravy train prompted much discontent and, eager to preserve this position of privilege,
the  Al  Khalifa  were  soon  keen  to  take  advantage  of  the  British  in  dealing  with
opposition.  Ahmed Shirawi, for example, was exiled after riots in 1935.398In 1938,
nationalist forces with loosely democratic ideals were in evidence.  The ringleader,
ʿAli bin Khalifa al-Fadil, was exiled for two and a half years, a comparatively light
sentence for a movement that was considered 'directly against the Government399. It is
also interesting to note that while some suggested the formation of a council of five
Arabs (Sunnis) and five baḥārna, their decisions were to be approved by a committee
headed by Shaykh ʿAbd Allah bin ʿIsa, indicating perhaps another attempt to secure
control over Bahrain's Internal Affairs through the language of reform.400 Hamud bin
Sabah Al Khalifa was also alleged to be mixed up in the agitation, and he had issue
with the British government since his conviction of attacks on baḥārna villages.401 In
the 1950s, and with the rise of the HEC and its general anti-colonial sentiment in the
397'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> [accessed 4 November 2015]
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region, the British sought to stay with the known quantity of the Al Khalifa who, in
exchange for protection, gave the British an important geostrategic foothold in the
region. 
 Less concerned with the political fallout of an exile decision,  the Al Khalifas
were keen to pressure the British to have the leaders of the HEC deported as soon as
possible.402  However, the British were aware decisions seen as heavy handed would
reflect badly on them, especially during rising Arab nationalism in the region. The
British were also worried  that  keeping such popular  leaders  in  Bahrain would  be
problematic, as  the poor prison facilities and lack of security  meant messages could
pass  on  easily  from  the  accused  to  others.403 They  also  worried  their  continued
presence would be a 'constant irritant and keep local agitation alive',404 and sought to
get rid of him by other means. As a half measure, they paid Abd al-Rahman al-Bakir,
the leader of the HEC, 5000 rupees to leave on one occasion, which the British, and
presumably al-Bakir, attempted to keep secret.405 
For lack of a solution, the British resorted to more creative means. When al-
Bakir was out of the country, the British instructed their consulates not to renew his
passport without a reference from Bernard Burrows, the Political Resident.406 This did
not  succeed,  and  the  British  realised  that  that  deportation  of  the  HEC leaders  to
Beirut, Syria or Cairo would result in agitation or the setting up of a 'Free Bahrain
Government'.407  The British also considered  sending two to England,  and two to
Beirut on just a one way ticket, or even the Seychelles. In the end, the three prisoners
were exiled to the island of St. Helena, a move which E.P. Wiltshire of the Political
Agency Bahrain  concluded had 'resulted in a  peaceful four years'.408 He added, 'out
of sight and so almost “out of mind”'.409 In the months following the deportation of the
St.  Helena  three,  others  deemed  to  be  threats  to  security  were  deported,  such  as
schoolteacher  Hassan  Geshi,  and  Bedreech  Khalfan,  a  'young  woman'  who  had
become a 'political leader'.410 Despite Belgrave discouraging the deportation of Geshi,
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who had worked in Bahrain for twenty years, members of the Al Khalifa deported him
without  legal  justification.411 This  authoritarian  learning  was  bolstered  by  an
impression that  such a process  of 'banishment  is  a  traditional  method in the Gulf
States',412 and the general belief in the Gulf was that deportation was 'beneficial to
security'.413 
Despite the British administration's strategising, the political scandal created
by the St. Helena affair made the British more sensitive in their dealing with Bahraini
internal  political  affairs.  The  breakup  of  the  British  empire  and  Bahrain's
Independence also meant that political prisoners could not be whisked away to remote
places where they would be less likely to cause trouble. Yet even as it fell out of
favour with the British,  the ruling family still advocated this method. As J.P. Tripp
notes,  the  'ruling  family'  preferred  the  'clandestine  deportation  of  known
troublemakers',414 such as  ‘Abd Allah Rashid, who was deported in 1960 simply for
distributing leaflets and writing slogans on walls.415 So while this tradition was often
adopted by the British,  it  was  becoming clearer  that  such security decisions were
increasingly being made by the Al Khalifa. 
Consequently, post-Independence there was a marked resurgence of exile as
repression, sometimes en-masse, by the Al Khalifa regime. This course of action was
prompted by the desires  of  the  ruling  core  itself,  and went  against  strong British
suggestions to the contrary. On one occasion in 1982, Ian Henderson complained that
he was 'very concerned over the increasing number of deportations being carried out
by  the  Bahraini  authorities  acting  for  Shaikh  Hamad  or  the  Prime Minister'.  416
Henderson added that the deportations had 'no legal basis', and by the beginning of
1982, about '300 people had by now been deported, many of them Bahraini passport
holders'. 417 It seemed there was also no political threat posed by these Shiʿa, and they
were  just  rounded  up  and  put  on  board  'willy  nilly'.418 While  Ian  Henderson
maintained some degree of influence in Bahrain, he was clearly opposed to what he
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saw as a unilateral move on  the part of the new ruling core to collectively punish the
Shiʿa in general. It also highlighted a worrying aspect of what Tomkys described as a
'multiplicty of pseudo security organisation',419 operating on behalf of members of the
Al Khalifa family.  In July 1982 Tomkys noted that:
 the total number of Bahrainis deported in recent years to Iran is put at
182. In some cases whole families have been deported at short notice on
the  basis  of  a  single  unsubstantiated  allegation  against  one  of  their
members. The legality of their deportation, particularly for those who are
arguably Bahraini rather than Iranian by nationality is doubtful semi colon
nor  is  there  much  political  wisdom  in  the  practice  which  is  bitterly
resented in the Shiʿa community here which may simply serve to provide
recruits for subversive training schools in Iran'.420
This tactic of exile reflects a resurgence of Al Khalifa hegemony, as articulated in
Henderson's  complaint.   However,  this  shift  to  Al  Khalifa  control  of  the  various
security organs, coupled with the Islamic revolution and increasing Saudi influence,
prompted a vindictive policy of  collective punishment  against  the country's  Shiʿa.
While this could suggest individual Al Khalifa prejudice may have manifested itself in
state repression, it also illustrates how regional tension between Saudi and Iran played
out in Bahrain. As the the two main players in what Gregory Gause calls the New
Middle East Cold War,421 government action against the Shiʿa opposition reflects its
ideological commitment of a Sunni pole represented in Saudi Arabia. 
However,  given  that  Henderson  strongly  argued  that  the  policy  would
probably have a negative effect in terms of security, the decision does not necessarily
follow the rational implication that it was done for security reasons. The increasing
criminalisation  of  the  Shiʿa  meant  that  these  deportations  reached  hundreds.
Following  the  Gulf  War,  Amnesty  International  noted  that  hundreds  of  political
dissidents had been exiled. Amnesty also note that 'hundreds of Bahraini nationals that
had been expelled from the country... attempted to return to the country, including
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whole  families'.422  They  added  that  'scores  of  people  were  permitted  to  return
although usually after more than one unsuccessful attempt. Many others, however,
were denied entry'.423   The same trend of exile and deportation occurred in the 1990s,
when Shiʿa  religious political  figures were targeted.  In January 1995, the Bahrain
authorities exiled at least eleven Bahrainis upon their return to the country.424 In 1995,
the  arrest  of  ʿAli  Salman,  a  prominent  Shiʿa  religious  figure  and  critic  of  the
government,  prompted a chain of events that resulted in the  forcible exile of Ali
Salman and two other religious scholars, Hamza al-Dayri, and Sayyid  Haydar al-
Sitri.425 Salman was seen as the driver of a signature petition for reform, and was
probably targeted because of this.426 Human Rights Watch noted that this tendency to
forcibly exile people stood Bahrain apart not just in the Middle East, but in the world,
stating that roughly 500, mostly Shiʿa, Bahrainis had perhaps been exiled by 1995,
with 128 being deported in 1993 alone.427
However, while this form of exile is against International Law, it  seems to
have abated  in  the  recent  uprising.  Having said  that,  the  intimidation  of  political
dissidents has prompted many to flee Bahrain, resulting in an involuntary exile. For
Bahrain in the 21st century, it is harder to send people abroad, legally, and  it is now
assumed  ideologues,  activists,  or  dissidents  can  foment  unrest  from distant  lands.
Indeed, while exile may have seemed like a solution sixty years ago,  we see now
Bahrain putting pressure on Britain to hand over convicts sentenced in absentia living
in Britain. With an empire, Britain had some latitude with where they could deport
convicts. However, even this was not effective, and frequently exiled convicts would
stir up trouble abroad or return to Bahrain and stir up trouble. 
In the recent Uprising, a number of US officials have been asked to leave by
the  Bahrain  government  for  their  perceived  support  of  the  opposition.  Thomas
Malinowski,  US  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Democracy,  Human  Rights  and
Labor, was expelled from Bahrain after he met with representatives  of Al Wefaq.428
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Ludo Hood, an American diplomat, was withdrawn after the US government feared
for his  life,  following a loyalist  backlash at  footage of  him giving Krispy Kreme
doughnuts to protesters. Like Hood, US envoy Thomas Krajeski was the subject of a
petition endorsed by nine Sunni Islamist societies, who claimed he was 'interfering in
political matters' and giving support to the opposition.429 The focus of attacks on US
diplomats reflects the US's less sycophantic position to Bahrain (as opposed to the
UK's more obsequious foreign policy), and also highlights how international lobbying
by opposition groups has been a notable feature of the recent uprising. Indeed, this
deterritorialization  of  protest  and  advocacy  has  warranted  the  need  for  adaptive
responses by the Al Khalifa regime. 
Shaping Civil Society 
Removal of Citizenship and Naturalisation 
Through a process of  'manipulating entry or exit in reference to polity or sub polity
boundaries',430 the  Al  Khalifa  regime  have  attempted  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of
persons  with  ideologically  opposing  views  from infiltrating  Bahrain,  whether  the
country itself,  or its institutions.  With this in mind, popular sanctions common in
Bahrain's history include the removal of citizenship of the regime's political enemies.
In 1956, the Bahrain government removed the citizenship of Abu al-Rahman Bakir,
who  was  also  the  editor  of  a  newspaper  critical  of  the  Bahraini  government.  In
addition to this, notable Shiʿi  figure  ʿAbd al-Hadi Al -Mudarrasi  was stripped of
citizenship and deported in 1981.431 Between 2011 and 2015, the Bahraini government
removed the citizenship of at least 72 citizens, a move which actually contravened
Bahrain's nationality law.432 Unfortunately,  this  disregard of law, both international
and local, typifies a shift  to this state of exception,  where the resurgence of tribal
politics is evident, as it highlights how even citizenship is a gift bestowed by the ruler,
as opposed to an an inalienable right enjoyed by Bahrainis. 433 ‘Ali Shucair notes that
429 Gulf Daily News, 'Societies Seek to Expel Envoy', 12 June 2013, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=355162, (Accessed 12 
May 2015). 
430A. Turk, Political Criminality, p. 160. 
431BICI Report, p. 29.
432 Al Jazeera, 'Bahrain Strips 72 of Citizenship for “Harming” Kingdom', 31 January 2015, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/bahrain-strips-72-citizenship-harming-
kingdom-150131140438495.html, (Accessed 2 October 2015). 
433Ibid.
105 
stripping citizenship represents a shift from merely punitive, to tyrannical, ' since the
Bahraini judiciary is not only issuing prison sentences against opposition members for
5 to 15 years, but also depriving them of their citizenship'.434Abdulhadi Khalaf argues
that in 'Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, threatening to revoke — or not
renew — one's citizenship has become one of the tools used by security forces to
control citizens, as well as a form of punishment for those whom the authorities wish
to  deny  their  generosity'.435 In  addition  to  this,  distrust  of  the  country's  Shiʿa
population has prompted mass deportations of workers. In 2011, Bahrain announced
that  they  were  deporting  16  Lebanese  nationals  they  claimed  had  links  to
Hezbollah.436 Although the decision was reneged on, other countries in the region such
as the UAE went ahead with the expulsion of hundreds of Shiʿa, pointing to a region
wide surge in sectarian-fuelled securitization.437
The  government  has  also  sought  to  strengthen  its  position  and  weaken
opposition  by  boosting  its  own popularity  vis  a  vis  the  issuing  of  citizenship  to
foreign, Sunni nationals, reflecting a growing sectarian issue in the region exacerbated
undoubtedly by Saudi influence and the fear of Shi‘a expansionism. The government
has reportedly naturalised thousands of foreign citizens, in a 'decade-long program of
naturalizing foreign Sunnis in return for police and military service'.438  One financial
times journalist described the Ruling Family attempting to build a 'cordon sanitaire'
around it, naturalising between 8000 and 10000 Sunnis from Pakistan, Jordan, Syria
and Yemen during the perceived Shiʿa uprising in 1998.439This naturalisation and use
of migrant labour ensures that oppositional movements will always have to contend
with either docile labour or a cadre of naturalized government loyalists, reducing the
likelihood of  broad-based popular  resistance to  the regime.  Because citizenship  is
contingent  on  continued  loyalty,  potential  dissidents  among  these  ranks  may,  in
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theory, be easily disposed of through de-naturalization and deportation.  Through the
removal of citizenship from dissidents, and the naturalization of those seen as likely to
be pro-government, the government have undertaken social engineering designed to
make citizens more amenable to the ideological inclinations of the ruling elite. 
The policy also seems to demonstrate a direct reneging on the British policies
of  the  first  half  of  the  20th century.  For  example,  the  descendants  of  the
aforementioned Sunni Dawasir tribe have also been largely repatriated by the Bahraini
government, with up to 20,000 reported to be holding dual Bahrain-Saudi citizenship
permitted under a Decree Law of 2002. A  video by the Bahrain Center for Human
Rights documented that the Dawasir living in Damman (Saudi Arabia) were voting in
the Bahrain elections on the Bahrain-Saudi causeway while  also obtaining housing
and state  benefits  from the government.440 When asked who they voted for in the
elections,  a number of them mentioned that the Chief of the Dosari (Dawasir) tribe,
ʿAli bin ʿIsa, told them who to vote for.441  Through ʿAli bin ʿIsa, the regime ensured
that  the Dawasir  voted for a  pro-government  candidate.  The film caused a  stir  in
Bahrain, prompting a parliamentary enquiry, yet this was deliberately scuppered by
the government's  insistence that naturalisation cases prior to a Decree of 2002, or
those 'special cases' determined by the 1963 Naturalization Law, be exempted. Given
that virtually all cases fell under one of these laws, the investigation yielded little
fruit.442 
In 2006, the problem of naturalization and anti-Shia discrimination became
more acute again after perceived Shiʿa empowerment under Maliki's government in
Iraq. Salah al-Bandar, an adviser to the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, was deported after
he blew the whistle on the actions of a cabal closely linked to the Al Khalifa family,
who  he  alleged  were  engaged  in  'conspiracy  to  rig  the  elections,  manipulate  the
country’s sectarian balance and ensure Sunni domination over the country’s majority
Shiites'.443 The report singled out Ahmed Attiyatallah Al Khalifa, the then head of the
Central Informatics Organization, the body responsible for organization the elections.
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In 2006, Al-Wasat published an investigation documenting that 17,000 names on the
voter roll that could not be accounted for after reports suggested that 5,000 South
Asians had been naturalized prior to the elections.444 
The nefarious strategy was reportedly part of a five-year plan to 'put political
control of the country firmly into the hands of militantly anti-Shiite Sunnis'.  445 The
network arose in response to a a report written by an Iraqi academic in 2005, titled 'A
proposal to promote the general situation of the Sunni sect in Bahrain'.446 The paper
was itself a bi-product of the fall of Saddam's regime and the perceived empowerment
of  Shiʿa  in  both  Iraq  and Iran.  Prior  to  the  release  of  the  Al  Bandar  report,  the
Americans had noted how regional developments, and the emboldening of Shi‘a in
Iraq had prompted a response in Bahrain that sought to focus on containing Shi‘a
influence. This, according to the US Embassy, had been let by the two Al Khalifa
brothers Shaykh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah  and Muhammad bin Attiyatallah.447 Monroe
notes  the  importance  of  regional  politics  in  developing  these  tactics  of  political
repression.
there can be no doubt that regional developments - Shia empowerment in
Iraq,  belligerent  rhetoric  and  actions  out  of  Iran,  unhappy  election
experiences in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, concerns about Shia
advancements enunciated publicly or privately by key allies like Jordan
and Saudi Arabia - have frightened or emboldened those in Bahrain who
want to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges448
Desite  al-Bandar  blowing the  whistle,  the  scandal  shows the  ability of  high-level
Sunnis  to  mobilise  identity politics  in  order  to  counter  the Shi‘a  threat.  This  was
evident in the recent uprising, where Sunni groups, backed by societies like Manbar
al-Islamic,  and  other  tribal  Sunni  and  Salafist  groups,  staged  a  popular  counter-
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revolution449 that helped quell the anti-government uprising in March 2011.450 
Thus the government's manipulation of identity politics, whether through the
withdrawal or issuing of citizenship, drives mobilisation among the country's Shi‘a,
promotes  grievances  along ethnic lines,  and ensures  a  cadre  of  supporters  for  the
regime. Coupled with recent complaints that other distributive awards are being given
to Sunnis, we can see how the selective distribution of wealth undermines the broad
brush, economic deterministic approach about rentier politics, criticised by scholars
such as Okruhlik.451
Selective Recruitment 
Another part of defining who maintains labour power and thus political and economic
strength is employment policy. Given Bahrain's increasing industrialisation, the pace
of  which  outstripped  the  ability  of  the  country to  provide  appropriate  indigenous
labour, migrant workers from abroad have been in demand since the 1960s. However,
the political inclination of certain 'states' precluded their citizens from employment
opportunities in  Bahrain. As Robert Tesh writes in 1972, 'Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians
and Egyptians have not been politically welcome'.452 In the 1960s, one British official
explained the reasons for this; 'It is not surprising at a time when the Gulf states are
increasingly feeling the draught of Arab nationalism that Bahrain should be turning to
Saudi Arabia in whose friendship she has, in any case, such a stake’.453 Indeed, Arab
Nationalism, and its perceived reach in the revolutionary Arab states turned Bahrain, a
traditional  monarchy,  closer  to  Saudi  Arabia.  Teachers  in  particular,  tasked  with
moulding  the  minds  of  impressionable  children,  were  subject  to  scrutiny.  Yet  the
Iranian Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war, which sharpened sectarian tensions in the
wake of declining Arab nationalism meant employment policy in the security forces
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focused more on perceived loyalty of sect and tribe, as opposed to Arab nationalist
allegiance.  The recruitment of Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, into the security services, has
increased since the Iranian revolution. 
Due to the general shortfalls of local skilled labour, the employment of 'docile
labour' from abroad, and particular South Asia has been encouraged. In 1974, it was
estimated that the labour force would have to be increased by 50% with workers from
'India, Pakistan and elsewhere'454, amounting to around 30,000 people.455  The process
of  altering  the  make  up  of  the  foreign  labour  force  has  also  been  a  strategy  in
attempting to ensure labour docility, and the government has sought to fragment the
'working  class  along  ethnic,  lingual  and  religious  divides',456 weakening  their
collective  bargaining  power.    Yet  ultimately,  despite  very  visible  attempts  to
Bahrainiise the work force, the use of foreign, 'docile labour' continues to increase in
many sectors. In 2001, the number of non-Bahrainis in the work force was 181,220,457
while  in  2015  the  figure  is  551,859.458  Yet  as  Franklin  notes,  'the  development
policies of the last decade have served the interests of the ruling elite'.459 However, 'at
the same time, this sort of dependent development has substantially added to the list
of problems the society must  deal  with'.  460 The calculated assumption is  that  the
generation  of  unrest  through  unpopular  hiring  policies  is  preferable  to  further
hindering the use of foreign labour in Bahrain, which both strengthens and furthers
the political and material interests of the regime. 
Towards Shiʿa containment 
The  leftist  threat  in  the  form  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  was  also  closely
monitored,  and  Bahrainis  returning  from  Soviet  or  Communist  countries  were
watched  closely,  as  the  government  worried  they  were  'establishing  positions  of
influence  in  the  government'.461 Yet  without  the  impetus  of  any immediate  threat,
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Special Branch were content to rely on surveillance through penetration rather than
incarceration.  The  refocusing  of  the  threat  on  the  country's  Shiʿa  has  resulted  in
priority being placed on an employee's sect. In 1997, Bahry noted that although  some
ministries contained  up to  80% Shi‘a labours,  these were all  areas deemed 'non-
sensitive',  and  certainly  did  not  include  the  military.462 Now,  the  ITUC  have
documented  that  Bahraini  Shiʿa  face  further  discrimination  in  the  work  place,  a
problem compounded following the 2011 uprising. 
With  growing  regularity,  jobs  are  now  being  denied  to  Shias.  Some
companies,  such  as  Gulf  Air,  have  actually  fired  Bahraini  workers,
targeting Shias specifically, under the pretext of restructuring. This was
done unilaterally and without prior consultation with the GFBTU. At the
same time, the companies are hiring non-Bahrainis and Sunnis with lesser
qualifications  and  announcing  new  job  vacancies.  Furthermore,  the
Government  has  allegedly pressured  many contractors  to  fire  qualified
Shia workers by denying them tenders. These violations are continuous
and recurrent, and the labour legislation fails to protect workers463
Again, the criminalisation of the country's Shi‘a, and the fact the country's Shi‘a form
most of Bahrain's disgruntled opposition, has led to a form of policy that works to
undermine the ability of workers to 'withhold their labor power through strikes and
work stoppages',464 often a key component in exercising their collective power. While
hiring policy has reflected the perceived nature of the threat to the Al Khalifa regime,
the government's  exclusion  and suspicion of  Shiʿa  has  led  to  a  process  by which
policy motivates discontent, and simultaneously seeks to disarm it. 
Political Amnesties, Taming Revolutionaries, and Benevolent Change 
While tactics such as exile and the removal of privileges such as citizenship or jobs
highlight the power of the ruling regime, the ability to restore them to underlies the
462 L. Bahry, p. 51. 
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regime's  perception  of  themselves  as  the  ultimate  authority  –  both  vindictive  and
merciful. Often this restoration of privileges is a form of conciliation that seeks to
reduce  animosity,  and thus  potential  subversion  among  political  dissidents.   Such
Amiri gratuities and prerogatives also include the return of exiles or the 'symbolic
release of political detainees'.465  As early as 1956, such tactics were suggested by
Belgrave, yet the Al Khalifa always had the final say. As Belgrave notes; 'Went out to
see HH, Sh Abdulla was there, took a list of 10 of the prisoners recommending their
release, but he crossed out 2, however its a good political gesture'.466  ʿAbd al-Rahman
Bakir was even invited to be on an administrative committee, a form of co-optation
that would have weakened the demands of the HEC.467 
The St. Helena three were invited back to Bahrain, some of them taking part in
institutions such as the National Assembly. Often this was on the advice of the British,
and not necessarily the will of the Bahrainis. Robert Tesh noted in 1973, 'I pointed out
that  the  political  prisoners  of  today  could  easily  become  the  chosen  leaders  of
tomorrow'.468 Indeed,  an example  of  this  is  Hassan al-Jishi,  who was exiled  from
Bahraini  for  his Ba‘athi agitation  in  1957,  and who returned in  1971,  only to  be
elected  President  of  the  National  Assembly in  1973.469 Similarly,  the  'tamed exile
Abdul  Aziz  Shamlan'  was  the  Amir's  candidate  for  Speaker  of  the  Assembly  in
1973.470 Khuri notes that this policy of co-optation was 'led by the Prime Minister',
who 'perhaps deliberately employed many of the “freedom fighters” of the past, which
weakened the opposition ideologically and organizationally'.471 
However the tactic did not always have the desired effect. The government
blamed the outbreak of labour  unrest  in  1974 on the release of 'two dozen or  so
political  detainees'.472 Similarly,  in  2007,  the  King  sought  to  diffuse  tension  by
ordering the public  prosecution to  drop its  legal  case against  Hassan Mushayma‘,
Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, and Shaker  ʿAbd al-Husayn, who had been charged, among
other things, with promoting change to the political system using illegitimate means.
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Despite this, clashes broke out between security forces and civilians in areas where
these figures were popular.473
As well as releasing prisoners, the government has issued amnesties formally
or informally in order to ameliorate dissent by forging the illusion of a new beginning.
Sometimes the Amir has personally intervened, undermining the police in the process,
highlighting the extent of his ultimate power. In 1965, the ruler Shaykh  ‘Isa upset
Shaykh  Mohammed  by  ordering  the  release  of  prisoners,  and  Mohammed  was
allegedly disheartened that the ruler had not allowed him to exercise 'arbitrary and
independent control over arrests'.474 Indeed, ‘Isa's reputation for softness meant he was
often  easily  pressured  by  influential  families  to  release  their  relatives.  In  1977,
following  a  time  of  stability,  the  government  'were  able  to  release  a  number  of
political detainees for National Day'.475 Occasions such as National Day have often
been used to release political prisoners, affirming the benevolence of the regime while
imprinting  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  elite  under  the  banner  of  nationalism.  
However, the fear of a negative Saudi reaction has previously discouraged the
government from releasing prisoners,476 again highlighting the rise of Saudi influence
in Bahrain's internal repression. Thus amnesties, as a tool to dampen desire of social
movements, are only effective during periods of relative calm.   However, in recent
years, it appears that the such amnesties are less concerned with the appearance of
benevolence or goodwill,  but more so that political  societies can police their  own
constituency. During the outbreak of contentious activity in the 1990s, the release of
political prisoners was often on the condition that those released would calm down
their followers.477478 The Bahraini government's concern for agitation even meant the
release was contingent on them calming down agitators living abroad, a bizarre turn
of events considering state policy had created this exiled opposition abroad. In one
instance,  Shaykh Khalil and Hasan Mushaymaʿ were released on the understanding
that they would travel to Damascus and London to persuade exiled regime opponents
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to end their activities'.479 
Yet  conciliatory  gestures  aimed  at  forging  new  beginnings  were  most
controversial following  ‘ʿIsa's death in 1999. While Hamad had been 'weaving the
story of his drive for political reform into a tapestry',480 earning 'international praise''481
in the process, his accession was also a fig leaf for the continuation of business as
usual. Hamad engaged in a number of steps that Fred Lawson argues served as the
backdrop  to  the  diffusal  of  social  tensions.  In  May  1999,  'Hamad  ordered  large
quantities  of  lamb  and  rice  to  be  distributed  at  government  expense  to  matams
throughout the country for use in the up- coming ʿAshurah ceremonies, and in early
June he ordered the release of 360 leading detainees'.482 In addition to this,  'The ruler
pardoned Shaykh ʿAbd al-Amir al-Jamri on July 8, after al-Jamri submitted a written
statement expressing his regret over the events that had taken place during the course
of  the  uprising'.483 Political  societies  such  as  Wa‘ad  formed,  their  membership
consisting of of returned exiles.484 This included Rahman Al Nuaimi, a Sunni liberal
who was exiled in 1970'.485
Religious figures, who were exiled in the 1990s, included Shaykh Ali Salman
Shaikh Hamza al-Dayri  and Sayyid  Haydar  al-Sitri,  were invited to  return.  While
some continued in their political activity, a smaller number were integrated into the
institutions of state, such as Murtadha Badr, a former IFLB activist who was elected
head of the Manama Municipal Council.486  Thus the significance of what happened in
2001, and Hamad's moderate credentials, should be seen more critically as a means of
assuaging  popular  discontent  without  being  hamstrung  by  a  democratic  body.
Fundamentally, the traditional process of  makramāt  were still in place, and the new
reforms  were  acts  of  Hamad's  personal  benevolence,  as  opposed  to  deep-rooted
constitutional change.  This personal benevolence is evidenced in the testimony of one
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member Al Wefaq, who said, 'Then the king sat with the opposition and opened a
dialogue, a new page. He took steps we highly appreciated: he released all political
prisoners,  allowed  exiles  to  return,  cancelled  the  emergency  law  and  staged  a
referendum on the National Charter'.487 
GONGOisation , Upgrading and Co-optation  
The government have also served to limit the flourishing of critical opposition and
meaningful change by placing stringent controls on civil  society organizations and
institutions, a key driver for political change.  As Heydemann notes, 'the hallmark of
authoritarian upgrading is  the ability of  Arab regimes to  exploit  rather  than resist
broad social, political, and economic trends both to blunt the challenges they might
contain and to generate political resources that bolster regimes' hold on power'.488
 In  particular,  the  government  have  attempted  to  limit  the  effectiveness  of
NGOs and civil society organizations which, if left unfettered, could provide extra
momentum  to social movements, institutions, or individuals desiring change. Human
Rights  Watch  note  that  in  Bahrain,  'the  Ministry  of  Social  Development  has  far
exceeded international standards in its restrictive scope' and has 'routinely exploited
its  oversight  role  to  stymie  the  activities  of  NGOs  and  other  civil  society
organizations'.489  They have done this  in  a number of  ways,  from the process of
'arbitrary rejection of registration applications and intrusive governmental supervision
of NGOs',490 to the 'takeover and in some cases dissolution of organizations whose
leaders have criticized government officials or their policies'.491 They have also  put
considerable limits on the ability of groups to raise local or foreign funding.492 One
Bahraini activist noted that the object was “to interfere, restrict, and attempt to control
the activities of civic organizations'.493 Crucial to this strategy is the use of co-opted
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agents or loyal opposition figures, who, to varying extents, consent to the limitations
imposed by the government on civil society activity. While this tactic has become
more salient  in the recent  uprising,  it  can,  according to Shaykh  ʿAbd al-Aziz bin
Mubarak Al Khalifa, be attributed also to anti-opposition and anti-Shi‘a hardliners in
the ruling family, especially the Khawalid, who, through their personal relationships
with the King and their officials positions have have been working since at least 2006
to '”throttle” civil society' by advocating for the clamping down of such groups.494  
The  shift  to  the  manipulation of  civil  society is  a  key development  in  the
arsenal of repression, as the government are countering new modes of mobilisation by
appropriating and utilising  them.  As protesters  in  Bahrain adopt  a  modern  human
rights agenda and discourse, the 'framing of demands on a popular level according to
international  legal  conventions  illustrates  a  new  articulation  and  platform  for
legitimacy'.495 Within this shift, human rights activists have emerged as leaders of the
movement, and the role of NGOs in lobbying international and regional bodies for
change  increases.  The  government  now have  to  fight  an  uphill  battle  against  the
discourse of human rights, the appeal of which lies in 'its capacity to imagine and
assert  universal  rights  possessed by every human rather  than the specific  political
rights of citizens or members of a particular political community'.496 Yet the regime,
for  their  part,  reacting  to  this  oppositional  tactic,  have  appropriated  the  discourse
themselves. Responding to the fact human rights have provided Bahrain's opposition
with  moral resources and agency, 'authoritarianism has been upgraded and the ruling
family has learnt to play the “human rights game”, engaging with the UNHRC and
celebrating its “track record” on human rights'.497 By doing so, it has given itself a
liberal fig leaf for what is a fundamentally illiberal regime and thus enabling it to
reinforce its position in the international community, whilst highlighting the hypocrisy
of the latter.498
The government themselves have appropriated a rhetoric of human rights, and
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have been especially keen to emphasise how the protests have impact on the rights of
the 'silent  majority'  for  a  peaceful,  undisrupted existence,  stressing the neo-liberal
sensibilities of being able to, for example, drive to work without disruption of civil
disobedience. Indeed, the process of stigmatization of Bahrain's opposition has relied
heavily on the government trying to wrestle the human rights mantle back from the
activists and protesters. 
The process of adopting a position of human rights defenders was embodied
most strongly by the commissioning of the BICI report, a step which was heralded by
Bahrain's  transatlantic  allies.  The  government  have  used  the  BICI  Report  as  a
platform  to  launch  a  cadre  of  Human  Rights  Organizations  that  they  claim  are
independent, but in actual fact receive funding directly or indirectly from the Bahraini
Government.499 In addition to setting up a Ministry of Human Rights and a National
Institute  for  Human  Rights  (NIHR),  the  government  have  legalised  a  number  of
Human Rights  organizations,  including the Bahrain Human Rights  Watch Society,
Bahraini Monitor, the Manama Centre for Human Rights, and others. Recently one of
these three GONGOS500 contributed to a witch hunt by publishing the photos of well-
known  and  internationally  respected  human  rights  activists,  saying  they  were
responsible for terrorism.  King Hamad also wants Bahrain to become home of the
Arab  Court  for  Human  Rights,  which  Cherif  Bassiouni  dismissed  as  a  'Potemkin
tribunal' – an empty vessel giving a facade of justice.501  Thus, prompted by pressure
for reform, the government have dealt with demands for pluralisation by creating a
heavily regulated civil society that simply extends the means the regime has to control
the population. 
Fragment, Polarise, Stratify and Conquer 
As Charles Wright Mills one argued that the unity of a power elite, when combined
with  a  fragmented  polity,  facilitates  control.502 While  various  British  policies  had
sought to facilitate the unity of the Al Khalifa regime under Hamad, this has been
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complemented by the tactic of dividing potential opposition  to the government.  It
was noted as early as 1923 that the ruling family had been attempting to weaken
opposition to their rule by encouraging enmity between Sunni and Shi‘a. In the 1920s,
the   state  of  Al  Khalifa  inspired  communal  strife  was  noted  by  the  British
administration; 'Owing to the extremely bitter relations in Bahrain between Sunnis
and Shaihs [sic], which attitude has, for their own ends, been deliberately encouraged
by the rulers for years'.503This tactic has not abated significantly, and even the British,
despite their seeming indignant attitude, used such tactics when it suited them. In the
1930s/40s, 'Arabs',  a term often used by the British to refer to Sunnis in Bahrain,
attempted to get the baḥārna to join strikes. Belgrave, however, reminded them that
the  British  had  always  looked  after  their  interests  and  thus  sought  to  compound
baḥārna reluctance to get involved.504  The Persian merchants, who also opposed the
goals  of  the  HEC,  were  also  granted  permission  to  set  up  a  group  that  directly
opposed  the  actions  of  the  HEC,  a  calculated  strategy  designed  to  create  some
opposition to the HEC.  The HEC argued that 'the policy of the Persian Committee
will be to oppose the Committee of National Union – the people's commiteee'.505 
While these fissures were often encouraged,  sometimes  they were driven by a
lack of material  resources or other political  imperatives. Burrows, for example,  in
1956, in his reluctance to see British Intervention, eschewed using British troops in
favour of  other  methods.  Yet  at  the time it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind that  the
sectarian unity touted in the HEC was perhaps not as significant as it has been made
out to be.506 Even in 1953, many Shi‘a went to the Agency for protection following the
outbreak of sectarian skirmishes in  Muharraq,507 highlighting a lack of depth to the
cross-sect unity espoused by the HEC. The British tended to admit that the HEC was
not particularly anti British, and the even Nasser and the Syrians had told the the HEC
to co-operate with the Bahraini government.508  Yet when Britain decided to support
the Al Khalifa and tackle the HEC, Burrows thought it  might be best to resort  to
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political  techniques.  It  was believed interceding at  the moment of the movement's
highest popularity might be dangerous. They did not, for example, wish to move too
quickly against al-Bakir in order to avoid making a martyr of him.509Musing on the
demise  of  the HEC, Burrows stated  by persuading the Ruler  to  'make reasonable
reforms and to give time for the more extreme demands of the Committee to disgust
moderate opinion', they  had 'ensured that there was in fact a very wide measure of
support in November for the action eventually taken by the ruler against the CNU'.510
Yet there is also evidence to suggest that the National Front at the time, led by
'prominent younger embers of the  Ruling Family', provoked unrest at a HEC Rally in
March 1956 in order to prove that the HEC were 'entirely unreliable' and that it was
necessary for 'foreign police force to maintain order'.511 Indeed, until this point, the
HEC had 'remained almost entirely within the bounds of the law'.512  The British did
not  confirm whether  this  happened,  but  noted  that  it  'fits  admirably with his  [the
Ruler's] for our support in his conversation with Secretary of State'.513  It may be true
then that the National Front acted as provocateurs in order to put pressure on the
British to intervene.
Even during Bahrain's brief democratic experiment in 1973 – 75, divide and
rule was used to try and split the National Assembly. As Tesh noted, the 'rulers are
deliberately encouraging the Right (particularly the Religious group) to react against
the Left'.514 One Minister insisted that the Left were being successfully smeared as
communists  and  were  becoming  generally  unpopular.  However,  as  Tesh  noted,  a
'“divide and rule” policy does however have its dangers and creates the possibility of
violence'.515This  apparently prophetic  comment  was  realised  in  1976,  when  leftist
PFLOAG activists were accused of killing a religious scholar, and the government
were worried about violence breaking out between leftists and the villagers.  516 The
consequences of this policy were manifest in growing fringe religious radicalism in
Bahrain, which was compounded by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, despite
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the work of more extreme groups like the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain,
the Shi‘a in Bahrain remained relatively quiet following the Revolution. As Harold
Walker stated in 1980, 'Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began there have, as you know,
been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shi‘a for the Imam
Khomeini’.517
Yet  growing  divisions  between  the  leftists  and  Shi‘a,  especially  after  the
murder of ʿAbd Allah al-Madani, the notable Shiʿi editor of al-Mawaqif, meant that a
united leftist Shi‘a front was an impossibility at the time of the Iranian Revolution. As
such,  it  was  not  an  appropriate  opportunity  for  pressing  for  regime  change.  Yet
following the Iranian Revolution, the government eschewed their 'low key' approach
to the Shi‘a problem, and instead drove 'young Shia into the extremist camp'.518
This abandonment of this low key approach to Shi‘a unrest was manifest in the
1990s, when Shiʿa marginalization combined with economic woes created an acute
political crisis. As expected, the government curtailed political cooperation between
moderate Sunnis and Shi‘as to  divide the movement, driving the Shi‘a movement
further  underground,  making  them  both  more  radical  and  religious.519 In  1991,
Amnesty noted  the  government's  move against  the  Shi‘a  was a  'deliberate  policy'
designed to target and “harass and intimidate entire communities – particularly Shia
communities” living in villages near the capital city.520 With the rise of a large Shi‘a
bloc following the reforms of 2001, the government feared an overwhelmingly strong
Shi‘a mobilisation. Yet when Al-Wefaq split over a decision to participate in 2006
elections, Najati speculated that the government's arrest of Hassan Mushayma‘, ‘Ali
Salman's rival, was designed to make him a hero among the Shi‘a community, driving
a wedge between Al-Wefaq and Haq in order to divide the Shi‘a street.521  
Attitudes to the Shiʿa post-2011
In the build-up to the uprising of 2011, government repressive policy can be seen as a
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product of hawkish ascendency. As Monroe states;
 'The royal family is, in fact, divided on how to deal with the Shia....royal
family hard-liners, exemplified by the Prime Minister, are wary of reform
for  many reasons:  the demographic threat  posed by the  majority Shia,
whose  loyalty  to  Bahrain  (i.e.,  connections  with  Iran)  has  long  been
questioned;  concern  that  democracy,  and  by  extension  noisy  street
demonstrations, will scare investors away; and -- most importantly -- the
potential threat to the Al-Khalifa regime that reform may ultimately pose.
Although one of the key hard-liners is Royal Court Minister and close
King confidant Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed, the views of the King are less
clear. It was the King, after all, who launched the reform movement, talks
of  a  day  when  the  King  will  serve  as  a  constitutional  monarch
paternalistically  protecting  the  interests  of  all  Bahrainis,  and infuriates
hard-liners by regularly ordering the release or pardon of Shia extremists
and demonstrators. And yet, he does little to reign in Shaikh Khalid bin
Ahmed and his hard-line allies. 522
Yet the alleged split in the ruling family, and Hamad's reform-orientated mentality, has
long been subservient to the interests of hardliners. The limited nature of the reforms
of 2001 already ensured  the  containment  of  the  Shiʿi  street,  implying that  it  was
always the investment-orientated hardliners who dictated policies that have facilitated
anti-Shia discrimination. Given this high-level distrust of the Shiʿa, it is unsurprising
that the government  instrumentalised sectarianism in order to divide the movement. 
 This instrumentalisation was most notable in the recent uprising when the
government  enflamed  religious  tensions  by deliberately destroying  Shi‘a  religious
structures, which Amnesty International considered to be 'collective punishment'.523
They also targeted  Sunni  members  of  the opposition.  Ibrahim Sharif,  the  General
Secretary of Wa‘ad, was arrested, as was Muhammad al-Buflasa, a former member of
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the Bahrain military. Justin Gengler once posited that Ibrahim Sharif and al-Buflasa
were the most dangerous men in Bahrain, not because they were violent, but because
both  Sharif  and  al-Buflasa's  stances  placed  them  'against  the  royal  family  and
government', which, 'as Khuri observed three decades ago, is especially intolerant of
social and political groupings that cut across Sunni-Shi'i lines'524. Yet it was not just
these high  profile  figures  that  were the 'most  dangerous'.  Manaf  al-Muhandis,  for
example,  was  arrested  for  starting  a  successful  online  campaign called  #UniteBH
(Unite Bahrain).  The purpose was to unite Bahrainis,  irrespective of sect,  through
Twitter.525 Others espousing unity were ridiculed. For example, guards at a checkpoint
ridiculed a driver for wearing a t-shirt saying 'No Sunni, No Shi’a, Just Bahraini'.526 
 Indeed,  by  playing  up  the  sectarian  threat,  Bahrain's  Sunnis
'disproportionately loyal' to the Royal Family have been mobilised to 'defend Bahrain
against Shi'i and Iranian designs'.527 However, as Justin Gengler notes, the problem
with  this  balancing  act  is  that  the 'more  the  state  succeeds  in  convincing  “loyal
citizens” of the need to defend Bahrain against Shi‘i and Iranian designs, the more it
opens itself to the charge of not acting firmly enough'.528 This has led to a state of
affairs  where  loyalist-dominated  democratic  institutions  support  draconian   and
repressive legislation in  the name of national security, giving a veneer of popular
legitimacy to discriminatory practises. This has been compounded by King Hamad's
empowerment of Sunni Islamists. Regional issues such as the Iran-Iraq war have also
sharpened  sectarian  tensions  to  a  point  that,  according  to  ‘Ali  Salman,  has  been
unprecedented in Bahrain history.529 
While much of this divide and conquer has taken the form of driving a wedge
between different sects to prevent the rise of large-scale formal political organizations,
the [Bahraini] government has opposed the foundation of political parties, societies,
524 J. Gengler, 'The Most Dangerous Men in Bahrain', Religion and Politics in Bahrain, [web blog], 5 
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labour unions, or clubs that cut across regional, ethnic, or religious groupings. It has
been particularly acute in the labour sphere. Trade unions or worker activity has been
highly  fragmented  by the  regime,  especially  after  the  1965  Uprising,  which  was
prompted by action  taken by the  state-controlled  oil  company BAPCO to  lay off
expatriate workers. Committees at BAPCO were subsequently created to be a 'safety
valve should any disturbances take place in the future'530, yet  organized in a way that
would  obviate  getting  social  and  political  items  on  the  agenda531.  The  resultant
committees  could  only  bargain  on  mundane532 issues,  and  the  ballot-system  was
arranged  so  that  a  company-wide  system  was  avoided  and  that  no  'Bahraini
personalities could emerge as the few representatives of a mass of workers'533. 
In 1973, the British note how the 'government and management contrived to
drive a wedge between the striking employees of two BAPCO contractors and their
ringleaders,  making  some  concessions  to  the  former  and  dispersing  the latter'.534
Eschewing  labour  legislation,  the  government  sought  to  engage  in  industrial
arbitration that would prevent the emergence of a  strong labour power base.535 In
1980 the Bahrain government were firmly committed to keeping labour groups 'small,
not  centralised'.536 Although  they  were  distrusted  by  the  majority  of  underground
worker  movements,  the  introduction  of  government  sponsored  'Workers'
Committees'537 in  1981  contributed,  albeit  marginally,  to  the  process  of  labor
pacification'.538 
However,  like  the  reforms  of  1965,  the  activities  of  these  groups  were
deliberately and heavily curtailed. The promulgation of the 1981 Labour Law paved
the way for the introduction of an 11-member elected  General Committee.  These
eleven were elected from the 48 elected worker representatives,who formed, along
with an equal number of management-appointed members, the Joint Committees (JC).
The JCs had their roots in the nominated Joint Consultative Committees created in
530 Anon, 1965, in A. Burdett (ed) Records of Bahrain, Cambridge Archive Editions, 1961-1965, 1997,
vol. 5, p. 422 
531 Ibid., p. 423.
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1971. Interestingly, the companies that were permitted to have JCCs were mostly one
in  which  the  management  were  Western.  This  was  done  primarily  due  to  the
experience held by such staff in dealing with labour issues. The focus on having an
appointed body to balance the will of elected members reflected the government's fear
of providing political space to those deemed subversive. Even those who ran for the
elected positions were vetted by the SIS.539 In addition to this, the Prime Minister was
reported to have personally intervened to prevent certain candidates being elected;
'The Prime Minister has involved himself closely in the process and allegedly turned
down several quite presentable candidates on his own account'.540 In addition, while
the Joint Committees and the General Committee could write their own constitutions
in accordance with the Labour Law, the latter's had to be ratified by the Ministry of
Labour.  Reflecting  the  relative  improvement  of  the  labour  situation,  but  one  that
nonetheless  guaranteed  government  control  over  labour  matters  both  at  the
international  and  national  level,  Simon  Collis  wrote,  'Meanwhile,  the  General
Committee  will  present  Bahrain  with  a  rather  more  decent  figleaf  to  sport  in
international labour circles'.541
Yet while the emergence of King Hamad's reforms saw the emergence of the
umbrella union, the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, (GFBTU) the 2011
Uprising  and  the  strikes  organized  by  the  GFBTU  prompted  the  government  to
dismantle them. The government issued new legislation that paved the way for the
creation  of  a  new  umbrella  trade  union  that  Cathy  Feingold542 described  as  an
'absolutely blatant attempt to split the union movement'. 543 Unusually, the acronym of
the new union spelled BLUFF, and critics such as Khalil Boazza, a Bahraini labour
activist,  believed  that  the  new  movement  would  weaken  Bahrain's  previously
'opposition-dominated'  unions.  544 Some  union  activists  even  argued  that  unions
representing workers at some major corporations went over to BLUFF without the
539 S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA
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consent  of  their  members.545 Overall,  the  new  trade  unions  amendments  and  the
creation of BLUFF highlighted the government's  attempts to limit effective collective
action, contributing to the process by which the 'state erodes the capacity of social
movements, thereby diminishing the ability to engage in contentious politics'.546By
dividing and disempowering the GFBTU, the government reduced the union's ability
to call effective strikes, and lobby on behalf of Bahraini workers both nationally and
internationally.547 
Thus  the  nature  of  political  repression  is  not  just  preventing  people  from
engaging in collective action, but shaping the nature of that collective action in order
that it can be best controlled. Fragmentation and reshaping is a dynamic process in
which the government attempt to assess potential oppositional coalition, and divide
them accordingly. Whether through trade unions, or through religion, the government
have maintained a degree of  organizational fragmentation. 
Reform as Repression: Grievance Removal, Administrative Reform, Democratisation 
Bahrain  is  rapidly  industrialising  in  a  period  of  rampant  inflation;  in
which  there  is  great  maldistribution  of  wealth  together  with  universal
education;  in  which  semi-feudalism  has  already  largely  given  way  to
broad-based  cabinet  government;  in  which  the  mushrooming  towns
contrast with the neglected villages and the Islam traditionalists with the
modernists: such a country needs a representative organ to balance and
adjust the strains'. 548
Demands for  democracy,  or at  least  democratic  ideals,  have been a key driver  of
reform since the early 1900s. The notion of them was not unfamiliar in Bahrain, a
perceived Gulf backwater at the time, and the British realised as early as 1922 that the
spread of  'democratic  ideas'549 had  made the  Al  Khalifa's  tyrannical  rule  difficult.
Generally, attempts at political liberalisation in Bahrain have been done as a form of
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top-down, state sponsored control, the purpose of which has been to provide a 'safety-
valve' for popular politics, thus mitigating the chances of direct violent action. These
institutions have taken a number of forms. For example, the Manama Municipality
established in 1919, was tasked with 'forcing a new political and sanitary regime in
the town as the antidote to Bahrain’s social and political malaise'.550The municipal
councils established in urban areas across Bahrain were efforts to extend the influence
of  the  Government  of  India  and  allay  social  turmoil  through  a  functional
administrative apparatus. 
However,  the  limitations  of  the  councils  were  made  apparent  when
increasingly  discontented  elements  pushed  to  have  more  democratic  institutions
established. Until the 1940s, both the Al Khalifa and the British have been reluctant to
institute such reforms. However, in 1935, TC Fowle sought to impress upon the ruler
that 'times have now changed and governments must now depend, to a large extent, on
the public opinion of the majority of their subjects'.551 Despite this, demands for a
democratic council, mostly by the Persian Holis, and not the baḥārna or Arabs, in the
1930s were rebuffed by the Al Khalifa, who thought that they would be the 'swan
song of  the Al Khalifah as  Rulers  of  Bahrain;'552 Yet  the British noted that  if  the
agitation spread beyond the Holis, it would be foolish to not implement at least an
advisory body for the Shaykh. 
While the British, and specifically the Government of India, had put the breaks
on suggesting democratic institutions,  they had pressed for reforms both after and
during the agitation of the Manama baḥārna in 1934/1935, yet this mostly related to
more  representation  on  the  commercial  council  and the  municipalities,  as  well  as
improvement  to education and the creation of a criminal  code.553 Increasingly,  the
British were pushing for administrative reform, and not democracy, to curb dissent. As
Burrows noted in 1954, 'the removal of some justifiable grievances will  leave the
subversive virus with less to feed on'.554 Generally speaking, the British believed that a
solid legal system would actually increase  the power of the administration and, as a
consequence,  bolster  Al  Khalifa  power;  'It  is  the object  of  the reforms which  the
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Bahrain Government have announced on our advice to increase both the impartiality
and the power of the administration'.555 If these reforms  failed to ameliorate dissent,
the British knew that it would at least allow time to strengthen the coercive apparatus.
Burrows noted that  the  government 'should  prosecute the essential  reforms which
have been long under discussion in the hope that this would give a breathing space in
which they might strengthen the Public Security Department, and at the same time
satisfy the more intelligent section of the people now discontented'.556Yet the Ruler
was reluctant to pursue administrative reforms that could empower the Shi‘a. It was
only after 'strenuous efforts on the part of Mr. Wall and Sir Charles Belgrave, that the
situation was retrieved',557 and the government published an ordinance that 'reforms
would be announced if the strikers returned to work'.558
In the 1970s, the British still  emphasised the need for reform as a form of
counter-revolutionary  insurance,  and  urged  for  popular  representation.559 Sterling
noted  that  the  British  were  to  'urge  the  government  to   effect  its  promised
constitutional  reforms'  and 'improve the system of administration'  in order  to help
'guard against revolution'.560 Sterling noted in the 1971, this constitutional advance
was the 'best  defence against  subversion'.561 Indeed,  in   order  to  smooth  over  the
transition and build confidence, Shaykh ʿIsa announced that a constitution would be
introduced  in  1971.562 Tesh  believed  in  1973  that  even  the  steps  towards
democratisation had defused labour unrest, 'Judging by the absence of violence and
the  paucity of  strikes  since  the  outbreak of  March 1972,  the  steps  taken towards
popular representation are having the desired effect'.563 
However  upon  Independence,  the  British  had  already  reported  that  the
hawkish  Prime  Minister  had  halted  moves  towards  popular  representation',
demonstrating the 'native talent for procrastination'.564 Democracy was also opposed
by Bahrain's neighbours, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and even Kuwait.565
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Tesh wrote in 1972, that 'there is some irritation that Saudi Arabian conservatism  puts
the  breaks  on   popular  representation  in  Bahrain'.566   When  the  reforms  did
materialise, the parliament was only 'representative enough to be credible'.567The fact
the  'Shi‘a  villages'  were  'underepresented'568 perhaps  reflects  Saudi-Al  Khalifa
animosity towards the Shiʿa. The veneer of credibility was evident in the amended
constitution, which 'appeared to curtail the Amir's powers but in fact was calculated to
give the government and the Prime Minister an assured position for the first four-year
parliament  at  least  –  after  which  they  would  take  their  chance'.569 In  effect,  the
National Assembly would still guarantee continued Al Khalifa rule. As Tesh noted,
'The aim of the Al-Khalifah inner circle was to delegate sufficient power to the People
to satisfy them that its intentions were genuine, but not to concede so much that the
administration  would  be   hamstrung,  or  rash  measures  forced  on  it,  or  powerful
neighbours antagonised, or the position of the Al Khalifa irredeemably undermined'.570
In addition to this distribution of power that favoured the Al Khalifa regime
and its allies, the government also engaged in tactics designed to limit the power of
elected  members.  For  example,  during  the  short-lived  National  Assembly,  the
government angered elected members of the NA by 'insisting on priority for its own
bills' and using 'parliamentary devices – closed sessions, the committee system, the
rules of reply, etc – to curb the elected members' powers'.571They also chose to pass
controversial  legislation,  like  the  security  decree,  in  the  summer  recess  by Amiri
decree as they knew parliament would not accept it.572 The decree, which had been
opposed by the assembly, was legal until the assembly declared it null.573 When the
Assembly did not ratify the bill,  it  was dissolved in order to 'contain the growing
influence of opposition and alter the power balance to the advantage of the ruling
family'.574 Even the timing of the dissolution was calculated,  and done in the summer
where it was assumed that the heat would 'provoke the least reaction'.575 
566 R.M. Tesh,  Bahrain: Annual Review for 1972, 31 December 1972, FCO 8/1974, TNA. 
567 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1973,  FCO8/2181, TNA. 
568 Ibid.
569 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual review for 1973.
570 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Constitutional Development.
571 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 4 March 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA. 
572 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974.
573 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 March 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA. 
574 F. Khuri, p. 234. 
575 H.B. Walker, Bahrain Internal, 28 June 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.
128 
The  tactics  of  democratisation  and  constitutional  reform  as  a  means  of
guarding against revolution had been profoundly influenced by Saudi encroachment.
The British noted that 'Saudi Arabia, though an immensely powerful friend, is too
rich, too Islamic, and too close for comfort',576 and that   'the government became less
inclined towards political change, no doubt under Saudi influence'. 577 Like the British
had done in the 1920s, the Saudis used their own makramāt to secure influence among
the ruling family. As Ivor Lucas noted,  'all the traditional regimes in the Gulf are
becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi support and that they must to a greater or
lesser  extent  accept  what  goes  with  it'.578 Saudi's  keenness  to  secure  favour  was
evident in its provision of 'grotesquely expensive sports facilities to please some of
the younger shaykhs', gifts that were most likely 'conditional on the abandonment of
[democratic] experiments which might prove dangerous to the Al Sa'ud as well as to
the Al Khalifa'.579  Saudi influence undoubtedly buttressed the anti-reform nature of
hardliners  such as the Prime Minister,  who began to move away from reinstating
democracy. As E.F. Given noted in 1979, 'this may be due to the influence of the
Saudis,  who   I  believe  greatly  disapproved  of  the  Bahrain  experiment  in
democracy'.580. 
While successive British political agents had initially rejected, but eventually
encouraged the idea of democracy, it was now chiefly Saudi conservatism, and fear of
Shi‘a subversion that prompted the question of democracy to be firmly snubbed in
1980, when the Bahraini leadership insisted there would be no return to parliamentary
life.581 Yet Al Khalifa prejudice seemed to have crept in too, with Tesh noting that 'The
Amir 'growled about “All these Shia”' in the Assembly's early days.  582 The Prime
Minister  too was  insistent  that  democracy  in  Bahrain  would  means  a  parliament
populated by men in Turbans who take their orders from Khomeini.583 The feeling that
the government gave too much in the way of representation in 1970 may explain the
reneges  on  promises  made by the  King in  2001.  Yet  without  British  pressure  for
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reform, which had been particularly acute in 1963, the Al Khalifa could indulge their
habitual disdain for democratic institution by 'clinging' not to Britain, but to Saudi
Arabia, with whom they were more ideologically aligned.
Thus democratisation as a means of grievance removal and a safety
valve to mitigate potential unrest was a temporary tactic, not deep rooted enough to
affect Al Khalifa hegemony. Attempts to resurrect the democracy were prevented by
Bahrain's new patron, Saudi Arabia. The Al Khalifa Ruling Family Council too were
disillusioned with democracy, and blamed the Amir for ever having agreed to it.584
The Prime Minister, who was firmly 'in the saddle' by the late 1970s, was, according
to the British, 'reluctant to defy King Faisal'.  585   Thus the reassertion of Al Khalifa
authoritarianism  and  Saudi  pressure   can  offer  more  insight  into  the  repressive
measures  taken  by  the  Al  Khalifa  regime.  However,  as  Franklin  notes,  'The
dissolution  of  Parliament  in  1975  abruptly  terminated  this  political  development
without  ending  the  sentiments  in  favour  of  reform,  creating  and  reinforcing  a
profound sense of deprivation and frustration'.586
Saudi  influence  was  also  touted  as  being  important  in  stymying  any
democratic advance in the 1990s.  In a time-honoured tradition,  the 1990s Intifada
resulted in the construction of an appointed council to form as a safety valve for the
popular temper. In 1993 a thirty member council with fifteen Sunni and fifteen Shi‘a
was appointed by the Amir,  but they had no legislative function.  As one Bahraini
argued, this 'Shura proposal was 95 percent made-in-Saudi Arabia',587 pointing again
to the idea that the extent of repressive reform was dictated by Saudi interests. Given
the context of the times, it  is hardly surprising. In 1997, the Saudi Interior Prince
Nayif had 'ugred his Yemeni counterpart to cancel the parliamentary elections' on the
basis that they were a 'threat to stability in the region'.588
 While the Shura council was criticised as pointless, a number of Bahrainis,
including a former Cabinet minister, alluded to how policy was increasingly the role
of a small cabal headed by the conservative, Saudi-influenced Prime Minister; 'even
the cabinet itself was no longer the site of useful policy discussion, and in recent years
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assembled only to rubber-stamp the decisions of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman
Al  Khalifa,  the  brother  of  the  Amir,  and  to  hear  from a  small  number  of  other
influential  officials,  most  notably Minister  of  Interior  Muhammad bin  Khalifa  Al
Khalifa, a first cousin of the Amir'.589 Unsurprisingly, the regime's attempt at diffusing
tension through a facade of popular representation  was a failure, and unrest continued
through the 1990s. While the council was updated in 1996 to forty members,590 it was
dissolved in 2002 upon the creation of the country's bicameral parliament. 
Towards Facade Democracy: A Faulty Safety Valve 
When viewed under a critical lens, the reforms of 2001, which were meant to usher in
a new era of progress, can best be described as a constitutional coup. Ostensibly a
response to American foreign policy promotion goals of democratisation, the actual
reforms were clearly tempered by a fear of giving the Shi‘a too much power. As Al
Aali notes,''The Saudi leadership opposes open elections in Bahrain for fear that the
Shi‘a would gain too much power'.591 In particular, Bahrain's close alliance with Saudi
has facilitated the execution of Saudi foreign policy objectives, which revolve around
countering internal democratic development in Bahrain. This, they see, as a form of
Iranian expansionism in the region592. As they did in the early 1970s, the government
sought to restrict the threats posed by social movements and opposition by diffusing
tension  through  democratic  reforms,  while  also  ensuring  mechanisms  for  their
continued  political  dominance.  However,  the  structures  of  democracy  chosen
'virtually guaranteed that ultimate decision-making power remained in the palace'.593
This supported the British assertions of 1982, in which they noted that the 'Al Khalifa
intend to continue to control Bahrain themselves'.594 In particular, 'the way in which
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the Amir and his family spend their funds will certainly be off limits'.595 To this end,
constitutional  amendments  required  a  two-thirds  majority  of  both  elected  and
appointed chambers houses, rendering change highly improbable. Furthermore, the
reforms meant that 'while power to pass laws rests with both chambers, the cabinet
alone has the right to initiate and draft them, and the appointed Shura chamber has in
effect veto power over initiatives and decisions by the elected chamber'.596 
Perhaps most importantly,  the newly declared King retains the 'power to rule
by  decree  (marsūm  bi-qanūn),  provided  such  decrees  do  not  violate  the
constitution'.597 Yet as we will see in the chapter on legal control, the constitution's
national safety caveat essentially suspends constitutionality guaranteed protections of
civil liberties or rights. In addition to this, a few political slights of hands were issued
during the reforms. A number of statutory decrees were issued before the creation of a
new parliament, ones that were not able to be challenged by the new elected body.
These included the draconian press law, which although suspended after protests, was
enforced at the government's discretion.598 As with any statutory decrees issued prior
to  the  first  meeting  of  Bahrain's   'democratic'  National  Assembly,  none  could  be
amended unless both houses voted to rescind them.599 The reality of this meant that it
is virtually impossible to rescind any laws decreed before the creation of the National
Assembly in 2002, no matter how draconian.
Electorally, the regime were careful to disempower the country's Shiʿa. Prior
to 2014, Bahrain's electoral boundaries were drawn in such a way to minimise the
impact of the Shi‘a vote. Sunni constituencies numbering only a few hundred were
often  given  the  same  voting  power  as  a  Shi‘a-dominated  block  consisting  of
thousands of  citizens.  In  some cases,  one  Sunni  vote  equalled  21 Shi‘a  votes.  600
Influential  in this  strategy were hardline members of the ruling family,  'two well-
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placed Al Khalifa brothers - Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin
Attiyatallah and President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah -
have  been  leading  the  effort  to  contain  the  electoral  process'.601   In  2014,  the
government  eventually  redrew  electoral  districts  to  tackle  issues  of  blatant
gerrymandering that weakened the 'Shi‘a vote', but the now established Shi‘a Islamist
Al Wefaq opposition complained that it was done so in a way to disempower both
them and Islamists in general.
 The facade  democratisation  prompted by the  King had,  prior  to  the  2014
elections, given more clout to Sunni Islamists to balance the increasingly empowered
Shi‘a  bloc  in  parliament,  a  move  which  the  American  Ambassador  noted  made
Bahrain more conservative. King Hamad's empowerment of the Sunnis reflected  a
conflict in his  'desire to be a regional leader on reform' and thee desire of  'neighbours
-- especially Saudi Arabia -- who worry about the influence his reforms might have
elsewhere  in  the  region  '602 Yet  although  the  King  'counsels  patience  and
understanding with  the  Shi‘a',  he  still  'permits  hard-line  royal  family members  to
crack  down hard  against  Shi‘a  interests'.603 The  influence  of  these  hardliners  was
noted by Al-Wasat  editor (and former Shi‘a exile) Mansur al-Jamri, who said  that
Minister of the Royal Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed is now the de facto Prime
Minister, and that Shaykh Khalifa is currently more focused on protecting his business
interests and his family's future.604  
Whether  or  not  this  faction  exerts  more  power  than  the  Prime  Minister  is
debatable, and perhaps irrelevant, as  their interests seem generally aligned on matters
of internal security. The limited nature of democratisation as a repressive safety valve,
evident in the constitutional coup, reflects again a middle course between appeasing
US and European Interests, while also bending to the Saudi and Al Khalifa desire to
not empower the Shi‘a too much.   So long as transatlantic democracy promotion is
itself muted by a strategic 'interest in containing Iran',605 significant democratic reform
that would put the Shiʿa on an equal footing with other Bahrainis is unlikely.  This is
especially  true  given  that  Bahrain's  transatlantic  allies  will  'prioritize  immediate
601 W.T. Monroe,  'Bahraini Political Scene Part II: Royal Family Conservatives Tighten Reins on 
Politics'. 
602 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain: Ambassador's Parting Thoughts'.
603 Ibid
604 Ibid.
605 O. Hassan, 'Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda?...', p. 480.
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security interests over promoting democracy'.606 As for democratisation in its current
guise, the limits, as defined by Saudi and the Al Khalifa, have already been reached. 
Conclusion 
By parsing  the  different  methods  of  political  statecraft,  this  chapter  highlights  a
number of important considerations with regards to the development of repressive
statecraft  in  Bahrain.  Firstly,  the  deployment  of  a  number  of  tactics  have  been
contingent on particular foreign policy objects of Bahrain's suzerains In particular,
British intervention in the 1920s and the 1950s was tempered by a desire to not be
seen to  be  too involved in  Bahrain's  internal  affairs.  Nonetheless,  the prospect  of
instability in Bahrain always prompted intervention by Bahrain's protecting powers.
Secondly,  the  reasons for  using certain  tactics  in  certain  instances  are  difficult  to
generalise.  For  example;  rewards  and  rentierism,  which  were  enabled  by  Saudi
largesse, were often an excuse for the cutting short of democratic experimentation or
administrative  reforms  in  favour  of  more  blatantly  paternalistic  and  patrimonial
distribution of makramāt. This itself stemmed from the Saudi fear of emboldening
Bahrain's  Shiʿa,  and  subsequently  the  Shiʿa  in  Saudi's  Eastern  province.  Yet  the
impact of such tactics has always been somewhat limited, a fact that has been thrown
into sharp relief in the recent Uprising, which Khalaf calls the mark of the death of
rentier economics.607
Repression  now  is  mainly  focused  on  the  Shiʿa  community,  and  methods
disproportionately effect them, whether through gerrymandering, or denationalization.
This has been notable in particular in the two major episodes of dissent; the 1990s
Intifada and the 2011 Uprising.  While the Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian Revolution
was  a  catalyst  for  further  repression  of  the  Shi‘a,  the  tendency  towards  a  more
draconian policy was set in place following Independence in 1971, itself due to Saudi
ascendency and the reassertion of the Al Khalifa's legacy of conquest. As Jones notes,
'without Saudi support, the Al Khalifa may be forced to negotiate a social contract that
provides more concessions and power to the ruled, yet this seems far off'.608
606 Ibid.
607 Khalaf, 'Foreword', 2015.
608 M. Jones, 'Saudi Intervention, Sectarianism, and De-democratization in Bahrain's Uprising', in 
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Policing, Security, and Personal Integrity Violations
The officers responsible for interrogation are Arabs and the more brutal
among them, according to Ian Henderson, are invariably Bahraini.  The
encouragement they get from some members of the AL Khalifa is to be
more rather than less tough in their methods609  
Violations of personal integrity have been a crucial method of containing dissent in
Bahrain over the past 100 years. As the key actors responsible for the processes of
intimidation,  incapacitation  and containment,  this  chapter  documents  how  the
repressive potential of Bahrain's security services has developed over the past 100
years, highlighting a number of factors that have come together to create the historical
persistence of security service militancy, from ideological reasons and poor training,
to social conditions leading to high levels of antagonism against the government itself.
However,  in  addition  to  the  foreign  and  sectarian  make-up  of  the  police,  it  was
independence that prompted a decline in British control over police and a subsequent
reassertion of AL Khalifa and Saudi influence in matters of internal security.  While
this coincided with the rise of the Shi‘a theocratic Iranian state,  it is important to note
that changes in repressive policy were set in motion  before this, and that growing
repression seems to be more a reassertion of brutal policy prior to the reforms of the
1920s.   Furthermore,  a  culture  of  permissibility  has  arisen  in  Bahrain's  security
services, in which extreme forms of coercion seem to be perceived as valid means of
social  control,  a  phenomenon  buttressed  by the  increasing  use  of  sectarianism to
legitimise oppression and the Al Khalifa's legacy of conquest.  The inability of the
government  to  secure  legitimacy  has  necessitated  the  need  for  a  'strong  arm'  of
government  to  deal  with  frequent  political  agitation.  Indeed,  personal  integrity
violations have been used frequently to repress dissent, and despite the creation of a
constitution  and parliament,  they appear  to  have  become worse  over  the  last  100
609W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
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years. 
Policing: The Struggle Between Force and Consent 
A Brief History 
Before discussing personal integrity violations, and how and why they have changed,
it is useful to look at the political milieu that has shaped Bahrain's security apparatus
in order to explore why they have emerged as the force that they have.  The term
security  apparatus  is  preferable  to  police  since  the  CID,  police,  NSA,  military,
Bedouin, auxiliaries, and Levy Corps have all been  used to repress dissent. This is
particularly true during times of political  crisis,  where the differing roles between
such agencies  or  groups becomes increasingly nebulous,  and cooperation between
them expands to include internal policing duties.610
As  the  main  institutions  responsible  for  violating  personal  integrity,  the
security apparatus has historically been a contentious force in Bahrain, suffering from
both a legitimacy deficit and an authoritarian disposition While the security apparatus
has modernized and professionalized over the past 100 years, it evolved as did many
colonial forces in the region, as a 'complex mixture of paramilitary, civil and tribal
organizations; of civil and tribal courts administering different law'.611 However, the
term modernization belies the fact that many of these characteristics have simply been
imbibed to create a larger apparatus with more sophisticated tools of coercion at its
disposal. Indeed, while the apparatus of control has been modernized, there has been
little consent to this change, resulting in a force with a disputed mandate. The inability
of the police to maintain public approval and respect, and thus minimise the need for
repressive force, stems from the fact that their primary function in Bahrain has been to
defend British, foreign and Ruling Family interests while insulating the elites from
anti-constitutional  agitation.  While  Bahrain  was  a  British  protectorate,  tactics  of
policing,  especially  since  Independence,  resembled  that  of  other  colonies,  having
'little  to  do with serving the community and everything to  do with upholding the
authority of the colonial', and in Bahrain's case, the recolonised state.612 Indeed, the
610 A. Turk, Organizational Deviance, p. 248. 
611 D. H. Johnson, ‘From military to tribal police: policing the Upper Nile province of the Sudan’, in D.M. 
Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 151. 
612 D. Killingray, ‘Guarding the extending frontier: policing the Gold Coast, 1865–1913’, in D.M. 
Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940,
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security services were, and continue to be, little more than the 'agents of arbitrary
“traditional” rule', and in this case, Al Khalifa domination.613 
This proximity was symbolised by the British official Charles Belgrave, who
was both financial advisor to the Ruler, as well as Commandant of the Police.614 This
joint responsibility as an officer of public service and as an employee protecting the
wealth of the ruling family inevitably led to some role confusion. This blurring of
roles continued well  into the 1960s,  when Benn, the British superintendent  of the
police, was being given a supplementary financial emolument ‘paid for privily’615 out
of the personal pocket of the Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa. This fact,
'had  become  “embarrassingly  widely  known”616,  and  no  doubt  contributed  to  the
'perception that the British were mercenary enforcers of Al Khalifa hegemony'.617As a
result,  it  is  unsurprising  that  the  security  apparatus  has  reflected  the  political
intentions and prejudices of the dominant power. 
 Yet initially the police and security apparatus was created to bolster
Hamad's,  and therefore Britain's  position.   Prior  to  the police,  the ruler  and other
members of the ruling family had relied on 'wild Bedouin' as a source of strength.618
The repressive actions of the al-fidawiyya619 (warriors), most of whom were acting on
the orders of their  respective tribal chiefs,  needed to be addressed as they were a
continued source of annoyance for the British authorities. Persian disquiet over the
treatment of their fellow co-religionists was also a major issue, as the British were
keen to diffuse tensions with Persia, who were threatening to go to the League of
Nations  to  hold  Britain  to  account  for  the  misrule  of  Bahrain's  Shi‘a  subjects.
Although  the  British  were  concerned  too  that  reforms  that  challenged  Sunni
hegemony would anger Ibn Saud, they thought that appeasing Persia would force the
Al Khalifas and (Ibn Saud) to put their  house in order,  frightening them with the
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 123. 
613 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), ‘An orderly retreat? Policing the end of empire’, in Policing 
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Manchester, 1992, p. 4. 
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615  J.P. Tripp, Communique to A.D. Parsons, 14 February 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.
616 A.D. Parsons, Communique to T.F. Brenchley, 18 December 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.  
617 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards: Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability 
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619The al-fidawiyya were the armed retainers of the feudal shaykhs who were responsible for coercion
and enforcement. 
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bogeyman  of  Persian  intent.620 Despite  this  self  interest,  Britain's  Viceroy  also
suggested humanitarian reasons as motivations for the decision to reform, stating: 'All
we want is to put ourselves right with the world and the Bahreinis by the introduction
of some measure of justice and equitable taxation'.621 The creation of the Manama
Municipality  was  significant  in  this,  for  it  prompted the  creation  of  a  embryonic
police force (collection of Naturs), designed to prevent 'rowdyism' and protect trade in
the capital. 
Poor Quality of Recruits: Mercenaries, Baltajiyya, and Foreigners
In addition to the Municipality, Hamad was given a personal body of Levy Corps, not
to protect him, 'but to remove the excuse that he had no force to maintain order and
could not restrain his relatives, fidawis and other Sunnis from armed attacks on his
Shia  subjects'.622 This  establishment  of  the  Muskati  Baluchi  Levies  followed  the
second Sitra Outrage, which Hamad insisted he could not control,623 and paved the
way for British-backed militaristic intervention on the mainland. The set up of the
Levies also accompanied the creation of a small police force totalling 89 people. Yet it
was decided that there was no need for separate police and Levy force in 1926.624
Indeed, the Levies were short lived following an incident in which one of them shot
and killed their commanding officer, wounding Major Daly, the Political Agent, in the
process. Their sudden disbanding required the prompt arrival of an Indian regiment
and Indian Police.625 However,  Indians did not speak much Arabic, which meant the
that they were replaced by a force of local men, a move which was completed in
1932. 
Aside from teething trouble, the police force was popular, especially among
the oppressed  baḥārna and residents  of Manama who, on one occasion,  lent  their
weapons and support to the police following an attack on a police outpost. Generally,
the Shi‘a at this time supported Hamad (according to Belgrave).626  The establishment
620 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India, 14 May 1923, RoB, vol 
3, p. 761. 
621 Ibid.
622 Horner, Express Message, 1923 – 1932, RoB. Vol. 4. p. 222. 
623 C.G. Prior, Communique from Political Agency Bahrain, RoB, vol. 4, p. 550. 
624 'Notes on formation of New Police Force', RoB. vol. 4, p. 223.
625 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, BGAR, vol. 5, p. 48. 
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of a standing force of armed enforcers of Hamad's authority did not come without
resistance. Unsurprisingly, the faction of the Al Khalifa who opposed the British-led
reforms directed attacks  against  the police in the early days,  as they saw it  as an
extension of British colonial control and an encroachment on their tribal privilege.
Indeed,  contrary  to  many  colonies,  where  the  police  where  a  source  of  popular
hostility,627 the police force in Bahrain was popular with an indigenous population
attempting to protect themselves from oppression – in the beginning at least.
Despite  the initial  popularity with the country's  Shi‘a  population,  the early
security apparatus in Bahrain was the result of a balancing act, an attempt to control
the Al Khalifa while also not overly antagonising them, Ibn Saud, or the Persians.  To
ameliorate this, a number of Al Khalifa were co-opted into joining the police,  yet
having recalcitrant members of the ruling family who were 'uneducated, vain, lazy,
and inclined to oppress' 628 in the police meant that the security apparatus, even in its
nascent form, was populated by characters seen as villainous, cruel and unpopular. In
addition  to  this,  'many  of  the  recruits  were  also  drawn  from  the  country’s  al-
fidawiyya, the notorious henchman and enforcers used by the Al Khalifa to extract tax,
intimidate  the  populace,  and  uphold  their  feudal  rule'.629Unsurprisingly,  they were
disliked by many of the population. The fact that they were led by equally unpopular
characters was also an issue in maintaining discipline, authority and control. In the
1920s,  the  Amir  of  Manama,  whose  role  was  ‘Governor  and  Chief  of  Police
combined’,630 was described as ‘one of the worst characters in Bahrain’.631 However,
he could be 'trusted by the Sheikhs to support them in every form of extortion', and
'had arbitrarily collected taxes, practically the whole of which were devoted to his
personal  expenditure'.632  When  he  was  removed  by  Hamad  in  1923,  the
representatives  of  the  Al  Khalifa  demanded  the  reinstatement  of  the  Amir  of
Manama.633 The Amir of Muharraq, who used to be the Amir of Manama,  was also
627 D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), ‘An orderly retreat?' p. 9. 
628 A.P. Trevor, 'Bahrain Reforms', RoB, vol. 4, p. 189.
629 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards:Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability in
Bahrain'. p. 220. 
630 C. Belgrave, ‘The Bahrain Municipality’, RoB,vol. 3, 1993, p. 651. 
631The Amir of Manama was later in charge of watchmen, (not police): C. Belgrave, Papers, 8 
February 1927
632 C.K. Daly, Note on the political situation in Bahrain November 1921, 6 January 1922, RoB, vol. 3, 
1993, p. 669.
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described in 1929 by Charles Belgrave as a ‘fat useless one eyed rascal who never
[did] any work’.634 In 1930, the Amir of Manama, who was appointed in 1927 was
described by Belgrave as a 'fat lazy scoundrel' 635 who did nothing but 'strut(s) about
with a belt full of pistols and daggers' had watchmen who were 'treating people very
badly'.636  
Yet by creating the police the British had usurped the Al Khalifa's monopoly
on arbitrary violence and position of privilege, creating a system whereby the British
were the main bulwark against Al Khalifa oppression of the baḥārna, a position that
would eventually be eroded in the subsequent decades. This change set in place a
dynamic  that  served  to  moderate,  but  not  fundamentally  alter,  an  antagonistic
relationship  between  the  Al  Khalifa  and  the  citizens  of  Bahrain.  Despite
modernization,  subsequent  members  of  the  Al  Khalifa  family  holding  important
positions have been criticised for either their hostility towards the Shi‘a, or general
incompetence or criminality. In 1956,  Major William Oscar Little, a British officer in
the  Bahraini  police  described  the  Director  of  Police  and  Public  Security,  Shaykh
Khalifa bin Muhammad, 'as a debauchee and a drunkard', and 'a leading crook, with a
finger  in  every nefarious  and profitable  racket,  from drug smuggling to  the  slave
transit traffic and procurement of girls’.637 Shaykh Khalifa’s replacement, Muhammad
bin Salman Al Khalifa, also had a reputation for anti-baḥārna violence (see chapter on
legal control).
Naturs, Bedouin and Vigilantes
As well as the questionable nature of recruits, the complex mix of paramilitary, tribal,
and official security organizations also made issues of co-ordination, discipline, and
role delineation complicated, inclining the Bahrain Security Services to deviance638.
634 C. Belgrave, Papers, 9 October 1929.
635 Ibid., 11 February 1928.
636 Ibid., 19 February 1930.
637 W.O. Little, ‘Report by Major Little’, in Pamphlet on Bahrain, Part IV, p. 4, 1957, FO 371/126918, 
TNA. 
638Police system omplicated. Initially, suggested in 1924, paid for by municiplaiites. OC levies 
administrative charge of police, but not  work, two superintendents (amirs). Police to be higher 
grade than Levies. Picked men from levies appointed as police. p. 237 Rob vol. 4 
pg 8. vol 2. 1937. History of 1926. Baluchi levies brought in. Assas attempt. Levies sent away. 
Everyone afraid of Dawasir. Indian regiment brought in. Then Indian Levies under park 
brought in end of 1926. ...quote 'regarded by the people of Bahrain as expensive foreign 
mercenaries'...phased out 1932.
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The Bahraini police grew out of force of Naturs or 'watchmen'. These ill-trained, often
illiterate guards, initially commanded by a minor Shaykh (Amir) and operating in the
Manama  Municipality,   would  eventually  supplement  the  work  of  the  police.  As
Belgrave  noted,  'they  [the  Naturs]  were  greatly  feared  especially  by  the  Shia
villagers'.639 Described  in  in  1929  as  'rather  a  wild  body'  but  suitable  to  local
requirements, they were the only force that Arabs would join as they could 'resign
easily',  go  diving  and  were  'not  obliged  to  wear  uniforms'.640Belgrave  in  1927
described Naturs as a 'sort of civil police',641 and they were frequently called upon to
help police unrest,  even though their  training and discipline was questionable.  For
example, in the pearl diver riots of 1932, many started firing guns 'wildly' in an effort
to  control  the situation.642 In 1965,  five hundred  nawātir helped quash the March
uprising, helping the already stretched police.643 
The evolution of various elements, including the al-fidawiyya into the Naturs
was also supplemented by the fact the shaykhs appeared to maintain a lot of their
Bedouin retainers who would help enforce the law. Yet these Bedouin were notably
violent in their approach. In 1938, the Shabab al-Watani (The Youth of the Nation), a
group of young,  politically-minded Bahrainis,  claimed that  they were beaten by a
‘number of bedouins’ when they protested outside the British Agency.644 A picket of
boys were also arrested by the Ruler's  retainers  in  1938.645 In  1954, when the Al
Khalifa oppression of the 1920s was still well within  living memory, the Shaykh's
Bedouin were used at road blocks to intimidate people, who were described as 'very
scared of them'.646 
In  1954,  during  Sunni  –  Shi‘a  communal  disturbances,  the  police  and  the
‘Ruler’s  Bedouin’647 patrolled  Bahrain,  with  Charles  Belgrave  arguing  that  such
ancillaries  were  necessary,  even  though  the  Higher  Executive  Committee  had
protested against the 'provocative attitude of the Bedouin police auxiliaries'.648 The
639 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1956, BGAR, vol. 5, p. 47. 
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644 Al-Shabab al-Watani, 1938, RoB, vol. 5, p. 130. 
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647 J.W. Wall, Communique to FO, 4 December 1954, RoB, vol. 7,  p. 86.  
648 Ibid., p. 87.
141 
problem was exacerbated by a ill-disciplined, and jumpy police force. As Belgrave
noted  in 1954; 'The Police refused to go out on duty without rifles, the fact is the
Police, except for show, are utterly useless & the main fault is Khalifah who is lazy,
cowardly & incompetent & always keeps himself well out of the way if there is any
possibility of trouble'.649 On a number of occasions, the British had to intervene to
prevent  the  young  shaykhs  leading  attacks  of  hundreds  of  bedouin  against  the
baḥārna.  The Ruler even joined the Bedouin in war dances after they gathered in
Rifa‘a to show support and intimidate the baḥārna.650 
Yet the presence of multiple agencies under Al Khalifa control became more
acute after the diminution of British control of the police following Independence.
The British Ambassador Roger Tomkys complained  that a multiplicity of pseudo-
security organs (see chapter on statecraft) were illegally deporting Shiʿa. In the recent
uprising,  the role of such para-state security organizations has been heavily evident.
Numerous reports, videos, and accounts have shown how thugs in civilian clothes
have attacked activists or protesters. In 2012, Ahmad Ismail, a citizen journalist, was
shot and killed by unknown assailants in an unmarked car as he filmed a protest. Dr.
Mike Diboll, a teacher at Bahrain Polytechnic, described how '“loyalist” vigilantes'
'equipped  with  pickaxe  handles,  iron  bars,  swords,  spears  and  machetes'  and
'supported  by  Ministry  of  the  Interior  Police',  came  to  campus  to  confront
protesters.651
Indeed, since 2011, numerous videos have emerged of vigilantes, or baltajiyya,
attacking civilians. The term baltajiyya has become engrained in the Bahrain lexicon
due to their prevalence. This vigilantism  epitomises a Hobbesian lawlessness, as it
can lead to pro-democracy activists silencing their calls for change in exchange for the
security  afforded  by  an  authoritarian  government.  Indeed,  the  psychological
implications of unfettered and unrestrained vigilantism can be telling, and their lateral
nature  symbolises  a  breakdown of  traditional  non-state  mechanisms of  protection,
such  as  community  and  neighbourliness.  In  combination  with  state  violence,
vigilantism is therefore amongst the most insidious forms of political violence. The
extent to which  the authorities endorse this vigilantism is highlighted by their apathy
649 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 September 1954.
650 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 July 1954. 
651 M. Diboll, ‘Written evidence from Dr Mike Diboll’.
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in tackling it, and their general fear of restraining Sunni loyalists. 
Foreign Mercenaries 
The Bahraini  government’s  recruitment  policy  in  the  officially  state-sanctioned
security services  has often motivated contentious politics,  being both a source of
discontent and a driver of repressive action. This is particularly true due to the number
of foreign employees in the PSF and National Guard. As Ala'a Shehabi and Nazgol
Kafai state, ‘The running joke in Bahrain is that you can expect to be arrested by a
Pakistani,  interrogated  by  a  Jordanian,  tortured  by  a  Yemeni,  and  judged  by  an
Egyptian, but at least you can expect your fellow prisoners to be Bahraini'.652   This
historical recruitment of foreigners, termed pejoratively, but accurately, al-murtazaqa
(mercenaries) has bred resentment, and resulted in a security apparatus that is 'for the
most part alien and thus mercenary in nature'.653 
In the first half of the 19th century,   recruitment policy was shaped to a large
extent by British foreign policy concerns, with the historic tensions between Persia
and Saudi informing how candidates were selected. This was particularly true in the
1920s when Britain, having to appease both the Saudi, baḥārna, and the Al Khalifa,
adopted an ambivalent strategy to recruitment. For example, during the early part of
the 20th century,  when the British  were seeking to restrain Al Khalifa piracy and
banditry,  it  was  expedient,  yet  expensive,  to  have  Punjabi  Indian  Muslims  as
policemen. Yet locals saw them as 'expensive foreign mercenaries',654 and they were
phased out to be eventually replaced by a force described by Belgrave as consisting of
'Bahrain Arabs, Shia Baharna, manumitted slaves, local Persians',and a ' sprinkling of
'Kurds,  Iraqis,  Swahili  and Sudanese'.655   However,  discontent  at  the  presence of
Persian policemen excited further  historical  animosity between the Al Khalifa,  Al
Saud and Persia, culminating in the Najdi Persian riots in 1923, in which a number of
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November 2015).
653 D. Killingray, ‘Guarding the extending frontier: policing the Gold Coast, 1865–1913’, in D.M. 
Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–
1940, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991, p. 106.
654 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1937, BGAR, vol. 2, p. 10.  
655 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1351 (1932 – 33), BGAR, vol. 1, p. 358. 
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Persians were killed.  As most  of  the Naturs at  the time  were Persians656,  and Ibn
Saud's anger more acute than Persia's, this prompted Knox to get rid of a couple of
them to appease Ibn Saud.657 
Further shifting geopolitical imperatives changed the nature of this recruiting
policy, yet they always brought with them questions of police legitimacy. Following
India's Independence, and the growth of Arab Nationalism and Communism in parts
of the Arab World, the British had to look elsewhere for recruits. In the 1950s, soldiers
from Iraq and tribal militias from al-Hasa were brought in to help keep order.658 These
troops were acceptable to both the Al Khalifa and the British, but not the citizens, who
protested over the presence of foreigners in the police. Despite this, the  tradition of
recruiting strangers to police 'strangers'  continued into the 1960s when the British
commandant of the police, Winder, went to Pakistan to recruit ex-servicemen'.659 In
1965, of the 921 strong police force in Bahrain, only 25% were Bahraini. In 1970, this
had increased to 32%.660 
Fig 9. Table showing percentage of foreigners in the Bahrain police 
1934 - 1935 1957 1960 1965 1970 2015
Percent Bahraini 6%661 24.00% 21.00% 25.00% 32.00% 50%662
There were a number of reasons why local policemen were eschewed in favour of
foreigners.  For example,  Winder,  the police commandant  in 1965, maintained that
'Bahrainis  [did]  not  make  good  policeman  being  lazy  and  not  amenable  to
discipline'.663 It was also a problem that very few applied. In  1961, of 360 recruits
who  applied,  only  four  were  Bahraini.664 Also,  the  lack  of  suitable  local  recruits
656 A.P. Trevor, From the British Residency – Bushire, 10 November 1923, vol. 4, p. 196.
657 Col. S.G. Knox, From Bushire to Secretary of State for Colonies, RoB, vol. 3, p. 757. 
658 F. Khuri, p. 207.
659 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards', p. 212. 
660 J.S. Bell, Annual Report for 1970, BGAR, vol. 8, p. 95
661This number is derived from a total force of 172, and 10 Shiʿa baḥārna.  No 'Bahrainios' wer 
ementioned, just Arabs, Persians, Manumitted Slaves, Swahilis, Sudanese, Iraqis, Yemenis, Kurds, 
Malabaris, and Baluchis. p. 523. Annual Records/ Belgrave. Vol. 1..On p. 445 he mentions all 
enlisted locally-not all local. 
662S. E. Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2015, p. 140. (This figure includes all armed forces).
663 J.P. Tripp, 14 Feb 1965,  FO 371/179790, TNA. 
664 M. b. S. Al Khalifah, Annual Report for Year 1961, BGAR, vol. 6, p. 46. 
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prompted  the  employment  of  foreigners,  especially  after  the  troubles  of  1965.665 
Following the disturbances of 1965, Peter Edward Turnbull was commissioned
to do a report on the Bahrain Police. He argued that more Bahraini policeman should
be  recruited,  yet  the  trend  of  employing  foreigners  continued  unabated  post-
Independence, and was adopted by the newly formed military. In 1974, three hundred
'kindred tribesmen' from Saudi Arabia were brought in to join the Bahrain Defence
Force.666 The imperative of recruiting foreigners, specifically Sunnis, was especially
apparent after the Iranian Revolution, and it is now believed that 50% of Bahrain's
security apparatus are foreign Sunnis.  This recruitment problem was compounded by
the  reluctance  of  young  Bahrainis  outside  the  Al  Khalifa  to  join  the  security
services.667  
The use of foreign Sunnis in the security apparatus was evident in the 2011
Uprising.  At  least  five  hundred  Emirate  policemen  entered  Bahrain  in  2011  to
augment the Bahraini forces.668 These Emirate policemen remained in Bahrain until at
least March 2014.669  In April 2014, the Bahrain Mirror published leaked documents
revealing  that  there  were  at  least  499 Jordanian  citizens  working  in  the  Bahraini
security sector.670 Furthermore, according to Pakistan's foreign minister Naila Chohan,
10,000 Pakistanis were serving in Bahrain's  'defence services'  in 2014.671 Many of
Bahrain's PSF are still recruited from Yemen, Syria, Jordan and other countries in the
Arab world, although the military tends to be predominantly Bahraini. 
The use of these al-murtazaqa is provocative on a number of levels. Not only
does it raise issues of employment by depriving Bahrainis of many state sector jobs,
thus promoting antagonism along political and economic lines, but it also means that a
non-native police force are tasked with policing a foreign citizenry – an issue that
665 K. Oldfield, 30 August 1965,  FO 371/179790, TNA. 
666 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1974, 2 January 1975, FCO 8/2414. The National 
Archives.
667 W. R. Tomkys, Tel 75: Internal Security, 27 April 1982, FCO 8/4332.  
668J. Lessware, ‘State of emergency declared in Bahrain’, The National, 16 March 2011, 
www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/state-of-emergency-declared-in-bahrain, (accessed 3 
October 2015). 
669The National, ‘Emirati officer dies in Bahrain bomb explosion’, 3 March 2014, 
www.thenational.ae/world/emirati-officer-dies-in-bahrain-bomb-explosion, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
670Bahrain Mirror, ‘Bahrain Mirror publishes important document regarding Jordanian police: 499 
policemen are costing Bahrain 1.8 million dollar per month’, 3 April 2014, http://bmirror14feb2011.no-
ip. org/news/14724.html, (accessed 5 October 2015).
671 P. Muhammad, ‘Foreign relations: tit-for-tat proposed over visa rejections’, The Express Tribune, 1 
April 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/689833/ foreign-relations-tit-for-tat-proposed-over-visa-
rejections/ , (accessed 3 October 2015).
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erodes the legitimacy of the police.672 It has also prevented the emergence of what
Douglas Johnson calls a positive 'link between government and the people'. 673  Fuad
Khuri concurs, arguing that the use of foreign police in Bahrain is said to 'harden their
hearts',674 imbuing the police with less empathy to the local population and increasing
the likelihood of more egregious violations. So while policing may be understood 'as a
continuum of activities ranging from a pole of service, protection, and concern for
individualizing  justice  to  a  pole  of  domination,  exploitation,  and  concern  for
maintaining order',  675 the security services in Bahrain have long inhabited the latter
end of the continuum, an aspect facilitated by having a mercenary police force. Even
the Bahraini Interior Minister recently acknowledged that using Bahrainis to police
Bahrain  problems  would  be  problematic.676
672Insert Table on Recruitment 
673D. H. Johnson,  p. 153. 
674F. Khuri, p. 123. 
675Austin Turk, Political Criminality, p. 116
676Lies of Samira bin Rajab, [online video], 14 March 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=GA4qMgNugys, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
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Anti-Shi‘a Discrimination 
The Shia would not rise against the Al Khalifa unless police oppression
became much more brutal than hitherto. If they did they would expect,
rightly,  to  be crushed eventually (and no doubt  inefficiently)  by Saudi
forces679 
In  addition  to  the  recruitment  of  aliens  to  police  locals,  there  is  deep-rooted
discrimination  of  Shi‘a  in  the  security  services,  something  that  has  led  to  a
contentious  disposition  towards  the  police,  and  thus  resulted  in  an  increased
677The National Guard was established in 1997 pursuant to Emiri Order No. 1 of 1997 and is governed
by Emiri Decree Law No. 20 of 2000. According to Emiri Decree Law No. 20,  (BICI Report). 
678Decree No. 14 of 2002 established the National Security Agency (NSA) to replace the General 
Directorate of State Security that was formerly under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.194  
(BICI Report). 
679 R. Tomkys, First Impressions.
147 
occurrence  of  personal  integrity  violations.  The  trend,  which  appears  to  have
continued today, was epitomised in 1953, when Charles Belgrave noted, 'one of the
policemen referred to the Shias as “the enemy” & that is the way they regard it'.680  He
also noted that all the police 'showed a strong anti-Shia basis' and that this 'feeling
sticks to them all'.681 Following communal disturbances in 1953, Belgrave revealed
that  the  police  obviously  sided  with  the  Sunnis  after  the  fracas  devolved  into  a
sectarian affair.682 He added that  the  'police were  obviously in  sympathy with the
Sunnis and the  Muharraqis'683 and that 'the Shias propose to have a general strike
tomorrow & I entirely sympathise with them'.684 J.W. Wall,  a British official,  also
noted in 1953  that the police were mostly Sunnis, who ‘naturally enough, felt the best
way to restore order was to hit a Shiite [sic]’.685The discrimination and subsequent
repression against the recruitment of Shi‘a was exacerbated after Independence, and
by the Iranian Revolution, which created an increased wariness of the country's Shi‘a
population, effectively placing the majority of Bahrain's population under suspicion. 
However, this explanation is not wholly sufficient, as the Shi‘a had long been
excluded from the police force in Bahrain before the Revolution. Charles Belgrave,
for example, often rejected baḥārna recruits as 'their physique and eyesight are not on
the whole as good as that of the Arabs and men of African origin'.  686 Belgrave also
noted;  'in  my opinion the best  type  of men are those of mixed Arab and African
extraction, they have more intelligence than the pure African and are tougher than the
local Arab or Bahrani'.687 While this suggest something of the 'significance of imperial
prejudices about  the attributes of different races and cultures'  688 it  also brings up
issues  of  how  such  problems  might  be  rooted  in  social,  political  and  economic
discrimination. Despite the health issues presented by the baḥārna, given the purpose
of  the  security  forces  at  their  inception,  there  were  still  religious  and  political
considerations  to  bare  in  mind  in  order  implement  control  policies.  For  example,
recruiting locally was problematic,  as the likely candidates would be Najdis, 'over
680 C. Belgrave, Papers, 6 October, 1953.
681 C. Belgrave, Papers, 1 October 1953. 
682 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.
683 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.
684 C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953.
685 J.W. Wall to B.A.B. Burrows, 5 October 1953, RoB, vol. 7, p. 22. 
686 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for Year 1357 (1938 – 1939), p. 14.
687 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1351 (1932 – 33), BGAR, p. 358. 
688D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), ‘An orderly retreat?’, p. 7. 
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whom there would be no control and all security would then cease in Bahrain'.689 To
this  effect,  it  was  actually  a  Shi‘a  baḥārna (Hajji  Salman)  who became  the  first
Superintendent of Police. He worked in the Bahrain police from its inception in the
Manama Municipality until his death in the summer of 1934/35.690 Hajji Salman also
survived an assassination attempt in 1926,691 which the British believed was a plot to
wipe out the police, possibly by ʿAbd Allah bin  ʿIsa Al Khalifa, who resented the
usurpation of Al Khalifa privilege. 
Hajji  Salman's  eventual  death  prompted  members  of  the  Manama  Shi‘a
community to 'secure the appointment of Hajji  Salman's  son as Superintendent of
Police'.692 Although Belgrave refused on the grounds his son was not qualified, he also
noted that such positions were often perceived by locals as hereditary, yet what the
mobilisation of the Shi‘a community highlights is the belief  that a member of the
baḥārna community in the police would secure them against Al Khalifa oppression.
The police, Prior noted in 1929, were part of the reason that the baḥārna 'had security
and justice for the first time for 150 years'.693
Yet  ultimately,  the  British  still  supported  the  Al Khalifa  as  rulers,  and the
continued  co-optation  of  members  of  the  ruling  class  into  positions  of  authority
caused a further reassertion of Al Khalifa influence in recruitment matters. In 1939,
shortly  after  Hajji  Salman's  death,  Shaykh  Khalifa  bin  Muhammad  bin  ‘Isa  Al
Khalifa,  was  appointed  Superintendent  of  Police.694 While  even  in  1929,   the
uniformed  constables  were  'mostly  Persians',695 reassertions  of  Persian  claims  to
Bahrain in 1948 provoked anti-Shi‘a sentiment in the  ruling family, which led to less
Persians in the police696. This was at the time of an increase in sectarian strife, and the
make-up of the police was argued to be a driver of coercive tactics. In 1955, as it
became increasingly clear that the policing apparatus was key to control, more and
more members of the Al Khalifa were recruited into officer positions.697  By 1965, the
British argued that the police should no longer be controlled directly by the Ruling
689Secretary, Communique to Resident, 12 August 1926, RoB, vol. 4, p. 217 
690C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1353 (1934 – 35), BGAR,  vol. 1, p. 523. 
691C. Belgrave, Papers, 3 August 1926. 
692C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1353 (1934 – 35), p. 523. 
693C.G. Prior, 29 June 1929, RoB, vol. 4, p. 551.
694C. Belgrave, Annual Report for  Year 1358 (1939 – 1940), BGAR, vol. 2, p. 21. 
695C.G. Prior, 29 June 1929, RoB, vol. 4, p. 551.
696C. Belgrave, Papers, 29 May 1951. 
697C. Belgrave, Annual Reports for Year 1955, BGAR, vol. 5, p. 47.
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Family,  implying that the police force were subject to the control of a general Al
Khalifa interest group.698 Yet the policy of Bahrainisation leading up to independence
resulted in Al Khalifa taking more positions. For example in 1970, expatriates were
replaced  in  police  headquarters  by  Inspector  Khalifa  Muhammad  Al  Khalifa  and
Assistant Superintendent Ahmed Sultan Al Khalifa.699 Shaykh Mohammed bin Khalifa
Al  Khalifa  was  also  promoted  to  Deputy  commandant,  under  Commandant  J.S.
Bell,700 while  Shaykh  ‘Isa  bin  ‘Ali  Al  Khalifa  was  appointed  Director  of
Immigration.701  
After Independence, and in particular after the Iranian Revolution,  Bahrain's
Shi‘a  population  were   excluded from the  higher  echelons  of  the  security forces,
requiring 'a certificate of good behaviour before getting a job'.702  Even ten years after
its creation, the British note that the BDF contained no Shi‘a.703  (The same is true
today, as noted by Ibrahim Sharif).  It is unclear how much Saudi influence played in
the recruitment policy. As, Francis Trew, the UK Ambassador to Bahrain in 1984,
noted, 'Saudi Arabia is funding the development of the Bahrain Defence Force and
calls  the  tune'.704 Post  1979,  Ian  Henderson  showed  some suspicion  of  the  Shi‘a
policeman taking part in the ‘Ashura processions, as it meant they could not be called
upon when duty required.705 As with Charles Belgrave, the attitude and influence of
influential individuals had a large influence on the nature of the police. For examples,
Yemenis were seen as treacherous, and Najdis unreliable due to their allegiance to Al
Saud.   Just  as  Belgrave's  impressions  of  race,  ethnicity  and  perceived
loyalty/independence defined recruitment policy, so too did the Al Khalifa distrust of
the Shiʿa. This distaste for the Shi‘a and the increasingly anti-Shi‘a sentiment in the
upper echelons of the security services post-Independence was evident as recently in
2007,   when  the  King’s  brother  and  head  of  Bahrain’s  National  Guard,  Shaykh
Muhammad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa reportedly said to Shiʿa notable Shaykh al-Najati that
698M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA. 
699 J.S. Bell, Annual Report for 1970, p. 89.
700 Ibid., p. 89.
701 Ibid., p. 91.
702S. Strobl, ‘From colonial policing to community policing in Bahrain: the historical persistence of 
sectarianism’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 35, no. 1, 2011, 
p. 30. 
703H.D.A.C. Miers, Attempted Coup in Bahrain, 26 February 1982, FCO 8/4332. 
704 F.S.E. Trew, Bahrain: Annual Review 1984, FOIA Request from the FCO. 
705S.P. Collis,  'Bahrain Internal: Ashoora', 15 November 1981, FCO 8/3893, TNA. 
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the Shiʿa 'should appreciate that he did not dismiss Sunnis married to Shia from the
security  services,  even  though it  was  in  his  power'.706 The  implication  of  course,
being,  that  there  was  considerable  opinion  against  having  Shi‘a  in  the  security
services. 
During 2011, after the so-called rise of hardliners, Khalid bin Ahmed, who was
notoriously anti-Shi‘a, stated that only the older members of the Al Khalifa family
knew the mentality of these protesters and 'how to deal with them'.707 The
continuance  of  a  political  structure  dominated  by  one  family  also  indicates  that
attitudes of social control methods have been preserved generationally. Saudi pressure
to, and the Saudi regime's need to retain the support of the Wahabi ‘Ulamā' by putting
pressure  on  Bahrain  to  contain  the  'ideological  challenge  posed  by  Iran'708 also
inevitably  underlines  Bahrain's  policy  towards  the  Shiʿa.  This  discriminatory
recruitment  policy challenges the assumption that  the police are employed for the
public good, and instead positions them as a private force protecting the interests of
hegemonic elite, rather than the citizenry in its entirety, irrespective of sect or class.
Failure of Policing 'by Consent' and the Resurgence of Collective Punishment 
The exclusion of the indigenous baḥārna Shi‘a  from the police  has corroded the
legitimacy of the institution and their ability to win public consent for policing tasks,
setting up a contentious disposition to policing operations.  As one British official said
in 1982, 'So long as the Al Khalifa continue to discriminate against the Shi‘a majority,
there  will  be  a  supply  of  restless  young  men  trying  to  subvert  the  Bahraini
government'.709  The extent of police violence has led to some accusing the state of
engaging in  collective violence  against  civilians,  particularly those living in  Shi‘a
areas.   In  the  2011  Uprising,  videos  and  reports  have  shown  security  forces
indiscriminately  firing  tear  gas  into  enclosed  places  and  Shi‘a  neighbourhoods.
During the 1990s Intifada, there were at least two reported deaths from tear gas, 60-
706W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain', Wikileaks 9 
April 2007,  https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MANAMA328_a.html, (accessed 3 
October 2015). 
707J. Gengler, 'The Khawalid, Al Khalifa Politics Lurch into the Open', 22 February 2013, Bahraini 
Politics, [web blog], http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/the-khawalid-al-khalifa-politics-
lurch.html, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
708S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian – Saudi Rivalry', Middle East Policy Council, vol xix, 
no. 2, 2012. 
709 HDAC Miers, 'Attempted Coup in Bahrain',  26 February 1982, FCO 8/4332. 
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year-old Sakina al-Ghanimi, and 18-month-old 'Aqil Salman ‘Ali al-Saffar, who both
died  in  1995.710This  figure  jumped  during  the  2011  Uprising,  and  Physicians  for
Human Rights (PHR) reported that up to 24 people had died from tear gas related
injuries between February 2011 and March 2012.711Many more deaths as a result of
tear  gas  have  been  reported  since  then  and  PHR  have  argued  that  the  Bahraini
authorities  were  'weaponizing  toxic  chemical  agents',  and  using  tear  gas  to
intentionally impair people's health, and in particular those of the Shi‘a sect.712 This
level  of  intimidation  has  extended to the security forces  preventing ambulances713
reaching the wounded, the occurrence of which has been reported in both the 1990s
Intifada714 and the 2011 Pearl Uprising.715 
Tear  Gas was first  introduced into Bahrain in  1956 by the British,  and its
capacity  as  a  less  than  lethal  method  has  facilitated  collective  punishment,  as  it
inhabits the nebulous area between deadly force and a 'humane'  method of crowd
control.716 Initially introduced to disperse crowds with minimum casualties, it is now
overused, partly due to the rituals of contestation that have emerged in Bahrain's Shiʿa
villages,  but  also  because  of  the  general  tendency of  Bahrain  police  to  resort  to
methods  early on  in  any confrontation.  Yet  this  weaponisation  of  tear-gas  is  also
symptomatic  of  a  sectarian  state  policy.  A state  that  pursues  certain  policies  with
regards to its police force will produce a coercive apparatus that has particularistic
features.  The  'collective  punishment'  is  itself  facilitated  by  Bahrain's  sectarian
topography,  and the emergence of Shiʿa  ghettos created by continued government
discrimination, such as the banning of sales of land to Shi‘a in 2007 in the Sunni
dominated governate of Muharraq.717 Other social engineering projects as revealed in
Al Bandar report also highlight this policy. Such ghettoisation and marginalisation of
710Amnesty International, A Human Rights Crisis, p. 40. 
711Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Weaponizing tear gas: Bahrain’s unprecedented use of toxic 
chemical agents against civilians’, August 2012, https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Bahrain-
TearGas-Aug2012-small.pdf, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
712Ibid.
713 It is interesting to note that Daly reports how after an attack on the Shiʿa village of A'ali in 1923, 
Khan Sahib Yusuf Kanoo was told not to rent cars to Shiʿa trying to take their wounded women and 
others to hospital. 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India 
Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> [accessed 4 November 2015]
714Amnesty International, A Human Rights Crisis.
715See, for example, the BICI Report.
716 B.A.B. Burrows, Letter from Bahrain to Foreign Office, 12 March 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 227.
717W.T. Monroe, 'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain'.
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the Shiʿa explains how riot police can launch dozens of tear gas canisters into whole
villages without generally having to be concerned about angering non-Shi‘a, Sunni, or
expatriate residents. 
Violent Coercion, Para military Policing & the Authoritarian Reflex
From Britain's gunboat diplomacy, to the arrival of over two thousand GCC troops,
the policing of Bahrain's internal affairs has always blurred the lines between military
intervention and regular  policing,  inhabiting the cusp between consensual policing
and a reliance on violent coercion. Yet while gunboat diplomacy existed at  a time
when, 'British prestige rested on fear  and not on respect',  the decision to  achieve
change by more pacific means meant more interference in internal institutions.718  Yet,
as with other British colonies, the 'continuity of personnel between the army and the
police,  the military style of police training and organization, meant that the police
presence...retained something of the aura of an army of occupation'.719  As a result
'popular hostility to the police and political realities dictated that policing remained
predominantly a paramilitary activity' throughout both the British Administration and
after Independence.720  
In the latter half of the 20th century, policing protest has frequently included
'military style deployment of large police and army formations, numerous detentions
and arrests as well as use of water cannons, mounted police and dogs, tear gas, and
rubber bullets'.721 This style of policing protest highlights an 'authoritarian reflex', that
is to say, the tendency of states with authoritarian histories to revert back to draconian
techniques when changing political opportunity structures threaten the status quo.722
However, because Bahrain's fragile position has prompted a near permanent sense of
anxiety and perceived threat,  the authoritarian reflex has been engaged frequently,
especially  with  ideological  threat  of  Shiʿa  expansionism.   This  reflex  has  been
aggravated by a lack of any real accountability or procedural oversight, resulting in
frequent accusations that the police fail to adhere to standards of due process,   such as
issuing warrants for searches and arrests. 
718F. Khuri, p. 88. 
719 D. H. Johnson, p. 151.  
720D. Killingray, p. 106.
721A. Juska and C. Woolfson, ‘Policing political protest in Lithuania’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 
vol. 57, no. 4, 2012, p. 405. 
722Ibid.
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This bifurcation in the rule of law seriously threatens the legitimacy of the
police and legal system.  A group of Bahrainis complained about this problem as early
as the 1940s, stating that while Bahraini houses could be raided without warrants,
police required a warrant from the Political Agent to raid the house of a foreigner.
This  bifurcation  was  also evident   with regards  to  elite  crime.  In 1954,  after  the
Ruler's son, Muhammad bin Salman Al Khalifa, and a group of Bedouin, broke into
the  house  of  a  baḥārna  and  beat  up  the  resident,  Charles  Belgrave  personally
persuaded  the  victim not  to  make  a  complaint.723 In  this  instance,  the  Ruler  had
ordered  his  sons  to  attack  the  baḥārna,  indicating  further  antipathy  towards  the
indigenous community.724 
As cooperation and compliance with the police is fundamentally structured by
the legitimacy of the police,725this lack of procedural justice aggravates police-society
relations. While these tactics also erode the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of
Bahrain's  marginalised and dissident  communities,  the lack of legitimacy can also
encourage a lack of compliance with the law, resulting in the creation of two groups
with  conflicting  goals  and  an  increased  permissibility  with  personal  integrity
violations.726  This is in part attributable to the reactionary tactics used by the police,
which have resulted  in a large number of citizens being killed or wounded by the
state  security  forces  since  the  1950s.  In  1953,  Belgrave  noted  there  were  'police
beating up people, sometimes indiscriminately727 during Muharram728 altercations. At
the same time, the British were attempting to dissuade the ruler, unsuccessfully, from
relying on more coercive methods. Belgrave noted in 1954 that the Ruler's 'idea is
more Police & more force to enforce law & order & no sign of any concessions to
public opinion'.729 The results of this armed, poorly trained and inexperienced police
force, who were also inclined and encouraged towards coercion, became evident on 1
June 1954, when a group of Shi‘a civilians, angry at the sentencing of a co-religionist
who had  been involved in  an  altercation  in  Sitra,  gathered  at  the  police  force  to
723C. Belgrave, Papers, 5 December 1954.
724Ibid. 
725J. Sunshine and T. R. Tyler, 'The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public 
Support for Policing', Law and Society Review, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003.
726Ibid.
727C. Belgrave, Papers, 20 September 1953
728 Muharram is a holy month celebrated by Muslims, and in particular,  Shiʿa. 
729Ibid, 28 December 1954. 
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protest. The police opened fired and killed three of them.730 Two years later, in 1956,
police opened fire in a market, killing five civilians and injuring seventeen. Even after
the suggested expansion of the police before 1956, the Ruler, ignoring the advise of
Charles Belgrave, increased spending on the police, even though this resulted in a
large budget deficit.731
Almost  ten  years  later,  in  1965,  during  unrest  provoked  by  the  state  oil
company's laying off of workers, between six and eight civilians were killed by police
using Greener guns to break up strikes led by the National Liberation Front – a leftist
group with Nasserist leanings and who were advocating more workers rights.732 In
1965 the Political Resident was given standing authority to commit British troops if
necessary,  although  this  was  considered  undesirable.  Yet  the  strike  was  largely  a
pretext for leftist agitation, and the police in Bahrain 'took on an increased security
function in dealing with unrest and insurrection prompted by anti-colonial politics'.733
Although British troops were not committed, Royal Navy helicopters were used to
drop tear gas on protesters. Despite this, the British were reluctant to commit their
armed  forces  to  defend  Bahrain,  which  meant  the  police  had  to  be  increasingly
capable of performing a duty that might be expected of a military during a period of
martial law. Consequently, the British eventually attempted to address this militancy
by  commissioning  a  report  by  Peter  Edward  Turnbull.  The  report,  which
recommended significant police reform, including a severe reduction in numbers, but
increase in pay and efficiency, was duly ignored by the Al Khalifa, who were sensitive
on issues of security and chose instead to increase the size of the police instead.734735
As a result, the police force almost doubled between 1965 and 1970, increasing from
1012 personnel to 2012.736 The Ruler and Shaykh Mohammed personally bought new
armoured  vehicles  for  the  police  in  'recognition  of  their  good  work  during  the
730Many of those present then ran to the Political Agency where they demanded the protection of 
British soldiers and the disarming of the Bahrain police. In a poignant moment, a member of the 
crowd grabbed a British flag and wrapped it around one of the deceased as a 'makeshift symbol of 
al-kafan' , the white linen symbolising the ordeal of the family of Imam Hussein'. 
731Ibid., 19 January 1957.
732 J.P. Tripp, April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.
733D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), ‘An orderly retreat?', p. 5. 
734 J.P. Tripp to M.S. Weir, 5 April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA.
735M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA. 
736 These figures are taken from the statistics provided in the annual reports of Bahrain between 1924 
and 1970. 
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disturbances'.737   
This  constant  expansionism  correlated  with  the  security-minded,  fragile
position of the Al Khalifa, whose fear of popular insurrection was validated by the
British,  who  knew  that  during  any  armed  uprising,  the  police  would  be  quickly
overcome. As J.P. Tripp noted 'the British commandant of police considers that an
actively hostile crowd would very quickly get beyond the control of his police and
believes that only the intervention of British troops could restore the situation'. 738 This
fear,  and diminishing British influence leading up to and following independence,
coupled with Saudi fear of Iranian expansionism, meant that  ruling family tendencies
towards securitisation measures could continue relatively unhampered. 
Ruling Family Rivalries and Coercive Strengthening 
The 1970s  saw,  according  to  one  US official,  a  regional,  'Gulf  Arms Race'.739 In
Bahrain,  this  was  compounded  by  post-Independence,  intra-family  rivalry  and
tensions between the then Crown Prince, Hamad Al Khalifa, and the Prime Minister,
Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who controlled the National Guard and the
MOI respectively, resulted in the growth of a police force that would be better able to
deal  with  any potential  BDF insurrection  or  rebellion.   This  rivalry resulted  in  a
security inflation, in which more and more resources were diverted to strengthening
the  police  and  providing  to  them  equipment  and  training  designed  to  contain  a
military threat. As Andrew Sterling notes, 
The greatest danger is still the Bahrain Defence Force, against which the
Special Branch efficiency offers almost the only protection. The Cabinet
claim to recognise the danger and they have allowed no increase in the
Defence Force while ensuring a considerable expansion of the police; but
the menace remains 740 
The British Ambassador E.F. Given wrote that the police, 'ordered large quantities of
737M.S. Weir, 22 April 1965, FO 371/179788, TNA. 
738J.P. Tripp, The Internal Situation in Bahrain, 1 June 1963,  FO 371/174521, TNA. 
739 US Embassy, 18 July 1978, 'Bahrain's Financial Plight', Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976MANAMA00964_b.html
740A.J.D. Sterling, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971.
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anti-riot  equipment,  including some which would enable the police to take on the
Defence Force'.741 The presence of internal subversion in the form of PFLOAG also
meant the Prime Minister boosted the strength of the police. Indeed, a 'by product of
the “security situation”' was 'the increasing strength of the police'. 742 As a result, the
budget was doubled again.743 
With the rise of leftist challenges in the 1970s in the form of the National
Liberation  Front  and  other  Trade  Union  Movements,  there  was  a  resurgence  of
political  activity.  This  was  abetted  by  a  number  of  factors,  including  increased
urbanization, rises in costs of living, changes in political opportunities, and further
industrialization. However, despite the arms race between the BDF and the police,
both came together to fight threats to the regime.   Police, often using armoured cars
and  tear  gas,  dealt  with  protesters  with  little  restraint.  In  many cases,  they  were
backed up by the newly formed army, as if they were dealing with an an insurgency
and not a protest. In the March uprising of 1972, labour activists took to the streets
after  negotiations  with  the  government  on  labour  unionisation  broke  down.  Their
'major  demands  concerned  improvement  of  labour  laws,  freedom  of  association
(including the right to unionise) and the release of political prisoners and detainees'.744
Anti-riot  squads  combined  with  the  Bahrain  Defence  Force  to  crush  the
demonstrations. Afterwards, 'most known leaders of the CCBWPU745 were detained
for a year but never brought to trial'.746 At the time, units of the Saudi National Guard
were also frequent visitors of Bahrain, including during the 1972 'uprising'.747
After the promulgation of the constitution in 1973, initial oppositional success
in the newly formed parliament increased opposition morale and led to a spate of
labour unrest.748 As a result, 'Thirty-six strikes took place during the first six months
of 1974, affecting all major employers on the island'.749 However, the government's
initial confusion emboldened the activists into thinking the government were weak.
741 E.F. Given, Bahrain: Annual Report for 1976.
742R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 8 October 1974, FCO8/2180, TNA.
743Ibid.
744A. Khalaf, 'Labor Movements in Bahrain'.
745 The Constitutive Committee CCBWPU, an alliance between the NLF, the Bahraini section of the 
PFLOAG, and independent opposition figures. 





Further strikes helped gain certain concession, include a raise in the minimum wage.
However,  the  failure  of  further  negotiations  prompted  the  whole  of  the  ALBA
workforce to go on strike. This strike, which cost the government 20 million dinars,
prompted  the  regime  to  respond  with  militaristic  and  non-militaristic  means.  As
Khalaf notes,  'the security forces took charge.  Anti-riot  squads and units  from the
Bahraini Defence Force were sent in and around the smelter’s area. Troops were also
positioned at every “strategic point” in main towns and crossroads'.750 
Although the BDF were seen as a potential threat, both they and the Police co-
operated to vanquish labour unrest, which was harming Bahrain's economy. Yet the
necessity of a Bahrain Army has always been challenged by its limited resources, and
the intervention of British and Saudi troops has always been deemed essential in case
of a  serious insurrection.  The BDF and the national  guard were therefore more a
deterrent against internal threat than an effective force to ward off outside challengers.
Yet ultimately, the increase in size of the police simply reflected a quantity, not quality
approach to security. Despite the increase in size of the coercive apparatus, Henderson
lamented what he saw as a 'total failure' of 'the Al Khalifa to face up to the need to
train their own officers to take over responsibility for the security services'.751  
This militancy, buttressed by the continued ascendency of the Prime Minister
and a general anti-Shiʿa and baḥārna ideological position, prompted severe repression
in the 1990s Intifada. Indeed, policy in its entirety was not even a cabinet decision,
but the work of a small cabal including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior
Muhammad  bin  Khalifa  Al  Khalifa.752  The  tradition  of  provoking  the  Shiʿa
manifested  itself  in  1994,  when  government  forces,  without  provocation,  fired
multiple  tear  gas  canisters  into  the  open area  outside  a  Shiʿa  mosque.  They then
arrested  about  two  dozen  people,  and  shut  down  the  mosque.753 The  lack  of
provocation seemed to reflect the government's willingness to manufacture a pretext
on which to clamp down on growing unrest.   In the following years, 'security forces
and riot police were said to have routinely beaten unarmed civilians, including women
and  minors'.754 In  1995  the  combination  of  a  paramilitary  force,  galvanised  by
750Ibid.
751 W. R. Tomkys, Tel 75: Internal Security, 27 April 1982, FCO 8/4332.  
752 HRW, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
753Ibid.
754Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, p. 40. 
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hawkish influence, resulted in an atmosphere of permissive police violence.  During
the 1990s Intifada, extra judicial killing outside of prison was common, with most
protesters being killed during altercations with the police. A number of these cases
occurred during peaceful protests, and early on during the uprising, when protests had
not had a chance to become violent, pointing to a policy of escalation by the police.
Indeed Amnesty argues that of the ten initial  deaths occurring between December
1994 and May 1995, most occurred during marches 'described as peaceful, with the
participants calling on the government to restore democratic rights'.755 
While a sectarian force under British stewardship had been inclined to oppress,
after  Independence  the aggressive  attitude  to  dissent,  furnished by an institutional
conservatism underscored by anti-Shiʿa sentiment became notably more acute. As was
noted by one observer, 'A defensive regime – the Al Khalifa family – which has an
even more defensive Saudi Arabia breathing down its neck, responded aggressively,
cracking down on all dissent'.756 
The 2011 Uprising and  Evidence of Police Rioting
Hope following the 2001 reforms, symbolised by the baḥārna of Sitra carrying King
Hamad in the air, was underscored by a decline in protest and thus police violence.
However, the mass protests that erupted on 14 February 2011 prompted the Bahraini
authorities  to  engage  their  authoritarian  reflex,  even  though  popular  protests  had
remained largely peaceful.   With the  Saudi-backed Al Khalifa  adopting more  self
reliance in matters of internal security, a tougher security policy emerged.  Killings
led to bigger protests, which resulted in further killings. As was noted in the BICI
report, the 'forceful confrontation of demonstrators involving the use of lethal force
and  resort  to  a  heavy  deployment  of  Public  Security  Forces  led  to  the  death  of
civilians. This caused a marked increase in the number of persons participating in
protests and led to a palpable escalation in their demands'.757  Thirteen civilian deaths
were officially attributable to the security forces between 14 February and 15 April
2011758, 'while the death of eight civilians could not be attributed to a particular person
755Ibid., p. 34. 
756The Economist, 'Gazing backward', 25 March1995, issue 7907, p. 74.




The rise of social  media has led to an increase in documentation of police
tactics that validate previous accusations of their heavy handedness. Videos depicting
gross acts of police brutality have become common, with hours of footage showing
policemen  attacking  subdued  and  unarmed  civilians760,  deliberately  damaging
property, and shooting at civilians. This was particularly prevalent during 2011, where
multiple  videos  emerged  of  police  smashing  up  cars  parked  near  the  Pearl
Roundabout. Often police were filmed in large groups, throwing Molotov cocktails,
stones,  metal  construction  rebars  and  other  non  standard  weapons.761 The
methodological nature and widespread nature of much of this deviance implies that it
was  either  encouraged,  tacitly  accepted,  or  completely  ignored.  The  repeated
occurrence though suggested at least that the Ministry of the Interior did little in the
way to discipline such policemen (see chapter five).  
The evidence, coupled with the narrative in the BICI report and various NGOs
highlights a culture of police rioting. The term, which was used in the Walker Report
from 1968,  is  used  to  describe   'unrestrained  and  indiscriminate  police  violence'
against protesters or property.762 Accusations of this type of behaviour are frequently
levelled  at  the  Bahrain  police.  One  witness  described  the  clearing  of  the  Pearl
Roundabout that happened on 17 February 2011 as if the police were 'hell-bent' on
trying to injure as many of the protesters as possible, even when they were fleeing.763 
The frequently aggressive tactics used by the Bahrain police have not endeared
them to dissidents. Reliance on military style methods have further delegitimized the
police  and  reduced  cooperation  with  the  general  public.  Indeed,  the  Bahrain
authorities  frequently  responded  to  demonstrations  with  'violence  and  minimal
759Ibid., p. 226.
760As part of the online virtual ethnographic, I collated a database of videos I could find demonstrating
police deviance. This list can be viewed here. 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12489YCwvB-
boyzQgYzPfU2q_nBJiS85WjTPEc7HGRuM/pub?output=html
761M.O. Jones, ‘For the record: police in Bahrain throw Molotov cocktails’, Marc Owen Jones [blog], 
18 March 2012, http://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/2012/03/18/for-the-record-police-in-bahrain-
throw-molotov-cocktails/, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
762Summary of report submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study Team, to the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, introduction by Max Frankel, E.P. Dutton, New 
York, 1968, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_chicago7_doc_13.html, (accessed 2 November 
2015).  
763T. Mitchell, 'Witness to an Uprising: What I Saw in Bahrain', The Atlantic, 14 December 2011,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/witness-to-an-uprising-what-i-saw-in-
bahrain/249977/, (accessed 3 October 2015).  
160 
concessions', 764 the hallmark of paramilitary policing. In the recent uprising, the BICI
report  noted  that  the  weapons  and the  way they were used  violated  principles  of
'necessity  and  proportionality'.765 Often,  the  police  fired  without  due  care  as  to
whether the victim was injured or killed.766 
Attempts  to  reform  the  police  have  generally  been  prompted  by  the  Al
Khalifa's  desire  to  increase its  co-ercive  capacity,  as  opposed to  creating  political
solutions to increase consent. Indeed, the attitude of the Al Khalifa towards policing
highlighted by Belgrave in 1954 seems to have endured; 'more Police & more force to
enforce law & order & no sign of any concessions to public opinion'.767 Indeed, the
security apparatus in Bahrain has been more 'reactive than proactive'.768 These fears of
militant policing have not been assuaged recently.  Matthew Cassel769 argued in 2011
that  the  so-called  'Miami  Model'  of  policing,  was  coming  to  Bahrain  after  the
government  invited  former  Miami  police  chief  John  Timoney to  help  reform the
police..  Jeremy Scahill  notes  that  the  Miami  model  is  more  akin  to  'paramilitary
soldering'.770  The  model  is  characterised  by  the  deployment  of  military  style
armoured personnel carriers, and the use of helicopters, which makes many protests
seem like war zones. 
Despite these fears, the Manama model has long existed prior to the Miami
model.  Violence  has  long  been,  and  continues  to  be,  an  important  aspect  of
maintaining Al Khalifa hegemony. It has however, got quantitatively worse over the
past century, and shows no sign of abating. 
Use of Torture 
Torture771 is a  form of  personal  integrity  violation  aimed  at  neutralizing  political
764PHR, Weaponizing Tear Gas.
765BICI Report, p. 418
766Ibid.
767C. Belgrave, Papers, 28 December 1954. 
768D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray, ‘An orderly retreat?', p. 10. 
769M. Cassel, ‘Even Bahrain’s use of “Miami model” policing will not stop the uprising’, The 
Guardian, 3 December 2011, www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2011/dec/03/bahrain-miami-model-
policing, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
770J. Scahill, ‘The Miami model’, Democracy Now! on Information Clearing House, 24 November, 
www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5286.htm, (accessed 2 November 2015). 
771Torture is defined by the United Nations as 'any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or 
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opposition, and has been used since at least the 1920s in Bahrain. Yet how torture is
done is as important as the deterrence or acquiescence it seeks to achieve.  Indeed,
torture is vital in 'making the consequences of political resistance so gruesome that no
one who has experienced it is psychologically and/or physically capable of further
resistance – if he or she survives'.772 Torture is also instrumental, and has been used in
Bahrain  for  a  number  of  reasons,  including;  exacting  confessions,  gathering
information about political movements, forcing detainees to relinquish their political
beliefs,  forcing  detainees  to  report  on  the  activities  of  their  friends,  and  forcing
detainees to promise to cease engaging in political activity.773 In this respect, torture
seeks to damage and debilitate social movements through intimidation, intelligence
gathering,  and persuasion.  Although it  has  existed  for  a  decades,  its  severity  and
occurrence appears to have increased markedly since Independence, and even more so
since the 1990s Intifada. 
Although Amnesty International reports document torture occurring as early as
1972,774 a more thorough consultation of British records shows that detainees were
exposed to physical harm for the purposes of extracting information from as early as
1926. Indeed, British officials were directly involved in torturing political prisoners
themselves, a fact that has not been addressed in the literature on Bahrain. This was
particularly  true  during  the  1920s,  when  the  British  administration  was  beset  by
numerous challenges to its authority, whether it was perceived Bolshevik agitation or
the  actions  of  groups  working  on  behalf  of  a  faction  of  the  Ruling  Family  to
undermine  British  authority.  When the  British  set  up a  force  of  Levies  to  protect
Hamad's authority, ʿAbd Allah and ʿIsa's wife sought to undermine these reforms.775
Dissent  was  sown in  the  ranks  of  the  new armed forces,  allegedly via  a  Persian
Bolshevik Mullah, which culminated in a Baluchi Sepoy killing two other Levies. The
attack  also  resulted  in  Major  Daly,  the  British  political  agent  at  the  time,  being
stabbed, shot and wounded. During the course of the investigation, Belgrave admits to
using  'methods of  a  mild Spanish Inquisition'  to  get  information  from one of  the
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions'.- UN Convention Against Torture. 
772A. Turk, Political Criminality, p. 137. 
773Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
774Amnesty International, Annual Report 1972 – 1973, p. 70. 
775A paramilitary force of troops
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conspirators.776 
In a raid on the village of  Sanābis, again thought to be orchestrated by the
faction of the Al Khalifa trying to undermine British authority, the British Captain
Parke used sleep deprivation methods to get suspects to talk.777 Belgrave noted; 'P's
idea is to keep him from sleeping for a few nights and then he may talk, that is not
exactly torture'.778 In another case, where a cabal apparently headed by Shaykh ʿAbd
Allah bin  ʿIsa Al Khalifa organised an assassination attempt on the Ruler, Captain
Parke tortured suspects to get them to talk. Belgrave noted how the torture from his
juniors occurred at their own volition, and although this angered Barrett, the Political
Agent, no action was taken to discipline Parke.
The  men  admitted  that  it  had  been  ordered  by Shaikh  Khalid  a  near
relation of the Shaikhs. Barrett wrote officially to the Shaikh telling him
of his various relations who were implicated in the murders but the Shaikh
does not dare to do anything about them. It makes me really very angry.
Barrett spoke about the business of the Police having used rather oriental
methods with the prisoners to get them to give evidence. Parke ordered it
and Barrett is very angry with him, one thing they did was to tie the men
up and then put lighted papers between their toes. Of course it is a pity
that it came out, but knowing the men and what they have done I dont feel
much  compunction  for  them.  It  is  a  pity  that  Parke  took  part  in  it
himself.779
Furthermore, in 1932, following the outbreak of riots, Belgrave 'beat' a few detainees
in order to get them to talk. He writes in his diary 
I spent the whole morning till two o'clock interrogating the prisoners, at
first they wouldn’t speak but I beat a few of them till they did speak, it
was  all  very  barbarous  and  illegal  but  on  some  occasions  one  has  to
776C. Belgrave, Papers,15 August 1926. Interestingly, Belgrave expresses remorse for these deeds – 
saying that 'he felt sorry for the boy'. 
777C. Belgrave, Papers, 12 November 1928
778Ibid., 12 November 1928
779Ibid.,  16 April 1929
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behave illegally. They gave me the information that I needed and on that I
was able to make a list of the names of the men who were the ringleaders
and who actually broke into the Police Office and took the man out.780
While some may protest that the 1920s were 'different times', and attitudes to violent
methods of coercion were less pronounced there are a number of issues. Firstly, such
methods were obviously perceived as an effective way of achieving certain objectives,
whether  information  gathering  or  punishment.  Secondly,  Belgrave  himself
acknowledged the deplorable nature of his actions, and the Political Resident Barrett
expressed his disapproval on finding out that another British officer had used 'oriental
methods'.  Belgrave even noted with remorse that he had acted 'illegally', although no
penal code existed at the time. Clearly, the British police had a lot of autonomy from
superiors in many ways, a fact arguably true of all the British agents in the region.
Belgrave's  own admittances  tend to  confound any illusions  of  a  civilising  British
colonial presence. Yet despite its occurrence, torture prior to Bahrain's independence
seems to be less systematic. 
Evidence of torture in the forties, fifties and sixties is harder to come by, and
the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office's  refusal  to  comply  with  freedom  of
information  requests  confounds  further  research  into  the  issue.  The  increasing
professionalization of the police in the 1960s and the shift to more intelligence led
policing  under  Henderson  did  not  initially  prompt  an  increase  in  torture.  Despite
reports of police brutality in 1965, a surprise visit by the Red Cross revealed nothing
of suspicion.781 Under Henderson's methods (see chapter on Information Control)  the
police were forbidden from arresting suspected dissidents let alone torturing them,
implying a general shift in policing behaviours.  The British too, believed Henderson
and Bell's  methods were less draconian than their  predecessors,  and were initially
'regarded with favour'  by Bahrainis.782 Yet popular discontent, and the activities of
bodies like Amnesty International, meant that the authorities were aware that such
actions could not be done with total impunity.  
780Ibid.,  27 May 1932. 
781 Visit to Bahrain by  International Red Cross Official, 1965, FO 371/179809.
782 K. Oldfield, 15 August 1965, Amnesty International and Political Prisoners, FO 371/185355, TNA.
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Torture post Independence 
Reports  of  torture  after  Independence  in  1971  became  more  common  and
consistent,783 and  deaths   as  a  result  of  torture  increased,  with  both  the  British
administration and NGOs documenting its occurrence.  Even though the 1970s and
1980s saw a  better documentation of torture by human rights organisations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the increase likely reflects a spike
rather  than  simply  better  documentation.  Amnesty  International  reported  that  six
political detainees died in custody between 1980 – 86.784  After Independence, deaths
by torture increased. Between 1976 and 1986, eight people died in police custody, and
Amnesty International and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group reported
that at least six of those were believed to be as a result of torture.785 In 1981, 23-year-
old Muhammad Hassan Madan was beaten to death by three policemen in Muharraq
police station.786 The ensuing protests also resulted in the police running down six
Shi‘a and killing nine-year-old yr old ʿAdel Hasan Khoki.787 It is said that their bodies
were buried in secret graves788, the Khoki incident certainly was not reported.789 In
most cases there was no investigation, internal or otherwise. In three of these cases
between 1976 and 1986, investigations found that three of the deceased had died of
suicide or medical illness. 
Yet the first Shiʿa martyr was considered to be Jamal ʿAli, who was killed in
police custody. In a suspicious case of history repeating itself, the  Gulf Daily News
reported  that  Jamal  ʿAli  had  died  of  kidney  failure  as  a  result  of  bad  health.790
Similarly, in 2011, the Bahrain News Agency noted that Karim Fakhrawi, who was
found to have been tortured, also died of kidney failure. The British acknowledged
that as well as likely being an  'innocent party', ʿAli was 'electrocuted'791 and 'beaten
783Amnesty International Annual Reports from 73 – 74, 77, 1980 and 1982, all report torture. 
784Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, p. 2.
785R. Wilkingson, 'Speak Together of Freedom. The Present Struggle for Democracy and Human 
Rights in Bahrain', The Parliamentary Human Rights Group, March 1996, 
http://bahrain.wikia.com/wiki/Speak_Together_of_Freedom:_The_Present_Struggle_for_Democrac
y_and_Human_Rights_in_Bahrain,_Robert_Wilkinson,_The_Parliamentary_Human_Rights_Group
,_March_1996, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
786Copson, Telegram No 165, 16 September, 1981, FCO8/3893, TNA.
787Ibid.
788Bahrain Martyrs, [Instagram Account], 16 February 2014, https://instagram.com/p/ke8XaLxEnT/, 
(accessed 5 October 2015).  
789 Copson, Telegram No 165, 16 September, 1981.
790Gulf Daily News, 'Ministry denies deaths rumours', April 1980,  FCO8/3489, TNA. 
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up in custody' where he 'died of his injuries'.792  
In addition to  an increased sense of vulnerability brought about by Bahrain's
Independence in 1971, there was a notable shift in power at the Ministry of Interior
that  empowered  hard-liners  within  the  Ruling  Family  –  in  particularly  the  Prime
Minister and a merchant elite, who Harold Walker mentioned included the al-Muyyad
and  al-Zayani  family.  This  relationship  was  highlighted  in  1974,  when  'the
government and the merchant class thought it was time to take a firm hand'793 against
any unrest. The  Prime Minister himself exhibited antipathy towards the Shi‘a that
indicate how his personal influence was significant in increasing repression against
the country's baḥārna and Shi‘a population. This shift in power to the Al Khalifa was
accompanied by a corollary diminishing of British influence in the security apparatus.
In 1973,  it  was reported that  the Prime Minister  had the last  word on matters of
internal  security  and  basic  foreign  policy'794 and  kept  police  and  special  branch
'closely under his own control'.795 
Despite diminishing influence,  the British were still  well-represented in the
Bahraini police, yet this seemed to have little impact on moderating torture. Foreign
Office  correspondence,  corroborated  by  US  State  Department  cables  both
acknowledge the declining influence of the British head of police, Jim Bell, and the
British head of special Branch, Ian Henderson, in the 1970s.796 The British embassy
reported 
Two years ago the Chief of the Police and the Head of the Special Branch,
both  British, came directly under the Prime Minister and were regularly
and visibly in close and constant touch with him. Now they hardly ever
see him, but work to a Bahraini Minister of the Interior who is fortunately
conscientious and hard-working. The Chief of Police is  now ‘Director-
General  of  Public  Security’,  advising  and  administering  from  the
background rather than exercising direct executive control.  He has lost
792H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1980, 10 February 1981, FCO8/3894, TNA.
793R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 July 1974, FCO8/2180.
794R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1973.
795R.M. Tesh, 17 December 1973.
796 'Advisory Roles of the UK and Certain Others Countries in the Persian Gulf States', US Embassy 
Manama, 20 February 1975,https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975MANAMA00217_b.html, 
(accessed 5 October 2015). 
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much of his power, and rather sadly accepts this.  The Head of Special
Branch  –  which  is  now,  at  the  top,  wholly  expatriate  –  is  no  longer
allowed to detain or interrogate; his intelligence network must therefore
function by other means, and the power of deterrence has dwindled. 797
As  a  result,  Henderson  and  Bell  were  'excluded  from  various  private  lines  of
command influence'.798 However, they were still seen as an 'inestimable advantage in
practical terms',as they they offered some assurance about the maintenance of law and
order in the wake of Al Khalifa conservatism.799 Ultimately though, the British were
less involved in the policing of Bahrain politics, and their ability to ensure a more
moderate attitude towards policing was reduced. 
The  murder  of  newspaper  editor  Shaykh  ʿAbd  Allah  al-Madani  in  1976
signified the overturning of Henderson's influence, and his relatively restrained policy
towards interrogation and torture. It was used by the Bahraini authorities to justify a
crackdown on leftist political groups in Bahrain, and resulted in a policy that had
previously prevented targets of subversion from being arrested, and therefore tortured.
As Given noted,  'the 'murder removed the restriction on the interrogation of Popular
Front suspects, and enabled the police to acquire a clearer picture than before of its
ramifications and activities'.800 Prior to this, 'the absence of interrogation of suspects
meant that the police received only the amount of intelligence which their sources in
the NLF cared to give them'.  801  The impact seemed immediate, and two Bahrainis,
Muhammad Ghulum Busheri and Saʿid al-ʿUwaynati, were killed as a result of torture
following the arrest. Although the trial was a farce, and the evidence shaky it was used
as a pretext for clamping down on political opposition. This was at a time where the
ruling family were 'closing ranks' 802 and concentrating in their hands both politically
sensitive posts such as security as well as posts relating to social affairs.803 Again, this
had  gone  in  opposition  the  recommendations  of  the  Turnbull  report,  which  had
797 R.M. Tesh, 1 March 1975.
798 W.R. Tomkys, Bahrain Internal Security, 10 April 1982. 
799 P.F.M. Wogan, Letter to W.R. Tomkys, 23 April 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
800 E.F.Given, Political Murder in Bahrain, 29 January 1977, FCO8/2874, TNA.
801 Ibid.
802 E.F.Given, 5 July 1976.
803 Ibid. 
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advocated 'removing direct control from members of the Ruling Family'.804  
The  legislative  provisions  of  the  State  Security  Decree  also  facilitated  'the
torture  of  prisoners  in  Bahrain'.805 Detainees  could  be  held  incommunicado  for
months, or even years, isolated from the outside world, with no access to legal counsel
until  the  time  of  their  trial  and  infrequent  visits  from  their  family.  Provisions
governing trial before the Supreme Civil Court of Appeal also allowed the court to
base its judgement solely on confessions given to the police, or even merely on police
testimony that they recorded such confessions (even in the absence of witnesses). In
the  1980s,  confessions  were  allowed  as  the  sole  basis  for  a  conviction,  even  if
uncorroborated. In this regard, the incentive of using torture was increased for the
police, and there were few safeguards ensuring that such evidence would be discarded
in the courts.806 Combined with  the  new State  Security Law,  the  al-Madani  affair
consolidated a shift from a more laissez faire approach to intelligence gathering to one
that demanded the interrogation, and, as a consequence, torture, of suspects. Indeed,
the tug of war between Henderson and the Al Khalifa appeared to be generally over,
and this ended what seemed like a 'lack of a coherent policy on dealing with' political
opposition, which had previously vacillated 'between inactivity and excessive zeal'.807
Following  the  increase  in  torture, the  British  wished  to  impress  upon  the
Bahrainis  such  a  method  was  not  simply  'morally  undesirable'808,  but  also  self
defeating, using the example of SAVAK. However, they were also reluctant again to
upset the Al Khalifa by doing so.809 This lack of influence strengthened the problem,
and led to a division of labour between the British and Arab police.  Roger Tomkys
reported  that  the  most  brutal  among  the  torturers  were  Bahrainis,  and  that  the
'encouragement they get from some members of the Al Khalifas is to be more rather
than less tough in their methods', indicating an increase in brutality with increasing Al
Khalifa control. 810 
Torture  also  became  functional  and  important  in  creating  intelligence
networks. The increasing necessity of intelligence was met with a problem of how to
804 M.S. Weir, 7 October 1965.
805Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, p. 10.
806 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
807 E.F. Given, 5 July 1976.
808 'Bahraini Police Methods',  FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
809 Ibid.
810W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982. 
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obtain  it  lawfully.   In  1991,  Amnesty  International  reported  that,   'detainees  are
tortured and ill-treated to obtain information, or confessions which may then be used
as a basis for their conviction and sentence... or threatened and warned against taking
part in any form of political opposition activity in the future'.811 Amnesty International
also reported that many prisoners were 'subjected to torture or threats in order to force
them to cooperate with the authorities, reporting back on the activities and friends of
particular  individuals'.812 Between  1994  and  1998,  Human  Rights  Watch  received
reports of at least 7 deaths in custody due to torture.813 The need for information, and
the  continued  relevance  of  confessions  without  sufficient  safeguards  to  ensure
confessions have not been coerced, have allowed the method of torture to flourish. 
Modern methods of torture, patterns and explanations 
With  more  accurate  documentation  comes  more  insight  into  those  methods  used.
Torture  in  the  eighties  frequently  involved  'beatings  with  lengths  of  hosepipe  or
electric cable, enforced standing upright for many hours or days, sleep deprivation,
prevention  from  going  to  the  toilet,  extinguishing  cigarettes  on  the  body  and
suspension  in  contorted  positions'.814In  addition  to  this,  Amnesty  International
received reports of 'prisoners being forced to eat faeces or a lizard, having their skin
pierced  by  a  drill  and  being  threatened  with  sexual  abuse  or  execution'.815 The
multitude of techniques highlight the importance of humiliation and the destruction of
the victim's self-esteem. Psychological methods such as threats to the family of the
detainee are used. It is also interesting to note the consistency of techniques over the
decades.816 Interestingly,  other  methods  have  been  used  that  are  particular  to
Bahrainis,  and the Shi‘a in general.  For example,  the endemic issue of sickle cell
811 Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, pp. 8 – 9. 
812 Ibid.
813HRW, Torture Redux: The Revival of Physical Coercion during Interrogations in Bahrain, 2010, 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ bahrain0210webwcover_0.pdf, (accessed 5 October 2015). 
814  Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, pp. 8 – 9. 
815 Ibid., p. 7.
816severe and sustained beatings all over the body using hosepipes, electric cables and other 
implements; falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet); forcing detainees to beat each other; 
suspension from the limbs in contorted positions, with blows administered to the body at the same 
time; enforced standing for several hours or days; sleep deprivation; preventing detainees from 
relieving themselves; immersion in water to the point of near drowning; burning the skin with 
cigarettes; and piercing of the skin with a drill. Reports of the sexual molestation of male detainees, 
particularly of youths, have also been received over the years. These include physical assault as 
well as other methods such as the insertion of objects into the penis or anus. - AI, Bahrain: A 
Human Rights Crisis, p. 29.
169 
anaemia in Bahrain is exploited to facilitate torture, as is the derision of the Shi‘a faith
by officials. Sickle cell anaemia patients in the 1990s and the recent uprising have
often been kept in 'air-conditioned rooms in winter for prolonged periods'  exposing
them to the risk of organ damage, especially kidney or eyes.817 In addition, 'they also
risk leg ulcers, gall stones and bacterial infection, and suffer generalised body pain'.818
Shiʿa detainees are also frequently prevented from 'saying their prayers or performing
ablution' highlighting how the perceived type of threat influences methods.819 Often
when those with sickle cell anaemia die in custody, the authorities simply blame the
disease by attributing it to kidney failure,820 reflecting a tendency to use cause of death
without referring to the underlying cause of death. Such distinctions are important in
determining why the person died. At least three deaths, two in custody, and one from
tear gas, were blamed by the government on sickle cell anaemia. In the case of the
custodial deaths of Hasan Jasim Muhammad Maki821 and Zakariya Rashid Hasan al-
Asheri822, the BICI report found the deaths had been as a result of torture, and in the
third, they noted that Sayid Jawad Ahmed Hashim Marhun did not even suffer from
sickle cell  anaemia.823  The BICI Report  noted that the level of mistreatment was
dependent  on  the  'categories  of  detainees',  again,  emphasising  the  relationship
between threat and method of torture.824
The continuance of torture throughout the 1990s seemed to be indicative of a
laissez  faire  attitude  towards   state  violence.  This  was  emphasised  when  Shaykh
Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa,  a member of the ruling family and the then
Foreign Minister, dismissed claims of torture and mistreatment by saying 'I think there
is a lot of exaggeration, I am not say [sic] we are perfect, I am not saying that, I am
not saying there aren't some mistakes'.825 In addition to this lack of accountability,
817  Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, p. 28. 
818 Ibid.
819 Ibid.
820 BICI Report, p. 244.
821 Ibid., p. 242.
822 Ibid., p. 244.
823 Ibid., p. 254.
824 Ibid., p. 417
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there appears to be an attitude that those detained on suspicion of criminal activity are
automatically guilty. As Human Rights Watch acknowledged, 'there is also a sense
that anyone in custody for whatever reason must deserve punishment, which ordinary
police and security officials feel entitled to administer.826 This attitude appears to have
been aggravated by the sectarian divide between perceived Shiʿa dissidents and the
Sunni police. In addition, the historic marginalisation and more recent criminalisation
of the Shi‘a at large may have a knock on effect. Their  perception as an underclass,
and lack of wasta (influence), perhaps making them more liable to mistreatment in
custody.827 
Although  torture  was  said  to  have  decreased  following  the  advent  of  the
National Charter in 2000, this changed  in 2007, when there was a 'reversion to past
practises''.828  Security officials   'utilized  a  specific  repertoire  of  techniques'  that
mimicked  exactly  those  from the  1990s.829 This  resurgence  also  coincided  with  a
regional fear of Shiʿa empowerment.  The King of Jordan, for example, noted that
Shi‘a  victories  in  Iraq  were  leading  to  a  rising  Shi‘a  Crescent.    Naturally,  this
engaged 'the Gulf-wide obsession with Iran's potential influence'.830  In addition, this
coincided with the creation of an almost  entirely Bahraini-run security services,  a
thing the British had anticipated with gloom in the 1980s, when they noted a Bahrain
run Special Branch could lead to civil unrest.831 In 2009, Shaykh Khalifa bin ‘Abd
Allah Al Khalifa was tasked by the King to Bahrainiise the BNSA in order to remove
'the last vestiges of British influence'.832 This, coupled with a legislative amendment of
2008, gave the NSA powers of arrest and interrogation,833 and paved the way for the
NSA violence of 2011.  
In 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry documented that a
826 HRW, Routine Abuse: Routine Denial.
827 Ibid.
828 HRW, Torture Redux.
829 HRW, Torture Redux.
830 G. Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a Sunni Divide', 
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Analysis Papers, no. 29, April 2013,  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/sunni%20shia%20abdo/sunni
%20shia%20abdo, (accessed 15 October 2015).  
831P.F.M. Wogan, Iran and the Gulf, 23 August 1982.
832C. Henzel, 'Scenesetter for Manama Dialogue, December 11 -13', US Embassy Manama, 2 
December 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA681_a.html, (accessed 5 October 
2015). 
833 BICI report, p. 45
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'systematic  practice  of  physical  and  psychological  abuse'  had  taken  place  during
2011.834 As before,  the  forms  of  torture835 and  abuse  were similar.836 This  historic
similarity that was documented after independence points to an institutional memory
of repression, where the transmission of memories, tactics, behaviours, occur between
members of the ruling class, their associates, and the institutions they control. As the
BICI  report  notes,  'the  very  fact  that  a  systematic  pattern  of  behaviour  existed
indicates  that  this  is  how  these  security  forces  were  trained  and  how  they  were
expected to act'. 837 Yet while this brutality in the recent uprising has been attributed to
a shift  to hardliners,  it  has been prevalent since Independence and grown steadily
more endemic since. This implies a number of more explanatory issues, such as the
increasing involvement of Saudi  in Bahrain's affairs, the criminalisation of Shiʿa, the
sectarian imbalance of the police, the Bahrainiisation of the police, higher popular
mobilisation, and the demise of sufficient moderating influences.  
Impunity Legitimising Torture 
Underpinning much  of  the  persistence  of  torture  is  both  a  lack  of  accountability,
coupled with a shift to policy makers and officials who perceive its value as a tool of
social control. Although it is difficult to prove that torture is ordered by those in key
political  positions,  their  influence,  or  failure  to  influence,  implies  some  level  of
complicity that points to a systemic issue of either negligence, wilful blindness or tacit
approval. Amnesty International wrote in 1996, that 'the impunity with which such
practices are carried out, and the absence of any official accountability, has resulted in
torture being regarded as an apparently legitimate method of interrogation'.838 This
lack of accountability has been an ongoing problem, yet its historical persistence can
also  be  explained  by a  culture  of  impunity  buttressed  by reactionary  attitudes  to
dissent.  There was also little influence to temper such excesses. 
In particular, the British embassy were fully aware of the goings on within
834 BICI Report, p. 298. 
835e.g. excessive handcuffing and blindfolding, forced standing, severe beatings, electric shocks, 
cigarette burns, beating the soles of feet (falaqa), sleep deprivation, threats of rape, sexual abuse, 
religious insults (usually anti-Shi‘a), electric shocks, hanging or suspension, solitary confinement, 
expose to extreme temperatures, and other forms of humiliation
836 Ibid., pp. 288 – 290. 
837 Ibid., p. 281
838 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
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Bahrain's Ministry of the Interior, yet appeared to do little to stop it. As Tomkys noted
in  1982,  'brutality  is  normal  and expected'839 On other  occasions,  Britain  actively
mislead  the  British  public  about  torture  in  Bahrain.  When  army officer  Saʿid  al-
ʿUwaynati was tortured and murdered by the Bahrain Defence Force for his alleged
role in the murder of the newspaper editor ʿAbd Allah al-Madani in 1976, the British
Embassy in Bahrain effectively denied the extent of their knowledge to Stan Newens,
a  British  MP making enquiries  about  human  rights  abuses  in  Bahrain.  They also
misled Newens on the explanation of Ghulum's death.  Other British officials justified
it by saying that Bahrain was moderate compared to other regimes, repeatedly using
euphemisms  to trivialise what was a serious ethical issue.
In light of increased global competition for contracts in Bahrain, the British
were sensitive about losing out on trade opportunities by upsetting the Al Khalifa.
During the interrogation of those arrested for the coup attempt in 1982, Henderson
reported that the security forces 'got the job done without without any of the prisoners
being  severely  or  lastingly'  injured,  a  'creditable  achievement'  in  'local  terms'.840
However,  J.C.  Moberly was  unwilling  to  press  the  Bahraini  authorities  on  issues
regarding  torture,  as  it  might  prejudice  their  relationship  with  Bahrain.841 British
leverage and influence diminished as they sought now to curry favour with Bahrain in
order  to  gain  business  contracts  and  investments  that  would  benefit  the  United
Kingdom. As Sterling noted;
Bahrain is one of our best Arab markets. So it is worth continuing to give
the Bahrainis the things that they want from us: help for the police, who
are the best guarantee of local stability;  training for the Defence Force
officers,  both  to  keep  them  happy  and  to  top  them  going  to  Iraq;
favourable  consideration  for  ECGD  cover  and,  in  particular,  a
continuingly effective technical assistance program. Our position here is
strong.  We can  best  maintain  it  by giving  help  and advice  at  least  as
readily  in  the  future  as  hitherto,  but  always  remembering  that  the
839 W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982.
840W.R. Tomkys, 16 February 1982.
841J.C. Moberly, Bahrain: Use of Torture by the Special Branch, 19 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, 
TNA. 
173 
Bahrainis  are  now  fully  independent  and  expect  to  be  treated
accordingly.842
In  reality,  Britain  benefited  from  a  status  quo  that  facilitated  torture,  and  were
assuaged  by pragmatic  goals  from any compunction  to  act.  Through  a  policy  of
beneficial  and  wilful  negligence,  demonstrative  obfuscation,  the  British  were
complicit  in  a  brutal  policy,  and perhaps  eased  their  conscience  through constant
reiterations  that  Bahrain  was  independent  and  that  such egregious  behaviour  was
commonplace in the Middle East. 
Yet while Ian Henderson was reportedly tried to temper the excesses of the Al
Khalifa regime, frequently trying to dissuade the Prime Minister from taking more
draconian forms of action, the British Embassy feigned ignorance, and there is little
evidence that they sought to highlight these egregious acts. Emile Nakhleh suggested
that it was tacitly accepted, and that a division of labour emerged, where Arabs did the
torturing and the British concerned themselves with intelligence.843 Many Bahrainis
maintain, however, allege that Colonel Ian Henderson engaged personally in torture,
although his role is still not clear.844 While  Henderson's influence in this regard is
hard  to  determine,  the  British,  disavowed  from  their  obligation  to  rule  with  a
moderating influence,  ultimately gave tacit  support to  security measures that  were
coercive, yet had the appearance of being beyond their control. While knowledge of
Henderson's role is still shrouded in mystery, he may have been, quite controversially,
a  man  who  tempered  the  excesses  of  hardliners  in  the  government.  After
Independence,  the  British   may  have  objected  to  these  brutal  methods,  but  they
objected quietly.  
The reforms of 2001, and the amnesty to anyone in the state security apparatus
who may have committed crimes before 2001, emphasised that the new order was not
committed  to  accountability.  Indeed,  until  the  publication  of  the  BICI  report,
government officials often claimed that reports about ill-treatment were exaggerated
in order to generate sympathy for the opposition. This happened in 1996, for example,
842A.J.D. Sterling, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1971.
843E. Nakhleh, 2013.
844R. Fisk, 'Britain at the Heart of Bahrain's Brutality Rule', The Independent,  18 February 1996, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/briton-at-the-heart-of-bahrains-brutality-rule-
1319571.html , (accessed 5 October 2015).
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when the Foreign Minister gave an interview to AP news  845, and more recently in
2011,  when  officials  claimed  that  doctors  or  protesters  had  inflicted  wounds  to
generate international sympathy.846 While the government accepted, after reading the
BICI report,  that  systematic  torture  had taken place  in  Bahrain during 2011,  the
promise of reforms designed to mitigate the occurrence of future torture have been
executed in a manner designed to prevent actual accountability.847 Justice has not been
forthcoming (See chapter on legal repression).  The fact that torture follows similar
patterns,  and  has  been  occurring  throughout  Bahrain's  history  with  little  to  no
accountability suggests that it moves beyond a systematic problem to a systemic one,
in which torture is tacitly acknowledged as  a legitimate method of coercion, as well
as an important instrument of state control, surveillance, and deterrence. Indeed, the
problem has deepened following Independence, and remains ongoing. 
Cutting off the Head of the Snake: Arresting Leaders 
The Bahraini authorities have engaged in the process of arresting intolerable political
opposition since the inception of organised political  opposition,  although evidence
suggests that while leaders were targeted in the first half of the 20 th century, mass
arrests have become increasingly important as a tool of repression. In late 1934, early
1935, when a group of Manama baḥārna inspired by Gandhi's demonstrations against
the British campaigned for more rights for labourers, the British threatened the eight
ringleaders, saying they would be held responsible.  However, the habit of targeting
political  leaders came into sharp relief  in 1956, when the British realised that the
popularity of the Higher Executive Committee848 meant that that unrest would break
out if they arrested the leaders – especially as their methods had remained 'within the






0cf71 , (accessed 5 October 2015).
846P. Cockburn, 'Bahrain regime jails doctors who dared to treat protesters', The Independent, 30 
September 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bahrain-regime-jails-
doctors-who-dared-to-treat-protesters-2363331.html, (accessed 5 October 2015). 
847 BICI Report, p. 298. 
848This was the original name before they were forced to change the name to the Committee of 
National Union. The Amir reportedly did not like therm 'higher', which implied they were above his
rule.
175 
bounds of the law'.849 Although members of the Ruling Family, further worried by the
British talking to the HEC, were pressuring Belgrave to take 'immediate and drastic
action'  against  the HEC by arresting the leaders,  Belgrave thought such an action
might  not  degrade  the  movement  but  lead  to  even  more  unrest.850 This  relative
'weakness'  as demonstrated by British caution was also evident in 1956, when the
Shi‘a leaders  of the HEC were not arrested as the British thought them harmless and
feared it would upset the villagers.851 The Foreign Office, for their part, encouraged a
policy of delaying arrests, stating that, 'I hope that you will be able to prevent him
provoking a dangerous situation unnecessarily before his police are capable of dealing
with'.852 
Reluctance to undertake arrests prompted consideration of other methods. It
was argued that the 'better elements' should be detached from the reformists only with
timely action.853 However, the divisions and fragmenting of the movement, facilitated
by  government  political  manoeuvring,  resulted  in  considerable  moderate  opinion
turning against the leaders,  itself  a form of repression that was designed to soften
public opposition to an eventual arrest. In addition to government manoeuvring, the
growing split in the HEC was a result of the fact that they had to 'respond to the
whims  and  moods  of  various  incoherent  factions  within  the  broad  spectrum  of
opposition' and 'indulge in riots, strikes, and demonstrations that it neither planned or
wanted'.854 This  growing  fragmentation,  itself  a  result  of  the  combination  of
government policy and HEC tactics, paved the way for the arrest of the leaders. After
the arrests, the HEC's supporters faded 'into thin air'.855
In 1965, students and strike leaders were arrested, with schools in particular
being a source of contention for the Bahrain government. The British claimed that the
settling of the strike and the 'arrest of the ringleaders' returned everything 'back to
normal  by  mid  April'  of  the  same  year.856 In  1973,  the  British  documented  that
PFLOAG  were  broken  after  most  of  its  leaders  were  arrested.857 Following  an
849B.A.B. Burrows, 4 March 1956, p. 211
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outbreak of strikes in the 1970s, trade unionist leaders were arrested. Between 'June
15 to 25, the SIS rounded up the leaders of the strike and a number of other labor
activists and political figures'.858   The British noted that arresting the leaders 'was
effective', and that it was likely that 'left-wing leaders themselves hastily restrained
those workers outside ALBA who wanted to strike in sympathy'.859The British also
noted that such a move encouraged the leftists in the Assembly to step more in line
with what the government wanted. Twenty-nine trade unionists were arrested in June
1974860,  while more were arrested in 1975 prior to the dissolution of the National
Assembly.  In the latter instance, mass arrests were designed to destroy the leadership
prior to an unpopular political decision. In 1981, after an alleged coup attempt by the
Islamic  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Front,  seventy-three  people  were  given  steep
sentences  (3  life  imprisonment,  60  15  years,  12  juveniles  7  years).861  Despite
acknowledging that they did not present a serious threat, Shaykh Khalifa argued that a
strong response was necessary to deter others, implying that regimes do not always
repress strongly when they feel threatened; 'They didn't represent anything dangerous
to us but we are not used to this sort of thing so we had to take strong action'. 862
Sometimes  arrests were designed to reduce societal tension. Following the murder of
ʿAbd Allah al-Madani in 1976, the police were under pressure to make arrests lest the
incident result in communal strife between religious folk and left wingers. After the
arrest of three culprits, anger reportedly 'subsided'.863  
In  the  1990s  Intifada,  the  targeting  of  political  leaders  continued.  Other
prominent religious leaders were accused of inciting hatred against the regime, and
arrested by the authorities.  These include Shaykh 'Abd al-Amir  al-Jamri,  'Abd al-
Wahab Hussain, Shaykh Khalil Sultan, Shaikh Hassan Sultan and Hassan Mushaima',
who were all arrested.864 In the 2011 Uprising, twenty-one leaders were rounded up
and put  in  prison.865 While  some have been tried  in  absentia,  the  rest,  who were
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859R.M. Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament, 8 July 1974.
860Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/1975, London, p. 126. 
861W.R. Tomkys, Trial of Detainees, 15 March 1982, 8/4332, TNA.
862Gulf Daily News, 'Interview with Shakykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa', 15 Saturday 1982,  FCO
8/4332, TNA.
863E.F. Given,  Political Murder in Bahrain.
864 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
865Protest leaders currently in prison, Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja (also a citizen of Denmark), Abd al-
Wahab Hussein, Hassan ‘Ali Mushaima, Muhammad al-Muqdad (also a citizen of Sweden), Abd al-
Jalil al-Muqdad, Abduljalil al-Singace, Seed al-Nuri, Abd al-Hadi al-Mukhudar, Mirza al-Mahrus, 
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imprisoned, have become known as the Bahrain 13.866 Summary justice followed, and
the the fledgling protest movement suddenly lost a lot of its important figureheads.
Religious  figures  and human rights  activists  were  also  arrested,  including Nabeel
Rajab,  Sayyed  Yousef,  and  Zainab  al-Khawaja,  thus  reflecting  the  importance  of
Bahrain's  advocacy revolution,  and also  the  threat  posed by the  revolution  to  the
regime.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  determine  strategic  decision  making in  modern
times, the empowerment of the Shiʿa in the region, the influence of Saudi, and the
power of hawkish Al Khalifa, all point to the reason for a reactionary arrest policy. 
The Shi‘a Threat and the Rise of  Mass Arrests 
While leaders have been targeted consistently throughout history, the process of mass
arrests  has  become  more  widespread  over  the  past  fifty  years.  Devolution  and
horizontal stratification of opposition movements has also made the arrest of leaders
problematic, as has the potential problem of leaders abroad fomenting unrest. With
hierarchical organizations and cell structures, which arose in Bahrain in the 1950s,
60s and 70s, broad-based arrests are necessitated due to structural changes resilient to
leader removal.   Improvements in communication and travel within the region have
also meant that it is easier for those in exile to foment unrest in Bahrain. This was
noted in 1965, when the British argued that exiled Bahrainis in Kuwait were sewing
discord. Yet even with the growth in technology and travel, which allowed leaders to
command unrest, rising levels of education and growing awareness of ruling family
corruption resulted in greater popular discontent. The Turnbull report of 1965 noted
the problem of education, and noted that relative spending on eduction compared to
security  had meant  that  the  “insurance  rate”  for  security  had in  five  years  fallen
considerably below the increased risk which a liberal education policy is liable to
create,.... as the present emergency so poignantly illustrates'.  867 Indeed, charismatic
leaders were no longer as important in mobilising political unrest. 
 In the 1950s,  the ideological  sway of  pan-Arabism was also important  in
Muhammad ‘Ali Rida Ismail, Muhammad Jawwad Muhammad, Ibrahim Sharif, Salah al-Khawaja, 
Nabeel Rajab, Zainab al-Khawaja (also a citizen of Denmark). See HRW, Interfere, Restrict, 
Control.
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Blog, 21 August 2012, http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/nabeel-rajab-why-did-the-u-s-state-
department-drag-its-feet/, (accessed 5 October 2015).  
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seeping  into the  population,  and the Al Khalifa  and the British were increasingly
perceived as a colonialist anachronism and a remnant of Western imperialism. Larger
scale arrests began in earnest in the 1950s, when arresting political leaders alone did
not stave off  agitation completely. After the British invasion of Suez in 1956, the
authorities arrested tens of people, building a new camp in Rumaitha in order to hold
them.   In  1965,  when  workers  mobilised  to  oppose  BAPCO's  plans  at  making
redundancies, the arrest of leaders was buttressed by widespread arrests.  In March
1972,  police  arrested  over  five  hundred  people  after  what  Amnesty  International
described as a series of 'non-violent strikes and demonstrations' took place.868 The size
of the initial arrest was clearly designed to have a salutary effect on demonstrators
while also removing bodies from meatspace. This is highlighted by the fact that about
four hundred were released shortly after they were detained.869   Sometimes agitators
were  targeted  for  no  apparent  reason  other  than  intimidation.  As  Amnesty
International noted in March 1978, '35 employees in the ship- building and aluminium
smelting industries were arrested and imprisoned for several days, during which time
they  were  beaten.  These  arrests  do  not  seem  to  have  been  connected  with  any
particular activities on the part of those detained'.870 
The Bahrain authorities also frequently retain a reserve of political prisoners in
order to maintain a level of deterrence. Amnesty International documented that 'the
number of political prisoners held for more than short periods has remained constant
at  approximately  30,  releases  being  matched  roughly  by  new  arrests'.871In  1978,
Amnesty  International  reported  that  'in  many  cases...the  same  people  have  been
arrested, released and re-arrested several times over a period of years, without ever
having been charged with an offence, and it appears to be the pattern that arrests are
made from time to time simply in order to discourage dissent'.872 
Although it is evidenced that the al-Madani murders may have encouraged this
policy of salutary arrests,  it simply seems to have been used as a pretext to justify a
more draconian policy advocated by the Prime Minister, who 'would have his own
way on security matters which were his sole responsibility'.873 Over all, Independence
868Amnesty International, Annual Report,1971 – 1972, London, p. 48. 
869 Ibid.
870 Amnesty International, Annual Report 1978, London, p. 252.  
871 Ibid.
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873R.M. Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 18 November 1973, FCO 8/1975.
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seemed to prompt a more hawkish approach to arrests. For example, in 1973, a group
of PFLOAG members, including two women, were arrested and put in a prison on the
Bahrain Island of Um al-Hassan where the Prime Minister, 'determined to act firmly',
said they would stay.874  In the same year, a PFLOAG member accused of storing
weapons and explosives was also given a stiff sentence, reflecting the government's
desire  to  deter  other  potential  recruits.875 Accordingly,  the  British believed  that
PFLOAG's  back  was  broken  after  the  arrest  of  most  of  its  important  members,
destroyed its existing structure.876Clearly the political murder of Al-Madani provided a
great opportunity to move against PFLOAG, and an even better opportunity to insure
continued division between religious elements and leftists. The PFLOAG arrests in al-
Madani case happened quickly877 , and perhaps too quickly, in order to keep peace.
This hawkish reaction by the government was only restrained by the fact they had run
out of room in prison to put PFLOAG members.878 The Prime Minister's attitude to
dissent reflected too growing autonomy and independence of Bahrain's Police. This
was highlighted as early as 1974, when the British complained about being kept in the
dark  about  early  morning  arrests  of  ALBA  labour  agitators.  Quoting  Shaykh
Muhammad bin Mubarak, Robert Tesh states 'For once we have taken the initiative.
What they did not tell me is that the police were going to pounce'.879This action was
said to be the result of firm action undertaken by the 'Government and the merchant
class'.880 
The Criminalisation of the Shiʿa 
The rise of the so-called 'Shi‘a threat' and the subsequent criminalisation of the Shiʿa
has also impacted upon mass arrests. As Roger Tomkys noted in 1981, the 'increasing
numbers of arrests of arrests among the Shi‘a community in the last few days, not
confined to young hotheads, may alienate them more widely'.881 Towards the end of
874 US Embassy Manama,'Security on Gulf and Bahrain', 30 April 1973, 
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the 1970s, the Iran-Iraq war and growing Shi‘a anger at the manner in which Saddam
Hussein's  regime  was  treating  Iraq's  Shi‘a  generated  some  discontent.  However,
contrary to narratives that posit that the Iranian revolution prompted Shi‘a insurrection
in Bahrain, the Shi‘a were relatively quiet during the Iranian Revolution. The police
even acknowledged this, and noted that since the Islamic Revolution, there had been
'virtually  no  visible  signs  of  support  among  the  Bahraini  Shiʿa  for  the  Imam
Khomeini'.882Yet the Prime Minister, ubiquitous in Bahrain's affairs, decided to move
against the country's Shi‘a population. In the early 1980s, 650 Shi‘a were arrested,
even though the Ashura holiday had passed peacefully, bringing the total to around
850.883 Interestingly, the fact Ashura had been peaceful encouraged the Prime Minister
to make the mass arrests, suggesting how personal inclination influenced repressive
policy and not the perceived threat.  
In  a  conversation  with  Christopher  Wilton,  the  British  First  Secretary  in
Bahrain, Ian Henderson had said that the Prime Minister’s reason for moving against
the Shiʿa was reportedly to demonstrate to them that the ‘Bahrain Government were
true Arabs’.884 Even Ian Henderson, the so-called ‘Butcher of Bahrain’ disagreed with
the decision to order this crackdown, as it would ‘probably have the opposite effect
from that desired’.885  The British Embassy reported that over one thousand Shi‘a were
arrested,  although  it  is  not  clear  for  what  reason,  if  any.  Amnesty  International
corroborated these numbers.886 Indeed, Independence, the Iran Iraq War, the Iranian
Revolution, the empowerment of the Al Khalifa, the growing influence and enabling
factor  of  Saudi  Arabia,  and  the  diminishing  of  British  Influence  meant  that  the
Bahraini  Government  'abandoned  their  tolerant  and  low  key  approach  to  Shia
unrest'.887The sectarian dimension to this repression has continued. In 1991, Amnesty
International argued that the government's move against the Shi‘a was a 'deliberate
policy' designed to target and 'harass and intimidate entire communities – particularly
Shia communities'  living in  villages  near  the capital  city.888 Amnesty International
reported that as many as 4,000 people were arrested between December 1994 and
882H.B. Walker, The Shia in Bahrain, 26 October 1980. 
883K.J. Passmore, Bahrain Internal, 3 December 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA. 
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September 1995, with many being held for months without charge or trial.889 
The framework for these mass arrests was also facilitated by the State Security
Law, which has given a legal pretext for the arrests of thousands of protesters since
the 1970s.890  The law essentially allows for indefinite incommunicado detention. In
the 1980s, detainees such as Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-'Ikri, 'Abd al-Karim Hassan
al-'Aradi  and 'Abd al-Nabi  al-Khayami  were  held  under  the  State  Security  Law's
'provisions, without charge or trial, for as long as three to seven years'.891Even after
the abolition of the State Security Law, the advent of the Anti-Terrorism law gave the
security  services  very  broad  powers  of  detention  and  arrest.  Those  suspected  of
engaging in a multitude of acts stipulated in the anti terror law can be detained for up
to 60 days without being charged.892 This can then be renewed by order from the High
Court for a period of up to 6 months.893 These laws have subsequently allowed the
authorities to incarcerate citizens on the barest suspicion of wrong doing. Indeed, the
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights reported that 'in 2013 alone, there were 38 terrorism
cases where 318 defendants including women and children were sentenced to prison,
or are awaiting verdicts'.894 The shift from arresting political leaders to mass arrests
has marked a corollary shift from 'cutting off the head' of the snake  to attempting to
destroy  or  incapacitate  the  body.  The  advent  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the  Iranian
revolution, as well as a reversal to more Saudi-backed Al Khalifa autonomy in matters
of internal security has led  both a more hawkish approach, but also a larger coercive
apparatus, that was less fearful of a backlash if draconian measures were taken. 
Conclusion 
From the evidence, it is clear that the scale of personal integrity violations have gotten
worse in a quantitative sense. Arrests have shifted from a leader-focused approach, to
889Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis. 
890Ibid.
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mass arrests,  to  the  collective  punishment,  arrest  and targeting  of  Bahrain's  Shi‘a
population. Torture too has become more prevalent, consistent, and routinised since
Bahrain's Independence, and superficial democratisation has, unsurprisingly, failed to
temper  its  egregiousness.  The  para-militarisation  of  the  police  has  continued
unabated, and despite advances in training, the absence of consent means that policing
will continue to involve military style soldiering. Facilitated by lack of accountability,
poor  regulatory  bodies,  lack  of  transparency,  sectarian  make-up  of  policing
institutions,  militant  nature  of  police,  the  multiplicity  of  security  forces,  wilful
blindness  by  authorities  and  Bahrain's  allies,  poor  training,  loyalist  demands  for
protection  violations  of  personal  integrity  have  remained  ingrained  in  Bahrain's
policing.  While many of these traits were a hangover from the Bahrain police under
the  British,  the  transfer  of  power after  Independence  resulted  in  a  key change in
personal integrity violations. After independence, police remained an alien body that
served, and were responsive to, the  narrow political  interests of the colonial,  and
recolonised regime. 
Like in many former colonies, the security services in Bahrain have long been
an ambiguous amalgamation of  mercenary bodies,  quasi-military bodies  and other
'informal structures of authority'.895 This habit of the police functioning like a 'military
garrison'896 is not simply a legacy of Bahrain's colonial past, but also indicative of
Bahrain's status as a frontier between two hegemon, a fulcrum between local politics
and a barrier to perceived Shi‘a expansionism. The police force, initially created to
temper elements of the Al Khalifa family from undermining British-led reforms, ha
since struggled struggled to remain free of political bias. This has been exacerbated by
Bahrain falling under the Al Khalifa and Saudi yolk, which prompted an increased
shift in the intensity of policing in addition to increased discrimination against the
country's Shi‘a. 
895D.M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds),'Consent, coercion and colonial control: policing the empire
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Legal Repression and the emergence of Repressive Law
'Even if the police stick to the book, Bahrain has a repressive enough legal system to
squash most dissent' 897
Laws, legal processes and the legal system have been a recurring aspect of repression
in Bahrain,  and have  become an ever  larger  and more comprehensive part  of  the
repressive  capacity  of  the  state.  By  examining  legislation,  legal  structures,  legal
processes,  and,  where  possible,  the  strategic  decision  making  behind  these,  this
chapter argues for the emergence of what Nonick and Selznick call 'repressive law' in
Bahrain, through both statutory effects, but also political manoeuvring and outside
interference. The establishment of certain laws and the use of legal repression has
facilitated in particular the embroilment, regulation, and persuasion that have defined
the scope of legal  interference by the Al Khalifa regime throughout the 21st century,
and initially stemmed from the British desire  to  retain order  through indirect  and
pacific means. Systemic legal bias has also emerged in Bahrain, and the hegemonic
order dominate the process of lawmaking and legal processes, resulting in 'rule by
law' instead of the 'rule of law'. While one must acknowledge that any given legal
order or legal institution is likely to have a mixed character, Nonet and Selznick's
argue  that  within  their  typology  of  law,  responsive,  autonomous,  and  repressive,
elements of one category tend to be more salient in certain states898.  This chapter
argues, that Bahrain most closely approximates the repressive law model. 
A Repressive Legal Structure 
A Brief Outline of Systemic Legal Bias From Tribal to Colonial 
The legal system in Bahrain has always been populated by members of the ruling
family  or  those  whose  interests  are  aligned  with  the  ruling  elite.  Historically,  Al
Khalifa feudal lords had considerable discretion when it came to dishing out justice in
897The Economist, 'Whitewash', 23 January 1999, issue, 8103, p. 60. 
898P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, p. 18. 
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their  individual 'fiefdoms',  with law being at  the discretion of local tribal shaykhs
governing their individuals estates, yet the process of reforms underscored by legal
changes centralized authority,  but maintained much of the particularized tribal law
that had defined the pre-reform period.  While Khuri asserts that tribal societies like
the Al Khalifa refute a standardized penal code, as it 'opposes the principles that bind
a tribal group together – namely, exclusiveness based on kinship and the ability to
“particularize” or make law without legislative bodies',899 a code has emerged that is
subservient  to  the ruling  elite's  interests.  This  has  stemmed from the  Al Khalifa's
reluctance to cede control over the legal system, which has been a persistent problem
over the past century. Indeed, in the 1920s, Shaykh Hamad bin Isa continually lost any
monopoly of powers of punishment that had been agreed on with the British, and
members  of the Al Khalifa  family ruled over  their  'individual  spheres',  conducing
'ruthless oppression'.900 In 1954, the Ruler Salman bin  Hamad Al Khalifa thought
judicial  reform  would  mean  ceding  his  absolute  authority  over  Bahrain.901 The
influence of the Al Khalifa in the judiciary persisted post Independence.  In 1976,
Salman's son, Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa said he would put the judges on
trial if they did not agree to his sentence.902 In 2013, the Prime Minister was also
filmed telling a man accused of torture that both he and the Al Khalifa were above the
law.903 
Certainly, the lack of political dynamism and the continuation of tribal  rule
has led to  a form of 'sticky authoritarianism',  where the influence of conservative
members of the Al Khalifa judiciary have impacted upon the legal apparatus, whether
in specific legal decisions, or processes of legislative development. However, while
the British  sought to reform the legal system in the 1920s in order to alleviate Persian
disquiet over the oppression of baḥārna subjects, it only ever became a hybrid entity,
one that fused tribal and colonial interests at the expense of a more impartial judicial
system. This combination of arbitrary rule and more standardized laws has resulted in
899F. Khuri, p. 216
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a system which is not only reflective of ruling class interests, but also a legal system
that  can  be  subverted  more  readily  when  ruling  class  interests  are  threatened.
Certainly the tensions inherent in this dual authority system impacted upon the timely
implementation and execution of laws and legal processes in the face of dissent. 
While the British were less reactionary than the Al Khalifa, legal reforms were
usually secondary to British commercial interests. They were also reactionary more
than pre-emptive, and the impetus for their  creation frequently derived from crisis
instead of forward thinking policy, as it was crisis that prompted Britain to deviate
from the Middle Course they were keen to steer.  However, the increasing British
reforms to the legal system initiated in 1919 by Major Dickson reflected the problems
of this dual authority system, in which the tribal and colonial authority systems came
into  conflict.904 This  conflict,  and tension  between  the  British  and the  Al  Khalifa
would often centre around the need to change both laws and the legal system.  The
British hoped that the the creation of a more solid legal system would help ameliorate
dissent  by  providing  people  with  appropriate  channels  from  which  to  conduct
agitation. As T.C. Fowle said in 1938, they have no 'no legal means of putting forward
their  grievances,  whether  real  or  imaginary,  and  are  therefore  reduced  to  illegal
channels such as agitation'.905  In addition to this, the Sharia courts that had been used
to adjudicate on civil and criminal matters were deemed unjust by the British, who
were concerned in particular about cases of violence perpetrated by Sunnis against the
Shiʿa. The British administration noted that if such cases were referred to a Sunni
qadi (judge) the perpetrator would escape 'scot free or with light punishment'. 906
By  arguing  people  have  a  ‘legal’  means  of  expressing  themselves,  the
government were a in a stronger position to deal firmly with those who employed
'illegal' means. However, Fowle accused the Bahrain government in 1938 for being
'responsible for the agitation' due to being 'remiss about initiating reforms, e.g. the
Bahrain Code'.907 This 'remiss' attitude dogged the implementation of a legal channel
for dissent. In 1963, J.P Tripp noted the intractable problem of how the Al Khalifa saw
justice  as  a  shaykhly  prerogative,  where  the  'idea  of  an  independent  judiciary  is
904F. Khuri, p. 88. 
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abhorrent'.908 He added that he did not think the Ruler nor his family believed in a
system of 'impartial justice', and that British attempts to help reform them had failed
or were doomed to fail.  Following Independence, the Al Khalifa and the merchant
elites  reasserted  themselves,  with  Saudi  gaining  influence  in  Bahrain,  especially
through the Prime  Minister Sheikh Khalifa who was amenable to Saudi pressure909.
With the absence of  any democratic safety valve following the 1975 dissolution of
parliament,  and  with  Bahrain  slowly  becoming  a  Saudi  pensioner',910the  legal
framework reflected an increase in repressive law. 
In  the  21st century,  much  remains  the  same,  despite  the  introduction  of  a
constitution  in  2002,  which  stipulates  that  that  the  judicial  system  should  be
independent  and  that  judges  should  not  be  subject  to  any  outside  influence,  the
International  Commission  of  Jurists  argues  that  the  'the  Bahraini  judiciary  has
typically been subject to inappropriate government influence'.  911In 2012, a decade
after the reforms,  many senior judges still belong to the ruling family, and the King
appoints all judges.912 Furthermore, those members of the judiciary who are members
of the ruling family may still issue verdicts that are aligned with the will of the ruling
family. The International Commission of Jurists argue that many of the judges not
affiliated with the ruling family are Egyptians on two year contracts, and that they
may be unwilling to issue rulings unfavourable to the government  for fear of not
having their contracts renewed.913 In times of social upheaval, this pressure is even
more  acute,  and  social  movements  may  find  themselves  at  the  receiving  end  of
decisions made by judges whose concern for their jobs transcends their desire to meet
out impartial justice. In short, Bahrain's legal system is constructed in such a way as
to reflect the will of the ruling elite in times of political agitation. Indeed, the odds are
stacked against political dissidents. However, it is well structured to ensure that prime
legislative capacity lies in the hands of the ruling core, and the King, who can rule by
decree. Nonetheless, the advent of legal reforms led by the British symbolised a shift
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from a  place  in  which  sheer  coercive  power  and  tribal  justice  as  repression  was
replaced  by channelling  in  the  form of  an  entire  'body of  laws,  announcements,
decisions, or decrees made and enacted by government'.914 
Laws
Emergency Laws: Legal Form for Cracking Down on Dissent 
Being  remiss  about  implementing  reforms,  and  particularly  establishing  a  legal
framework, has necessitated the use of emergency laws as band aids to combat unrest,
itself not unusual in an embattled nascent state with little to draw on but arbitrary
tribal practises. Yet as this section highlights, Bahrain has been subject to emergency
law for the majority of the past fifty years, and, as with repressive legal systems, a
'spirit  of  martial  law  prevails'.915 These  include  the  Emergency Law of  1956,  the
Public Security Law of 1965, the State Security Decree of 1974, and the State of
National  Safety  in  2011.  In  this  manner,  emergency  laws  have  expanded  the
definitions of dissent and have facilitated the process of the incarceration, trial and
incapacitation of political 'criminals'. The British, who had embarked on a process of
influence designed to be spread by 'indirect and pacific' means, had been encouraging
legal reform, yet they blamed the Al Khalifa for its slow implementation. However,
the  vagueness  of  the  terms  of  Britain's  suzerainty  over  Bahrain  has  made  the
implementation  of  law  haphazard  and  unclear,  and  while  Britain  preferred  non-
interference, laws were often introduced brashly as reactionary measures to what the
British perceived as, initially,  Al Khalifa misrule, and later threats to the Al Khalifa.
Because Britain were often forced to take the reigns when emergencies necessitated it,
the laws were often harsh and draconian . 
 A delayed penal code meant that legal framework had not failed to set the
terms for legitimate dissent, and the first formalised emergency 'notice' came in 1956,
as a reactionary measure that gave the authorities significant powers to deal  with the
Committee  of  National  Union,  a  populist  nationalist  movement  that  potentially
threatened British  hegemony in  Bahrain  as  well  as  the  ruling  Al  Khalifa  regime.
Crucially, the uprising of 1956 drew government attention to its weaknesses and lack
914Khuri, p. 216.
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of security laws.916 Yet the issuing of the notice was not without equivocation, and the
indecision  of  the  British  to  pressure  the  Ruler  into  accepting  rested  on  two
considerations. Firstly,  they thought it would 'make clear to the reformists that the
Bahrain Government is determined to preserve order and that political activity must
be kept within proper constitutional bounds'.917 It would also 'enable the Ruler to act
in proper legal form against the reformist leaders if their conduct merited it'. Without
legal  resources,  must   use  non-legal  power  to  deal  with  any  problems  of  social
interaction.918 However,  the  British  knew  the  HEC  would  see  the  move  as
'provocative',919 and it might prompt disorder that would necessitate the intervention
of British troops. The British also considered the advantages of the Ruler being able to
use his more discretionary tribal laws.920 Yet, crucially the Emergency notice of 1956,
gave the authorities 'legal form' to crack down on absolutely any dissent, the HEC or
otherwise. Specifically, it gave magistrates, including state officers, the authority to
ask people to disperse on pain of death.
The 1956 emergency law was superseded by the equally broad Bahrain Public
Security Law of 1965, which was also brought in hastily following strikes at Bahrain
national oil company (BAPCO) due to an absence of a proper legal framework for
managing  dissent.  JP Tripp  of  the  British  Political  Agency  stated  that  the  laws,
‘although repugnant to normal British notions of justice, are regrettably necessary in
Bahrain.’921 Despite  this  apparent  repugnance,  the British  persuaded the Ruler  of
Bahrain to issue the Public Security Ordinance,922 saying that the recent disorder was
an 'ideal peg with which to hang the enactment of a Public Order decree' on. 923 Article
3 (1) of the Public Security Law of 1965 gave the Ruler of Bahrain ultimate power to
'lay down any regulations which he considers necessary or suitable in the interests of
public security or for the preservation of public order or the safety of the country'.
Furthermore,   any regulation invoked by the Ruler under the Public Security Law
916F. Khuri, p. 216. 
917D.M.H. Riches, 10 April 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 239 
918 A. Turk, Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict, Social Problems , vol. 23, no. 3 (Feb. 1976) , pp. 
276-291 p. 284. 
919D.M.H. Riches, 10 April 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 239 
920Ibid.
921J.P. Tripp, Communique to M. S. Weir, 26 April 1965, RoB, vol. 5, p. 389. 
922 Ibid.
923R.F. Brenchley, Communique to JP Tripp, 26 March 1965, RoB, vol. 5, p. 385.
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voided any other  laws  that  may run  contrary to  it.  924 On 22 April  1965,  and in
accordance with Article 3 of the Public Security Law, the Ruler issued Public Security
Regulation No. 1. This gave the Ruler the power to lawfully detain anyone deemed to
be a 'danger to public security or the safety of the country'.  925 These broad laws,
which deepened the government's ability to legally repress anyone deemed a threat to
the  state  (itself  a  broad  and nebulous  concept),  reflected  both  the  British  fear  of
nationalistic forces and the Al Khalifa's fragile position. Indeed, while the British had
to persuade the Al Khalifa to issue the Public Safety Law, the Ruler's reluctance may
have stemmed from no real respect for justice, but more that Sheikh ʿIsa objected to
having to legally justify his actions when it came to dealing with anyone wishing to
'harm Bahrain'.926 
Through these emergency laws, the government's ability to justify containment
and involve protesters in embroilment and regulation increased, yet reflected again
British overreach into a situation that had stemmed from administrative apathy and a
failure  to  implement  proper  reforms  since  1956.  The  reactionary  measure  again
highlights the British going beyond their middle course and encouraging the ruling
regime to take drastic measures in order to initiate proper 'legal form'. The British
were  also  under  pressure  to  protect  British  subjects,  and  over  zealous  in  their
application of laws that would have been unthinkable at home, but seemingly fine on
the periphery of an embattled empire in retreat.  In addition to the creation of this
vague law, the police were obstructing the Code of Criminal Procedure as it would
involve them having to disclose 'evidence in open court the evidence and sources on
which their cases against subversives might rest'.927  This, coupled with the Public
Security Law,  marked the growing asymmetry between the rights of the police and
the public, fuelling a disparity that facilitated the incarceration of perceived agitators
with no external oversight. 
After Independence in 1971, at a time of increasing Saudi hegemony, the 1965
laws were replaced by the State Security Decree of 1974, another draconian piece of
legislation that sought to manage the inherent risk of a new legal system and Bahrain's
924Public Security Law,  RoB, vol. 5, p. 385. 
925Ibid.
926J.P. Tripp, Letter to J.A. Shellgrove, RoB, vol. 5, p. 383. 
927Ibid.
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venturing into Independence.  The new law, encouraged by Ian Henderson928, was an
attempt by the government to maintain their ability to adopt a monopoly on emergent
legal resources, which was itself challenged by the new parliament. Indeed, the new
parliament established in 1973 had exposed the government to the risk of legitimate
dissent,  and  the  unprecedented  need  to  devolve  issues  of  national  security  to  an
elected body, was anathema to the tribal politics of the Al Khalifa regime. Yet because
the parliament failed to vote in accordance with how the government had expected
due to a surprise coalition between leftists and the religious group, the Prime Minister,
according to British documents, led the decision to dissolve the parliament with the
State Security Decree remained.929 In order to legitimise the dissolution, the Bahraini
government fabricated a coup as a pretext. The Americans noted that the coup was
indeed a pretext; 'GOB seized on ineffectual intent of certain radical elements as a
justification for taking, on “security grounds”, moves it felt otherwise necessary'.930
Indeed, there was 'no clear security threat to regime',  highlighting that even threat
perception is not necessary in implementing repressive laws.931 
Although the British had encouraged the law, the foreign Minister of Bahrain
told the US Embassy in 1975 that the decision to implement the law had 'come from
the Prime Minister  who,  over  the summer  in  consultation  with the Amir,  Foreign
Minister and Interior minister, had come to the conclusion continuation of national
assembly as it had been constituted and operated for last two years was harmful to
Bahrain's national interest'.932Yet while Bahrain's diversification strategies, and British
concerns,  reflect  a  neo-liberal  quest  for  security  and  predictability,  the  new  law
marked the triumph of security, and the growing assertiveness of a ruling core worried
by the results of Bahrain's brief democratic liberalisation. The State Security Decree
Safety Law lasted over thirty years, and was instrumental in repressing dissent in the
1980s and the 1990s. It allowed the state to detain without trial for up to three years
anyone  convicted  of  a  range  of  ambiguous  activities,   from  spreading  'atheistic
928Author Unknown, Letter to ITM Lucas, 22 June 1975, FCO8/2415, TNA.
929  Leading Personality Reports 1977, FCO 8/3090, TNA.  
930 US Embassy Manama, 'Bahraini Political Developments: Foreign Minister's Comments', 11 





principles' to the spreading of 'subversive propaganda'.933 
The broad nature of the law934, and its lack of clear definition of the acts it
sought to criminalise led to it being used to target the long-term detention of political
criminals  for the non-violent expression of their opinions.935 In addition to offering a
broad description of what might constitute a crime under the State Security Law, the
scope  for  lodging  an  appeal  was  limited.  Detainees  could  submit  a  complaint
regarding their arrest, but only after spending three months in detention.936 This initial
period of three months detention not only deprived the defendant of the right to be
brought promptly before a judge, but it also allowed the authorities to sweep potential
dissidents off  the street  without  fear  of bureaucratic  slowdown. It  also meant  that
Special  Branch  no  longer  had  to  persuade  a  judge  every  six  days  to  keep  those
charged of sedition detained.  If a complaint did go to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
hearing would be held 'in camera' and only attended by members of the 'prosecution,
the complainant and his representative'.937Furthermore, as stipulated by Article 3 of
the State Security Law, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not have to adhere to the
Code of Criminal Procedure.938 So while successful appeal would still necessitate at
least an obligatory three month period of detention, the odds of securing an appeal are
heavily weighted in favour of the state. Thus the decree facilitated the state's legal
repression by loosely determining what activities constituted as subversive, and laid  a
framework for criminalising behaviour that could be defined at the whim of the state.
In  short,  Independence,  saw  the  deepening  and  further  codification  of  a  legal
apparatus that sought to legitimise the processes of containment, embroilment, and
incapacitation,  while  giving the intelligence apparatus greater scope for increasing
knowledge in Bahrain's affairs. 
The challenge posed by the 1990s Intifada posed such a threat that the security
933Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis. 
934For example. Article One permits administrative detention for the following:; if there is serious 
evidence that a person has made statements, committed acts, undertaken activities or made contacts 
which are damaging to the internal or external security of the country, or to the country's religious 
or national interests, or to its fundamental structure, or social or economic systems, or amount to 
discord, which affects, or could affect, relations between the people and the government, or between
the various institutions of the state, between sectors of the people, those working in establishments 
and companies, or which aim to assist in the commission of acts of sabotage or harmful 
propaganda, or the dissemination of heretical principles
935Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, p. 4. 
936Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis. 
937Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis. 
938Ibid.
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law had to be augmented.  Despite the broad nature of the State Security Law, the
Amir  issued a  decree in  March 1994 whereby suspected cases  involving arson or
violence were handed to the State Security Court.939 This was after ‘Isa Qambar, a 29-
year old Bahraini accused of killing a policeman, had his case shifted to the criminal
court after his lawyers successfully argued his case was not in the jurisdiction of the
State Security Court. The government, concerned it would have 'to prosecute other
destruction of property and bodily harm cases in the criminal court, with its higher
standards  of  evidence  and  more  substantial  adversarial  procedure...  transferred
jurisdiction over some fourteen additional articles of the penal code from the criminal
courts to the State Security Court'.940941    Ten months after these changes, the State
security courts tried 130 more people than they had done the previous year, pointing
to an increase in the efficacy of this repressive law.942 This legal slight of hand sought
to not only criminalize sedition, but to broaden the definitions of sedition so that more
and more crimes could be dealt with in a manner that allowed the state to do cope
more  punitively  with  dissident  tactics.   After  the  changes,  Notwithstanding  this
modification,  the  State  Security Decree was,  in  principle  and practise,  barely less
draconian than the 1965 law.  It simply amounted to an equally draconian, yet  more
verbose and sophisticated legal ambiguity, augmented by the ability of the executive
to modify it when political expediency necessitated.
While 2001 saw the demise of the State Security Law, existing legal strictures
still ensured the continuation of repressive law. For one, the 1976 penal code was
criticised for voiding civil liberties enshrined in the 1973 constitution.943 Likewise,
939Amnesty International,  Report: Bahrain, 1 January 1997, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?
page=publisher&docid=3ae6a9fe0&skip=0&publisher=AMNESTY&coi=BHR&searchin=title&sor
t=date, (accessed 6 October 2015). 
940'The additional offenses that can now be prosecuted in the security court include arson and use of 
fires or explosives (Articles 277 -281), and assaults or threats 'against a civil servant or officer 
entrusted with a public service' (Article 220), or 'against another in any manner, even though 
without having the intent of killing the victim, if the assault leads to death of the victim' (Article 
336). Also in early 1996 the government quietly expanded the security court from one chamber to 
three chambers in order to cope with the increased number of arrests (see below). Over the 
following ten months, more than 180 persons were convicted under the state security process, 
compared with one estimate of fewer than fifty in 1995.This period also saw increased detention of 
women and children'. - Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the 
Political Crisis in Bahrain, 1997. 
941HRW, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
942Ibid. 
943Bahrain's 1973 constitution guarantees freedom of speech (Article 23), the press (Article 24), 
communication (Article 26), association, including the right to form trade unions on a national basis
193 
provisions of the 1976 penal code still void articles of the new constitution, and has
been  'heavily criticised for giving the government the right to suspend key human
rights or encroach on them for “national security” reasons'.944 In 2006, and in light of
the emboldening of the Shi‘a in Iraq,  Bahrain passed a law on counter-terrorism that
threatened  to  undermine  the  constitution  and  reform moves  initiated  in  2001.  By
defining terrorist acts so broadly, the law has allowed the 'criminalization of rights
that  are  internationally  recognized  such  as  freedom  of  assembly,  freedom  of
expression or the right to strike'.945 The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights described
the law a 'tool to silence dissidents',946 and despite Bahrain being a State Party to
ICCPR,  the  law allowed for  'ill-treatment,  disappearances,  arbitrary detention  and
enforced disappearances'.947  The International Commission for Jurists also argued that
(Article 27), and assembly (Article 28). In many cases, however, the 1976 Penal Code effectively 
nullifies those rights, particularly in the following articles; Article 134A calls for imprisonment and 
a fine for 'any citizen who has attended abroad in whatever capacity and without authorization from 
the Government, any conference, public meeting or seminar, or has participated in any manner 
whatsoever in the deliberations thereof with the intent of discussing political, social or economic 
conditions in the State of Bahrain or in any other state so as to weaken financial confidence in the 
State of Bahrain or undermine its prestige or standing or to worsen political relations between 
Bahrain and these countries.'; Article 163 more broadly penalizes 'any person who establishes, sets 
up, organizes or runs in the State of Bahrain without a license issued by the Government, 
international societies, organizations or institutions of any kind whatsoever or branches thereof,' or 
'any person who joins the aforesaid societies, organizations and institutions', including any citizen 
who 'join[s] or participate[s] in any manner without a Government license in any of the aforesaid 
organizations which are based outside the country.'; Article 164 authorizes the closure and 
dissolution of 'aforesaid societies, organizations and institutions.'; Article 165 authorizes an 
unspecified prison sentence for 'any person who expressly incites others to develop hatred or 
hostility toward the system of government.'; Article 168 penalizes 'any person who deliberately 
disseminates false reports, statements or malicious rumors, or produces any publicity seeking to 
damage public security, terrorize the population or cause damage to the public interest', and 
penalizes possession of 'any publication or leaflet' containing such material or possession of any 
device intended for the reproduction or dissemination of such material.; Article 169 penalizes 
publication of 'untrue reports' that 'undermine the public peace or cause damage to the country's 
supreme interest or to the State's creditworthiness.'; Article 178 proscribes any assembly of five or 
more persons 'aimed at undermining public security, even though for the realization of a legitimate 
objective.'; Article 222 penalizes 'any person who offends with the use of signs, saying, writing or 
by any other method a civil servant or officer entrusted with a public service.'
944 Interview with Bahraini Lawyer, 20 November 2013. 
945International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 34th Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 10 
May 2005: Submission by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on the impact of the draft 
law on counter-terrorism of the Kingdom of Bahrain on its obligations under the United Nations 
Convention against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(UNCAT), 10 May 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a57eff2.html [accessed 9 
December 2013] 
946Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 'The Terrorism Law in Bahrain: A Tool to Silence Dissidents'.
947International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 34th Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 10 
May 2005.
194 
the  terms  in  the  law  were  too  nebulous  and  unclear,  and  ran  contrary  to  the
cornerstone of criminal law nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege948 (no crime without
law949).  According  to  the  legislation,  a  demonstration  that  led  to  clashes  with  the
police could result in the protesters being branded terrorists and detained for 90 days
upon  the  basis  of  secret  and  undisclosed  evidence.  Such  a  law  does  not  simply
criminalize  civil  disobedience,  a  key method used by social  movements,  but  also
renders it a terrorist act, further empowering the state in its legal ability to prevent
legitimate freedom of expression and expanding the number of the citizenry who may
be deprived of  rights.    The  law also limited  the  discretionary powers  of  judges,
further  empowering the  state  in  regards  to  sentencing outcomes.950 The  law came
among the US war on terror, and there was considerable US pressure on countries in
the Gulf to clamp down on terrorism.951 Other terror attacks in Saudi, Kuwait, and
Oman  also  prompted  support  among  a  number  of  influential  Bahrainis  for  a
crackdown.952 The parliament, with its limited powers, could do little to challenge the
law, and it carried many of the hallmarks of its State Security predecessor. 
From a State of State Security to a State of National Safety 
Although the State Security Law lasted until the advent of the National Charter in
2001, the creation of a constitution and a bicameral parliament under the then Amir
Hamad was no more than a guilded cage.  Hamad has sought to build his legacy on a
platform of democratisation and the abandonment of the legal structures that had been
the source of much repression and discontent.  Yet  Hamad's  'constitutional  coup'953
shattered illusion of a an authentic reform process, and illustrated the continuation of
new  forms  of  control,  ones  that  reflected  both  a  Saudi  and  Al  Khalifa  fear  of
emboldening the Shi‘a or giving them more power,  especially the power to make
948Essentially means a law has to exist prohibiting an action before it can be deemed as criminal 
949This principle is founded on the idea that no one can be tried for a crime that is not stipulated in 
law, nor its punishments defined. The ambiguity of the laws in Bahrain are such that the 
government have almost unlimited discretion in determining what is considered a crime under the 
law.
950Law Number 58 for the year 2006, Law for the protection of society from terrorist acts'. 
http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K5806.pdf  (accessed 6 October 2015). 
951 W.R. Tomkys, Mahdi Tajjir, 16 May 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA., TNA. 
952W.T. Monroe, Bahrainis Publicly Acknowledge Regional Terrorist Threat, US Embassy Manama,16
February 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05MANAMA224_a.html, (accessed 2 October 
2015). 
953A. Gresh, 'Bahrain: divide, repress and rule', April 2011, http://mondediplo.com/blogs/bahrain-
divide-repress-and-rule, (accessed 5 October 2015). 
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laws.  This  was  evident  following  the  outbreak  of  protests  in  2011,  where  the
government  introduced the Orwellian named 'State  of National  Safety'.   This  law,
which was passed by decree and not subject to ratification by parliament, allowed the
authorities broader scope in dealing with dissent without democratic scrutiny. The law
was  approved  by the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Supreme  Defence  Council,  a  body
created  to  monitor  matters  of  national  security  which  is  made  up  exclusively  of
members  of  the  Ruling  Family and  not  accountable  to  the  legislature954.  In  other
words, the decision bypassed even the weak parliament, demonstrating how the legal
repression endorsed by the constitution lacked any binding consultation between not
just the state and society, but the Ruling Family and society. Unsurprisingly, the law
was  passed  the  day after  2,000 Saudi  soldiers  from the  Peninsula  Shield  entered
Bahrain to “defend Bahrain as a bulwark against perceived Iranian expansionism”.955
However despite this draconian measure reflecting a large degree of fear from both
the Al Khalifa and the Saudis, it cannot simply be said to be the work of hard-liners
such as the Khawalid or the PM, as it was voted on by the Supreme Defence Council.
The extent of ruling family autonomy in this is challenged by the 'Saudi invasion', and
the fact that protests had reached such a pitch that Saudi saw the Bahraini red line as
having been crossed. 
The  State  of  National  Safety  removed  the  restraining  barrier  of  role
delineation, and gave legal pretext for multiple enforcement agencies to work together
to impose curfews, search citizens, censor or confiscate publications, regulate or ban
public gatherings.956 This lack of 'separating functions'  is a move that Austin Turk
associated with increased deviance and coercion.957 The absence of statute 'identifying
the  exact  powers  to  be  exercised  by  the  Government  during  a  State  of  National
Safety',958 compounded the issue. This outcome was not undesirable for the regime, as
the Bahrain government also induced a temporary state of lawlessness to create a wide
sense of disorder to create panic and a desire for 'law and order'. During March 2011,
the government's government’s withdrawal of the police from the streets created an
954A. Shehabi. 'Bahrain's Sovereign Hypocrisy', The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, 14 August 
2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/14/bahrains_sovereign_hypocrisy?
wp_login_redirect=0  (Accessed 6 October 2015). 
955J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, p. 20. 
956 BICI Report. 
957 A. Turk, ‘Organizational deviance and political policing’, Criminology, vol. 19, no. 2, 1981, p. 248. 
958BICI Report, p. 418
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atmosphere of lawlessness that was later used to justify a heavy-handed deployment
of  security  forces'.959 Federico  Ferrara  describes  this  deliberate  creation  of  social
disorder  as  a  form of  repression.  Bahraini  citizens  were  placed in  a  20th-century
version of Hobbesian dilemma, where 'anarchy was pervasive',960 and where 'violence
and the indiscriminate pillage were not only tolerated but promoted by the armed
forces'.961  Indeed, such a dilemma created a corollary demand for intervention by the
armed forces, the only one's capable of reasserting order.
The decree also created a two-tiered quasi military court system, and all those
arrested under the National Safety law's broad mandate would be tried in a court in
which one of the three judges was a member of the military, a Sunni-dominated body
whose  experience  lay  with  military  and  not  civil  justice.  Human  Rights  Watch
described the courts as 'as a vehicle to convict defendants of alleged crimes stemming
from the exercise of  fundamental rights of freedom of expression, association, and
assembly, in violation of international and Bahraini law'.962 No matter how nefarious,
the State of National Safety was crucial in giving the authorities the correct, yet highly
repressive,  'legal form'  to  arrest  and put on trial  important  leaders of the political
opposition.  Twenty-one  opposition  activists  were  tried  and  given  harsh  sentences
(ranging from 5 – 25 years), even though much of their testimony had been extracted
under  torture  and  that  most  of  the  evidence  related  'almost  entirely  to  peaceful
political  activities  and raised serious due process issues  as  well'.963  However,  the
judges  argued  that  the  provisions  of  the  decree  took  precedent  over  those  in  the
Bahrain constitution that protect a citizens right to free speech and association.964 In
addition, statutes were interpreted by the Military Attorney General in a way 'least
favourable to the arrested persons and to the defendants appearing before the National
Safety Courts'.965
Despite the name of the decree, the State of National Safety was simply a way
959 J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, 012, p. 20. 
960 F. Ferrara, 'Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes' Dilemna During a Rangoon Summer', The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 47, no. 3, 2003, p. 310. 
961Ibid. 
962Human Rights Watch, No Justice in Bahrain: Unfair Trials in Civilian and Military Court, 2012, p. 




965BICI Report, p. 418
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of increasing  the  efficiency with  which  the  Bahrain  government  could  justify the
detention and arrest  of a large number of people.  Indeed, over 3,000 people were
arrested  following  the  declaration  of  a  State  of  National  Safety,966reducing  the
efficiency of the opposition movement in that they actually reduce the number of
activists  at  large.  In  particular,  the  incarceration  of  political  leaders  reduced  the
organizational capacity of the opposition in Bahrain. Describing something as law sets
out the terms for those activists, simply adding a veneer of legal form to a process that
would otherwise be seen as an entirely arbitrary means of repressing social movement
activism. Given that the Prime Minister has stated a number of times that all citizens
are 'equal before the law',967  the process also allows the government to argue that
procedures  are  done  in  'accordance  with  the  law'.   Perhaps  most  crucially,   the
protection afforded by the constitution is entirely subservient to the security of the Al
Khalifa regime. Rather than preventing repressive law, the constitution enshrines it by
having a caveat that allows for a state of national safety.  Most tellingly,  while the
memorandum attached to the constitution states that measures undertaken in a State of
National Safety are meant to be less restrictive than Martial Law Decree of 1981, they
were interpreted in a manner that 'exceeded those stipulated in Amiri Decree No. 27
of 1981'968 (Martial Law). 
While Bahrain's precarious position has always made it vulnerable to increased
uncertainty, prompting the almost constant existence of a state of emergency, one in
which  the  regime  have  justified  the  'suspension  of  normal  legal  principles  and
procedures' 969  the state of National Safety simply reflects the legal redundancies put
in place to deal with popular unrest. The fact such emergency laws have always been
accompanied by foreign intervention simply add legal support to the strengthening of
the coercive apparatus. While some, such as Hamilton may argue that a constitutional
endorsement of a state exception is a 'pragmatic  recognition of limited constitutional
dominion',970 the decision to institute National Safety in Bahrain is solely by decree,
966BICI Report. 
967Gulf Daily News,  'No Place for Anarchy'', 13 March 2013, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=349200, (accessed 6 
October 2015). 
968BICI Report, p. 57. 
969 Welch, p. 18. 
970S. Humphreys, 'Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception', The European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 3, 2006, p. 678. 
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with  no  binding  consultation  between  state  and  the  King,  demonstrating  that
legalising  lawlessness  in  the  form  of  an  emergency  law  is  a  discretionary  right
initiated by the King in the defence of private interests. The fact that Bahrain is a 'red-
line' by Riyadh, and that the arrival of Saudi troops was swiftly followed by the laws,
971 indicate that the decision of the National Safety Law was not solely a Bahraini one.
Emergency  laws  highlight  foremost  the  'close  integration  of  law  and  politics',972
especially when enacted as a response to widespread popular discontent  (with the
exception  of  1965  in  Bahrain).  In  such  cases,  the  'direct  subordination  of  legal
institutions'  973 is a means of preserving local minority elite interests in the face of
populist demands. While in Latin America, the constitution was 'rendered inoperative
by continuing states of emergency',974 in Bahrain the constitution is de-legitimised by
the very caveats that allow a state of national emergency. 
Ordinary law, Ordinances and Regulations: The Expansion of Repressive Law 
While emergency laws are a band aid, designed to cope with agitation in a context
where administrative and non-coercive control are not sufficient to give the authority
vague enough parameters to deal with dissent, non-emergency laws or ordinances are
also an important tool of repression.  Many of these laws concern the regulation of
public meetings, labour organizations, regulation of the press, and the association of
people  in  clubs  and societies  The British  attempts  to clamp down on Al  Khalifa
'rowdyism', resulted in the creation of the Manama Municipality, which offered one of
the  first  legal  frameworks  in  Bahrain  for  regulating  public  space.   A curfew was
introduced,  and systems of taxation and discipline were regulated and formalised,
already setting a precedent that urban centres would be subject to the law before the
rural 'hinterland'.  The Al Khalifa, for their part, sort to strangle the legal reforms from
within,  resisting  British  encroachment  on  what  they  saw  as  tribal  law,  that's
particularism  had  gave  a  legal  particularism  to  their  oppression  of  the  baḥārna.
Popular demands for reform highlighted the widespread desire to end arbitrary tribal
rule, and petitions for a penal  code in 1935 and 1938975  fell on deaf ears, despite
971  S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian – Saudi Rivalry', Middle East Policy Council, vol xix, 
no. 2, 2012.  
972  P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, pp. 50-52. 
973 Ibid.
974 Fagen, P.W., 'Repression and State Security', p. 48. 
975T.C. Fowle, 12 November 1938, p. 132. 
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British encouragement.976 ( It  is  telling that during the 1990s Intifada,  and despite
numerous 'legal reforms',  protesters took to the streets and got petitions due to no
legal means of expressing their  discontent.977 Petitioning the government marked a
resurgence of the tactics used by the baḥārna in the 1990s).
It was only in 1954 that the British finally got around to drafting one, again,
highlighting how the lack of timely reforms impacted upon dissent and subsequent
repressive choices. They also brought in a labour code in 1955. While the attempted
standardization of law originally stemmed from the British Administration's idea that
the  ruler  had  'proper  legal  form'  978 to  repress  dissent,   the  British  were  initially
worried that laws at the time would antagonize the HEC. Yet tackling the HEC via
administrative and legal measures was  in the face of Al Khalifa backsliding were
preferable to British boots on the ground.  As a result, Britain's 'middle-course' was
once again abandoned; 'We shall be involved in a greater degree of direct participation
in the administration, through the Judicial Adviser and the British police officers, than
would otherwise be necessary or perhaps desirable'.979 This was not Kuwait, Burrows
argued, where British influence was more involved in the administration. In Bahrain,
given the recent memories of Al Khalifa oppression, British influence was seen as
necessary as there was 'no alternative method of reassuring the people of Bahrain that
impartial justice will in future be done and that police will be in a better position to
maintain order without the unwarranted use of firearms'.980
As predicted, the introduction of a penal code was opposed by the HEC on 'the
grounds that it incriminated whoever took part in sedition or civil disturbances'.981 The
HEC had already been worn down by a number of unilateral government notices. The
final straw came when government claimed that a march planned by the HEC had
deviated from its route, and, as such, the HEC had failed to control people and was
thus responsible for these 'grave disorders'.982 So while the desire for a penal code
ultimately  drove  forward  the  standardization  of  law  in  resistance  to  tribal
particularized  law,  the  penal  code  and emergency law were  designed  to  facilitate
976T.C. Fowle, Communique to the Foreign Secretary, RoB, vol. 5, p. 4. 
977The Economist, 'Bahrain's Spreading Flames', 19 July 1997, Issue 8026, p. 56. 
978D.M.H. Riches,  10 April 1956, p. 238
979B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 58.  
980Ibid
981 F. Khuri, p. 206. 
982 Bahrain State Radio Transcript, 6 & 7 November 1956, Bahrain Internal Political, 1956, TNA. 
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repression and Al Khalifa domination. In this respect, the rise of the HEC marked the
widespread beginning of the conflict between 'de facto rights' 'from below', and 'de
jure' rights 'from above'. 
Limiting Organization, Maintaining Fragmentation 
With the HEC out  of the picture,  the Bahrain government  felt  less  need to  hurry
reform. The  Labour  Ordinance  considered  in  the  late  60s  and encouraged  by the
British provided for registered union organization, was scuppered by Al Khalifa and
merchant  class  interests,  on  the  basis  the  law  would  'conflict  with  those  vested
interests among the members of the Ruling Family and the more influential merchants
which  are  still  effective  obstacles  in  the  way  of  progress'.983Indeed,  the  British
dropped  pressure  to  introduce  such  a  law  as  they  feared  that  introducing  such
measures  might  be  seen  as  subversion.984 The  undermining  of  the  Labour  Law
highlighted the Al Khalifas fear of legal changes giving groups power to collectively
organise, whether in unions, or in public spaces. Thus the ability to formulate the law,
and the nature of the laws themselves, was something that remained the prerogative of
the Ruling Elites. 
 The  first  law  concerning  the  regulation  of  public  meetings  was  the  Amiri
Decree Law No.  18 of  1973 on the Organisation of Public  Meetings,  Rallies and
Assemblies. The law was passed hastily in September 1973, two months prior to the
establishment of parliament in order that it not be subject to public debate. As such, it
gave legal form to the containment of public order before the public could question it.
The law,  which was subsequently amended in 2006 and 2011, stipulates,  amongst
other  things,  that  the head of  public  security be informed of the time,  place,  and
subject  matter  of  all  public  meetings  and  demonstrations.  Law  No.  32  of  2006
stipulates that organisers are also responsible for 'forbidding any speech or discussion
infringing on public  order or morals',  although it  does not define 'public  order  or
morals'. 985 It also permits the authorities to deem whether a police presence should be
necessary,  thus giving the authorities the legal scope to best position legal control
agents to pre-empt any serious attempts at dissent. Human Rights Watch have argued
983 G. Middleton from the British Residency, 18 July 1960, RoB, vol. 7, p. 820. 
984 Ibid.
985 BICI Report, p. 209. 
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that  the  Bahrain  government  have  used  the  law to  prosecute  both  organizers  and
participants  in  gatherings  arbitrarily  deemed  as  “illegal”.986 Combined  with  stiff
sentences, charges of illegal gatherings have been a means for the authorities to scoop
up activists expressing publicly their right to free expression. In one high profile case
in  2012,  prominent  human  rights  activist  Nabeel  Rajab  was  given  a  three  year
sentence for charges related to illegal gathering. 987   The extent to which such charges
of illegal gathering have been used to clamp down on perceived trouble makers is
evident in the fact that the authorities have 'arrested hundreds of mostly young men
and imprisoned them on charges of “illegal gathering”, “rioting” or “arson” after trials
that  failed to  comply with international  fair  trial  standards'.988 The Law on Public
Gatherings, and its subsequent amendments (discussed later) came into place ahead of
the National Assembly to manage the risks posed to the regime by the democratic
body,  yet   treated  the  right  to  peaceful  assembly  'as  if  it  were  a  mere  privilege,
imposing arbitrary obstacles in the way of those who wish freely to exercise this right,
including to demonstrate  against  the government'.  Two constitutions  later,  both of
which enshrine freedom of expression, its draconian tenets are still being utilised to
give legal form to preventing freedom of expression.  
Legal channels to constrain dissent have also been useful in defining the nature
and size of opposition. Since the rise of Arab Nationalism, and the proliferation of
para-political institutions such as the ‘Uruba club were, laws of association have been
important in attempting to create 'organizational fragmentation' that seeks to weaken
potential challengers. In 1959, the government issued an ordinance that regulated the
foundation and operation of clubs and societies in Bahrain, ensuring that they were
'ethnically  divided  between  Shi‘a  and  Sunni,  Arab  and  Persian,  Indian  and
Pakistani'.989 The  principal  of  fragmentation  extended  to  both  foreign  labour  and
expatriates.  While  the  introduction  of  such a  law sanctioned the  creation  of  such
clubs,  it  also  regulated  them in  an  attempt  to  minimise  their  potential  to  act  as
986 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch UPR Submission on Bahrain, 21 November 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/21/human-rights-watch-upr-submission-bahrain  (Accessed 6 
October 2015). 
987 Index on Censorship, Bahrain Activist Nabeel Rajab Sentenced to Three Years in Prison, August 
2012, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/08/bahrain-activist-nabeel-rajab-sentenced-to-three-
years-in-prison/  (Accessed 6 October 2015). 
988 Amnesty International, Behind the Rhetoric: Human Rights Abuses Continue in Bahrain Unabated,
April 2015, p. 11. 
989 F Khuri, p. 185.
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institutions  that  encouraged  widespread  political  mobilisation.  Indeed,  clubs  were
forbidden to extend membership beyond a particularly geographic location, especially
if  eligibility for  joining was broad990 As Fuad Khuri  notes;  'The proliferation and
fragmentation of club organization has not  been haphazard;  it  is  an expression of
government policy and the factional divisions of communities and ethnic groups'.991
Therefore while the authorities used the law to permit the establishment of clubs and
societies,  the  law  also  helped  ensure  that  the  membership  of  those  clubs  was
constrained and limited so as to maintain some degree of disorganization and disunity,
further weakening potential opposition. Clubs believed to foster dissidence in any way
were targeted.  Following the killing of ʿAbd Allah al-Madani, for example, clubs in
al-Dayh and Abu Sayba‘ were shut down. In the 1990s Intifada, clubs had to seek
permission from the authorities to hold public meetings. When the ‘Uruba Club asked
to have an event on the theme of 'freedom of the press and condemning violence',992
they had to  submit  all  the  names  of  invitees  to  the  Ministry of  the Interior,  who
subsequently denied permission to hold the event.
Although such legislation has served to stymie political organization or shape
it  in  such  a  way  that  political  debate  is  skewed  in  a  manner  that  benefits  the
government (e.g. promoting affiliation according to religious sect for example), it has
never  been  a  panacea,  and  has  required  upgrading.  For  this  reason,  the   Law of
Associations, amended in 2002, was written to further constrain the operation of civil
society organizations and NGOs so important in shaping Bahrain's political debate. 993
As Human Rights Watch argue, the Law of Associations has been used to
to suppress civil society and restrict freedom of association in three main
ways:  by  arbitrarily  rejecting  registration  applications  and  intrusively
supervising NGOs; taking over and dissolving—more or less at  will—
organizations whose leaders have criticized government officials or their
policies;  and  severely  limiting  the  ability  of  groups  to  fundraise  and
receive foreign funding.994
990 Ibid., p. 185. 
991 Ibid.
992 HRW, Routine Abuse: Routine Denial.
993 HRW, Interfere, Restrict and Control,  p. 2.
994 Ibid.
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With the advent of the Law No. 26 of 2005 with respect to Political Societies, passed
by a Sunni Islamist dominated parliament, the government also sought to draw a legal
distinction between legitimate political societies and illegitimate political societies. As
the law required all groups to register with the Ministry of Justice, those who did not
could  be  construed as  rejecting  the  legitimacy of  the  constitution  promulgated  in
2002. The state's purpose here was clear, to deligitimise and criminalise those groups
who did not, through their willingness to succumb to the state's legal-bureaucratic
apparatus, register with the Ministry of Justice.995  Furthermore the law empowers a
judge to seek a court order to shut the political society down for up to three months if
they  violate  either  the  constitution  or  the  law.  Although  the  court  must  reach  a
decision within thirty days, the political society is suspended during this time, giving
the government the ability to disrupt the activities of such groups even before any
wrongdoing has been ruled by the courts.996 The law also prevents Bahrain's restive
teenagers from forming legal political allegiance, with the minimum joining age set at
21. Cross-group co-operation is also discouraged, with it being illegal to be a member
of more than one society. 
In June 2012, Law No. 26 was invoked to dissolve the Islamic Action Society
(Amal).  The  government  accused  them of  failing  to  submit  their  annual  reports,
failure to convene a general conference for more than four years, and taking decisions
from a religious  authority that  openly advocates  and incites  hatred.997 Despite  the
official reasons, Amal had been a thorn in the regime's side for some time, and their
dissolution  was  the  culmination  of  the  government's  antipathy  towards  Amal  as
opposed to their failure to adhere strict  to laws and regulations. Amal's failure to
comply with specific laws thus enabled the government to prevent them engaging in
legally sanctioned protest, even though their failure was on account of the fact most of
its board members and over 200 active members were arrested in 2011.998
995 J. Gengler, 'Bahrain's Legal “War on Terror”', Religion and Politics in Bahrain, 17 September 2013,
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 Indeed, despite the King's political openings of 2001, the legal slights of hand
constrained  most  of  the  advantages  bestowed  upon  society  with  repressive  and
constrictive law.  Law of Associations (no. 21/1989) gives the government significant
powers to interfere in the work of NGOs, such as the ability to replace board members
and forbidding the NGO from engaging in political activities.  999 The law has been
used, as a weapon, by the regime in dealing with dissent. In 2011, the Ministry of
Social Development used the Law of Associations to dissolve the Bahrain Teachers
Society  and  'replace  the  board  of  the  Bahrain  Medical  Society'  after  they  had
supported protesters demand for more political  rights.1000 The Law of Associations
also curtails sources of funding for NGOs, and those groups who refuse to accept
government  funds  (for  fear  of  appearing  to  be  co-opted  and  complicit  in  the
government strategy) have severe restrictions on how they raise money. As Gary Marx
states, 'Social movement organizations need money', and 'government actions may be
taken to deny or restrict a movement's to' resources such as money.1001 
Further attempts to deepen government control over civil society continued
throughout 2013. In September 2013, Ministerial Order No. 31 of 2013 stated that
political societies must liaise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) prior to
meeting with members of foreign parties or political societies.1002 The MoFA may also
a send a representative to the meetings.1003 Such a move represents the increase of
state surveillance over the activities of political groups, and makes it more difficult for
rights  groups  to  alert  foreign  governments  and  audiences  in  their  struggle  for
advocacy. This in turn, creates further obstacles for social movements trying to draw
attention to their cause. This does not simply reflect government fears of, for example,
groups  like  Al  Wefaq meeting  with  Shi‘a  figures  in  other  countries,  but  also  the
tenants of Bahrain's advocacy revolution,  which has seen a burgeoning number of
groups  seeking  assistance  from  international  organizations.  Al-Wefaq,  operating
within the system, also feel the pressure to make sure their political activity is within
999Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch UPR Submission on Bahrain, 21 November 2011.
1000HRW, Interfere, Restrict and Control. p. 12,
1001G. Marx.
1002Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, Report: The Recommendations of the Bahraini National
Assembly Restrain Human Rights, 8 September 2013, http://byshr.org/wp-content/en-reco.pdf  
( Accessed 6 October 2015)
1003Gulf News, 'New Rule for Bahrain Societies over Contacts', 4 September 2013, 
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the confines of acceptable means. This was the case at least until recently, and Al-
Wefaq would try to 'mollify Shiʿa demands and passions while demonstrating to the
government its mass support'.1004 Yet, as Nonet and Selznick argue, 'some forms of
consent are distorted by desperation, for example, when weakness and disorganization
induce oppressed to adopt the goals and perspectives of their oppressors'.1005
In additions to curtailing the work of NGOs that may hold the governments to
account, the Bahraini authorities have sought to weaken and control another common
institution  for  political  mobilisation  –  the  trade  union.  This  has  been  especially
necessary following industrialisation, which has changed the social base of power and
created a shift  towards 'issue-orientated'  politics which transcended traditional and
more predictable (for the tribal Al Khalifa) forms of organizations such as sect. While
trade unions were illegal throughout much of Bahrain's history, there have been calls
for  workers  rights  from as  early  as  the  1930s.  When  trade  unions  were  actually
permitted to form, strict laws were implemented, and breaking these laws resulted in
severe penalties. What is more, even abiding by those laws and exercising the right to
strike within legal parameters has resulted in state repression.  The Labour Law of
1981 even allowed the Secret Service to vet candidates running for positions on a
company's  elected  Joint  Committee.1006 
In  2011  when  the  General  Federation  of  Bahrain  Trade  Unions  (GFBTU)
organized  a  legal  action,  thousands  of  workers  went  on  strike.  The  government
responded with a series of witch hunts that resulted in the sacking of thousands of
workers. In addition to this, amendments to the trade union law were made that sought
to divide, fragment and ultimately weaken the GFBTU. Amendments included only
allowing unions chosen by the Ministry of Labour to represent Bahraini workers in
national  and international  bargaining,  a  change that  the International  Trade  Union
Confederation argued would prevent the GFBTU from voicing its concern that the
new amendments  were  designed  to  prevent  the  GFBTU from further  denouncing
government  violations.1007 The  amendment  also  included  a  clause  that  the  ITUC
1004 A. Ereli, 'Bahrain's Shiʿa Opposition: Managing Sectarian Pressures and Focusing on 2010 
Parliamentary Elections', US Embassy Manama, 22 July 2009, 
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2011, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ITUC_Bahrain_Statement_Final_3_.pdf  (accessed 6 
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argued  would  prevent  trade  union  leaders  convicted  of  actions  leading  to  the
dissolution of a trade union (e.g.  leading strikes in 2011) from being elected for five
years following the date of his conviction.1008 In other words, trade union leaders who
organized the legal strike in 2011 (by the BICI) would be targeted by the new law.
These measures, Amy Austin Holmes argues, have severely curtailed the ability of the
opposition to lead effective protests.
In  line  with  how  challenges  to  authority  have  honed  the  Bahrain's
government's use of repressive law, the Ministry of the Interior claimed that it was
considering  studying  sites  that  would  be  specifically  for  protests  and
demonstrations.1009 Although the outcome of the study was unclear, the government
banned all protests between 30 October 2012 and 13 December 2012 citing 'repeated
abuse' of the right to protest.1010 In August 2013, a ban on protests in Manama was
then formalised into law via an amendment to Article 11 of the Public Gatherings
Law1011, highlighting how the government were not satisfied with the existing laws'
effect on the behaviour of protesters. The new amendment banned public meetings,
marches   gatherings  and demonstrations   in  the  capital,  'excluding  sit-ins  outside
international organisations', which can be held with the written authorization of the
Public Security Chief.1012 However, in addition to this condition, the Public Security
Chief may also define the time, place,  and number of people participating in any
demonstration.  The  exclusion  of  protests  from the  country's  capital  represents  an
attempt to limit the visibility and occurrence of protest as well as mitigate the effects
of civil disobedience. Since part of the purpose of a protest is to garner public and
media attention, relegating them to discreet locations, far from the eyes of the media
or other citizens, is a way of  reducing their effectiveness as a means of expressing
discontent or gaining public support.1013 Indeed, it functions as a form of censorship
October 2015). 
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and containment, attempting to persuade people, via omission, that Bahrain is a place
in which protest and discontent are not a serious problem. 
The  protests  in  2011  have  also  prompted  a  swathe  of  legislation
designed to extend state repression further into the private sphere. This was facilitated
by the tactics of Al Wefaq.  In a move of political principle, the almost exclusively
Shi'i  al-Wifaq withdrew from parliament, vacating 18 out of 40 seats, prompting bi-
elections  that  resulted  in  the  election  of  a   largely pro-government  coalition  who
ratified, among other things, laws that gave the state even deeper powers to deal with
dissent.1014 Yet  Al Wefaq's  point of principle,  an attempt to win supporters among
those factions more tempted by the confrontational politics of  the illegal opposition
such as al-Wafa', Haq, and Bahrain Freedom Movement backfired. The government
capitalised on this, pushing draconian legislation through the lower house in order to
give  some  semblance  of  popular  legitimacy  to  measures  that  sought  to  legally
enshrine  the  continued  stifling  of  civil  society.   While  Bahrain's  parliament  was
already structurally biased in favour of the regime, the withdrawal of al-Wifaq simply
encouraged a repressive public policy.1015  
 The 1976 juvenile law was amended so that the parents of anyone under 16
who  took  part  in  a  public  gathering  would  be  warned  on  the  first  offence,  and
imprisoned or fined on the second.1016 Again, this attempt to raise the costs of protest
through legislation that  informally makes parents part  of the policing apparatus  is
designed to weaken opposition through a process of intimidation. Using families to
police their offspring, the state's role in the private sphere has become increasingly
pervasive  as  legal  controls  seek  to  replace  extralegal  or  more  violent  means  of
controlling dissent. 1017 This also marks a further shift to collective responsibility and
1014 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, 2015,  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2015/bahrain#.VWius8_BzGc, (accessed 5 October 2015). 
1015Existing laws already regulate people's right to freedom of association, 
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1973 and the Press Law of 2002, also unduly restrict the activities of political 
societies as they relate to freedom of assembly and expression'. See Human Rights 
Watch, 2013. While existing legislation is restrictive enough, the new moves saw 
an entrenchment of authoritarianism, and the emergence of even more repressive 
public policy.
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punishment. That is to say, those other than the people carrying out criminal activity
are being held accountable for crimes. This asymmetry is matched by a similar, yet
opposite degree of state unaccountability. Essentially, families are explicitly expected
to police what the state has failed to, and the burden of accountability has extended
further from the state to the citizens. Thus the political rights of parents or guardians
now become contingent on the behaviour of those under their care, representing the
deepening  of  repression.   For  those  abetting  protesters  by  providing  medical
treatment, the government announced that they will be held 'legally responsible' for
the  victim's  'health  and  well  being',  forcing  protesters  to  either  suffer  or  turn
themselves in to a hospital, and by extension, the police.1018 
Freedom  of  expression  has  also  been  constricted  in  the  legislation  of
cenosrship. Bahrain's formalised publication law came into effect in 1965.1019 The law
offered  formal  legal  control  that  limited  who could  publish  and  what  they  could
publish.  Among its  stipulations  was that  no one could insult  any ruling  figure  or
anyone  in  the  ruling  family  except  without  their  permission.  The  law  was  also
thorough and far-reaching, and 'newspaper' was deemed to be any magazine, paper,
newsletter or circular issued in Bahrain. Indeed it was so broad that any conceivable
medium was subject to these draconian laws. Also, to instigate regime change whether
through  advocating  violence  or  other  means  became  illegal,  further  limiting  the
opportunities  for  expressing  discontent  at  the  government  and thus  solidifying  its
power. Furthermore, the law stipulates that those who wish to own a newspaper or
become  its  editor  must  have  a  'good  reputation'.  Such  subjective  prerequisites
naturally preclude those who may be seen as a threat to the existing regime. Thus the
legal  system  in  Bahrain  has  explicitly  been  designed  to  restrain  organizations,
activities, and discourse that may be harmful to a ruling core. While such laws offer
'handy tools  for  imposing order',  they are  'far  less  competent  at  securing stability
founded in consent'.1020 The government  even penalised  the  seemingly trivial,  and
made  the  importation  of  V for  Vendetta  masks  illegal.1021  So  although Bahrain's
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nebulous emergency laws were guilty of no crime without law, but that development
has  resulted  in  a  legal  system  often  so  specific  that  it  seeks  to  delineate  and
criminalise all facets of collective action, whether in theory, or in practise.
Legal Processes 
The Political Trial and Political Justice 
While laws may seek to give the government a legal means of pursuing dissent, the
use of legal processes and the courts to repress dissent is also important.  A political
trial is one such method,  and is designed to 'incriminate its [the state's] foe's public
behaviour with a view to evicting him from the political scene'. 1022The political trial
has been used throughout Bahrain's many episodes of contentious activity.   In the
1920s,  when the  British  were  attempting  to  end  ruling  family persecution  of  the
indigenous  baḥārna community, a problem that was effecting Britain's relationship
with Persia, a few members of the Ruling Family were put on trial for various crimes.
Yet even at what was arguably the peak of British influence, justice was 'meted out
differentially based not just on the 'offender, the intent, and the offense', but the goals
of the regime too.1023 To put an end to arbitrary trials, the British further consolidated
Shaykh Hamad binIsa 's rule by giving him exclusive power among the Al Khalifa to
try certain cases or inflict  punishment.1024 However,  while  members of the Ruling
Family were put on trial, their sentences were barely enforced. 
For  example,  on  18  September  1923,  a  group  of  al-fidawiyya killed  a
bahrāni1025 villager after a camel belonging to Shaykh Khalid Al Khalifa was found
wounded  near  the  village  of  Sitra.  Shaykh  Khalid  was  found  guilty  of  having
'encouraged and approved of the attack',1026 and was made to forfeit his property in the
town of  Sitra  and pay blood money of  two thousand rupees1027.  His  son ʿAli  bin
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1023 R. Sharlet, 'Party and Public Ideals in Conflict: Constitutionalism and Civil Rights in the USSR', 
Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 23, no. 2, 
1024 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [119r] (242/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002b> [accessed 27 October 2015]
1025 Bahrāni is the adjective of baḥārna. 
1026 C.K. Daly, 25 September 1923, No. 123-C, RoB, Vol. 4, p. 130.
1027Ibid.
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Khalid,  who  was  found  guilty  of  'organising  and  accompanying  the  attack'  was
banished  to  India1028.  Salman  Al  Khalifa,  another  son  of  Khalid  Al  Khalifa  was
banished from Bahrain for a year. According to Charles Belgrave, the punishment so
'annoyed'  the  Khalid  shaykhs  that  they  briefly  returned  to  Sitra  and  shot  nine
people1029 in  what  became  known  as  the  second  Sitra  outage.1030 Following  this,
Shaykh Khalid's sons were sentenced to death, a move that was intended to establish
the new regime under Hamad.1031  Although ʿAli bin Khalid was banished to India, he
returned to  Bahrain about six months later without British permission1032. Much to
Belgrave's chagrin, the political resident Barrett also allowed Shaykh Hamad to issue
a  retrial  of  the  two  Khalids  involved  in  the  Sitra  outrage.  Shaykh  Hamad  then
proceeded to 'square' the thirty-four witnesses who had seen the Khalids shoot nine
villagers.1033 Belgrave wrote a letter to Barret complaining about his decision to let the
Khalids  return,  and also complained to  the Shaykh about  the 'persuasion'  that  the
baḥārna witnesses in the Sitra case were being subjected to.1034  In February 1928, the
Shiʿa Qādi Sayyid ʿAdnan wrote a letter to Hamad saying he had managed to 'square'
the witnesses in the case.1035 
While the Khalids were not imprisoned, the illusion that justice had been done
was seen by the British as an important step in securing the authority of the courts and
the legal system. Whether or not many perceived this as the case is, of course, difficult
to determine. Nonetheless, the return of the Khalids highlighted the limits of Britain’s
ability  to  press  for  high-level  accountability.  Instead  they  had  to  concede  that
mitigating conflict within the Ruling Family was more of a priority than the execution
of substantial  justice.   The façade of justice that hides elite impunity has been an
enduring  aspect  of  Bahrain's  history,  and  this  case  has  never  been  accurately
documented.1036
1028Ibid.
1029 C. Belgrave, Papers, 30 January 1928.
1030'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00007b> (accessed 4 November 2015)
1031'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [195r] (394/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x0000c3> (accessed 5 November 2015)
1032C. Belgrave, Papers, 11 Feb 1927. 
1033Ibid. 30 January 1928.
1034Ibid., 22 February 1928. 
1035Ibid. 25 February 1928. 
1036Khuri ends the discussion of the case by noting that the Khawalids were given the death sentence 
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In addition to the retrials of 1929, Ibrahim bin Khalid bin ʿAli Al Khalifa was
convicted for instigating an assassination attempt on Shaykh Hamad in 1926.  He had
allegedly co-ordinated this from exile on the mainland after his involvement in the
Sitra Outrages.  In the end, the men who carried out the attack were given varying
prison sentences, while Ibrahim was exonerated by Shaykh Hamad on the grounds
that because the attack had been against him, he had the power to forgive.1037 (Ibrahim
eventually  worked  in  Hamad's  house).  Other  Al  Khalifas  and  shaykhs  were  also
convicted for climes including rape and murder; including Shaykh Hamad bin Sabah
and Shaykh Hamad bin ʿAbd Allah al-Ghattam.1038 Yet fines were only imposed, even
though the relatives of the victims demanded the death penalty.1039 Hamad's lenient
sentences stemmed from both his weakness and desire to maintain family unity, itself
an important factor in preventing further challenge to his rule. 
It is also interesting to note that initial investigations suggested that it was the
Ruler's brother Shaykh ʿAbd Allah who had been behind the assassination attempt.
Interestingly though, ʿAbd Allah was brought in to augment the judges on the Bahrain
Court that convicted Ibrahim. When it was suggested that ʿAbd Allah be put on the
court, Belgrave wrote in his diary; 'As ʿAbd Allah is one of the people implicated he
would be certain to condemn the men to shield himself, and if they accused him in
Court he is quite clever enough to suppress any such idea. I think it would be a good
idea to put him on the Court'.1040 Unless Belgrave had made a grammatical error, he
appeared to be supporting ʿAbd Allah's position as a judge in order to protect himself
from accusations against his involvement in the assassination attempt on his brother. 
Given  ʿAbd  Allah's  previous  attempts  to  undermine  Hamad's  rule,  his
involvement  would  not  be  unlikely.  Such  evidence,  in  addition  to  ʿAbd  Allah's
continued attempts  to work against Hamad, contradict Khuri's assertion that ʿAbd
Allah committed himself to maintaining unity within the ruling family following the
but then fled. Al-Tajir mentions a fine and prison sentences/
1037 C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1348 (1929-30), BGAR, vol. 1, p. 153.
1038Shaykh Hamad bin Sabah was found guilty of instigating an attack on the house of one of his 
tenants in the village of Tubli in around 1981. The house owner was killed. Shaykh Hamad bin 
Abdulla Al Ghattam had been previously tried by Shaykh Hamad for instigating murder and rape in 
a tenants house in Farsia. After being retried he was found guilty and a payment of blood money 
was ordered. 
1039 Ibid.
1040 C. Belgrave, Papers, 4 February 1929. 
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abdication of Shaikh ʿIsa in 1923.1041 Indeed, Khuri's idea that ʿAbd Allah became a
conciliator as opposed to a party to conflict seems too simplistic, and it was perhaps
the fear of losing a generous stipend from the state that induced ʿAbd Allah to limit
his  intrigues  against  Hamad.  Furthermore,  despite  ʿAbd  Allah's  attempts  to  work
against Hamad, he was perceived by the British as the most competent Al Khalifa, and
one who was important in securing Shaykh ʿIsa's supporters to cooperate more fully
with the British reforms. While these attempts to repress dissident members of the Al
Khalifa resulted in reprisals or amnesties, they highlight the limits of British control
over Al Khalifa agitation. Indeed, the British may have tempered their excesses, but
they were never in full control, and justice was subsumed to strategies designed to
control Al Khalifa agitation. 
Institutionalising the Political Trial 
Both  the  British  and  the  relatively  unified  Al  Khalifa  clients  came  together  in
opposition to the agitation of the 1950s. The political trial once again became a means
of attacking the legitimacy of dissenters while consolidating the position of the Al
Khalifa.  In 1956, after Bahrain had been subject to two years of political agitation by
the Higher Executive Committee, the government decided to move against the leaders
of the HEC. Following a highly political  summary trial,  in which the British CID
officer Benn acted as government prosecutor,three leaders of the HEC were illegally
deported to the British island of St. Helena.1042  In addition to questionable evidence,
those accused refused to defend themselves on the basis that the trial was held in
secret, although the British argued that they shifted the location of the trial to avoid
creating a public security issue. 
Major William Little, a former member of the Bahraini police turned whistle-
blower  submitted  a  report  to  British  parliament  criticising  the  nature  of  the  trial,
arguing  that  it  was  simply  a  means  of  publicly  discrediting  the  movement.1043
Belgrave, who disliked Little, and had at one point called him  'absolutely useless' and
a 'mischief maker',1044 also added that much of the evidence would be 'inadmissible' in
1041 F. Khuri, p. 98. 
1042 C. Belgrave, Papers, 22 December 1956
1043The report was kept secret for about 50 years, highlighting the British authorities desire not to 
generate criticism of their policy abroad 
1044C. Belgrave, Paper, 14 February 1957, 
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a 'strict  court  of law'.1045 It  should also be noted that the notorious ʿAbd Allah Al
Khalifa acted as a judge on the trial, thus making those responsible for giving justice
against  political  agitators  the  same  parties  interested  in  maintaining  Al  Khalifa
hegemony. Unlike earlier trials, where Al Khalifa legitimacy was threatened due to
them  being  in  the  docks,  the  new  arrangement  consolidated  their  power  and
legitimacy by allowing them to arbitrate on matters of sedition and treason. British
complicity in this political trial was highlighted by the collusion of local officials in
shipping the detainees off to the island of St. Helena. Although the defendants applied
for a successful habeas corpus action  to the 'Supreme Court of St. Helena and to the
Judicial  Committee  of  the  British  Privy  Council'1046 and  were  released,  the  legal
deviance necessary to dull the movement's momentum had achieved its objectives. 
Although  the  British  played  a  crucial  role  in  logistically  and  politically
supporting the demise  of  the HEC, post-Independence Bahrain  has  seen a  certain
routinisation of  the political trial, and it has become a feature of Bahrain's contentious
episodes. In 1976, five alleged members of PFLOAG were put on trial for the murder
of ʿAbd Allah al-Madani, editor of the weekly paper al-Mawaqif.  Despite a lack of
evidence, which was mostly based on confessions allegedly extracted under torture,
three  of  the  five  were given the  death  penalty.1047 The  questionable  nature  of  the
evidence and the provisions of the State Security Decree meant the men had little
chance of defending themselves properly. Their fate was also sealed by the pressure of
hardliners  in  the  Bahraini  and  Saudi  government  demanding  death  sentences.1048
According to the British Ambassador, the Prime Minister of Bahrain threatened to put
the judges on trial if they did not secure death sentences. 
Eventually, 'after a long delay, reflecting dissension within the Ruling Family
to the degree of severity to be shown, two were sentenced to death and one to life
imprisonment,  while  the  instigators  were  acquitted'.1049 The  decision  was  then
reversed, and the person sentenced to life imprisonment was also executed. A number
of those who were acquitted languished in jail for eight years, simply to prevent them
1045Ibid., 23 December 1956. 
1046M. Joyce, 'The Bahraini Three on St. Helena, 1956 – 1961', Middle East Journal, vol. 4, 2000, p.  
618. 




becoming opposition heroes.1050  Such summary justice was done in order to avoid
international  pressure  for  a  reprieve.1051   The  Al-Madani  trial  is  significant  as  it
represents the first clear examples (at least in the British archives) of Saudi influence
in the repressive choices of Bahrain's government. 
Following the successful repression of the leftist threat and their subsequent
demise in the 1970s, the oppositional vacuum was filled by the Islamist threat, which
gained ground following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Two years later in 1981,
the  government  arrested  seventy-three  people  from  the  Islamic  Front  for  the
Liberation  of  Bahrain  (IFLB).  Again,  the  trial  was  held  in  camera,  while  the
defendants' lawyers were never given sufficient access to their clients. There had been
a virtual media 'blackout' of the trial which was  closed to international observers and
the press. The verdicts were subsequently harsh, with sixty of those accused given
sentences of fifteen years, three to life imprisonment,  and ten to seven years. The
harsh sentencing was no doubt designed to have a salutary effect on other potential
dissidents, though the lack of death sentences was adequate to not generate too much
international pressure for a reprieve. 
In the trial of the IFLB members, the British had attempted to dissuade the Al
Khalifa  from  giving  death  sentences  for  fear  of  further  isolating  the  Shiʿa
community.1052 Ian  Henderson advocated  passing  death  sentences  but  not  carrying
them out,  as  he   believed carrying  them out  would  be  disastrous  for  stability.1053
Indeed,  there  seemed  to  be  an  overnight  decision  to  change  death  sentences  to
imprisonment, perhaps highlighting that the Amir did not want to push the Shiʿa too
far. The decision was such that even the Minister of the Interior  considered resigning,
and those close to PM seemed surprised by the sentences.   Henderson was said to be
relieved at the outcome of the trial.1054
Again, the Al Khalifa were caught between Saudi Arabia advocating for harsh
punishments and the British advocating a slightly less stringent approach.   Saudi
believed if dissent 'were not stamped on hard, Bahrain would bear the responsibility
 ,[WAAD, National Democratic Action Society, [website .صحيفة الوطن.. الفرعنة عندما ل تجد من يردعها 1050
22 October 2010, http://www.aldemokrati.org/details.php?artid=6765 (accessed 6 October 2015).  
1051E.F.Given,  'Political Murder in Bahrain'.
1052 P.F.M. Wogan, 23 April 1982.
1053W.R. Tomkys, The December Coup, 21 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
1054W.R. Tomkys, 23 May 1982,  FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
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for subsequent similar attempts (coups) in the region'.1055 Ultimately, the decision lay
with the Al Khalifa, who it was reported, 'may not have decided what penalties would
be appropriate”, and thought it advantageous to take a 'slow course'.1056 However, the
trial highlighted the extent of Saudi influence in Bahrain's repressive choices. As one
British Diplomat foresaw, 'the danger is that Bahrain will snuggle so closely under
Saud  Arabia's  protection  that  it  will  eventually  lose  its  independence  and  liberal
traditions'.1057 Consequently,  the  laws  were  broadened  substantially  in  order  that
anyone implicated in the plot could stand trial  'without  obliging the authorities to
demonstrate that they were full parties to the conspiracy'.1058 
Saudi fear of Iranian expansionism undoubtedly played a role in the political
pressure.  As Mabon argues,  'the  strategic  importance  of  the  Al Khalifa  for  Saudi
Arabia, coupled with a history of Iranian action in Bahrain, clerical ties and Iranian
rhetoric,  means that Riyadh has to act under the assumption'  that  any prospect  of
Iranian interference is a valid threat.1059 Perhaps most interestingly though, is that the
current  King  of  Bahrain,  considered  a  reformist  by  many,  was  believed  by  the
influential Shiʿa Mahdi Tajir to have been pressing for a 'root branch extirpation of the
Shiʿa  opposition  following the  alleged coup.1060 This  does  cast  some light  on  his
reformist  credentials.1061 Certainly  the  presence  of  the  IFLB  reflected  how  the
revolution in Iran had emboldened certain groups and refocused Saudi and Bahrain
security attention  onto  Iran.  However,  the attitude of  hardliners,  and the fact  that
Shaykh Khalifa noted that the coup attempt 'didn't represent anything very dangerous
to us' suggests that it may have been a pretext to clamp down on the Shiʿa.1062  
The next major political trial in Bahrain occurred in 1996, when ‘Isa Qambar
was convicted of taking part in the killing of a policeman during the Bahrain Intifada.
At the time, the Prime Minister was said to be responsible for this draconian judicial
policy1063Qambar's  prosecution  contained  all  the  tenets  of  a  political  trial.  For
1055S.M.J. Lamport, Bahrain Security, 8 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
1056W.R. Tomkys, Internal Political Situation Bahrain 1982, 10 April 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.
1057Ibid.
1058S.P. Collis, Bahrain Internal, 20 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
1059 S. Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain'.
1060W.R. Tomkys, 16 May 1982. 
1061The British document in which this is mentioned is redacted immediately after the quote about 
extirpation. 
1062 Gulf Daily News, 'Interview with Shakykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa', 15 Saturday 1982,  
FCO 8/4332, TNA.
1063The Economist, 'Sheikhly fall-out', 6 december 19987, Issue 8046, p. 82. 
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example, ‘Isa Qambar and his co-defendants were arrested without judicial warrants
and denied access to their family and legal counsel until the day of their trial.1064 In
addition to this, the evidence relied on confessions extracted in pre-trial detention,
allegedly under torture.1065 Defendants also argued that there was no forensic evidence
linking them to the murder weapon. Furthermore, defendants in a separate case gave
evidence against ‘Isa Qambar and his associates, even though this violated Article 137
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  1066 The defendant who gave evidence allegedly
did so in exchange for his release.1067 
Like the al-Madani case, there was also pressure to reach a verdict before the
judicial recess on 15 July.1068 The state media also widely publicised the trial of those
accused of killing the policemen, yet the government remained silent on the issue of
civilians  being  killed  by  police.1069 This  smear  game,  assisted  by  a  convoluted
program of legal embroilment and legal deviance,  threw Qambar and oppositional
legal help into a lengthy process of deliberation and distraction. Amnesty International
said  that  the  trial  'ignored  internationally  accepted  human  rights  standards',  the
authorities in Bahrain obviously were seeking to raise the costs for those planning on
engaging in dissent.1070 Although the case was eventually tried by the High Court (and
not the State Security Court) because the defendants' lawyer successfully argued that
the  case  was  a  murder,  the  accused  were  denied  fundamental  rights  in  pre-trial
detention.  1071 Following the trial of Qambar,  eight leading Shi‘a Muslim activists
were also put on trial,  a move that reportedly was done by the Prime Minister to
undermine the comparatively conciliatory approach of the then Crown Prince Shaykh
Hamad.1072 
In  2011,  thirteen  opposition  activists  and  political  leaders  were  arrested
between 17 March and 19 April.   The number  of  those put  on trial  was actually
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According to Human Rights Watch, many of the charges related to 'the exercise of
freedom of expression, assembly and association'.1073 The sentences given were harsh,
and ranged from between twenty-five and two years in prison.1074 Despite a retrial
under  a civilian court as demanded by the recommendations of the BICI report, the
original  rulings  were  upheld,  and  confessions  extracted  under  torture  were  still
deemed  admissible.  Cherif  Bassiouni,   the  head  of  the  BICI  team,  expressed  his
outrage at this decisions, declaring; ' I cannot think of a more egregious and specious
legal  decision'.1075  Like many other  political  trials,  press  access was limited.  The
defendants eventually refused to show up to the hearings complaining that many of
the hearings were held in 'secret'  and thus not subject to the scrutiny of either the
public or the local and international media. 
Similar trials of other reputable figures was undertaken in the recent uprising,
frequently on the basis of questionable evidence. On 29 September 2011, the Lower
National Safety Court convicted twenty medics of a number of offences, including
'instigating hatred against the ruling system', 'spreading false news' and 'incitement to
overthrow the regime'.1076 The medics claimed that they were tortured, and Human
Rights  Watch  stated  that  procedural  flaws  meant  that  the  trials  violated  both
international human rights law and Bahrain law.1077 Although most of the medics had
their  conviction  quashed  in  March  2013,  the  interim  period  saw  a  process  of
vilification by the state media. The medics were smeared in the press by sensationalist
stories, one of which claimed that Kalashnikov rifles were found in the hospital in
which  the  medics  worked.1078 Given  the  medics'  role  as  front-line  witnesses  to
atrocities carried out by the authorities, and the inherent respect associated with the
medical profession, it was likely that any testimony given by the medics would be
viewed  favourably  by  international  NGOs  and  news  organizations.  Thus,  they
1073HRW, 'Bahrain: Vital Reform Commitments Unmet', 28 March 2012, 
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represented  a  threat  to  the  regime.   In  their  attempts  to  make  trials  look  fair,
authorities  have  also  been accused by Amnesty International  of  trying,  en masse,
those convicted of crimes, and then releasing a few in order to make the trial seem
fair.1079 By the time retrials had come around, the social control objectives had been
completed, and whenever the regime face a serious challenge, the  general processes
of procedural unfairness and 'rampant official discretion'1080 illustrate a proximity of
law and politics that point to the existence of repressive law. 
Selective Accountability and Asymmetric Justice 
In addition to the use of legal processes that contribute to repressive law, Bahrain's
legal control agents such as the police and employees of the intelligence services have
been  given  broader  scope  to  carry  out  their  duties  with  minimal  disruption.
Accountability of legal control agents accused of committing crimes or violations is
one such disruption, and reduces the ability of the authorities to quash dissent, as well
as damaging the legitimacy of the state. Having legal controls agents tried for crimes
erodes the authority of the state and is often avoided – especially in times where the
regime  faces  an  existential  threat.  This  impunity  has  been  reoccurring  aspect  of
repression in Bahrain's  history. 
Between 1953 and 1956 the nature of the coercive apparatuses' impunity was
very much determined by the unwillingness of Britain to draw itself into Bahraini
politics, while at the same time maintaining order until the Bahrain authorities were
capable of dealing with dissent themselves.  After three people were shot and killed by
the police in 1954, people demanded that the police responsible for the shooting be
held accountable. The authorities, fearing an increasingly tense situation, sought to
diffuse matters by forming a Commission of Inquiry headed by a British judge named
Haines,  as  the  judiciary were  described 'as  inept  and  discredited  members  of  the
Ruling Family'.1081  Indeed, the decision to involve Haines was done due to the fact
that the inquiry would hold no weight without the appointment of a British judge.1082
Shi‘a leaders also requested that the British police the town, highlighting the pitch of
sectarian tension between the police and the Shiʿa. The tensions between the public
1079 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis,p. 25.
1080   P. Nonet, and P. Selznick, pp. 50-52. 
1081J.W. Wall, 25 October 1954, RoB, vol. 7 p. 71.
1082B.A.B. Burrows, 1 July 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 40. 
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and  the  police  were  further  noted  by  the  British  Commandant  Colonel
Hammersley1083, who stated that there had not been 'good feeling' between the police
and the public for a long time.1084 As a consequence of this, the Political Agent also
advised the inclusion of a prominent Shiʿa to sit on the board with Haines .1085 
The  Commission  of  Inquiry  found  that  while  two  officers  had  acted
commendably, 'severe disciplinary action' needed to be taken against those police who
had fired without orders.1086 Despite this, the Ruler later pardoned those policeman
responsible,  a decision that angered the British administration, not least because the
Bahraini  government  were  still  showing  reluctance  in  reforming  the  courts.  The
Commission of  Inquiry appointed to investigate the events of 1 July 1954 was the
first documented investigation into civil unrest and the role of the police,  yet the poor
implementation of disciplinary measures against state officials reflects both weakness
in the Ruling Family and the limits of British influence. The decision of the Ruler not
to prosecute any of the policeman found responsible illustrates what might be termed
the beginning of a culture of impunity with the Bahrain police. Indeed, the lack of
accountability would suggest that the police, at this time, were given more autonomy
to commit deviant acts. 
On 11 March 1956 an altercation between a number of vegetable sellers and
the Market Inspector led to a serious incident that culminated in police firing on a
crowd of civilians. The shooting killed five civilians and injured seventeen, six of
them seriously.1087 In anticipation of a circular from the  HEC that would be critical of
the police,  the Political  Resident  Burrows said explicitly that  statements  from the
British  'should  not  (repeat  not)  criticise  police'.1088 However,  another  inquiry  was
launched  into  the  incident.  It  was  to  be  headed  up  by  G.L.  Peace,  the  Judicial
Adviser,  and W.P.R, Mawdsley,  the Assistant  Judge for  H.M.'s  Court  for  Bahrain.
Judge Haines, who had led the previous inquiry into the 1954 police shootings, was
asked to  advise what  action ought  to be taken on the Board's  findings.1089 Haines
1083Colonel Hammersley was third in command of the Bahrain police at the time. Above him was 
Director of Police Shaykh Khalifa, and Commandant Charles Belgrave.
1084G.L. Peace, W.P.R. Mawdsley, 31 May 1956, Report into March Disturbances, 1956, RoB, vol. 7, 
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1086Report into July Disturbances, 1954, p. 63. 
1087B.A.B. Burrows, 12 March 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 218. 
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1089Judge Haines, Comments on Disturbances, RoB, vol. 7, p. 269. 
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argued that the police fire was 'grossly excessive'  and unjustified. Despite this, he
concluded that the culpability 1090 of the police could not be sufficiently proven, and
therefore no criminal procedures ought to be taken against the police, calling instead
for departmental disciplinary action.1091 Despite this, further investigations were not
recommended. Bernard Burrows1092  and whistleblower Major W.O. Little argued that
it was Colonel Hammersley and not Charles Belgrave1093 who was probably guilty of
negligence. Nonetheless, the government responded  to the inquiry by saying that the
public were 'mainly to blame for these disturbances', and stated that training of the the
police will focus on 'modern methods of crowd dispersal'.1094 No mention was made of
the fact the during the inquiry into the shootings of 1954, Haines recommended that
something much 'less lethal than rifles' be used for 'mob dispersal'.1095  
An  explanation  for  the  unsatisfactory  and  dismissive  nature  of  Haines's
recommendations can be understood in the context of Britain's political considerations
at  the  time.  Indeed,  the  Foreign  office  had  pledged  to  support  the  Bahraini
government with British troops if order was to break down,1096 yet this was seen as a
last resort, as the British believed direct involvement would invite harsh criticism of
British  'colonial'  interference  at  a  time  of  rising  anti-colonialism  and  Arab
Nationalism. For this reason, the British were keen for the Bahrain police force to be
capable of acting autonomously and  without British assistance. In order for this to
happen it  was  imperative  that  morale  amongst  the  police  remained high.  Bernard
Burrows argued that the criticism of the police in the 1954 inquiry resulted in a severe
lowering of their morale over a long period, and that the 'diminution of it [police
morale] would bring the nearer the possibility of intervention by British forces'.1097 In
this respect, there were compelling political pressures that meant that the outcome of
1090 (1) the policemen fired their rifles without orders with intent to do grievous bodily harm 
or to kill and that the death or wounding of any particular individual resulted from this action, 
or:
(2)  that they attempted to commit such an act. 
1091Oddly enough, Haines's concludes that despite all the deaths and injuries the police had fired from 
the hip and into the air. Haines also argued that because one man had been shot by someone other 
than the police, it had to be proven that all injuries and deaths were not caused by persons other 
than the police. 
1092 D.M.H. Riches, Minutes, 26 June 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 267.
1093It is often argued Belgrave is responsible for much of what went on in Bahrain – perhaps unfairly. 
1094 Government Comments on March Disturbances 1956,  RoB, vol. 7, p. 273.
1095 Report into July Disturbances, 1954, p. 63.  
1096 Foreign Office, Communique to Agency Bahrain, No. 202,  6 March 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 63. 
1097 B.A.B. Burrows to Foreign Office 12 March 1956, p. 226. 
221 
the inquiry should not be too critical of the police. Indeed, it was police weakness that
prompted  reforms  and  further  foreign  interference  while  the  apparatus  was
strengthened. The second enquiry, with its foregone conclusion, was simply a means
of embarking upon conciliatory measures in order to provide a 'breathing space in
which they might strengthen the Public Security Department'.1098
Legalising Impunity 
Indeed, the events of 1956 highlighted how maintaining the morale of the police was
perceived as important for the government.  In 1965, not one  mention was made of
investigations into the police's killing of eight protesters in the March Uprising. The
same was true following government repression in the 1990s, and no officials were
held accountable. On the contrary, upon becoming King in 2001, Hamad Al Khalifa,
sought  to  exonerate  those  employees  of  the  state  who were  guilty  of  committing
crimes during the unrest, and issued Decree Law No. 10 of 2001 and Decree Law No.
56 of 2002.  While the former allowed political prisoners accused of state security
crimes to go free, the latter allowed those who had potentially engaged in torture or
extra judicial killing to go free. In other words, Decree 56 conferred  impunity from
prosecution and investigation upon security officials accused of human rights abuses
before 2002.1099 As Khalaf notes, 'Decree 56 saved many senior al-Khalifas and SIS
officers'1100 and was an important pre-condition in securing Ruling Family consent to
any reforms. Unsurprisingly, any suggestion to the contrary was quashed.  When ʿAbd
al-Aziz Al Khalifa suggested to the media that some form of transitional justice was
necessary, he incurred so much of their 'wrath' that he offered to resign.1101 
Impunity has been routinised in Bahrain's history, indicating the subservience
of legal processes to power politics. While granting impunity may exacerbate conflict
by promoting anger, it is secondary to ensuring that the morale and integrity of the
security forces is maintained. In addition to the lack of accountability, those accused
of political crimes have never properly acknowledged to have been innocent, meaning
that the state maintains some degree of moral high ground by avoiding positioning
1098B.A.B. Burrows, 20 July 1954, p. 54. 
1099 HRW, Torture Redux.
1100 M.O.Jones, 'Bahrain's history of political injustice', Your Middle East, 29 April 2013, 
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/marc-owen-jones-bahrains-history-of-political-
injustice_14064, (accessed 5 October 2015). 
1101W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II'.
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itself as the guilty party in its conflict with society. 
The Era of Reform: Factors Encouraging Impunity1102
While Amnesty International believe that not one no member of the SIS or CID have
been brought to justice by engaging in acts of torture prior to 19951103, the same seems
to  be  largely  true  after  the  period  of  reform that  began  following  King Hamad's
accession to the throne. 
In  2011,  following  the  outbreak  of  unrest,  the  Bahrain  Independent
Commission of Inquiry Report revealed that dozens of people had been tortured, tens
killed,  and  thousands  imprisoned  by  the  State  Security  Forces.1104 Following
recommendations by the BICI report to create a mechanism to hold both junior and
senior officials accountable, the government attempted to demonstrate its commitment
to reform by prosecuting a number of low level officials.  However, as of November
2012, the highest ranking official charged with 'abuse' was a Lieutenant Colonel. 1105
The  tactic  of  selectively  holding  only  low-level  security  officers  accountable
represents  an attempt to  paint  police  deviance as  the  work of  a  couple of  ‘rotten
apples’,  that  is,  'rogue  officers  operating  with  individualistic  motives  but  whose
actions are not reflective of the police institution as a whole'.1106 A less critical analysis
would  suggest  that  police  deviance  in  Bahrain  was  the  result  of  what
O’Connor describes as ‘rotten barrels’, namely,  groups of police acting
together  but  whose misconduct  is  also not  representative of  the  police
institution  in  general.  However,  given  the  habitual  nature  of  police
deviance  in  Bahrain,  the  concept  of  a  ‘rotten  orchard’  seems  more
appropriate.1107 
Considering  the  nature  of  the  abuses  carried  out  by  the  police  in  Bahrain,  both
1102 Much of the data gathered concerning the impunity of state officials was gathered from tracking 
local news reports, NGO sources, and State Department reports. 
1103 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, p. 9.
1104 BICI Report. 
1105BICI Follow Up Team, BICI Follow-Up Report, November 2012, p. 10, 
http://iaa.bh/downloads/bici_nov2012_en.pdf  (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1106 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards', p. 210.
1107 Ibid.
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historically  and  more  recently,  the  concept  of  a  ‘rotten  orchard’  seems  more
appropriate.  This  metaphor,  originally  put  forward  by  Maurice  Punch  in  2003,
outlines how 'deviance is not merely the fault of individuals or groups, but the result
of systemic problems that either encourage, reward or necessitate police deviance'.1108
In this definition, the systemic issue refers to the formal structures such as ‘the police
organization, the criminal justice system, and the broader socio-political context’.1109
Indeed,  as  Turk  notes,  'legal  deviance  is  much  more  likely  to  be  attributed  to
individuals  than  organizations.  Indeed,  it  is  easier  to  punish  individuals,  and
scapegoating will as far as possible be used to block the imputation of legal deviance
to  the  organization'.1110 Deviance  and  impunity  become  more  necessary  the  more
widespread the  abuses,  and the more those organizations  are  intertwined with the
regime. 
Despite the findings of the BICI report, which documented systematic torture,
the  authorities  were  reluctant  to  charge  any  of  the  officers  with  torture.  When
prosecutions did occur, the sentences were extremely lenient, reflecting a desire to
appease international actors or local opposition.  Indeed, a 'distinct pattern of legal
wrangling'  emerged, one that involved the use of a series of legal procedures that
initially incriminated, but ultimately repealed or commuted the sentences of security
officials.1111The  examples  of  such trials  are  extensive;  Originally  sentenced  to  ten
years in prison, the two policeman who tortured and killed ʿAli Saqr in custody had
their sentence reduced to two years. The policemen who tortured and killed civilian
and journalist Karim Fakhrawi were 'sentenced to seven years for manslaughter, but
had their  sentences  reduced  to  three  after  appeal'.1112 Similarly,  'the  police  officer
accused  of  killing  and  shooting  civilian  ʿAli  ʿAbd  al-Hadi  Mushaymaʿ  was  first
sentenced to seven years for manslaughter, but this was reduced to three following an
appeal'.1113   In another controversial case, 'the police officer who shot Hani ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz  Jumʿa  was  also  sentenced  to  seven  years  for  manslaughter,  reduced  to  six
1108 Ibid. 
1109 M. Punch, ‘Rotten orchards: “pestilence”, police misconduct and system failure’, Policing and 
Society, vol. 13, no. 2, 2003, p. 172. 
1110 A. Turk, Organizational Deviance, p. 240.  
1111 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards...'  p. 229. 
1112 Ibid. p. 230.
1113 Ibid. p. 230.
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months  on  appeal'.1114 In  addition  to  this,  ʿAli  al-Shayba,  an  officer  accused  of
permanently  disabling  a  man  by shooting  him in  the  leg,  first  had  his  five  year
sentence reduced to three, and then six months on account of his ill health'.1115 
Others  have  simply  been  acquitted,  such  as  the  two  officers  accused  of
shooting  Fadhil  al-Matruq  on  February  2011  and  the  five  policemen  accused  of
beating blogger Zakariyya al-ʿAshiri  to death in custody.1116 Amnesty International
reported that in at least one case where an officer was sentenced to seven years for
abuses committed in 2011, he was 'free pending the outcome of his appeal'.  1117 In
other cases, policemen being prosecuted for abuses have been accused of remaining
on  duty  through  the  trial,1118 although  the  government  say  they  remain  on
administrative  duty.1119 These  prosecutions  also  reflect  a  minimal  commitment  to
investigating the deaths of those killed by the security forces in 2011. Forty-five cases
of death believed to have been caused by the security apparatus were thrown out by
the government, although no case of violence against police officers has ever been left
unpunished.1120 
Those  members  of  the  security  forces  charged  are  often  accused  of
manslaughter  and  not  murder,  which  holds  a  maximum  sentence  of  only  seven
years.1121 Manslaughter  also  implies  a  lack  of  menace,  and thus  has  the  effect  of
rendering the state unintentionally violent.   Ultimately though, even this wrangling
does not obscure the fact that the state is using such cases to project a veneer of
accountability.  Little  is  likely  to  change.  The  BICI  recommendations  to  improve
redress for victims of state violence have been implemented to preserve government
control. For example, five of the eight on newly created Special Investigations Unit ,
tasked with investigating torture, are former MOI prosecutors.1122
1114 Ibid. p. 230. 
1115Ibid. p. 230. 
1116 Ibid. p. 229. 
1117Amnesty International, Bahrain: Reform Shelved, p. 9.
1118 N. Zahra, 'Officer Jailed in Shooting Case', Gulf Daily News, 26 June 2012, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Officer+jailed+in+shooting+case.-a0294433698 
1119 Ministry of the Interior Media Center, 'MOI Response to US State Department's 2013 Country 
Report on Human Rights', 8 May 2014, http://www.policemc.gov.bh/en/print.aspx?
articleId=22819&mode=print, (accessed 2 November 2015). 
1120BICI Follow Up Team, BICI Follow-Up Report, November 2012, p. 10, 
http://iaa.bh/downloads/bici_nov2012_en.pdf  (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1121N. Zahra, 'Sentences slashed for officers', Gulf Daily News, 28 October 2013, http://www.gulf-
daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=363780 (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1122Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, US Department of State, Bahrain 2013 Human 
Rights Report,  27 February 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/nea/220348.htm 
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Fig. 11: Heuristic Illustrating Structure of Accountability for Police
Government and Al Khalifa Influence in Shielding Loyalists 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Prime  Minister  still  plays  a  role  in  this  lack  of
accountability. Reflecting his commitment to a loyal constituency, 'the PM, it is said,
is determined to  demonstrate that the Al Khalifa remain loyal to those who faithfully
serve  the  Al-Khalifas'.1123 Although  these  words  by  former  U.S.  Ambassador  to
Bahrain W.T. Monroe were uttered in 2007, a leaked video emerged in 2013 of the
Bahraini Prime Minister meeting with an exonerated security agent accused of torture.
In it, the Prime Minister says,
I am here to thank you, Mubarak, for your patience and good work. A
(Accessed 6 October 2015). 
1123 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain'. 
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human as they say is judged by his work, and your work as a family is the
reason  for  your  reputation  which  is  exemplary.  A human  is  left  with
nothing but his reputation in life and death, and yours is a great one as a
family. We are one family.1124 
The Prime Minister also mentioned to the gathered loyalists that they were above the
law,  saying  'These  laws  cannot  be  applied  to  you.  No  one  can  touch  this  bond.
Whoever  applies these laws against  you is  applying them against  us.  We are one
body'.1125 Indeed, this  highlights a total  absence of reformist  influence in the legal
apparatu,  and  also  reflects  the  confidence  of  hawks  in  ensuring  continued
unaccountability .1126 
In addition to lenience for legal control agents, the government also sought to
repress  dissent  and  strengthen  their  own  position  by  raising  the  costs  for  those
engaging in attacks on the state's legal control agents.  In 2012, amendment 221 of
law no. 33 imposed stringent sentences on those who attacked or injured members of
the security forces, even if it was done unintentionally.1127 Similarly, while law 52 of
2012 also appears to criminalise official use of violence such as torture, it excludes
from accountability  those  who  cause  injury in  the  name of  legal  punishments  or
'procedures'.  This law could potentially be a get out clause for those legal control
agents accused of excessive force in the protect of the state. 1128 As such, it gives the
regime a stronger remit to engage in repression, for it does not clearly curtail the use
of  harsher  methods  of  suppression,  disincentivising  restraint  by  precluding  legal
control agents from sufficient accountability.
In addition to raising the penalties for those who attack the security services,
1124Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, 'Prime Minister's Speech to Mubarak bin  Huwayl', [online video], 
7 July 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&client=mv-
google&hl=en&feature=plcp&v=YVundvyyNS8&nomobile=1, (accessed 1 October 2014) – 
translated by the author.  
1125Ibid. 
1126 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples or Rotten Orchards:Police Deviance, Brutality, and Unaccountability 
in Bahrain', in A. Shehabi and M.O. Jones, M. (eds.), Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and 
Repression in the Gulf, London, Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 229. 
1127Law Number 33 for the year 2012, Amendment to number 221 for the penal code decreed by the 
law 15 for the year 1976, http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K3312.pdf  (accessed 6 
October 2015). 
1128Law Number 52 of the year 2012, ammendment to some of the penal code stipulated by decree 15 
from the year 1976. http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K5212.pdf   (accessed 6 
October 2015). 
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laws have been introduced that criminalise those who incite hatred against the security
forces, including the NSA, the police, the National Guard, and the Bahrain Defence
Force.1129 The  government  also  increased  the  penalties  for  insulting  the  King,  the
country, the flag of Bahrain, and the 'regime'.1130 By 2013, six people had been jailed
for up to a year for allegedly insulting the King on the social-networking website
Twitter.1131 In a worrying, yet unsurprising event that highlighted Saudi's influence in
Bahrain,  the  authorities  arrested  nine  people  on  23  January  2015  for  making
statements on social media that were deemed defamatory to the late King ʿAbd Allah
of Saudi Arabia.1132  
Societal Pressure 
Yet repressive choices such as impunity are also necessary due to societal pressure,
itself  manufactured  from  the  government's  invocation  of  an  exogenous  threat.  A
number of pro-government rallies held in support of the security forces were held
between 2011 and 2013. In addition to this, groups have been established to pressure
the government into protecting those policemen accused of abuses.1133 Following the
outbreak of protests in 2011, groups from the mostly loyalist villages of al-Hidd and
Busaiteen erected billboards around Bahrain depicting a noose with the  slogan; 'We
Demand from the Government the Maximum Punishment [No Pardon] for the heads
of Fitna and the Misguided Elements'.1134 Such campaigns were validated by state
media,  who published  sycophantic  speeches  by the  likes  of  Dr.  ʿAbd al-Latif  al-
Mahmud, the head of the Gathering of National Unity, who demanded that those who
carry out crimes against the state not be given amnesty. 1135 
Thus coercive  violence by the  state  is  endorsed  by many who support  the
1129M. Al A'Ali, '20 years jailed backed for inciting hatred', Gulf Daily News, 30 April 2013, 
http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=352350  (Accessed 6 October 2015).
1130Amnesty International,  2014 – 15 Report Bahrain,  https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-
east-and-north-africa/bahrain/report-bahrain/, (accessed 3 October 2015). 
1131S. Yasin, 'The cost of Tweeting in Bahrain', Index on Censorship, July 2013, 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/07/the-cost-of-tweeting-in-bahrain/  (Accessed 6 October 
2015).
1132 Amnesty International, Behind the Rhetoric, 2015.
1133M. Al A'Ali, Group formed to help Policemen', Gulf Daily News, 1 January 2012, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Group+formed+to+help+policemen.-a027611748, (accessed 6 
October 2015). 
1134J. Gengler, 'Guilty by Billboard', Bahrain Politics Blogspot, [web blog], 10 May 2011, 
1135Bahrain News Agency, ' جللة الملك يزور مجلسي ال محمود والمسلم بالحد ويحث على تعزيز اللحمة الوطنية التي
21تجمعنا كأسرة واحده متكاتفة ومترابطة   ' June, 2011, http://bna.bh/portal/mobile/news/461875 
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regime, or internal state 'legitimaters'1136. Indeed, it is not uncommon 'for residents in
places with endemic crime problems to adopt a “tough on crime” mentality. In such
environments,  there is  more  tolerance for  what  might  ordinarily be termed police
deviance'.  1137  For  this  reason,  ‘police  abuse  does  not  stem simply  from police
authority  alone,  but  also  from a  larger  belief  system shared  by citizens  in  which
brutality is acceptable as long as it is directed against “bad people.”'1138 The problem
with this  argument  is  that  it  attempts  to confer  legitimacy on deviant  policing by
invoking an element of consent. In actual fact, the fear that allows people to exercise
greater tolerance towards police deviance is an artificial construct, born out of the
regime’s ability to exaggerate the sectarian threat'.1139 In Bahrain, tolerance of state
violence has become increasingly high among loyalist elements in society. 
These  demands  for  security  by  loyalists  have  an  impact  on  police
accountability, as holding accountable legal control agents runs the risk of angering
those constituents on whom the regime rely on for support. This is emphasised by the
fact  many  of  the  local  security  forces  are  drawn  from  the  country's  Sunni
communities,  whose  support  for  the  ruling  regime  is  often  contingent  on  jobs
provided in  al-Amin (the security forces). Indeed, there are already 'hardline Sunni
groups  angry  about  even  the  government’s  limited  steps  to  put  the  BICI  report's
suggestions into practice'.1140 The decision by the Court of Cassation to overturn the
death sentences against two opposition activists who had been convicted by a military
tribunal of killing two policemen sparked a furious protest, prompting demonstrators
to hang photographs of the spared men from a mock gallows.1141   
Yet limited prosecutions against Sunnis are are a 'reminder of the difficulty of
actually prosecuting Sunni extremists in Bahrain'.1142 The rise of Iran and ISIS, and the
sharpening of the Middle East Cold War has highlighted the long standing 'Bahraini
reluctance to  move against  or alienate  the Sunni  Islamist  community at  a time of
1136  G. A. Lopez & M. Stohl, 'State Terrorism: From the Reign of Terror to Ninety-Eighty Four 
Terrorism',  p. 25. 
1137  M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples', p. 233. 
1138 N.W. Pino and L.M. Johnson, ‘Police deviance and community relations in Trinidad and Tobago’,
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, vol. 34, no. 3, 2011, p. 459.
1139 M.O. Jones, 'Rotten Apples'.
1140G. Carlstrom, 'In the Kingdom of Tear Gas', MERIP Online, 13 April 2012, 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041312?
ip_login_no_cache=a560e0ddfd87c30e7b1e14c337e587ee , (accessed 3 October 2014)
1141Ibid.
1142 W.T. Monroe, 'Future of Bahrain'.
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heightened  concern  about  Iran  and  rising  Shia  influence  in  the  region“1143  It  is
worrying then that a policy of exacerbating ethnic tension and fragmenting opposition
along sectarian and political  lines has given the ruling regime more legitimacy in
exercising a policy of impunity and violent repression. 
Conclusion
With significant interference from Britain and Saudi Arabia, the Bahraini government
has frequently used laws, legal processes and legal deviance to repress dissent, a fact
which  is  facilitated  by  a  repressive  legal  structure  that  represents  primarily  the
interests of the Al Khalifa ruling core.  Through a combination of  emergency laws,
political trials, regular laws, non-accountability and systemic legal bias, the Al Khalifa
regime have sought  to  ameliorate  dissent,  both  before  and after  its  inception.  Yet
while  scholars  on  Latin  America  noted  military  dictators  suspended  'judicial
protection, due process and executive accountability'1144 during their period of rule,
Bahrain has more or less existed in such a state for much of the 20 th and 21st century.,
Theoretically  speaking,  this  work  rejects  the  moral  functionalist  idea  that  law  is
simply  a  means  of   resolving  problems,  and  adopts  a  critical  perspective  that
emphasises how law reflects the norms, values and interests of a ruling elite.1145 Far
from being a neutral apparatus, the law in Bahrain is a means of reinforcing the power
and control of the dominant Al Khalifa regime.1146   At times where the Al Khalifa
regime has been threatened in Bahrain, 'the mandate to prevent radical changes in the
distribution  of  power  and  privilege  is  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  a  legally  or
ethically limited effort to do so'. 1147 
Interestingly, while Khuri argues that the British introduction of uniform laws
curtailed  the  particularity  of  tribal  law,  particularism has  re-emerged  through  the
structures of state and is evidenced in the state's ability to produce laws that protect
the interests of the ruling elite, whether through decree, or through the ossification of
punitive laws enacted through parliament.   Khuri too is perhaps too optimistic when
he asserts how the trial of the Khalids represented the establishment of public over
1143Ibid.
1144 Fagen, P.W., 'Repression and State Security',  p. 48. 
1145 T. Sellin, Culture conflict and crime, New Jersey: Social Science Research Council, 1938. 
1146W. Chambliss & R. Seidman, Law, Order, and Power, 1971. 
1147A. Turk, 'Organizational Deviance and Political Policing',  p. 241. 
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private law.1148 The authorities have subverted law in the interests of protecting their
position of power.  
 In its most modern guise, the Al Khalifa government and a loyalist parliament
demonstrate the permeation of tribal structures through democratic institutions. The
inability  of  opposition  movements  to formulate  legislation  mean  that  the  legal
framework offers citizens, and particular Shi‘a, no safeguard from an 'arbitrary state'.
1149 Where legal controls fail to contain or constraint social movement activity before
its  inception,  the  system  in  Bahrain  is  manipulated  in  order  that  social  control
objectives take precedent. Indeed, the legal order is broken to save the social order.1150
The recent uprising in particular has highlighted how law is also a 'form of power' that
can be used as a 'weapon in social conflict', generating and exacerbating 'conflicts
rather than resolving of softening them'.1151
1148The myth that the Khalids (or Khawalid) were deported has been propagated as recently as 2013. 
For example Charles Levinson of the Wall Street Journal wrote an article stating that the deportation
of the Khawalid in 1923 had left a wound that festered for decades. 
1149L. Kalmanowiecki, p. 37.
1150G. Agamben, State of Exception, Translated by Kevin Attell, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005, p. 26. 




'All expressions of political thought are regarded as subversive'1152 
The control and regulation of information have formed an integral part of repression
in Bahrain over the past 100 years, although modernization has necessitated ever more
extensive measures of allowing the state to interfere in the informational sphere. This
primarily takes the form of censorship, propaganda, and surveillance. The extent of
censorship, surveillance, and propaganda has expanded, and the media has been a key
instrument of repression, particularly since the 1950s. While globalisation and even
increasing liberalisation of the press have resulted in difficulties in controlling the
flow of information, elite  strategies to throttle the press or shape the message have
also bolstered narratives designed to stigmatize and demonise resistance. With the rise
of  Saudi  'bolstering  tyranny''1153 in  the  region,  coupled  with  their  fear  of  Iranian
expansionism,  there has been a growing demonization and stigmatization of Bahrain's
Shi‘a, and the media's growing efforts to frame protesters as violent, Shiʿa religious
zealots,  demonstrates  the  increasing  prevalence  of  Sunni  tribal  sectarianism as  an
informational strategy.   While social media poses new challenges for authoritarian
regimes, these challenges have been met with repressive solutions that problematise
the democratising and liberalising potential of technology.     The ruling core, and the
constituency on which they depend for some legitimacy, have used new technologies
to  extend  the  state's  surveillance  and  informational  control  abilities,  making  the
process of repression more rhizomatic1154 in the information realm. The ability of both
the regime and its supporters to engage in unfettered media and online vigilantism
certainly answers the question posed by Marc Lynch, ' Are some groups differentially
1152J.P. Tripp, 16 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA. 
1153G. Greenwald, 'The US – alongside Saudi Arabia – fights for freedom and democracy in the 
Middle East', The Guardian, 12 January 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/12/us-saudi-arabia-libya-freedom, (accessed 
6 October 2015).  
1154 Rhizomatic here is in the Deleuzian sense, and refers to increasingly horizontal, bottom-up forms 
of control in which citizens begin to take charge of surveillance. 
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empowered by the new media'.1155 The chapter too notes the importance of foreign
actors in determining developments of informational control strategies, and reflects
the increasing outsourcing of propaganda and surveillance strategies. 
Censorship and Insulation 
Insulation  
Editors or publications thought to be critical of Bahrain's protecting powers Britain,
Saudi, or the Al Khalifa have often been censored, highlighting the importance of
British  and Saudi  sensitivity  in  Bahrain's  repressive  apparatus.   The  British,  ever
sensitive of their responsibility to protect Bahrain, were cautious about external ideas
or criticism provoking disturbances in Bahrain.  As a result, censorship was used from
early on in the reforms of the 1920s to stymie the flow of ideas and information to
those groups that may have exerted pressure or provided support to potential agitators
in Bahrain. This was particularly true of the press and media. As early as 1922, ʿAbd
Allah bin ʿIsa was paying the Persian and Arab Press huge sums of money for anti-
British propaganda.11561157 
In 1933, Charles Belgrave was concerned about any propaganda criticising the
British in Bahrain in Arab and Iranian newspapers. In order to counter it journalists
were required to obtain visas1158 before entering Bahrain, an act that Belgrave claimed
to help decrease propaganda in Bahrain.1159 Those who violated this diktat would often
be punished.  For  example,  in  the  1920s,  Belgrave  deported  Ahmed bin  Faraj  for
writing violently anti-British opeds in Cairo Papers. The Shaykh however, sent him a
letter saying that he could return, much to Belgrave's chagrin. The Political Agent
Barrett caved, and Belgrave stated that he [Barrett] was as weak as the Shaykh.1160
According to Major Little, there had been a complete ban on the British Press entering
Bahrain prior to the 1956 riots, and Charles Belgrave (the Ruler's advisor) had been
1155M. Lynch, “New Arab Media Research Opportunities and Agendas” In Arab Uprisings: New 
Opportunities for Political Science, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS Briefings): 
57–58. 
1156'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [119r] (242/412), British Library: India Office Records and 
Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar Digital Library 
<http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x00002b> [accessed 27 October 2015]
1157'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [159r] (322/412),
1158C. Belgrave, Annual Report for the Year 1352 (1933 – 1934),  p. 393. 
1159Ibid., p. 489. 
1160C. Belgrave, Papers, 4 January 1929. 
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the local correspondent for  The Times. This embedding of Charles Belgrave as the
soul  voice  of  progress  in  Bahrain  undoubtedly  shaped  the  world's  perception  of
Bahrain.  For example,  Burrows was keen that any publicity of the trial  of the St.
Helena three in 'the Times and the Associated Press should focus on the convictions,
and that their removal from here and detention in a British possession should obtain as
little publicity as possible'.1161
The  lack  of  criticism  of  British  Policy  in  international  media  outlets  can
largely be explained by this ban, although even the British administration in London
were quick to intervene in criticism of Bahrain. In 1957 Major W.O. Little, a former
employee of the Bahrain state Police, circulated a pamphlet among British Members
of  Parliament  entitled  'Memorandum  on  Bahrain  and  Related  Problems'.1162 The
document  offered  a  highly  critical  assessment  of  how  the  British  and  Bahrain
authorities handled the 1954-1956 crisis, and included scathing accounts of British
officers  in  the  Bahrain  Police.  The  Foreign  Office  described  the  pamphlet  as
'scurrilous and tendentious',1163 and debated how to prevent the further circulation of
the pamphlet. They considered getting those mentioned in the pamphlet to issue a writ
for libel in the hope that it would discourage Little from further propagation. At the
same time however, the Foreign office worried that if a libel case were pursued, it
might give rise to 'undesirable publicity and might well encourage a further spate of
Parliamentary Questions'.1164 In the end, Little was 'exposed' and dismissed from the
J.I.B. after him and another former employee of the Bahrain state Police Captain Hills
were caught taking and copying documents about Oman from the Joint Intelligence
Bureau.  Despite Bahrain only being a British protectorate, the British were keen to
mitigate  any  criticism  of  the  government  or  the  Ruling  Family,  and  the  police,
especially soon after the unwelcome intervention by British forces in 1956. 
In  1955,  in  order  to  further  the  government's  monopoly  on  distributing
information, the two local newspapers Sawt al-Bahrain (Voice of Bahrain) and  Al-
Qafilah (The Caravan) were suspended because they made 'offensive remarks about
neighbouring friendly states'.1165  Indeed, the editor of the former was 'Abd al-Rahman
1161 B.A.B. Burrows, Secret to Foreign Office, 15 December 1956, RoB, vol. 7, p. 303. 
1162 W.O. Little, ‘Report by Major Little’, in Pamphlet on Bahrain, 1957, FO 371/126918, TNA. 
1163Foreign Office, 1957, FO 371/126918, TNA. 
1164Ibid.
1165C. Belgrave,  Annual Report for the Year 1955, in BGAR,, vol. 5, p. 3. 
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al-Bakir, one of the eight leaders of the HEC and later the CNU. In addition to this, al-
Bakir  had  his  nationality  temporarily  revoked  by  the  Ruler  in  1954  .1166 This
punishment,  incidentally,  gave  many Sunni  an  'immediate  and  personal  grievance
comparable to those enjoyed by the Shiʿa, having a mobilising effect, prompting more
Sunnis  to  be  involved  in  HEC meetings.1167 Indeed,  punishing a  high  profile  and
politically active Sunni simply had the effect of generating further mobilisation. In
1956, the Bahrain government cancelled the nationalistic newspaper Al-Watan (The
Nation) for its anti-Saudi and anti-British editorial stance.  Al-Shu'lah (The Flame), a
re-branded version of Al-Watan.,1168  was also banned a month later for its criticism of
Iraq  and the  Information  Section  of  the  British  administration  (and the  British in
general).1169   The  news  editor  of  the  Bahrain  wireless  news  bulletins  was  also
removed because his views tended to 'present the Egyptian view to the exclusion of
others'.1170  Because  the  papers  commanded  a  wide  readership,  and  advocated
governmental reform, unionisation, and improvement of living and labour conditions,
they  were  seen  as  inherently  subversive.  In  1960,  the  British,  more  fearful  of
communism than Arab Nationalism at this point, wanted to ban the Indian newspaper
the  Blitz,  which  one  official  saw  being  read  by  a  Bahraini,  again  indicating  the
influence  of  the  fears  of  Bahrain's  protecting  powers  in  shaping  the  information
availability in Bahrain.1171  
Britain Press for Media Relaxation 
The fifties were instrumental in the development of information control stategies in
Bahrain, as the rise of mass media and wireless technologies posed new problems for
the British, whose presence in the Middle East provoked the ire of anti-colonial Arab
Nationalist.  However,  the  strength of  the HEC highlighted  the limited efficacy of
simply trying to repress newspapers. So  while the British had long resisted a press,
during  the  1950s  the  British  began  to  see  its  value,  at  least  for  the  purposes  of
spreading  pro-government  propaganda  to  counter  the  adept  strategies  of  Arab
1166J.W. Wall to Political Resident in Gulf, 25 October 1954, RoB, vol. 7, p. 71. 
1167Ibid.
1168Anon, 6 September 1956,  FO 371/120548, TNA.
1169For a complete history of Bahrain's Print and Broadcase Media, see Rumaihi 'The Development of
Mass Maedia in the Kingdom of Bahrain', PhD Thesis, University Exeter, 2002
1170Ibid.
1171Confidential, 11 July 1960, FO 1016/684, TNA.
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nationalists  in Egypt  and Kuwait  who were using wireless technologies to foment
unrest.  Bernard Burrows suggested that an independent newspaper be set up, arguing
that this  would  be  complemented  by  an  information  office  and  the  Bahrain
Government Public Relations Office. Combined, these would make it easier to 'guide'
without resorting 'to censorship and suppression'.1172 This attitude reflected a growing
realisation that if information could not be stopped, it should at least be controlled.
However, Major Little claimed that the repression of the local media prevented the
'emergence of moderate opinion'  and that the Bahrain radio station was ineffective
against  Egyptian  propaganda.  In  1956,  The  new criminal  code  also  contained  an
article designed to tackle the publication of inflammatory pamphlets and circulars that
were issued by the groups of the HEC. These lack of avenues to  foster  moderate
opinion may have contributed to the rise of fringe groups and violence in 1956. 
 Yet despite a relative relaxing of British attitudes in the 1960s, the personal
attitudes of subsequent members of the Al Khalifa family proved hostile to a greater
press  presence,  reflecting  to  the  British  influence,  and  their  ability  to  secure
pacification through indirect and pacific means. In 1960, the British noted how the
ruler  'obstinately refuses  to  allow the  broadcast  of  any subject  of  a  controversial
nature',1173 and in 1963, the British Political Agent noted that Ruling Family's attitude
was  entirely  security-orientated,  and  for  this  reason  allowed  no  newspapers.1174
Indeed,  J.P.  Tripped  stated  in  1963 that  all  'expressions  of  political  thought  were
regarded as subversive'1175 by the Ruler.
Return to Hard-Line Influence on Censorship 
Post Independence, Bahrain's brief democratic experiment allowed more latitude for
free speech, and livened up the press somewhat. Robert Tesh noted that  'criticism of
the government in a reasonably polite way was pretty free'.1176 Ultimately though, it
was  still  a  'puppet  press'1177 and  opposition  groups  like  the  Marxists,  who  were
democratically  represented  in  parliament,  were  denied  permission  to  open  a
1172 B.A.B. Burrows, 5 March 1955, RoB, vol. 7, p. 129
1173 Wm C. Lyall, 22 October 1960, FO 1016/684, TNA.
1174 J.P. Tripp, 18 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA.
1175 J.P. Tripp, 16 April 1963, FO 1016/684, TNA. 
1176R M Tesh, 'Bahrain Internal', 1 March 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA.
1177Ibid.
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newspaper.1178  Post independence, as Bahrain lilted further into its neighbours orbit,
criticism of Saudi Arabia, or indeed, other friendly nations in the Gulf, was penalised
heavily.  For  example,  on 1975,  a  local  paper  was suspended for  a  month  after  it
published comments  critical  of  Saudi  Arabia  made by a  visiting  official  from the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.1179 
The  stringent  censorship  resumed  after  the  demise  of  parliament.  Ibrahim
Muhammad Bashmi, was imprisoned by the regime in 1975 for being the editor of a
paper that published an article that contravened the 1955 Penal Code and the 1965
Press Ordinance.1180 In 1982, the Guardian journalist David Hirst was prevented from
entering Bahrain to cover the trial of those accused of plotting a coup, as he had not
given advanced notice. Similarly, Amnesty International observers were allowed in
but they were not allowed to  enter the courtroom.1181 The British, who were now
firmly of the opinion that the Al Khalifa's attitude to censorship was 'shortsighted',1182
said  that  the  Bahraini  authorities  should  be  actually  encouraging  the  press  and
Amnesty to cover it1183 in order to remove plausible suspicion that the trial  was a
kangaroo  court.  This,  the  British  thought,  would  prevent  Shi‘a  from  using  their
'predilection for martyrdom' to 'weave an effective political and religious mythology'
out of any mishandling.1184  Indeed, the coverage of the trial was minimal, and David
Hirst  noted that  the  local  newspapers  were 'as  insubstantial  as  their  headlines  are
bold',1185 and that not even the head of Bahrain's  state television could get access.
Indeed, Roger Tomkys noted that all the press got their information from a 'Ministry
of Information handout'.1186 The  British  explained  the  reasons  for  this  stringent
policy as coming directly from the Prime Minister; 'all concerned thought the Prime
Minister was responsible for this policy',1187 - reflecting growing influence in multiple
spheres of Bahrain's government. Such minimal coverage was usual on issues related
to political mobilisation. Even the coverage of the elections for the Joint Committees
1178Ibid.
1179R M Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 4 March 1975.
1180Amnesty Report in, FCO8/3893, TNA. 
1181P.F.M. Wogan, Bahrain Coup: Trial of Detainees, 16 March 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA. 
1182W.R. Tomkys, The December Coup. 
1183P.F.M. Wogan, Bahrain Coup.
1184Ibid.
1185D. Hirst, 'Putting the Gulf's Resistance on Trial', The Guardian, 15 March 1982.
1186W.R. Tomkys, Trial of Detainees.
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was arranged to be as 'low-key' as possible.1188
This  short-sighted  attempt at  insulation  continued into  the  1990s.  Amnesty
complained during the 1990s Intifada that the government resorted to a number of
tactics to prevent information1189 being released that could aid social movements in
their attempts to lobby local and international actors to pressure the government. The
rise of more newsworthy and egregious incidents also meant more stringent control of
information.  On  4  April  1995,  one  of  the  Bahrain  government's  controlled  daily
newspapers,  al-Ayam,  published  a  statement  issued  by  the  then  Minister  of
Information, Tareq al-Mu'ayyed, highlighting the government's fear of negative press
going outside Bahrain. The statement said 'The ministry wishes to draw attention to
the  fact  that  no  citizen  is  permitted  to  transmit  news  abroad  without  obtaining
authorization from the ministry...', and that those who do so may be liable to legal
action'.1190 Although the threat of legal action had, according to Amnesty International,
no basis in law since no decree had been issued, 'a number of people were summoned
by government officials and reportedly told to refrain from giving interviews to the
media and transmitting information abroad on the situation in Bahrain,1191a Saudi hand
in determining press policy was evident when both the 'editor of the newspaper and
the  minister  of  information  separately  warned'  a  Bahraini  journalist  'that  Saudi
officials had complained about the reporter's articles'.1192
Even after the reforms of 2001,   six of Bahrain's seven daily newspapers in
Bahrain  are  'either  pro-government  or  owned  by figures  affiliated  with  the  royal
family'.1193  Attempts by oppositional forces to provide balance, apart from through
non-official means, such as social media, are stymied by the government's refusal to
1188  S.P. Collis, Bahrain Labour, 12 March 1983, FCO 8/4920, TNA
1189Article 5(4) of Amiri Decree No. 7 of 1976 stipulates that sessions of the State Security Court 
shall be public unless it is deemed necessary to hold them in camera 'out of consideration for public
order, public security or the higher interests of the state ...'. The same article stipulates that 
sentencing shall be pronounced in public session. In practice, sessions are always held in camera, 
attended only by members of the courts' bench, the defendants, defence lawyers and representatives 
of the Public Prosecution. Relatives of the defendants as well as independent observers and the 
media are barred from attendance. Sentencing also takes place in closed session. Such in 
camera proceedings are inconsistent with the right to a public trial guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
UDHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR. -  AI, 'Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis'. 
1190HRW, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
1191 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
1192HRW, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
1193 POMED, 'One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain;s Implementations of the BICI Report', November 
2012, http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/One-Year-Later-Assessing-Bahrains-
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issue  newspaper  and  television  licenses  to  opposition  groups  like  Al  Wefaq.1194
Bahrain pulled the plug on Saudi  Prince Alwaleed bin Talal  -al  Saud's  television channel
Alarab within 24 hours of its first broadcast an interview with a senior member of Al
Wefaq.1195 Recently, media and informational strategies have come further under the
control  of  hawkish members  of  the  ruling  family,  many with  allegedly anti-Shi‘a
tendencies,  such  as  the  Khawalid.  As  former  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Bahrain  noted,
'Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a direct hand in a scathing
press campaign launched by Arabic daily Al Watan against NDI, other NGOs, and
even the U.S. Embassy'.1196Al Watan, in particular,  was noted for its close ties to the
royal court .1197 Paradoxically, it was the reforms of 2001 and Hamad's rise to power
that empowered Anti-Shiʿa hardliners such as the Khawalid, who have continued to
maintain a tight grip on informational control strategies. Yet a relative rapprochement
has now, especially since 2011, seen a reassertion of pervasive censorship. A leaked
cable from the then Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
indicated  that  the  2011  unrest  prompted  Saudi  to  ask  Bahrain  for  a  co-operation
between its media agencies to adopt strategies to counter what it say as efforts by
foreign agencies to attack the reputation of Bahrain and Saudi.1198
Shiʿa and baḥārna Exclusion 
Books or publication that are critical of, or embarrassing about, the Al Khalifa are
banned, although this  includes most histories, including Khuri's Tribe and State in
Bahrain,  and  the  papers  of  Charles  Belgrave.1199 Much  of  these  highlight  the  Al
Khalifa oppression of the indigenous population. Yet the marginalisation of particular
Shiʿa or baḥārna voices from Bahrain's media and cultural fabric has perhaps simply
strengthened this native identity.1200  In addition to this censorship, baḥārna and Shiʿa
culture is marginalized in Bahrain's historical and cultural output. TV shows produced
1194Ibid.
1195 S. Kerr, 'Bahrain pulls plug on Saudi media tycoon's TV Station', Financial Times, 20 February 
2015, (accessed 20 October 2015). 
1196W.T. Monroe, 'Bahraini Political Scene Part II'.
1197W.T. Monroe, 'Government Committees Warn Newspapers about Anti Regime Coverage, 21 June 
2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MANAMA1116_a.html (accessed 6 October 2015).
1198 F. Al Saud, 'Secret and Urgent', Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 – 
2012 (1433 Hijra), Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/doc46685.html 
1199  Cited in J. Gengler, Ethnic Conflict p. 56.
1200 Ibid. p. 56.
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by Bahrain's national television  are mainly done in Sunni dialect, marginalizing the
baḥārna dialect  almost  completely.1201 The National  Museum tends to promote the
history of Bahrain's Sunni dominated pearl industry and pre-Islamic civilization of the
Dilmun, to the almost complete exclusion of the ʿAjam and the baḥārna, the latter of
whom mostly formed a settled agricultural class.  As Amal Khalaf notes, the state-
controlled  image  economy emphasises  the  ruling  family,  and  therefore  privileges
Sunni Muslims.1202 
Yet Bahrain's heavily managed image economy aims to portray it as a neo-
liberal haven, increasingly important following Bahrain's attempt to diversify away
from oil into sectors such as finance. In order to not disrupt the image of Bahrain as a
peaceful oasis,  safe for investment,  casualties or victims of police brutality in the
1990s were frequently sequestered away in order that the visibility of their injuries or
testimony remained hidden. Often they are secretly transferred to Bahrain's Military
Hospital,  where the identity is better assured/hidden as Bahrain's Military lies closely
under regime control.  This combined with the sequestering of victims, allows the
government to claim that people are 'fabricating' evidence or injuries, adding to the
stigmatization of social  movements.  Yet  widespread abuses in the recent  uprising,
coupled with social media, has increased the government's fear of this information
getting out.  Medics  have been targeted in  particular  due to their  proximity to  the
results of state violence. Dr. ‘Ali al-Akri, one of many medics to be arrested, tortured
and  prosecuted  by the  government,  claimed  they did  it  because  the  medics  were
witnesses to the atrocities.1203 The reaction of the government to those attempting to
assist journalists also marked a new height for retribution; at least three residents of
Bahrain,  two  of  whom  were  Bahraini  (one  was  Omani),  were  arrested  and
interrogated for acting as a fixer for BBC Middle East correspondent Martin Ingram
and BBC Television Reporter Sue Lloyd Roberts.1204  
1201C. Holes, 'Dialect and National Identity: The Cultural Politics of Self-Representation in Bahrain 
Musalsalat', in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds), Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity
in the Arab States of the Gulf, London, I.B. Tauris, 2005. 
1202A. Khalaf, 'The Many Afterlives of Lulue', Ibraaz, 28 February 2013, 
http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/56 
1203M. Chulov, 'Bahrain doctors await the call that will send them to prison', The Guardian, 30 
September 2011,  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/bahrain-doctors-prison-uprising 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
1204  Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial, Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in 
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Between 14 February 2011 and the end of November, there were  at least 221
instances  'where a foreign journalist,  NGO member,  politician,  trade unionist,  aid
worker, or activist was denied access to Bahrain, alone or as part of a group. This total
includes representatives from at least 17 NGOs and 22 media organizations. Some
individuals have been denied access in multiple instances. Access denials to Bahrain
increased from 2011 to 2012: of the 221 cases of access denial, 74 were in 2011, and
147 were in 2012'.1205In 2013, three journalists from the  British broadcaster Channel
4 were deported after attempting to film protests while in Bahrain on an Formula One
visa.1206 Bahrain Watch add that 'Methods of access denial  include: denial  of visa,
refusal at a port of entry, changing regulations to prohibit planned visits, deportation,
and blacklists'.1207 The denial  of an organization whose access could facilitate and
support the work of opposition social movements severely represses the abilities of
those organizations to garner regional and international support. The larger the scale
of abuses, the more profound the censorship.
Increasing the Reach: Censoring Abroad 
While  Bahrain's  protecting  powers  have  always  been sensitive  of  criticism of  the
Bahrain  regime,  British  companies  continue  to  work  directly  to  prevent  negative
coverage of Bahrain. Western PR companies, particular in London and Washington,
have played a big role in pressuring international organizations to remove material
from  newspapers  that  could  be  seen  critical  of  the  regime  in  Bahrain.  Bahrain
threatened to sue the Independent for defaming it. Dragon Associates, a London-based
company, forced the Guardian to take down an article written by Nabeel Rajab and
John Lubbock that described how torture had occurred at Bahrain's F1 track.1208 This
was strategically timed ahead of the Bahrain F1, and although the Guardian put it up
again (albeit with a superfluous addendum), they did so after tickets for the F1 had
already  started  selling.1209 Similarly,  CNN  decided  not  to  repeat  a  shocking
1205Bahrain Watch, Access Denied, 2012, https://bahrainwatch.org/access/viewreport.php#findings 
(accessed 6 October 2015). 
1206 J. Halliday, 'Channel 4 journalists arrested and deported from Bahrain', The Guardian, 23 April 
2012, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/apr/23/channel-4-journalists-arrested-bahrain 
(accessed 5 October 2015). 
1207Bahrain Watch, Access Denied, 2012, https://bahrainwatch.org/access/viewreport.php#findings 
(accessed 6 October 2015). 
1208 Interview with Brian Whitaker, February 2012. 
1209 Bahrain Watch, PR Watch: Dragon Association, 2012, https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/dragon-
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documentary  presented  by  Amber  Lyon  on  Bahrain  after  its  first  airing  caused
'blowback'  from the  Bahraini  government.1210 The  Bahraini  government  also  hired
British law firm Carter-Ruck to attack the Independent for their negative coverage on
Bahrain.1211 Wikipedia also suspended accounts after I discovered that changes to
entries about John Timoney  and John Yates had been made immediately before it was
announced that they were coming to Bahrain.  Information that  was negative was
removed so that it looked like Bahrain was recruiting two unblemished candidates to
reform  the  police.  Recurring  tropes  exist  in  government  framing  of  protests.  By
attempting to reduce negative press of Bahrain, these companies are conforming to the
government's desired narrative that Bahrain is safe space, ripe for investment and the
global flow of capital.  Yet interestingly,  the reach of this repression highlights the
importance  of  the  growing  web  of  non-state  actors  invested  in  laundering  the
reputations of authoritarian regimes. 
Intimidation: Targeting Liberal Media Outlets and Journalists 
While  the  proliferation  of  media  technology  and  newspapers  has  enabled  more
information to get out, the government's authoritarian reflex has meant that tactics
apart from insulation are necessitated.  The recent uprising in Bahrain has seen the
most  egregious  targeting  of  journalists,  not  simply because there have been more
journalists, citizens and otherwise, covering the protests, but also due to the increased
influence of security minded, anti-reform, Sunni hard-liners. As Wehrey notes, 'the
hardline  faction,  which  controls  the  security  forces  as  well  as  the  instruments  of
censorship, is now very open about its intention to silence the opposition'.1212 Yet the
nature of this intimidation started long before the uprising of 2011.  Shaykh Ahmed
Attiyatallah Al Khalifa reportedly established two media watch committees under the
auspices of his office to, at least, intimidate journalists and editors into not writing
articles that were deemed anti-regime. While such directives could only, in theory,
come  from  the  IAA,  Shaykh  Atayitallah's  interference  signified  the  influence  of
associates.php (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1210 J. Horne, 'Tn Tn Tn and torture in Bahrain: Puncturing the spectacle of the “Arab Spring”, in A. 
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Zed Books Ltd, 2015, p. 163.
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elements of the ruling core in  dictating press freedom.1213 
In 2011, early on in the Uprising Bahrain's only opposition newspaper,  Al-
Wasat, was targeted by pro-government thugs, who attacked the company's printing
press.1214  Al-Wasat was suspended on 2 April 2011 after the government used a raft of
legal arguments to quash it, accusing them of 'publishing fabricated news,' 'harming
public safety', and 'damaging national interests'. Mansur al-Jamri, the paper's award-
winning editor, admitted to publishing six incorrect articles, but also claimed he was
the victim of a deliberate campaign to plant disinformation that had been sent from
accounts with IP addresses in Saudi. The editorial staff were replaced by government-
appointed  personnel,  and the  newspapers  stance  became less  critical  overnight.1215
Saudi too  intervened in what they see as pro-Shi‘a or Iranian propaganda, and the
King  has  intervened  by  decree  to  take  the  Iranian  satellite  channel  off  the  air
whenever it reports on Bahrain.1216
In addition to the intimidation, and subsequent censorship of Al-Wasat, attacks
and extra judicial killings on other journalists also increased. Reporters Sans Frontier
(RSF) noted that citizen-journalist Ahmed Ismail Hussain was 'killed while covering a
peaceful demonstration in Salmabad on 31 March 2012'.1217 Although it is not known
who killed him, RSF state the  authorities were clearly to blame for the torture and
'deaths of Karim Fakhrawi, a co-founder of the newspaper Al-Wasat and member of
its  board,  and  Zakariya  Rashid  Hassan'. 1218The  authorities  have  also  harassed,
tortured, arrested, and tried  journalists in an attempt to prevent them evoking support
for  Bahrain's  opposition  by  publishing  potentially  damning  news  stories.
Photographers wearing clearly marked vests, such as Hamad Muhammad and Amer
Muhammad, have been targeted by direct shots with tear gas canisters, and no one has
been held accountable. Others have been arrested or convicted on spurious charges,
1213W.T. Monroe, 'Government Committees Warn Newspapers'.
1214M . Tran, 'Bahrain accuses human rights leader of faking pictures of beating', The Guardian, 11 
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accused , (accessed 6 October 2015).
1215Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Bahrain, 2012, www. 
freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Bahrain%202012_0.pdf 
1216B. Hubbard and M. ElSheikh, 'Wikileaks shows a Saudi obsession with Iran'. 16 July 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/world/middleeast/wikileaks-saudi-arabia-iran.html, (accessed 
6 October 2015).




including Mustafa Rabea, Ammar ʿAbd al-Rasul, Ahmed al-Musawi, Sayid Baqir al-
Kamal,  Qassim Zayn al-Din,  Ahmad Zayn al-Din,  Ahmad al-Fardan,  and  Hussam
Surur. Again, spurious legal charges have been used to set in motion the processes of
legal  embroilment.  The  alleged  crimes  range  from  'participating  in  an  illegal
gathering', to 'attacking policemen'.1219 Between 2011 and 2012, sixty-eight journalists
were charged with treason or 'publishing news that defamed the image of Bahrain
abroad'.1220Some, such as Naziha Sa'id and Mohammed al Oraibia, have accused the
police of torturing  them. Those like Mohammed Al Najer, complained to have been
arrested and beaten by police while covering protests.1221
 Foreign news agencies have also found themselves in trouble after obtaining
access. Bahrain Watch has noted that 'Some individuals who gain access to Bahrain
are harassed by security forces, have their movements restricted, or are only granted
access  to  attend  Government  events'.  Bahrain  Watch  note  that  this  'policy  of
restricting access to foreign observers puts a greater burden on local organizations that
are already stretched thin by Government harassment, and reduces impartial coverage
of the situation in Bahrain'.1222 This 'lack of impartial  coverage may cause policy-
makers  to  consult  biased  or  outdated  information  about  Bahrain,  leading them to
suboptimal policy decisions'.1223 Most foreign journalists are just deported, and torture
is reserved for nationals over whom the government believe they have more impunity
to exact grisly punishments. While the intimidation of journalists has occurred before,
the proliferation of media outlets, citizen journalists, and social networks, has created
an information deluge that has prompted the government to react more violently. Yet
the  hard-line  influence,  and  loyalist  ownership  of  mass  media,  has  facilitated  an
aggressive policy towards censorship, itself enabled by hard-line control of security
institutions. 
Social Media and Trolling 
The Bahrain  authorities  have  always  been suspicious  of  new technologies.  In  the
1219 Reporters Without Borders, 'Media Freedom Still Under Attack in Bahrain', 11 March 2015, 
http://en.rsf.org/bahrain-media-freedom-still-under-attack-11-03-2015,47675.html (accessed 6 
October 2015). 
1220 POMED, 'One Year Later'.
1221 Reporters Without Borders, 'Media Freedom Still Under Attack in Bahrain'.
1222Bahrain Watch, Access Denied.
1223Ibid. 
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1990s,  government  offices  issued  strict  control  of  photocopier  and  fax  machines,
while in 1996, international calls from public phones were banned as they could not
be traced, and the government suspected citizens may attempt to contact subversive
elements abroad or journalists/members of NGOs.1224 What set the 2011 uprising apart
from previous contentious episodes was the use of social media. In addition to the
targeting of official journalists and agencies, unaffiliated activists and netizens have
been  intimidated  and  'trolled'  into  silence.  Trolling  can  be  defined  as  'a  form of
aggressive internet communication where people using anonymous or non anonymous
accounts  to engage in abusive behaviour towards others'1225 and varies  in severity,
from  provocative  comments,  to  death  threats,  to  outright  bullying.1226  This
intimidation was prolific on social media, especially in 2011, where people often felt
intimidated  into  not  criticising  the  government  due  to  the  prevalence  of  online
harassment,  mostly from Twitter  trolls,  or 'e-thugs'  (reflecting the commonly used
Arabic term at the time, that translates as thug) Although some were indifferent, other
users admitted that it has stopped them tweeting or writing anything critical of the
regime.1227 One informant noted that trolling stopped him tweeting; 'Don’t know how
long Marc,  my heart  is  heavy.  Even my moderate  views get  attacked by trolls1228
Others have 'protected' their Twitter accounts, meaning that what they write can only
be read by those followers permitted by the author, contributing to the censorship and
silencing of oppositional voices on Twitter. This tactic was especially effective in the
midst of the political upheaval in 2011, when there was the very real possibility of
arrest and torture. The prevalence of Bahrain's Twitter trolls has prompted a number
of  international  journalists  or  activists  to  write  about  them.1229,  For  example,  Al-
Jazeera reporter Gregg Carlstrom tweeted in November 2011: ‘Bahrain has by far the
hardest-working Twitter  trolls  of  any country I’ve reported on’.1230 Global  Voices‘
1224HRW Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
1225 M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising’, Westminster 
Papers in Communication and Culture: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, Past and 
Present, vol 9, no. 2, April 2013, p. 
1226Ibid., p. 77.
1227(the phrase self-censorship is problematic, as it implies that there is no stimulus that 
causes the censorship, shifting the responsibility from the hegemonic order, to the 
individual).
1228Conversation with victim of trolling, 2011.
1229 including Jillian York, (2011) David Goodman (2011) and Brian Dooley (2011). Following the 
release of the BICI report on 23 November 2011. See  M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, surveillance...'
1230 M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, surveillance...'
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MENA editor Amira Al Hussaini  “cyberbullying = censorship! Welcome to the new
era of freedom in #Bahrain”.  Trolling in Bahrain reached such a pitch that it  was
addressed in a report  commissioned to investigate human rights abuses during the
uprising of 2011. The report singled out the actions of @7areghum, a Twitter account
that 'openly harassed, threatened and defamed certain individuals, and in some cases
placed them in immediate danger'.1231 Although the authors of the report noted that
@7areghum had broken Bahraini law and international law, there is no evidence that
Bahrain government have asked the US government to subpoena Twitter to release
information about the account.1232 In addition to forcing people into censorship, these
trolls  are  an  important  source  of  disinformation.  They  frequently  disseminate
information that is controversial,  defamatory,  sectarian, or wrong'.1233   In times of
conflict, such disinformation is harmful, 'for it is also a time when people are feeling
vulnerable, defensive and afraid'.1234  Trolls exploit people's desire for information,
which  increase  during  a  time  of  crisis.  However,  the  lack  of  credible  official
information  on  issues  and  the  government's  deliberate  obfuscation  makes   the
scramble for answers both desperate and blind.1235 It is not clear  in all cases who run
the accounts,  yet  thousands of  sock puppet  accounts  appeared  at  key moments  at
2011, spreading government propaganda, or intimidating opposition figures online.1236
In some cases, people reported that the circulation of government atrocities
made them more afraid of engaging in dissent. While accounts such as @7areghum
were never identified, the similar @mnarfezhom account was identified to be Salman
Al Khalifa, a member of the ruling family.1237 Although his anti-Shi‘a discourse, and
critique of the protest movement was not considered problematic by the government,
he was questioned by authorities after he slandered influential and Sunni notables.1238
1231BICI Report, p. 401.
1232M.O. Jones, ‘Bahrain activists’ trouble with trolls’, Index on Censorship Uncut, 15 May 2012, 
http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/2012/05/bahrain-marc-owen-jones-twitter-trolls/, (accessed 4 
October 2015). 
1233M.O. Jones in J.D. Goodman, ‘“Twitter Trolls” haunt discussions of Bahrain online’, The Lede [New 




1236 M.O.Jones, 'Social media, surveillance...'.
1237 Bahrain Watch, The IP spy files: How Bahrain's government silences anonymous online dissent, 
August 2013,  https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/ip-spy-files.pdf. (accessed 30 December 2014).
1238S. S. Grewal, 'Probe into slander on Twitter', Gulf Daily News, 7 January 2013, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=345115 (accessed 20 
October 2015). 
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Again, this asymmetry in the application of rule and law reflects a tacit approval by
the regime of harassment strategies designed to intimidate opposition members. What
is clear though, is that such tactics, whether undertaken directly by the government, or
facilitated by their wilful blindness, contributed to censorship by invoking a climate of
fear.  This  was  underscored  by  reminders  by  the  head  of  Public  Security  that
circulating  videos  of  the  security  forces  engaged  in  egregious  acts  would  be
considered  an  act  against  the  nation.1239 Despite  this  warning,  social  media  has
actually facilitated the process of 'making the consequences of resistance so gruesome
that no one who has experienced them is psychologically and/or physically capable of
further resistance'.1240 
Between Propaganda and PR 
The Increasing Need for Propaganda 
Shaping the perceptions of citizens about the nature of reality is an important aspect
of  repression,  as  it  can  deter  people  from  supporting  social  movements  via
stigmatization.  The  most  salient  strategy  of  the  Bahrain  government  has  been  to
portray opposition as being externally supported fifth columns operating in Bahrain.
Before  independence,  inside  agitation  was  often  attributed  to  nationalist  or  leftist
movements,  while  after  Independence,  Iran  has  often  been  used  as  the  external
'bogeyman' with a hand in dissent in Bahrain. As early as the 1920s, the British would
frighten the Shaykh with 'bogeyman of Persian pretensions to get his own house in
order'.1241 Yet the media scene in Bahrain has hardly ever been vibrant, and it is only
really in the last fifteen years that the proliferation of media outlets and the internet
has seen a burgeoning of state and non-state discourse that attempts to shape public
perceptions  of  opposition  movements.  Thus  stigmatization  and  demonstration  and
intimidation by way of new media technologies is an increasingly more prevalent tool
in the government's repertoire of repression. 
1239@YusurAlBahrani, 'Chief of Public Security in #Bahrain @Talhassan, claims that who publicize 
video of @moi_bahrain violations is traitor', 25 December 2012,  
https://twitter.com/YusurAlBahrani/status/283442087192588288, (accessed 10 October 2015).  
@Talhassan, '-  يقوم الدجالون والعملء ببث تلك اللقطات ويبالغون فيها وحسبما يردهم من تعليمات وبما يحقق لهم ولمن
البحرين#يدفعهم من الدول أهدافهم   https://twitter.com/talhassan/status/283339899518730241, 24 December
2012, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1240 A Turk, Political Criminality,  p. 134.
1241 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India, 14 May 1923, RoB, vol
3, p. 761. 
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Propaganda  has  always  reflected  the  type  of  threat,  and  the  perceptions
authorities have of that threat. Rising nationalism, for example, made Britain and the
Al Khalifa  regime particular  paranoid about  the dissemination of Arab Nationalist
propaganda.  On  1  February  1955,  the  government  of  Bahrain  opened  the  Public
Relations Department. This was done primarily to explain the governments policies
and  achievements,  and  to  combat  the  'continual  incitement  against  established
authority being poured out by the Cairo and Damascus wireless'1242 stations.   The
newspaper Al Khalij (The Gulf) edited by the British Colonel Anderson was set up to
spread pro-government  propaganda,  marking the beginning of  the trend of  British
Officers  or  former  British  Officer  doing  propaganda  on  behalf  of  the  Bahrain
Government.1243 They even co-opted ‘Ali Sayyar, the former editor of Al Watan, and
once  described by the HEC as the 'greatest torch of freedom in Bahrain;'  He later
resigned due to accusations of collusion with the British. 1244
The same problems arose during the worker and student strikes of 1965, where
slack  reform meant  it  was  still  deemed  necessary  to  create  a  'lively  and  strong'
broadcasting station 'capable of answering the groundless allegations poured out by
Kuwait  and  other  hostile  Middle  East  broadcasting  stations'.1245 Despite  the
recalcitrance of the Ruler and the Al Khalifa, the British encouraged them to allow an
independent newspaper, 'Al-ADwa' something which he had long been against.1246 The
first  issue was published on 9 September 1965, and described by J.W.D. Gray as
lacking  'spice'  on  account  of  the  draconian  Press  Law issued  in  August  1965.1247
Indeed, such was the government's paranoia about propaganda, that the Press Law
was both comprehensive and stifling. Amongst the requirements was that the editor
and owner had to be over 25, and that the papers were not allowed to criticise the
Ruler or his family, or publish news that may damage the economy or harm relations
with  'friendly  nations'1248  All  publications  brought  into  the  country  could  be
appropriated by the authorities if they contravened any of the articles laid out in the
1242C. A. Gault, 27 January 1957, RoB, vol. 7, p. 335. 
1243B.A.B. Burrows, Summary of news, 24 August 1956, 
1244Note in Margin on, 'Daily in Bahrain by ‘Ali Sayyar', 1956,  
1245W. Luce, Dispatch No. 305, 26 April,1965 telegram to foreign office, RoB, vol. 5  p. 292.
1246Arabian Department, 'Minister of State's Visit to the Persian Gulf',  9 – 16 May 1965, RoB, vol. 5, 
p. 297.
1247J.W.D. Gray, Letter to S.J. Nuttall, 14 September 1965,  RoB, vol. 5, p. 49.
1248http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/K0765.pdf
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Press Law, and anything that encouraged people to embrace communism was also
banned. The press in Bahrain was never intended to be a 'fourth estate', one designed
to speak truth to power, but rather a way in which the government could celebrate its
own achievements, deploy propaganda, and counter news issued by foreign actors.
Even in 1974, during Bahrain's brief democratic experiment, the British noted that the
government was 'infiltrating the press' and controlled both state radio and state TV.1249
In  addition  to  celebrating  government  achievements,  propaganda  has  been
used as a tool of intimidation.  In 1979, for example, 'the expressions of support the
authorities received from other Arab Governments probably convinced the dissidents
that they were not up against the Bahrain Government alone'.1250 Similarly, in 1980 it
was thought that a rumour that Saudi troops were in Bahrain was spread to intimidate
any baḥārna from protesting.1251 In 1982, the British mentioned that there was a 'well
advertised campaign to underline the fact that Bahrain enjoys the support of its Arab
neighbours'.1252 Indeed, this strategically placed information has also been deployed in
order to have a salutary effect. In 1979, for example, 'the expressions of support the
authorities received from other Arab Governments probably convinced the dissidents
that they were not up against the Bahrain Government alone'.1253  During the 1990s
Intifada,  the  Saudis  were  more  demonstrable  in  their  shows  of  support,  staging
military exercises around invading a Bahrain overtaken by fundamentalists, and the
Defense  Minister  Prince  Sultan  stating  to  the  BBC:  'We  are  prepared  to  stand
forcefully by Bahrain if the need arises'.1254 When the GCCPS came over the bridge in
2011,  it  was  widely broadcast  on  state  media,  with  soldiers  displaying the  V for
victory sign, potentially evoking the 'visceral fear' that many baḥārna reportedly have
of Saudis.
Stigmatization and False Balance
Another important way that the opposition movement has been framed has been the
government's creation of  a good versus evil binary, in which the government present
themselves as a bulwark against violent extremism. The state media, loyalists, and PR
1249 R. M. Tesh, 9 April 1974.
1250 H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979.
1251K.J.Passmore, Bahrain Internal: Ashura, 1 December 1980,  FCO8/3489, TNA.
1252W.R. Tomkys, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1981,13 February 1982, FCO 8/4332, TNA.
1253 H.B. Walker, 'Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979', 8 January 1980, FCO8/3490.
1254Cited in HRW, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.
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firms working for the Bahraini government  have employed a number of rhetorical
devices and narratives that contribute to framing the opposition in a negative light. In
this, acts of violence against the state are exaggerated or focused on, while egregious
acts perpetrated against citizens are dumbed down. Even in its infancy, this was noted
of  the Bahrain press.  For  example,  in  order  to  justify its  decision  to  dissolve the
National Assembly in 1975 for reasons of national security, the government widely
publicised acts of violence perpetrated by those with leftist political associations. One
man,  ʿAbd  al-Rahman  Ahmad  ʿUthman,  a  member  of  the  PFLO  who  allegedly
confessed to throwing a bomb into a police station, had a trial widely published in the
now defunct 'Gulf Weekly Mirror'. The British even noted that this was 'no doubt to
lend support to the government's line that national security was under threat'.1255 This
pattern continued unabated into the 1990s. For example,  Amnesty International noted
that  official  investigations  into  the  killing  of  3  policemen  received  widespread
publicity, while the 'government remained silent on the killing of civilians'.1256As John
Pilger notes, omission  can be the most virulent form of censorship, as it can present a
simplistic narrative in which the villains and the heroes can be controlled by the state.
Unsurprisingly the government have always been keen not to draw any attention to
torture or wrong-doing. Even the British noted, that after the death of Jamal ‘Ali, the
papers  carried  a  disingenuous  statement  about  his  death,  attributing  it  to  kidney
failure.1257 Thirty years on,  the government blamed kidney failure on the death of
someone who the BICI noted died of torture.1258  
The rise of media outlets, both national and regional, has prompted a need for
tactics  that  aim  to  utilise  media  to  the  regime's  advantage.  In  the  1990s,  state
newspapers  frequently published images  of  suspects  along  with  accounts  to  them
having confessed.  Al-Ayam was singled out on a number of occasions by Amnesty
International for publishing the names and personal details of those accused in various
cases.  Amnesty  note  that  'articles  along  similar  lines  were  published  regularly  in
Bahrain's  newspapers  for  several  months'.1259 AI  added  that  such  statements
'undermined the defendants' right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty before a
1255E.H. Noble, Bahrain Internal, 26 August 1975, FCO 8/2415, TNA. 
1256 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
1257C.E.J. Wilton, Bahrain Internal, 14 May 1980, FCO8/3489, TNA.
1258Gulf Daily News, 'Ministry denies death rumours', FCO8/3489, TNA.
1259 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
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court of law, guaranteed by Article 20(c) of Bahrain's Constitution and Article 14(2)
of the ICCPR, thereby prejudicing any chance they may have had of receiving a fair
trial.1260  In 1996, Kathy Evans of the Guardian reported how the state 'paraded' a
'string  of  bearded  young  men  with  dead  staring  eyes'  on  television,  all  of  them
confessing  to  their  role  in  an  alleged  Iranian-backed  plot  to  overthrow  the
government. This trial by media occurred again in 20081261 and 2010, and the BCHR
and  the  FIDH  accused  the  state-controlled  media  of  publishing  images  of  those
connected to a terror threat, including lawyers defending the suspects.12621263 Indeed 6
out of the 7 daily newspapers published the images, highlighting the lack of editorial
diversity.1264 Amnesty International described the decision as, 'nothing less than a form
of trial by media in which the accused themselves had no means by which to defend
themselves or their reputations'.1265In one particular egregious example, Bahrain State
Television aired the confession of ‘Ali  Ibrahim Saqer on 28 April  2011, who was
accused of killing two policemen. However, he had already been killed in custody on
9 April 2011 as a result of torture.1266 Despite so-called media reforms, state media
still pursued this form of trial by media, and in 20121267 and 2013, Al Watan published
the names and photos of terror suspects – a move that is usually illegal under Bahraini
law.1268 
Despite many opposition members branding certain stories as 'fabrications', or
mufabrakat, instances  of  alleged  protester  violence  have  been  highly  publicised,
1260Ibid.
1261R. Khalifa, '(AP) – Bahrain TV airs terror plot confessions', BCHR, 29 December 2008, 
http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/2625, (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1262BCHR, 'ANHRI: Bahrain: Court holds mass hearing for human rights activist', 29 October 2010,  
http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node?page=155&nomobile=true , (accessed 7 October 2015). 
1263Human Rights Defenders, 'Violent crackdown continues to target human rights defenders', Press 
Release, 8 September 2010, https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-
africa-middle-east/bahrain/Violent-crackdown-continues-to, (accessed 6 October 2015). 
1264H. Toumi, 'Bahrain's prosecution defends decision to publish suspects' names and pictures', Habib 
Toumi, [web blog], 2 September 2010, http://www.habibtoumi.com/2010/09/02/bahrains-
prosecution-defends-decision-to-publish-suspects-names-and-pictures/ , (accessed 8 October 2015).
1265Amnesty Internationa, Crackdown in Bahrain: Human Rights at the Crossroads, London, p. 16, 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/bahrain_ai_2011_hr_crossroads.pdf, (accessed 2 October 
2014).
1266Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, 'A man died in custody confession on television that he 
had killed two policemen', 28 April 2011, http://www.byshr.org/?p=396, (accessed 10 October 
2015). 
1267   POMED, 'One Year Later'. 
1268@F-albinali, '@marcowenjones @lawyereemkhalaf its a concern, NHRI raised it as well. My 
view is that that's it's a grey area. Something for the defense',  21 February 2013,  
https://twitter.com/f_albinali/status/304556075405955072, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
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leading to the emergence of a violence frame. An attack on a Pakistani muezzin by a
group of protesters was highly publicised by the state media who claimed that his
tongue had been cut off. Doubts about the story were strengthened by the BICI report,
which claimed his tongue was lacerated, and that those found guilty of the attack were
tortured into confessing.  Pro government newspapers Gulf Daily News1269 and  Al-
Ayam reported a taxi-driver had been killed by 'terrorists',1270 while the moderate  Al-
Wasat1271 claimed  it  was  a  traffic  accident.  In  other  instances,  social  media
commentators,  endorsed by the state in the form of recognizing them through the
issuing  of  social  media  awards,  perpetuated  news  designed  to  defame  notable
activists. Lex Birch, who was awarded most 'outstanding resident' by the Information
Affairs  Authority,  claimed  that  Nabeel  Rajab,   had  ordered  people  to  cut  off  the
fingers of British expatiate Peter Morrisey..1272 The veracity of government claims has
been questioned, not least due to the fact they have been exposed on a number of
times with questionable stories. For example, in the 1990s, the government claimed
parents  beat  the  corpses  of  their  children  to  make  it  look  like  they  had  been
tortured.1273 In 2011, people were accused of making their wounds worse in order to
elicit media sympathy. One video was circulated that showed children being made up
to  look  injured,  with  pro-government  supporters  claiming  it  was  opposition
fabricating wounds. It was discovered that the video was from a Palestinian school
putting on a nativity play. At least here, social media provided means by which to
highlight the government's fabrications.
In addition to these more overt strategies attempting to associate violence with
the opposition, the government have resorted to more subtle rhetorical devices. Chief
among these are constant referencing to them not as protesters or activists, but as
'vandals', 'terrorists' and 'hooligans' beholden to outside powers.  Although there are
groups in the February 14th Movement to have used violence, the initial protests in
1269S.S. Grewal, 'Track down my father's killers', Gulf Daily News, 15 June 2011, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=307919 
1270Al Ayam, 'Terrorists brutally and mercilessly stabbed his body with their knives',  29 March 2011, 
http://goo.gl/qmhTWC
1271 Al Wasat,  'Funeral of Rashid Mamri in Riffa Cemetry',23 March 2011, 
http://www.alwasatnews.com/3120/news/read/533682/1.html 
1272@LexBirch,'@NABEELRAJAB well you are, and you proved it by sending out your 
thugs to amputate #UK citizens fingers #Bahrain. We all know the truth now', 10 February 
2012, https://twitter.com/LexBirch/status/167887885960347648
1273The Economist, 'Whitewash',p. 60.
252 
2011 started as peaceful. Yet, state media, in both English and Arabic, have used a
narrative that  is  designed to conflate  fringe violence with the tactics of the entire
opposition. This excerpt from a weekly security report by the Ministry of the Interior
highlights this rhetorical slight of hand; ‘The security report brings you a summary of
what  happened  during  the  week from rioting,  vandalism and  law-breaking  which
SOME [original emphasis] still  call it  a peaceful protest.  And through this week’s
report once again we will show you by footage what has been labelled as peaceful as
an act of terrorism'.1274 This rhetoric is regurgitated in the state media or by the work
of loyalist interest groups writing op-eds, such as 'Citizen for Bahrain'. In an op-ed for
the GDN, Citizens of Bahrain stated the following; 'The opposition claims that its
methods  are  peaceful,  but  its  actions  say  otherwise.  When  opposition  militants,
trained  and  armed  by  Iran,  are  going  to  such  efforts  to  bring  armed  conflict  to
Bahrain's shores'...1275 
Generally speaking, there is a homogeneity to hegemonic state and non-state
discourses that attempt to skew the narrative around criminality linked with Bahrain's
Uprising These techniques can be summed up in four ways. The rhetoric attempts to;
1) Vilify the victims or the people the victim was associated with. I.e. Say they were
engaged  in  nefarious  activities  or  doing  something  illegal/using  weapons.  2)
Denounce any responsibility by indicating that the police acted in self defence. 3) Use
phrases that imply lack of agency when it comes to killing. I.e. instead of saying the
victim was killed, say he died. Similarly, suggest disconnect between incident and
death of victim. 4) Legitimize police response by mentioning how they adhered to
protocol  or  were  doing  their  duty.  The  following  excerpt  from a  MOI  statement
concerns  the  death  of  Husayn  al-Jaziri.  The  numbers  used  above  to  mark  the
rhetorical devices used by the MOI in their attempts to abrogate their responsibility
and deligitimise opposition claims of police oppression or malpractice. 
The most violent (1) group amassed at around 8am in the village of Daih
where 300 rioters assembled to  attack police (1) deployed in the area,
with rocks, steel rods and Molotov cocktails (1). Warning shots (4) were
1274 Bahrain News Agency, 'Bahrain Weekly Security Report 12/07/2012', 12 July 2012, 
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/516756#.T_8KWEjw0Z0.twitter, (accessed 2 November 2015). 
1275Citizens for Bahrain, 'Weapons cache proves motives not peaceful', in Gulf Daily News, 5 January 
2014, http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=368096 
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fired but failed to disperse the advancing crowd which  continued their
attack (1). Officers discharged birdshot to  defend themselves (2) and at
least one rioter was injured (3) in the process. A short time later, a young
man was pronounced dead at (3) Salmaniya Medical Complex.
In a similar incident in October 2012, when the police shot and killed 16-year-old
Hussam al-Haddad, the MOI issued the following statement.
The director general of the Muharraq Police dept said that a police patrol
was carrying out its duty securing (4) a crowded Al Khalifa Avenue in the
middle  of  Muharraq,  when  it  was  subjected  to  a  terrorist  attack  (1)
carried out by a large number of fire bombs (molotovs) (1). This was at
9.30  pm  yesterday.  The  attack  endangered  the  lives  of  the  patrol,
civilians,  residents  and those  present,  which led  to  the  injury  of  the
patrol, fear among citizens/residents, panic, and damage to public and
private property (2). The police dealt  with matters in accordance with
established legal procedures (4) appropriate to such cases and defended
both themselves and citizens (2 and 4). This resulted in the injury (3) of
one  of  the  persons  taking  part  in  this  terrorist  activity  (1),  who  was
immediately taken to hospital where he died. To confirm, this was both a
terrorist act and attempted murder (1 and 2), intended to take the lives of
those policemen on patrol whilst also subjecting citizens and residents to
danger. Director general says he had informed the public prosecution of
the incident.
The  MOI  also  choose  to  frame  the  deaths  of  policemen,  or  what  it  calls  ‘duty
martyrs’.  The  headline  about  the  death  of  policeman  Muhammad  Asif  reads  as
follows, 'Police Officer Dies In Unprovoked Attack'. Contrary to the report about the
death  of  Hussain  Al  Jaziri,  which  implied  his  guilt  ,  and  stated  that  he  was
participating in the day’s most violent protest (the fact the protest was termed ‘the
most’ violent also indicates that the police were under the most duress at this time-
further legitimizing their harsh response), the report about Muhammad Asif claims
that  the  attack  was  unprovoked.  So  whereas  protesters  killed  by  the  police  are
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inevitably done in the name of ‘self-defence’, police killed at the hands of protesters
are done so without provocation. It also states that an investigation was launched to
find those who were ‘responsible’. When protesters die at the hands of the police an
investigation is sometimes launched, though it rarely mentions that the purpose is to
find out who is ‘responsible’. In the BICI follow-up report,  18 instances of police
violence are framed as responses to dealing with a 'riot'.1276 The term riot obviously
implies an orderless, dangerous situation, as opposed to peaceful political expression. 
While it is unsurprising that the MOI use these rhetorical devices to demonise
protesters and absolve themselves of responsibility, such statements are often the basis
of  the  police’s  defence  argument  should  they  actually  end  up  in  court.  This  is
especially  disturbing  when  the  media  are  prevented  from baring  witness  to  such
incidents.  Indeed,  journalist  Mazen  Mahdi  and  a  number  of  other  reporters were
arrested  and  detained  for  covering  protests  (though  they  weren’t  given  an  actual
reason for their arrest). By removing witnesses from the scenes of such incidents the
MOI are able to exploit an information vacuum, one in which their testimony will lack
credible contradiction.  This is especially true in a court  run by a non independent
judiciary dominated by members of the Ruling Family, who also run the Ministry of
the Interior. In addition to using rhetoric that demonizes protesters, the MOI often use
the term ‘to become a martyr’ when referring to police casualties They do not do this
with  civilians,  which  suggests  they  are  attempting  to  appropriate  the  category  of
‘legitimate victim’, adding a sense of religious sanctity to the action of the security
services. This rhetoric is also present in official documentation. In the November 2012
follow up to the BICI report, in which the government are meant to be demonstrating
their  implementation  of  the  reforms,  a  detailed  list  of  deaths  of  protesters  during
confrontations with the police is included. 
 The  state media have also attempted to fabricate the idea that respectable
International  Organizations  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  Bahrain  government  are
countering  a violent threat by putting falsified quotes or stories in national papers.
For example, the Bahrain News Agency put out a news release claiming that Eileen
Donahoe, the US ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council, had 'expressed her
dismay at  violent  demonstrations and burning of tires'  by Bahrain's  opposition.1277
1276 BICI Follow-Up Report, November 2012
1277Bahrain Watch, 'UN Ambassador to UN Human Rights Council', September 2014, 
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When informed, Donahoe's office denied the story. In another example, the Bahrain
News Agency claimed that UN  Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had hailed Bahrain's
efforts to 'preserve its security and stability hailing the reform process spearheaded by
His Majesty King Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifa'.1278 In actual fact, Ban Ki Moon voiced
concern about state violence towards protesters. In another case, chairman of the BICI
commission,  Cherif  Bassiouni,  was forced to claim his  opinions were deliberately
represented by pro-government newspaper Al-Ayam.1279 Amnesty International too had
to issue a rejoinder after  Akhbar Al-Khaleej (The Gulf News)  claimed that they had
issued a  statement  condemning opposition  for  using  children as  human shields  at
protests.1280 Other people or international organizations to have been misrepresented
or  misquoted  by  Bahrain's  government  controlled  media  include;  Member  of
European Parliament Marietje Schaake, Former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff  Hugh  Shelton,  CNN,  and  International  Federation  for  Human  Rights
President.12811282
The Iran Myth, Sectarianism, and Existential Threat Myth
The importance of creating or exaggerating an existential threat to provoke the real
possibility of violence or death is the very essence of securitization.  Securing and
protecting  citizens  from a  threat  gives  the  state  'legitimacy to  undertake  extreme
measures to protect itself and keep the larger citizenry secure'.1283 The government, via
the media,  have long exaggerated links to  outside groups in  order to achieve this
securitization, and frame dissent as the influence of ill-intentioned outsiders.  Prior to
the emergence of the IFLB, the link between Bahrain's leftist movement and external
https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!donahoe, (accessed 2 November 2015). 
1278Bahrain Watch, 'Secretary General of the United Nations', Fabrigate, September 2014, 
https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!bankimoon 
1279Fabrigate, 'Chairman of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', Bahrain Watch,  
https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!cherif 
1280Fabrigate, 'Amnesty International', https://bahrainwatch.org/media/#!amnestyintl 
1281 Fabrigate, https://bahrainwatch.org/media/ 
1282These are but a few, other known cases include;  Souhayr Behlassen, Reuters News Agency, 
Author and Broadcaster Joseph Braude, Former UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt, British 
MP Conor Burns, Tunisian Minister of Culture Mehdi Mabrouk, Tunisia's Al Nahda Party, Former 
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, 
International Federation of Journalists, and UK Under Secretary of State and Lords. See Fabrigate, 
Bahrain Watch, https://bahrainwatch.org/media/ 
1283 L. A. Fernandez, p. 161.
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sponsors was deliberately exaggerated by the Bahrain government. Even the British
noted that 'the extent to which the People's Bloc and ULO were taking their orders
from outside Bahrain has been deliberately exaggerated by the Government'.1284 Yet
since  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  and  the  Iranian  Revolution  of  1979,  Iran  has  been  the
bogeyman,  and  following  the  Prime  Minister's  crackdown  on  the  Shi‘a,  the
government, through the media have tried to paint the opposition as a fifth column,
determined to impose a Shi‘a theocratic state in Bahrain. The Bahraini regime has
harshly suppressed Shi‘a groups and played the sectarian card to portray the Shiʿa as
an Iranian 'fifth column', resulting in dividing Sunnis from Shiʿa.1285 
This demonisation of the Shi‘a was particularly acute after the alleged coup
attempt of 1981, which was widely reported. Any attempt to besmirch Iran was taken.
For example, reports on Iranian subversion in Yemen were given 'pride of place in the
local press'.1286  The Prime Minister reiterated his anti-Shi‘a suspicions in 2012 in an
interview with Der Spiegel,  where he said,  contrary to the BICI report  which had
found  no  Iranian  involvement  in  Bahrain's  unrest,  that  protesters  wanted  to  turn
Bahrain into a 'second Iran'.1287 In the 1990s, 'statements were made on a number of
other occasions by government officials, linking the mass protests and acts involving
violence in  Bahrain to  the activities of an unauthorized organization supported by
hostile foreign powers'.1288   This was done deliberately to detract from the fact that
the  Intifada  was  'neither  exclusively  Shia  nor  hardline  Islamist'.1289 Indeed,  'the
committee that  drafted the petition for democracy and basic rights includes Sunni
religious leaders  and a Sunni  feminist  professor'.1290  In  1995,  the Minister  of  the
Interior stated that behind incidents of sectarian strife and sabotage, 'lies an extremist
religious  organization  with  illegitimate  goals  and  aims  linked  with  a  political
organization abroad and supported by a  foreign country'.1291 (Foreign country here
1284 R.M.Tesh, Bahrain's First Parliament.
1285M. Ma'oz, 'The “Shi'i Crescent”: Myth and Reality', The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at 
the Brookings Institution, no. 15, November 2007, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/11/middle-east-
maoz/11_middle_east_maoz.pdf, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1286 S. P. Collis, 16 January 1982, FCO 8/4332 
1287Spiegel Online, 'Interview with Bahrain's Prime Minister: The Opposition “are Terroziing the Rest
of This Country”, 27 April 2012,  http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-bahraini-
prime-minister-prince-khalifa-bin-salman-al-khalifa-a-830045.html, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1288 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
1289 The Economist, 'Gazing Backward'.
1290Ibid.
1291 Amnesty International, Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis.
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always means Iran). 
In addition to Iran, this threat has been extended to other Shiʿa organizations
such as Hezbollah, for example, on  '1 May 1995, the State Security Court sentenced
Hussain ‘Ali al-Tattan to 10 years' imprisonment, Salman ʿAbd Allah al-Nashaba to
five years' imprisonment, and eight other defendants to three years' imprisonment',1292
for being members of Hezbollah in Bahrain. Officials also publicised that Shaykh 'Isa
Qassim,  based in Qom in the 1990s, guided Hezbollah in Bahrain, and that the 250-
strong network was only a small part of a labyrinthine network connected to Iran.1293
Similarly,  TV coverage was given to  a  group of  Shi‘a  youth who said they were
trained in Lebanon and called the Bahrain Hezbollah.1294 In 2014, Bahrain's foreign
minister  Shaykh  Khalid  bin  Ahmad  Al  Khalifa  said  Hezbollah  was  behind  an
explosion that killed a Jordanian officer working in Bahrain,1295 although given the
government's  attempts  to  forge  an  Iranian  link,  the  veracity  of  these  claims  is
disputed. In 2013, Erin Kilbride, an American teacher living in Bahrain, was deported
for  allegedly inciting  hatred  against  the  government  and ruling  family.  The BNA
published an image of her room, replete with a Hezbollah flag hanging on the wall.1296
Two days after the second anniversary of the 14th February uprising, the Ministry of
the Interior announced that they had arrested eight men who were part of a terror cell
with links to Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. 
During the uprising, there was a string of false stories claiming boats from
Iran, heading to Bahrain, had been intercepted. A Kuwaiti news portal claimed Qatari
authorities had intercepted an Iranian boat smuggling weapons to Bahrain.1297 (Qatar
later denied the story.)1298 On 21 March 2011, soon after the Uprising began, King
Hamad announced that a foreign plot had been foiled with the aid of Saudi troops. A
week later a Kuwaiti news site said that Qatari authorities had intercepted two Iranian
1292Ibid.
1293K. Evans, 'Bahrain plot “is led from Qom”', The Guardian, 12 June 1996.  
1294L. Bahry,  May 1997.  
1295 Reuters, 'Policeman killed in “terrorist” attack in Bahrain: interior ministry', 8 December 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/08/us-bahrain-security-policeman-
idUSKBN0JM25320141208 , (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1296Bahrain News Agency, 'Teacher with Links to Extremists Deported for Social Media Activities 
and Violation of Labor Laws', 10 August 2013, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/574672, 
(accessed 2 November 2015). 
1297H. Toumi, 'Qatar denies seizing Iran boat loaded with weapons', Gulf News, 23 January 2013, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-denies-seizing-iran-boat-loaded-with-weapons-
1.1136351, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1298Ibid.
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ships  carrying  weapons  to  Bahrain,  a   story  that  Qatar  again  denied.1299 On  12
November 2011, a few weeks before the release of the BICI report, the government
reported that they had discovered another terror cell with links to Iran.1300 A similar
report was released strategically the day before the National Assembly was dissolved
in August 1975. About 30 people were arrested from the National Liberation Front
and the People’s Front. Soon after, the weekly paper  al-Mawaqif (Points of View)
published an article claiming that a ship loaded with arms was intercepted as it headed
towards Bahrain. Many of those arrested also had ‘ pamphlets ready for distribution’.
The only difference about today’s ‘plotters’ is  that they are Shi‘a rather than left-
wing.1301
As well as these suspicious news stories, officials such as Sameera Rajab, the
Minister of State of Information,  propagate bizarre myths,  some of which beggar
belief.1302 These include mentioning that there were tunnels1303  to Iran dug under the
Pearl Roundabout, or that an Iranian drone had been found off the coast of Bahrain.1304
1305 In  another  instance,  Sameera  Rajab claimed protesters  were carrying Bahraini
flags with twelve points, reflecting their commitment to twelver1306 Shi‘a Islam, the
dominant strand in Iran. Sameera Rajab even went on Al Jazeera holding a photo of a
flag as evidence, even though the the flag in the photograph she was holding did not
have twelve points. The conspiracy reached such a pitch that the Arabic translation of
the  BICI  report  contained  mention  of  the  12-point-flag,  implying  high  level  and
influential forces were inserting anti-Iranian propaganda in an official document, and
1299 J. Bladd, 'Qatar denies seizing Iran ships carrying weapons', Arabian Business, 28 March 2011, 
www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-denies-seizing-iran-ships-carrying-weapons-390435.html, 
(accessed 10 October 2015). 
1300M. Singh, 'Terror Plot Foiled', Gulf Daily News, 13 November 2011, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=317594,  (accessed 10 
October 2015). 
1301A. Khalaf, 'A ship loaded with arms and explosives', Al-Waqt, 
http://bahrainonline.org/showthread.php?t=224765, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1302Lies of Samira bin Rajab, [online video], 
1303@busalmani, ' نفق في الدوار يودي على ايران و نفق في عذاري يودي العكر حشى اللي عندكم ارانب مو بشر كله تحت
طنبورها #نفق#البحرين#الرض#مسخره   #Bahrain' 23 October 2012, 
https://twitter.com/busalmani/status/260673433485062145 (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1304Fajr al-Bahrain, 'competition...enter and put in your information', [web 
forum]https://www.fajrbh.com/vb/threads/24682/ , (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1305Al Wasat, 'Iran deny sending unmanned aerial spy drone above Bahrain', 23 May 2013,  
http://www.alwasatnews.com/3911/news/read/774772/1.html, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1306Twelver Shiʿa Islam is the largest branch of Shiʿa Islam. The name reflects that its  adherents 
believe in twelve divinely ordained leaders, known as the Twelve Imams. 
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casting  doubts  about  the  integrity  of  the  report.1307 (Soon  afterwards,  the  Arabic
translation of the report was withdrawn).  The government also announced in 2013
that the February 14th Youth Coalition were backed by Hadi Al Mudarrasi, an exiled
Iraqi Cleric who had lived in Bahrain, and who was now living in Iran. Al Mudarrasi
had been accused of attempting to stir up unrest in Bahrain during the 1980s.1308 Other
sensationalised reports  include articles focusing on emotive topics like the role of
women and children,  claiming that they were being used as human shields in  the
villages. Faisal Fulad, of the Government run Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society
stated to the press that 'Iran-backed extremists are using children as human shields'.1309
In  a  video  alleging to  show a  police  raid  on  a  Bahrain  bomb-making lab,  a  one
thousand Iran Toman note was placed strategically on the table.1310
1307N. Toorani, 'Arabic Report of BICI Withdrawn', Gulf Daily News, 30 November 2011, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=318698, (accessed 2 
November 2014). 
1308 'Bahrain: Report on the carrying out of terrorism and the identity of the February 14 Movement', 
[online video], 12 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
feature=player_embedded&v=D_WBKYBXlY0 (accessed 10 October 2015). Translated from 
Arabic by the author.
1309S.S. Grewal, 'Children used as “human shields”' Gulf Daily News, 7 June 2013, 
http://archives.gdnonline.com/NewsDetails.aspx?date=04/07/2015&storyid=354827 
1310 'Bahrain Propaganda Machine is Turned up to Eleven', Marc Owen Jones, [web blog], 13 July 
2012, https://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/tag/timoney/, (accessed 5 November 2015). 
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The fetishization of the Shi‘a and Iranian threat, and the rise of sectarianism through
media channels, argues Al Naqeeb, is a particular feature of tribal monarchies, that
became more apparent both after the demise of Arab nationalism, to which they had
all  been hostile.  Al Naqeeb adds that  this  'tribal  consciousness'  is  becoming more
embedded,  and facilitated with rise  of  new media outputs.  Khuri  concurs that  the
regime exploit the polarities inherent in political unions,1311 and this is most easy along
sectarian lines, which explains the emphasis on focusing efforts at stigmatization on
the sectarian threat. Indeed, it is probably this trend, less so than the  fact Bahrain's
media recently appointed the Sameera Rajab as information minister, who has widely
reported as being pro-Saddam Hussein – a figure widely disdained by  many Shiʿa
everywhere.1312 Her anti-Shi‘a statements have previously caused much  trouble.  Yet
1311F. Khuri, p. 242. 
1312 D. Murphy, 'After Formula One Scrutiny, Bahrain Hires a Fan of Saddam Hussein to Improve its 
Image', The Christian Science Monitor, 25 April 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-
Watch/Backchannels/2012/0425/After-Formula-One-scrutiny-Bahrain-hires-a-fan-of-Saddam-
Hussein-to-improve-its-image, (accessed 5 November).
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Illustration 1: The figure holding the snakes wears a t-shirt with 'Bahrain' written on 
it. The caption on the right says 'Conflict with the Persian snakes', from @AAK_News
Instagram account, 6 November 2015,. https://www.instagram.com/p/9vSLy0JTzj/?
taken-by=aak_news, (accessed 8 November 2015). 
these  'pathological  symptoms'1313 of  mostly  Sunni  tribal  exclusivity  have  long
tentacles,  and  present  a  business  opportunity.  The  buttressing  of  such  existing
sectarian sensibilities with negative media framing has contributed to Bahrain Sunnis
adopting a government line in which they 'reject the position taken by Sunni liberals
that democratization would integrate the Shi’ah'.   Instead,  conservative Sunnis are
portraying 'democracy as a vehicle for the Shi’ah to seize power in Bahrain'.1314 As the
regime  rely  more  on  a  policy  of  divide  and  conquer,  that  creates  a  small  but
ideologically extreme core of support, inevitably repressive policy seeks to become
more draconian. Strengthened by the support of these Sunni conservatives, 'the regime
imposed  considerable  restrictions  and  harsh  discrimination  on  Shi’i  political
representation,  employment,  education  and,  for  the  first  time  in  Bahrain,  Shi’i
religious worship'. 1315 To this end, state media frequently attempts to dehumanise the
Shiʿa by referring to them as subhuman, such as spiders or snakes.




Illustration 2: The caption reads 'A Persian Dream'. Artist: Muharraqi. Sourced 
from @AAK_News Instagram Account, 8 November 2015, 
https://www.instagram.com/p/90OGq4JT2u/, (accessed 8 November 2015).  
Indeed,  despite  democratisation,  state-controlled  media  is  still  an  avenue  for
government repression. Reforms to the media post-2011 have done little to change
this.  The  creation  of  the  Higher  Media  Board  (HMB)  is  nothing  more  than  a
reorganization of  the censorship apparatus, with control of appointment in the hands
of  the  Al  Khalifa.  It  consists  of  seven  members,  'four  of  whom will  be  directly
appointed by the King, and one each appointed by the Prime Minister, President of the
Shura  Council,  and  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Minister'.1316 Thus,
recommendations from the BICI to  create  a  media body that  promotes  opposition
representation and tempers incitement to violence or hatred through the media have
not been implemented
Western PR Companies
To market the exogenous Iranian threat myth to the international community, Bahrain
turned  to  the  mostly  Washington  and  London-based  PR  companies,  marking  a
broadening of the repressive reach of the Bahrain government.  The idea here was
simple, legitimise the crackdown to the international community to diminish global
support for Bahrain's opposition, or at least allow Bahrain's Western allies to justify
any inactivity on their part.  Former British military officials and diplomats wrote a
number op-eds for various publications. Harold Walker,  the British Ambassador to
Bahrain between 1979 – 1981, stated in an op-ed for the Conservative Middle East
Council1317,  that  'the 1979 Islamic revolution'  and the impact of Iran has been the
single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion
into opposition politics'.1318However,  in a diplomatic cable written in 1980, Harold
Walker stated that, 'Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began, there have, as you know, been
virtually  no  visible  signs  of  support  among  the  Bahraini  Shia  for  the  Imam
Khomeini’.1319 In addition to Harold Walker suspiciously changing his tune, this PR
offensive by PR groups defending the Bahrain government was widespread. 
1316POMED, 'One Year Later'.
1317I was asked by the CMEC to write a piece on social media in Bahrain. My critical piece was 
rejected on the basis it did not fit with the Conservative support for the Bahrain Government 
1318H.B. Walker, 'Bahrain after the BICI', Conservative Middle East Council, 6 December 2011, 
http://cmec.org.uk/blog/bahrain-after-the-bici/, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1319H.B. Walker, The Shia in Bahrain.
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The reach of PR was also evident in the pages of the media. In a parliamentary
report commissioned to evaluate the UK's relationship with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
the Bahrain government's perspective on the events of 2011 were overrepresented. Of
the 30 submissions dealing with Bahrain in Part One of the report, 22 were submitted
by  organizations  or  individuals   either  paid  directly  by  the  Bahrain  government,
suspected  of  doing  PR  for  the  government,  or  British  officials  deemed  to  hold
establishment views on Britain's Foreign Affairs.1320 At least five relatively glowing
and separate testimonies were included from members of  the Bahrain Society,  an
organization  whose  previous  chairs  include  Harold  Walker,  and  Michael  Rice,  a
former PR expert whose company, the Michel Rice Group, was asked to cover the
dissolution of Bahrain's parliament in 1975 so that the Bahrain Government could
'present their case abroad'.1321 
The  role  of  British  elites  in  spreading  this  propaganda  was  drawn out  by
investigative work, including the monitoring of Bahrain's tendering contracts and the
US Foreign Registration Act. Other British officials, like retired British army officer
Graeme Lamb, whose company, G3, were contracted by the IAA in 2011 for £1.5
million, wrote at least 6 op-eds for newspapers, including the Guardian and the Times
of  London,  all  of  which  tried  to  put  spin  deflecting  criticism  from  the  Bahrain
government.1322 The main argument in his article for  the  Guardian article was, 'Of
course,  Bahrain  could  and  should  do  better.  But  Iran  is  a  bigger,  and  a  more
immediate  problem'.1323The emergence  of  these  sectarian  narratives  addresses  how
'different  political  interest  groups  attempt  to  control  and  respond  to  political
dissidence within particular countries',1324 and highlights 'how the salience of given
narratives  varies  over  time  and  place'  .1325Other  PR  companies  contracted  by  the
Bahrain  government  created  seemingly  independent  websites  and  social  media
1320M. Jones and J. Horne, FAC Submission Breakdown, Internal Document at Bahrain Watch, 2012, 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1puCoqyyMvPeJy1fWmVuGqIVOOzGcLs
LNuwo94ZFH0UM/edit?usp=sharing 
1321E.H. Noble, 26 August 1975.
1322Bahrain Watch, PR Watch, G3, https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/g3.php, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1323G. Lamb, 'Why narrowly cast the push for democracy as the “Arab Spring”?', The Guardian, 22 
February 2012,  http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/feb/22/democracy-arab-spring, 
(accessed 10 October 2015). 
1324M. M. Howard and M. R. Walters, 'Explaining the Unexpected: Political Science and the Surprises
of 1989 and 2011', vol. 12, no. 2, June 2014, p. 401. 
1325Ibid.
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accounts to attempt to influence public opinion, by arranging meeting with influential
Western government officials.1326 In total, the Bahraini government spent about $32
million between 2010 and 2012 on PR companies.
Fig 10: Summary of frames of how the opposition and government were constructed
Demonising Protesters Exonerating the Government 
• The opposition protesters are 
wolves in sheep’s clothing who 
may be calling for democracy, but
are actually backed by Iran and 
want to impose a Shi‘a theocracy;
• The February 14th Youth 
Movement in particular are 
violent radicals
• The opposition's values are 
backward and conservative, and 
they are sectarian 
• Any violence carried out by 
security forces against protesters 
is always only in reaction to 
violence carried out by protesters, 
labelled as “terrorists” or 
“vandals“
• The country is not ruled by an 
autocrat, but by an enlightened 
monarchy shepherding its subjects
towards democracy;
• Torture and police abuse is not 
systematic, but is the result of just
a few bad apples rather than the 
orders of any senior officials
• The government has made 
amends for any mistakes it made 
last year.
Social Media
The rise of social media has increased the opportunities for the government and pro-
government forces to attempt to stigmatize opposition or spread propaganda. This was
particular commonly on articles published on online news sites that were critical of
the  regime;  before  long,  tens  of  accounts  would  'astroturf'  the  comments  section,
criticising  the  author  or  'debunking'  the  criticism.    In  2011,  myself  and  another
activist  discovered  that  a  PR  company  paid  for  by  the  Bahrain  government  had
created a fake journalist persona called Liliane Khalil13271328, who wrote an extensive
op-ed  published  on the  site  of  the  author  Reza  Khalil,  noting  how human  rights
1326 Bahrain Watch, 'Bahrain Govt Hires 18 Western Companies to Improve Image after Unrest', 23 
August 2013, (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1327This story was broadcast on Al Jazeera and France 24. See  M.O. Jones, ‘The hunt for 
#LilianeKhalil’, Al Jazeera English, 4 August 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgCp15kVggI 
1328Despite her singular mention, the investigation into Liliane Khalil was extensive and painstaking. 
At the time, with the rise of issues like the 'Gay Girl of Damascus', the issue was very revelatory in 
determing the dangers of social media and what sources to rely on.
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activist  Abdulhadi  Al  Khawaja,  and  BCHR,  were  essentially  an  Iranian-linked
clandestine  operation.  At  the  time,  this  was  the  first  real  insight  into  how  PR
companies were generating patently false stories that sought to emphasise the Iran
angle.  Authors working for the same outlets have also published pieces criticising
vocal human rights activists in an attempt to stigmatise and discredit their views. One
site ranked prominent activists and commentators on Bahrain according to their 'troll'
level,1329 suggesting that HR activists were somehow disingenuous, attention seeking,
opportunistic, and fat.1330 Erin Kilbride notes that loyalist accounts insult opposition
figures  by making references  to  their  sexuality  or  promiscuity  'in  order  to  place
opposition leaders on the extreme fringes of Bahraini society and depict their work for
civil rights as deviant and foreign to Bahrain'.13311332 
Social media has also provided opportunities for an ostensibly bottom up form
of  repression,  creating  a  fertile  breeding  ground  for  this  alleged  evidence  of  an
Iranian-backed  plot.  Such  grass  roots  conspiracies  were  appropriated  by  the
government to fit their diplomatic strategy.  This was most notably demonstrated by
the aforementioned Twelve Point Flag Conspiracy propagated by Sameera Rajab. :
The  12  point  flag  conspiracy  started  as  a  video,  which  was  then  circulated  on
YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and other messaging services. It quickly received 18,400
views, and was given an air of credibility when a number of online commentators,
including one studying for a PhD in Law at  Leeds University,  confirmed without
evidence that some loyalist students at the University of Bahrain were being bullied
into  taking  down  the  official  Bahraini  flag  and  told  to  put  one  up  with  twelve
1329Bahrainwatch, 'Bahrain: Please don't feed these trolls', [web blog], June 2012, 
https://bahrainwatch.wordpress.com/2012/06/08/bahrain-please-dont-feed-these-trolls/ ,  (accessed 
10 October 2015).  
1330http://www.bahrainviews.com/?p=170 [taken down] 
1331E. Kibride, '”Too Gay to Represent Bahrain”': Homophobia and Nationalism in the Wake of a 
Revolution', Muftah, 15 December 2014, http://muftah.org/homophobia-and-nationalism-in-
bahrain/#.VjY7hCsl-ao 
1332Kilbride writes, 'Political opposition leaders have received the same sort of crude, homophobic, 
and even transphobic attacks. Photoshopped images feature Sheikh ‘Ali Salman, leader of Bahrain’s
largest opposition party, al Wefaq, dressed in drag sporting a pink tutu and sash that reads “Ms. 
Iran.” Others reckon that Salman’s Twitter handle, @wefaqGS, stands for “Wefaq Gay Salman” 
rather than the actual name, “Wefaq General Secretary.” The@WatchBahrain cartoon series, which 
levels vitriol against prominent Bahraini opposition and international rights activists, labels the 
group “Al Wefag. - E. Kilbride, '”Too Gay to Represent Bahrain”': Homophobia and Nationalism in 
the Wake of a Revolution', Muftah, 15 December 2014, http://muftah.org/homophobia-and-
nationalism-in-bahrain/#.VjY7hCsl-ao 
266 
points.1333 Another Bahraini, a member of the ruling family, and a former professor of
international relations, stated on Twitter: 'Do you know what’s the story behind the 12
edged flag? Well, all I can say is that majority of Shi‘a in #Bahrain are Twelvism
Shi‘a.  Research  it’.1334 Encouraged  by  a  climate  of  uncertainty  and  fear,  and
legitimised by credible members of the online community and the government, the
conspiracy’s impact was surprising.
Naturally the 12 point flag controversy highlighted the increase of a sectarian
discourse that has long been been bubbling under the surface. The extent to which
those propagating the discourse were government operated accounts or citizens within
and without Bahrain cannot be determined, although an investigation by members of
Bahrain  Watch,  including  Bill  Marczak,   found  evidence  that  suggested  that  the
Bahraini  government  was  operating  social  media  accounts  spouting  extremist
discourse. Bill Marczak notes, 'If the Government did indeed run these accounts, this
would raise  serious  questions about  to what  extent  the Government  is  inciting its
supporters  — and  the  opposition  — to  violence'.1335 One  of  the  most  pernicious
occurrences  was  the  7areghum  Twitter  account,  which  paved  the  way  for  the
propagation of sectarian discourse. These tweets, and those from similar accounts, set
the tone for the sectarian discourse, which had previously been generally present on
YouTube  videos  of  political  violence  in  Bahrain.  Derogatory  terms  like  Majūsi,
Rawāfiḍ,  Ṣafawi,  and Walad/abna'  al-Mutʿa1336.  Importantly though, it  shows how
playing the sectarian card, whether the will of a small cabal, or a broader government
strategy, creates the potential for violent escalation in pursuit of repressive goals. The
opposition were also portrayed as utilising international linkages to undermine the
regime. In one instance, a fake Wikileaks cable that appeared to originate on a loyalist
1333 @Kalfadhel,  'Many UOB students were bullied to take off the official  Bahraini  flag (with 5
points)  and  replace  it  with  the',  12  March  2011,
https://twitter.com/KAlFadhel/status/46576218627248128, (accessed 10 January 2015). 
1334F. Desmukh, 'Myths and Lies in the Bahrain Infowars', [ web blog], 11 April 2011, 
http://revolutionbahrain2.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/myths-and-lies-in-bahrain-infowars.html, 
1335B. Marczak, ‘Is Bahrain’s government running extremist accounts?’, Bahrain Watch blog, 5 August 
2013, https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2013/ 08/05/is-bahrains-government-running-extremist-accounts/ 
1336Majūsi, meaning Zoroastrian, is a derogatory term often used by Sunnis to describe Shi‘a. 
Rawāfiḍ,, meaning rejecter, is often used by Sunnis to mean one who rejects the true Islamic 
authority and leadership.   ṣafawiis another term derogatory term directed Shi‘a – it comes from 
'Safavid, the Iranian dynasty that made the state religion of Iran Shi‘a Islam.  Walad/abna' al mut'a 
literally means children of mut'a. Muta'a is a type of temporary marriage that some Muslims  argue 
is immoral.
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internet forum was used by two state newspapers as the basis of a story accusing the
critical  Sunni  MP Osama  Al-Tammimi  of  supplying  the  US Ambassador  Thomas
Krajeski with private parliamentary documents and asking for US citizenship.1337 
Surveillance 
The Growth and Increasing Importance of Surveillance 
Khuri notes that the Al Khalifa could  name every family in Bahrain, and their history.
Yet the seventies represented a time when there was increasing distance between not
just the Al Khalifa and the baḥārna, but also the Al Khalifa and the traditional upper
middle class merchants. The necessity of information in keeping the security forces
informed of oppositional activities became more acute as opposition developed more
sophisticated  structures,  and  also  as  the  process  of  modernization  and  reform
eviscerated the Al Khalifa's traditional ability to maintain a knowledge of what was
1337 B. Marczak, 'The “Trivially Fake” Wikileaks Cable that fooled Bahrain's Press and Parliament', 
Bahrain Watch, [web blog], 12 September 2013, https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2013/09/12/the-
trivially-fake-wikileaks-cable-that-fooled-bahrains-press-and-parliament/, (accessed 5 October 
2015). 
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Illustration 3: Cartoon from a blogger and Tweep '@WatchBahrain' whose series of 
drawings tried to show that Human Rights activists were doing the Iran's bidding
going on in Bahrain. While  British tactics of surveillance overseas were then brought
to  Bahrain  by  Henderson,  highlighting  how  policing  experience  in  the  'colonies'
informed practise elsewhere, tactics of infiltration had been used by the ruler since as
early as the 1920s. The ruler had 'secret agents'1338 - in village communities since, the
1920s (most likely the ruler's 'special proteges among the Baharinah'1339 - that S.G.
Knox once called 'myrmidons'). In 1965, Bahrain recruited Colonel Henderson, who
pioneered methods of infiltrating the Mau Mau during his tenure as head of security in
Kenya.  By  capturing,  co-opting,  and  turning  members  of  opposition  groups,
Henderson formed 'pseudo-gangs' or 'counter-gangs' who would then infiltrate these
networks, professionalising this structure of infiltration. Again, Britain's experience of
control strategies garnered in other corners of the empire were brought to bear in
Bahrain. 
In  1980,  Special  Branch  described  how  surveillance  was  foundational  for
controlling the National Liberation Front, a cell-structured, USSR influenced, Marxist
political organization who had formed in 1955: 'in 1968, it was penetrated at all levels
by the Bahrain Security Forces, and its organised structure was destroyed'.1340At the
time, any former exiles or political  dissidents were potential  suspects,  and closely
monitored by the  security forces  following Henderson's  appointment.  Robert  Tesh
wrote in 1973 how those  that drifted back from exile were  'closely watched and
occasionally detained by the Security Forces'.1341  In the run up to the election for
National  Assembly,  Special  Branch were even  'keeping track'  of  the activities of
'would-be members', 1342 highlighting the government's paranoia about the democratic
turn.   In 1975, the British noted that 'a million pounds is being allocated to setting up
student  officers  in  foreign  universities  presumably to  try  to  control  their  political
activities'.1343
Even after the British began losing their influence in matters of security policy,
the role of the British in maintaining the efficacy of the intelligence apparatus was
frequently mentioned as a necessity in preserving stability in Bahrain. The 'efficient
and loyal Special Branch are run by Britons, because no Bahraini could do it. These
1338C.K. Daly, 30 September 1923, RoB, vol. 4, p. 136. 
1339S.G. Knox, 'Report on Bahrain Reforms', p. 779. 
1340 Bahrain Special Branch, 'The Bahrain National Liberation Front (NLF)', FCO8/3489, TNA.
1341 R.M. Tesh, 'Bahrain: Annual review for 1973
1342RM Tesh, 'Bahrain Internal', 18 November 1973, FCO 8/1975, TNA. 
1343RM Tesh, Bahrain Internal, 1 March 1975.
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are now coming under attack (not, as yet, seriously) . They have at last been given the
protection  of Bahraini Minister of the Interior'..1344Indeed, the British were very keen
to maintain control of Special Branch, as they feared that 'Bahraini control of Special
Branch could provoke civil  unrest'.1345The British,  for their  own part  then,  saw an
efficient, British-run Special Branch as a bulwark between the local population and
the  ruling  core.  The absence  of  the  British,  they argued,  would  be  disastrous  for
Bahrain.  Yet while it is fashionable to criticise Henderson's role, and argue that he
was foundational to security in Bahrain, the reality is that while important to Bahrain's
security, his apparatus was subservient to the Al Khalifa core and his control over
Special Branch was limited by external interference. 
Surveillance policy changed following the assassination of Al-Madani in 1976,
and  leftists  in  particular,1346 who  had  been  closely  observed  without  being
interrogated, were now hauled in for often brutal interrogation. This was accompanied
by a  shift  in  political  control  of  the  security  apparatus.   With  the  side-lining  of
Henderson  and  Bell,  and  the  ascendency  of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Shi‘a  were
particular  targets,  especially  in  the  early  80s;  'The  security  forces  took  some
precautionary steps to emphasise their close surveillance of Shi‘a meetings and these
appear to have had the desired effect'.1347 In addition to this, 'The Shi‘a clergy were
also  closely monitored',  by the  security services,1348 especially   during  Ashura.  In
addition to being closely monitored, muezzins were rewarded with a 50% pay rise as
'trouble  blew  itself  out'  in  19791349,  the  implication  being  that  they  were  being
rewarded  for  remaining  politically  on  message.  Although  some  attributed  the
efficiency of the surveillance apparatus to uncovering the coup in 1981, a British note
scribbled on a document mentioned that Hamad had told the Jordanians that the coup
had been discovered 'by chance', highlighting an element of confusion as to the true
nature of what actually happened.1350 Following the coup attempt, the efficiency of
Bahrain's  security  forces  was  bolstered  by  Saudi  and  UAE  money,  extending
1344 R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Annual review for 1973
1345P.F.M. Wogan, Iran and the Gulf'.
1346E. F. Given, Prospects for Bahrain.
1347 R.M. Tomkys, Bahrain Internal, 30 October 1982, FCO 8/4332.
1348S.M.J. Lamport, 'Bahrain Security, 8 March 1982. 
1349 H.B. Walker, Bahrain: Annual Review for 1979
1350 H.D.A.C. Miers, Attempted coup in Bahrain.
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Bahrain's capabilities beyond what would be expected for such a small state.1351 
The  regime's  distrust  of  the  Shi‘a  evolved  into  embedding  even  more
repressive structures, and any sign of unrest prompted a deepening of the process of
administrative  surveillance.  In  1996,  in  the  midst  of  the  unrest,  the  government
divided the country into four muhafidhahs (provinces), each  with a governor directly
responsible  to  the  Ministry of  the  Interior.  Accordingly,  one  of  the  duties  was to
maintain public order and security,  and each governor could appoint an unlimited
number  of  mukhtars responsible  to  him.  As  Bahry  notes,  the  'multitude  of  local
mukhtars gives the government intensified security control over villages as well as
urban areas'.1352  On the defensive by the unrest, the government made administrative
reforms that further increased their power over Shi‘a religious elements. This mainly
took  the  form of  exercising  further  control  over  the  Shi‘a  clerical  establishment.
While the ministry of justice already 'nominates the imams in the Sunni mosques,
pays their salaries, and promotes or fires them',1353 the Shi‘a, on the other hand, had
been outside the reach of the government, yet the new decree would mean that all
clerical appointments would be overseen by the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs,
who would screen Shi‘a nominations for clerical positions, as well as deciding on
expenditure  for  Shi‘a  mosques  and  matams.1354 The  decree  also  allowed  the
government to direct scholarships towards students, allowing them to control where
they  received  their  theology  education,  potentially  steering  them  away  from
unfriendly countries like Iran. This continued the historical trend of masking regime
strengthening as progressive reform. 
Despite the political reforms of 2001, this surveillance network of informants
has continued to the current day, yet it is the Shi‘a villages that are still scrutinized. In
a  meeting  with  the  former  US  Ambassador,  'Jawad  scoffed  at  the  government's
distrust of Shi‘a in the security forces, claiming that the police have hired numerous
Shi‘a to work undercover in the villages, and these Shi‘a have always worked loyally
for the government'.13551356 In 2010, the BCHR told Human Rights Watch that there
1351 S. P. Collis, 16 January 1982.
1352L. Bahry,  1997.
1353Ibid.
1354Ibid. 
1355W.T. Monroe,'Prominent Shias Paint Gloomy Picture of Shia Outlook in Bahrain'.
1356It is worth noting that the Al Khalifa have long relied on co-opted baḥārna to assist their 
domination. In 1923 Daly talks of how baḥārna Waziers were appointed to sublet Al Khalifa plots 
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were 'no Bahraini Shi‘a in the ranks of the Special Security Forces, and that the only
Bahraini Shi‘a working for the NSA are a small number of informants and persons
holding low-level positions'.1357In 2012, Jane Kinninmont wrote that this apparatus is
often coerced into place, and that Shiʿa 'refusing to act as informants were beaten,
slashed with  box-cutters,  burned with  cigarette  lighters,  or  threatened with  sexual
assault'.1358 While  this  network  of  informants  or  'psuedo-gangs'  remains  from
Henderson's days, there is evidence to suggest that the initial idea that such groups
would  serve  to  mitigate  against  employing  more  coercive  forms  of  repression,
implying that the methods of coercing people into becoming informants have changed
since pseudo-gangs were implemented. In 2011 foreign expertise was brought in to
increase the effectiveness of surveillance, and CCTV cameras were installed around
the country, but particularly outside Shi‘a villages. This policy reflected the advisory
influence of the British John Yates. For Yates, 'CCTV is everywhere [and is] utterly
fantastic'.1359 Police  units  dispatched  to  protests  and  other  incidents  often  have  a
cameraman  present  recording  protesters.  As  Horne  notes,  'this  is  reminiscent  of
British Forward  Intelligence  Teams,  used  to  help  police  identify  and  monitor
protesters, whose details are then stored on a database'.1360 So while intelligence does
not seem to be replacing coercion, but merely augmenting it, the tactics have become
more commonplace, highlighting a deepening of the surveillance apparatus through
the creation of multiple levels of observation. 
Bahrain's  security  forces  have  long  used  surveillance  to  monitor  students
studying abroad. In 1977, the British noted that 'students abroad continue to furnish a
resevoir of dissidents', but they also mentioned that Bahrain's student organisations
were ''fairly well penetrated by the security forces'.1361 This trend of targeting students
continued in the 1990s: 'Bahraini students studying abroad, and relatives of political
opposition activists or suspects are often subject to arrest and detention on their return
of land and to extort the baḥārna farmers. See 'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [158r] 
(320/412), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/713, in Qatar 
Digital Library <http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100023385511.0x000079> [accessed 4 
November 2015]
1357Human Rights Watch, Torture Redux.
1358J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, p. 12. 
1359 J. Horne, 'Policing Bahrain: the long arm of the British', Open Democracy, 8 August 2013, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/john-horne-john-lubbock/policing-bahrain-long-arm-
of-british (accessed 10 October 2015). 
1360Ibid.
1361 E.F. Given, Bahrain Round Up, 20 June 1977, FCO 8/2872, TNA. 
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to Bahrain'.1362 As Amnesty note, 'Many have been subjected to torture or threats in
order to force them to cooperate with the authorities, reporting back on the activities
and friends of particular individuals. Detainees are apparently left in no doubt that if
they fail to comply, they may be held indefinitely'.1363In the 2011 uprising, Bahraini
students studying in Britain complained of harassment by the Bahraini authorities. In
2011, at least nine students in Britain said that their £850 subsistent grants and tuition
fees  had  been  axed.  One  student  noted  how  the  Bahraini  Ministry  of  Education
informed his father that they had video footage of his son attending a rally in the UK.
They asked the father to order the son home.1364 . The reach of this fear of surveillance
is also compounded by Britain's historic support of the Al Khalifa regime. Jaafar Al
Hasabi notes that the threat of surveillance was extended as far as London, after two
activists were attacked on their way home.1365 He noted that activists in London did
not feel safe anymore, because of spying, and other means. He believed that Britain's
relationship with  Bahrain meant  that  anything said  here could  be relayed back to
Bahrain, and that the behind the scenes relationship between Bahrain and Britain were
such  that  activists  felt  threatened.  He  noted  considerable  behavioural  changes,
including how he would often be careful on the telephone, and only speak to people
via face-to-face to interaction, undermining the democratic potential of technology.
The combination of actual surveillance, the threat of surveillance as Marx notes, and
the  visible  grisly  consequences  of  engaging  in  dissent,  all  combined  to  create  a
climate of fear that lessened, for some people,  their  will  to engage in contentious
activity, whether in the UK or Bahrain.1366
Government Spying
New technologies, while providing opportunities for resistance, have been targeted by
the government in an attempt to undermine tactics of anonymity used by activists.
Bahrain Watch revealed that at least eleven activists were put in jail in 2012-2013 for
1362Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, p. 6.
1363Amnesty International, Bahrain: Violations of Human Rights, p. 9.
1364R. Booth and J. Sheffer, 'Bahrain regime accused of harassing UK-based students', The Guardian, 
15 April 2011,  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/bahrain-regime-uk-students , 
(accessed 10 October 2015). 
1365J. Al Hasabi, 'Privacy Extra: Jaafar Al Hasabi and Marc Owen Jones Discuss Bahrain and 
Surveillance', [online video], 19 Marc 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ViK48BX24U 
(accessed 20 October 2015). 
1366 Ibid. 
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referring to King Hamad as a 'dictator' (tāghiyya) or a 'fallen one' (saqiṭ) in Arabic.1367
Their details were obtained by using the internet, and it was often social media that
was used as the medium of delivery. These attacks, most likely carried out by Minister
of Interior's Cyber Crime Unit, were fairly crude, and sought to identify the poster's IP
address, which are assigned every time they use the  internet via a local provider (e.g.
Batelc, Zain, Menatelecom).  Because 'Bahraini law requires that every time an IP
address  is  assigned,  the  internet  service  provider  must  record  the  name  of  the
subscriber of the internet connection, as well as the date and time',1368 IP addresses
offer a wealth of information about the target. This information but be kept for at least
one year, and the 'security forces must be able to directly access this information at
any time'. 1369 As a result, targets would be compromised if they clicked on malicious
links generated from freely available online services  sent out by government operated
Twitter and Facebook accounts. Malicious links were also sent out  through 'e-mail,
and likely via other services including YouTube, InstaMessage, and mobile messaging
services including BlackBerry Messenger and WhatsApp'.1370 Some activists were sent
malicious links from  opposition or activist accounts that appear to have been hacked
by government  agents.1371 The  government  used  'IP spying'  on  'journalists,  labour
unions, human rights groups, activists, licensed opposition groups... whistleblowers,
Sunni groups, vigilantes, and even residents opposed to the seizure of their homes to
build a government housing project'.1372
The  growing  relevance  of  European-made  surveillance  technology  was
highlighted when it was revealed that the Ministry of the Interior was using FinSpy,
malware  developed  by  UK-Based  Gamma  International,  to  spy  on  opposition
members. Finspy can, without the user knowing 'take remote control of a computer,
copy its  files, activate the microphone, take screenshots, intercept Skype calls, and
log every keystroke'.1373  Other people perceived as political dissidents were infected
1367Bahrain Watch, The IP spy files: How Bahrain's government silences anonymous online 







1373M.O. Jones, 'Social media, surveillance and cyberpolitics in the Bahrain Uprising', in A. Shehabi 
and M.O. Jones, M. (eds), Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf, London, Zed 
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after opening malicious files disguised as banal email attachments, including Ibrahim
Sharif,  the Sunni  head of the country's  liberal  Wa'ad party,  Muhammad al-Tajir,  a
prominent human rights lawyer, Hadi al-Musawi, head of Al Wefaq's Human Rights
Department,  and Hasan Mushaymaʿ, an incarcerated opposition leader adopted by
Amnesty International  as  a  prisoner  of  conscience.1374 A number  of  activists  were
targeted when FinSpy was attached to an email that appeared to come from Al Jazeera
journalist Melissa Chan. 1375 Some of Bahrain's most prominent lawyers, activists, and
politicians,  were  targeted  by Finspy.  Sai'd  Shehabi  'as  also  among three  Bahraini
exiles granted asylum in the UK to have their computers targeted, illustrating how
Bahrain's  repressive  reach  extends  well  beyond  its  borders.  Others  residing  in
Belgium and Germany were also targeted.1376 Vulnerabilities were also exploited in the
social media app Zello, which allows people to use their phones like walkie talkies:
Fifteen activists were arrested after being lured to a  meeting arranged by the police
who had posted the message through the account of a compromised member. The
police then posted messages via the app saying that they would come and get the
activists, 'one by one'.1377  In an Q and A at a presentation on Bahrain at LSE in 2011,
one  Bahraini  activist  claimed  that  those  who  were  arrested  were  asked  for  their
Facebook or Twitter login details, and threatened when they did not comply. Indeed,
while  it  is  important  to  note  the  liberalising  or  democratising  potential  of  new
technologies, the Bahrain authorities have been successful in utilising it is a counter-
revolutionary and repressive measure. Other British companies such as Olton, also
contracted by the Bahraini Government, have advertised their products as being able
to use social media to target ringleaders and thus stave off unrest. 1378 In an interview,
Books Ltd, 2015, p. 247. 
1374F. Desmukh, 'Bahrain Government Hacked Lawyers and Activists with UK Spyware', Bahrain 
Watch, [web blog], 7 August 2014, https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/08/07/uk-spyware-used-to-
hack-bahrain-lawyers-activists/, (accessed 31 Decembr 2014). 
1375W. Marczak and M. Marquis-Boire, 'From Bahrain With Love: FinFisher’s Spy Kit Exposed?', 
Citizenlab, 25 July 2012, https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love-finfishers-spy-kit-
exposed/, (accessed 31 December 2014). 
1376European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 'Gamma/FinFisher: No investigation into 
German-British software company', 12 December 2014, http://www.ecchr.de/surveillance-
technology/articles/human-rights-organisations-file-oecd-complaints-against-surveillance-firms-
gamma-international-and-trovicor.html, (accessed 31 December 2014). 
1377W. Marczak, 'Bahrain Watch Issues Urgent Advice for Activists to Stop Using @Zello Due to 
Security Flaw', Bahrain Watch, [web blog], 7 September 2014, 
https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/09/07/bahrain-watch-issues-urgent-advice-for-activists-to-stop-
using-zello-due-to-security-flaw/, (accessed 31 December 2014). 
1378M.O. Jones, 'Social Media and Surveillance..'
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an ex-employee mentioned that part of their mandate was to dig up publicly available
information  on  oppositional  elements  as  defined  by  their  clients  and  use  it  to
blackmail them.1379
Social Media, Rhizomatic Control and Sousveillance
In an age where the relevance of controlling digital networks and information systems
is becoming integral to state security, and surveillance more and more embedded into
technologies, the Bahrain government and pro-government loyalists have sought to
use the internet and technologies to extend their digital surveillance network and the
Bahrain government were early adopters of Twitter accounts. Aware that social media
poses a challenge to the regime’s ability to control its image, the regime issued Social
Media Awards in a grand ceremony.1380 The move was an attempt to confer legitimacy
and credibility on certain news sources on Twitter and Facebook, and was preceded by
warnings  to  avoid  spurious  social  media  sources  and  only  listen  to  official
governments ones.  
Unsurprisingly,  one of the winners  was the Ministry of the Interior  (MoI).
While  the  MOI's  account  tended  to  publish  news  without  interacting  with  other
people, this did not stop people from interacting with the MoI. In the first half of 2011
in particular, its  pro-regime supporters would often use Twitter to inform the MoI of
people, especially others Tweeps, whom they thought were opposition 'traitors'. This
example, shows someone reporting the person with the Twitter handle @hussainm89;
Dear @moi_bahrain can you please arrest this MOFO Hussain Mirza born 1989, he is
a traitor'. In another example, a prominent Tweep at the time encouraged this type of
behaviour; 'If u have any names or information about any traitor or terrorist, kindly
send it to @moi_bahrain no need to expose his family & children'.1381 The effect this
fear of surveillance had was made clear by several informants. One informant stated;
'Be careful Marc. Don’t argue a lot. A lot of people from MoI on Twitter. And if you
mention the king justice etc, you might be unable to enter the country. Just be careful
1379Interview with former employee, 2014. 
1380Bahrain News Agency, 'Shaikh Fawaz Presents Social Media Awards', 8 February 2012, 
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/493277, (accessed 2 November 2015).
1381@adelmaymoon, 'If u have you any names or information about any traitor or terrorist, kindly 
send it to @moi_bahrain no need to expose his family & children', [Tweet by @adelmaymoon], 1 
May 2011, https://twitter.com/adelmaymoon/status/64784728217223168 , (accessed 10 October 
2015). 
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plz'.1382 In many instances, especially in 2011 accounts like 7areghum would circulate
images of protesters or activists, circle their heads, brand them traitors, and ask for
personal information such as name, address, and telephone number. Such a tactic was
effective in a small, island community like Bahrain, and soon people mentioned by
7araghum would go into hiding. 
In March 2011, some prominent Tweeps were targeted in this way. A photo of
‘web terrorists’ was circulated on Twitter, it included Manaf al-Muhandis, Mahmud
Yusif  and  Muhammad  Masqati.1383 After  the  circulation  of  the  document,  these
bloggers  were  subsequently arrested.  A year  after  his  release,  Manaf  al-Muhandis
Tweeted, ''Today is the anniversary of my detainment. Just because someone posted
my picture on Facebook'.1384 Following their release, none of them tweeted anything
controversial or  political for a considerable time.  ʿAli  ʿAbd al-Imam, a prominent
blogger,  was sentenced to 15 years in prison for ‘spreading false information and
trying to subvert the regime’.1385 However, he escaped the island in 2013 after finding
a way to get from Bahrain to Britain. As their account were becoming trusted, the
above arrests reduced the amount of credible online activism, prompting much fear
among other online activists, who were far more reluctant to tweet anything critical of
the regime – at least without using a pseudonym. Some informants stated that their
family had pressured them not to use social media such as Twitter for fear of arrest.
One informant stated: 'I used to Tweet but then when some of my friends got arrested
my father sat me down and gave me a looong [sic]  talk, guilting me into deleting all
my tweets'. One informant reported that her father, a former influential banker, was
messaged by a former colleague to ask if he could do as much as he could to get a
traitor removed after he was mentioned by 7areghum.
Accounts  like @7areghum demonstrate  the potential  pitfalls  of what  Mann
calls ‘personal sousveillance’, that is, the use of technology such as social media to
document one’s own day-to-day experience. Bahraini activists, sharing their collective
joy  at  reaching  the  Pearl  Roundabout,  took  images  of  themselves  celebrating.
However, such seemingly banal yet defiant and political ‘personal sousveillance’  can
1382 Exchange with Twitter user during March 2011.
1383 M.O. Jones, ‘Social media, surveillance, and social control in the Bahrain Uprising’.
1384 @Redbelt, 'Today is the anniversary of my detainment'. 
1385 Global Voices Advocacy, 'Remembering ‘Ali Abdulemam', 7 November 2011, 
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2011/11/07/remembering-ali-abdulemam/, (accessed 7 October 
2015). 
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be  re-appropriated  by  the  regime  and  its  supporters  and  used  as  part  of  its  own
surveillance apparatus.1386 This is nowhere more evident than in Bahrain, where the
increasing polarization of society has resulted in citizens using social media as a tool
of peer-to-peer to surveillance. 
Conclusion 
Informational  control  strategies  have  deepened intensely over  the  past  fifty years,
although the recent uprising has demonstrated that social media in particular can be
appropriated by counter-revolutionary forces as a tool of repression, highlighting the
importance of non-state actors in repression. Certainly,  information control strategies
shift according to changing international contexts. Bahrain's Independence, the Iran-
Iraq War, and the Iranian Revolution created a situation in which the regime became
increasingly suspicious of the country's Shi'a population. Undoubtedly, Bahrain's shift
into the orbit of Saudi Arabia contributed to enabling this fear of the Shi‘a as a threat.
As such, surveillance strategies,  propaganda campaigns, and media framing attempts,
have led to an increase in anti-Iranian and anti-Shi‘a rhetoric.   It also seems clear that
elite opinion makers are close to the media industry itself, and that the Al  Khalifa
ruling  elite  exercise  an  enormous  amount  of  control  over  media  output,  whether
through unofficial means such as the Khawalid, or through institutions such as the
Supreme Media Council.  This raises the alarming question of to what extent elite
perceptions  of  the  Shi‘a  as  an  underclass  are  now  being  indoctrinated  into,  and
perpetuated  by,  future  generations   of  Bahrainis?  Importantly  though,  information
control has increasingly become an operation in which multiple actors outside the
state are involved, from cyber vigilantes,  to international corporations that include
Western PR companies or  surveillance specialists.   'Crucial  to all  this  will  be the
Government's will to insist on retaining the means of knowing what is going on, and
controlling subversion – ie an effective security service with good morals'. 1387
1386 Ibid. 
1387R.M. Tesh, Bahrain: Internal, 18 December 1973.
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Conclusion 
 'Revolution is unlikely to succeed as long as the Kingdom of Saudi
remains intact'.1388
This  thesis  has  sought  to  explore  Bahrain's  modern  history  through  the  lens  of
repression in order to better understand 1) what constitutes repression 2) why certain
methods  are  used,  and  3)  what  role  Bahrain's  external  actors  have  played  in
constructing the repressive apparatus and influencing methods of repression. Through
answering  the  first  part  with  an  expansive  definition  of  repression,  organized
according to the master categories of  statecraft, personal integrity violations, legal
repression,  and informational  control,  we have  been able  to  garner  insights  into
particular aspects of repressiveness and the reasons for its use, from the growth of
repressive law and the rhizomatic growth of social media surveillance, to political
strategies designed to provide facade safety valves without power sharing. The thesis
has  also  highlighted  the  deficiency of  broad  causal  models,  indicating  that  more
academic attention needs to be dedicated to how repressiveness is deeply dependent
on contextual, temporal, and other factors. These include; the attitude or ideology of
elites, the weakness or strength of the coercive apparatus, the availability of resources
(whether technical, monetary, or political will), the perception of threat, the nature of
the threat, the technologies available and, crucially, the intentions of foreign actors. 
Revisionism, historic injustice and repressive cycles
The application of  the repression template  to  Bahrain's  history has brought  to  the
surface new facts about  Bahrain's history. While these have been detailed throughout,
there  have  been  some  notable  historical  trends.  In  particular,  the  examination  of
political  trials  suggests  the  regime  has  routinely  imprisoned  or  executed  political
criminals with little due process or evidence. This is especially true with regards to
those accused of killing al-Madani in 1976, the St. Helena three and the trial of those
1388W.R. Tomkys, 4 February 1982. 
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accused of attempting to assassinate Shaykh Hamad in 1926. 
This thesis has, in particular, revised historical accounts of the aforementioned
assassination attempt of Shaykh Hamad. It seems that Charles Belgrave acted as a true
eminence grise, throwing members of the Khawalid family under the bus in order to
preserve the utility of ʿAbd Allah Al Khalifa, who was actually the prime suspect in
the  case.  To the  best  of  my knowledge,  this  fact  has  never  been revealed  in  the
substantial scholarship on Bahrain during the first part of the 20 th century. Even now,
such facts remain remarkably pertinent, as they throw into sharp relief  the current
tendency to focus on the role of the Khawalid, whose recent rise to power has been
described  by  journalist  Charles  Levinson  as  partly  the  result  of  wounds  that
'festered'1389 in  the  decades  following  the  various  trials  of  the  1920s.  The  close
examination of these trials, whether it be that of ʿIsa Qambar or those deported to St.
Helena, reveal what appear to be systemic attempts to subvert justice undertaken in
order to preserve the interests of the status quo.  Such new insights provide interesting
examples of those fleeting moments in which the motivations for particular repressive
choices  can  be discerned. They also demonstrate the cyclical  tendency of certain
aspects of repression in Bahrain's modern history. 
In   many  regards,  such  facts  demand  further  investigation.  Certainly  for
colonial historians, many questions have arisen about the extent of British 'complicity'
in the pursuit of Al Khalifa regime maintenance. The  idea that the British helped prop
up the Al Khalifa  regime cannot  be in  dispute.  British officials  and citizens  were
clearly engaged in practises that could have faced legal consequences if it were not for
the fact that Bahrain's nominal independence construed upon them some autonomy
from what could be generously regarded as the burden of imperial responsibility. Who
used  to  be  colonial  officers  became  what  were  viewed  as  mercenaries,  and  the
sovereign state system allowed an informal amnesty for those complicit in abuses in
states where they were not actually citizens, but employees. Prior to Independence,
Britain intervened militarily,  politically and economically,  straying from what they
hoped  would  be   a  middle  course  of  pacification  and  minimal  interference.  In
particular, the British influence in the police has been revealed not simply as a force
1389C. Levinson, A Palace Rift in Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base, The Wall Street Journal,
22 February 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324595704578239441790926074 
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who  tempered  the  excesses  of  a  brutal  local  institution  in  a  classic  Orientalist
exposition, but as one that fundamentally created and shaped an institution the legacy
of which is still felt today. 
Yet this is far from a anti-colonial polemic. Indeed, despite the crystallisation
of Al Khalifa rule through British protection, this study has revealed that the British-
led reforms did, for a number of decades, temper the brutal legacy of conquest of the
Al  Khalifa  regime,  who  had  hitherto  tyrannised,  oppressed,  and  extorted  the
indigenous baḥārna population. Bahrain’s independence, and the subsequent decline
of  British  influence,  prompted  its  recolonisation  by  Saudi  Arabia  which  had  an
enabling effect on more coercive forms of repression. That, coupled with the Iran-Iraq
war and the Iranian Revolution seemed to result in a culture of revenge, whereby the
Al Khalifa  regime,  unrestrained and galvanised  by Saudi  conservatism,  reasserted
their previous tribal dominance over the Shiʿa.  With the Saudis now conducting the
type of regional imperial intervention formerly reserved for the British, the latter have
undertaken a more surreptitious, neo-colonial form of influence, executed through the
sale  of  weapons,  cover  ups,  political  support,  and  the  provision  of  security
expertise.1390 
With  regards  to  foreign  actors,  this  thesis  has  highlighted  how  Bahrain's
sovereign insecurity has had an impact on repression. Bahrain's  relationship with its
suzerains,  in  particular  Britain  and  Saudi  Arabia,  has  had  a  large  impact  upon
determining the  repressive methods and choices in Bahrain; from the micro level,
such as Saudi pressuring Bahrain to execute prisoners, to Saudi making political gifts
contingent on the abandonment of Bahrain's democracy. This is not to overstate the
case of a singular variable,  yet Saudi clearly has behaved as an enabler in forms of
repression designed to  be more  paternal,  violent,  coercive,  and draconian.  On the
other  hand,  the  British  generally  favoured   the  more  thrifty  alternative  of
administrative  and  constitutional  reforms  towards  the  end  of  the  20th century.
Nonetheless, it was British protection of the ruling family in Bahrain that ossified a
tribal system that set the foundations for the nature of continued tribal exclusivity and
societal  discord  in  Bahrain.  Indeed,  the  various  strands,  legacies,  policies,  and
1390M.O.Jones, 'Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf', Open Democracy, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/marc-owen-jones/bahrain%E2%80%99s-upising-
resistance-and-repression-in-gulf, (accessed 20 November 2015). 
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influences of different agencies make determining particular variables problematic,
although  there  does  seem to  be  some evidence  of  repressive  cultures,  i.e.  certain
methods that are  resultant  from a confluence of particular  ideologies,  instruments,
experience,  and  attitudes.  Despite  the  relative  difficulty  of  finding  comparable
locations, comparative studies on places similar to Bahrain would be fruitful in seeing
how the evolution of repression changed
It  needs  to  be  said  that  this  thesis  does  not  want  to  completely denounce
Bahrain's sovereignty, or lack thereof. Indeed, Bahrain, despite its small size, has been
able  to  play  off  regional  tensions  between  Saudi  and  Iran  for  its  own  benefit,
indicating substantial agency. For example, it signed an MoU with Iran for potential
gas sails, mostly to prompt Saudi ire and get Qatar and Saudi Arabia to renege on a
decision not to export gas to Bahrain.1391 However, its deference to Saudi has been
hard  to  deny,  whether  in  repression,  or  even  trivial  matters,  and  while the
securitisation  of  the Shiʿa  threat  may suggest  that  Saudi's  influence  in  Bahrain  is
reserved predominantly on issues of GCC security, Bahrain's unwillingness to defy
their neighbours is evident in the most banal of matters. For example, Bahrain refused
to recognise Kosovo in 2009 until Saudi had done so. As U.S. Ambassador Henzel
noted, 'Bahrain is unlikely to get out ahead of the Saudis on Kosovo'.1392Nonetheless,
the growth of a GCC alliance seems to reflect an increasing tribal, monarchical, and
Sunni coalition whose interests transcend the demands of Bahrain's citizens wanting
political change, and whose policies will continue to impact how Bahrain's represses
internal dissent. 
Theoretical implications: new insights and old generalisations 
By examining  long  term trends  in  repression,  this  thesis  highlights  not  only  that
authoritarian  regimes  repress  differently,  but  that  the  same  regime  represses
differently over time due to changing regional politics and internal dynamics.  For
example,  deaths  in  custody  only  appear  to  have  occurred  after  Independence  in
Bahrain.  Beginning before the  Iranian Revolution,  such deaths  imply a  change in
certain factors over those years that resulted in the emergence of such tactics. While
1391 US Embassy, 'Bahrain-Iran Gas Deal Still Far Off', 3 February 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA58_a.html, (accessed 20 November 2015). 
1392 C. Henzel, 'Bahrain Will Follow Saudi's Lead on Kosovo', 19 February 2009, Wikileaks, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAMA97_a.html 
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the  reasons  for  this  have  been  hypothesised  in  the  preceding  chapters,  it  is  only
through an extensive historical analysis that we can ascertain the emergence of such a
phenomenon. This is also particularly interesting as it is often the Iranian Revolution
or the 1981 coup attempt that is argued to have been the key moment in shifting the
regime's threat perception and subsequent increased coercion of the Shiʿa population.
1393However, as this research highlights, such assertions place an erroneous emphasis
on  the  Iranian  Revolution,  rather  than  other  variables,  such  as  the  impact  of
Independence,  the increasing role of Saudi,  or the reassertion of the  Al Khalifa's
legacy  of  conquest.  Thus  this  interpretive  work  has  undermined  normative
assumptions on Bahrain and the region, which tend to reflect  transatlantic foreign
policy objectives that portray Iran as the main agent in creating draconian policy shifts
in the Arab Gulf States towards the Shiʿa. In Bahrain's case,  what is certainly evident
is the extent to which Independence and Saudi ascendency has resulted in deleterious
consequences  for  the  country's  Shiʿa  community.  Through  the  examination  of
repressive methods, this thesis has been able to highlight this. Indeed, the tendency to
over-emphasise the role or the importance of the IFLB and the Islamic Revolution in
Bahrain's history complement the government's attempts to paint the Shiʿa opposition
as  a  security  threat,  and  enact  processes,  legislation,  or  actions  that  serve  to
disproportionally criminalise  Shiʿa  members  of society.  Certainly,  emphasising the
impact of the Iranian Revolution on Bahrain's internal politics adds credibility and
legitimacy to a discourse of national security, which runs the danger of positioning
discrimination against Bahrain's Shiʿa as being in the interest of maintaining Bahrain's
sovereignty. 
In addition to revising previous assumptions about events prior to the 1950s,
this  is  one  of  the  first,  if  not  the  first,  study  of  Bahrain  to  focus  on  primary
documentation  of  the  immediate  post-Independence  period.  The national  archives,
coupled  with  freedom of  information  requests,  have  shed  interesting  light  onto  a
period of time that has proved to be remarkably insightful into the shifting nature of
political  decision  making  in  Bahrain.  The  period  also  marked  the  rise  of  US
hegemony, and the activities of leftist  organizations such as PFLOAG. With these
threats and changing dynamics, it was interesting, for example, to compare how the
1393 L. Louër, Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
vol, 36, no. 2, pp. 245-260, 2013.
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regime  treated  leftist  opposition  versus  Shiʿa  opposition.  Yet  the  aforementioned
reassertion of the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest is perhaps the most notable finding of
this period.  This thesis has also complicated generalisations regarding repression in
the Cold War period, such as the argument that the demise of the Sovet Union made
states  less  autocratic  in  order  to  appease  the  democracy-spreading  agenda  of  the
United States. While this may be true in some contexts, this research, like Christian
Davenport's research on repression in authoritarian states, highlights that the death of
the  Soviet  Union did  not  have  a  great  effect  on  Bahrain.  In   actuality,  Bahrain's
continued geostrategic importance to the United States meant that its protection of the
status quo continued unabated. Indeed, repression has gotten worse despite the end of
the cold war. 
The  large  temporal  timespan  combined  with  a  broad  conceptualisation  of
repression has also highlighted a number of other interesting trends, prizing open the
authoritarian  play book.  The growth of  legal  forms of  repression and information
control are particularly notable. While it would be tempting to assert, as  Foucault
does in  Discipline and Punish, that the growth of these invisible forms of control
replace more coercive and disciplinary measures, it seems that in Bahrain they simply
augment  them.  As  we  have  seen,  coercive  methods  have  not  abated  but  actually
increased. Yet this is not to attach a particular value to certain types of repression. If
anything, the study has exposed the problems of attempting to rank repression, or
ascertain levels of severity among its manifested forms. The tendency in the field to
focus perhaps on overt physical acts of harm as the more egregious acts of repression
is problematic. Surveillance, for example, may not traditionally be seen as a violent
form of coercion, yet when it instils anxiety or fear that modifies behaviour, making
victims less likely to engage in challenges to the status-quo, it is fundamentally and
physically  altering  their  physiology.  Thus  how  do  we  determine  where  coercion
begins and ends?
Information  control  too  is  a  growing  tool,  and  one  that  has  become
fundamental to repression since the 1950s in Bahrain. It is also one of the clearer
areas where we see innovation. From crude PR and propaganda to pseudo gangs and
now social media, innovation in the field reflects the regime's ability to adapt to new
technological challenges.  Thus by expanding the framework for repression we are
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inviting people to critically interrogate the very notion of repression and its visibility.
Indeed,  it  is  perhaps  more  insidious  to  dismiss  certain  institutions,  regulations  or
actions as benign, than to explore the extent to which they regulate our behaviour in a
way that deliberately advantages a specific 'elite'.  
Perhaps one of the most unexpected, yet important contributions in this thesis,
is its shedding light on how individual actors within a regime can influence repressive
choices. As noted by Jennifer Earl,  there is little done on how elite attitudes impact
upon the type/frequency/consistency of repression?1394 Yet this thesis has shown, for
example,  that  under  the  British,  Belgrave's  influence  was  pervasive,  as  was  the
personal  influence  of  various  political  agents.  In  recent  times,  this  research  has
implicated the Prime Minister as a key driver of certain repressive strategies. This, in
many regards, represents one of the most significant shifts in the past hundred years of
repression in  Bahrain.  This ties in  with Goldstein's  argument  that  the single most
important  variable  throughout  history  in  determining  repressive  outcomes  is  the
attitude of policy-making individuals towards dissidents.1395 Certainly, as was noted
earlier  in  this  research, 'ideas/beliefs  also  play a role'  in determining  response  to
threats.  Interestingly, these findings cast some doubt on recent scholarship that has
emphasised how the violent repression of 2011 was the result  of  an 'anti-reform'
faction  led  by  the  Khawalid  and  other  hardliners.1396 It  would  perhaps  be  more
accurate to say that any large scale challenge in Bahrain will  be met with violent
repression, rather than it being simply the result of a swing to hardliners away from
moderates. Furthermore, this hardline reaction has been evident since the 1970s. Thus,
the importance of historical habit is important, as is the significance of ruling family
coalitions  in  controlling  dissent.  Certainly  the  issue  raises  questions  about  the
existence of path dependencies, institutional memory, or authoritarian learning.  In
Bahrain, there seems to be a notable cycle in responses to unrest, and an authoritarian
1394J. Earl, 'Political Repression: Iron Fists...'  p. 263. 
1395Goldstein, 1978, p. 558. 
1396See for example J. Kinninmont, 2012, J. Kinninmont, Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, Chatham 
House, London, 2012, p. 20. 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle
%20East/pr0612kinninmont.pdf (accessed 6 October 2015).  p. 1; F. Wehrey, 'The March of 
Bahrain's Hardliners', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 May 2012, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/march-of-bahrain-s-hardliners (accessed 10 October 
2015); Gengler, J. (2014). Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securitization of ‘the Shīʿa 
Problem’ in Bahrain, Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea,  3  (1), 53 – 79.
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reflex facilitated by the fact  that  officials  from the same family,  and who discuss
affairs on a family council,  often hold positions for decades, rather than years. As
Justin Gengler once noted, 'Khalid bin Ahmad replied that the crown prince would
"bring God only knows what disaster upon the family," and that it is only the older
members that "know these people" (i.e., the protesters) and how to deal with them'.1397
In states  like Bahrain,  where the will  of  influential  members  is  less  tempered by
institutional processes, the attitudes of elites will certainly impact upon repression. Yet
crucially,  the  Prime Minister,  rather  than  the  Khawalid,  long seems to  have  been
driving against opposition movements.
Certainly  the  focus  of  this  thesis  has  cast  doubt  on  numerous
generalisations  made  about  the  nature  of  regimes  and  why  they  use  repression.
Depending  on how one  wishes  to  quantify  repression,  this  has  demonstrated,  for
example, that political democracy does not necessarily mean a decrease in repression.
Certainly  personal  integrity  violations  have  become  worse  in  Bahrain  despite
democratisation.  Could it  be, as has been argued, that transitional regimes are the
most coercive? The combination of perceived increasing political opportunities but
limited realities may create a dynamic that encourages collective action, yet maintains
barriers.  What  was  an  opaque  ceiling  has  become  a  glass  one.  Alternatively  the
influence of personalistic attitudes skew understanding of threat perception. We have
seen, for  example,  that  disagreements  between Henderson and the Prime Minister
reflect a disagreement over fear of consequences and fear of appearing weak. The
Prime Minister did, for example, wish to increase repression against the Shiʿa despite
Henderson saying it would only make things worse. Rather than assuming, as a norm,
that increased dissent is an undesirable outcome, it could be that it is an inevitable part
of specific,  divide and rule governing strategies.  Notions of whether government's
repress relevant to their own strength and weakness have also been challenged. It is
perhaps better to examine to what extent regime strength or weakness influences those
methods and strategies adopted. For example, the regime weakness in the 1920s (with
threats of the withdrawal of British protection), prompted more conciliatory attitudes
from  the  regime  to  the  population  at  large.  However,  rather  than  extorting  and
enacting violence against the population, the regime took British advice and accepted
1397J. Gengler, A Different Sourt of Coup, 20 March 2011, 
http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.de/2011/03/different-sort-of-coup.html, (accessed 5 May 2016). 
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a stipend to maintain internal cohesion. Having said this, it is important to bear in
mind that any criticism of generalizations in repression studies here are contingent on
a definition that may not be applicable for those scholars valuing a more parsimonious
conceputalisation.
Despite  these findings,  scholars of repression have long complained of the
difficulty  of  obtaining  clear  data  on  how  governments  calculate  the  'onset  and
escalation of repression'.1398 Bahraini internal documents are not public, and with next
to no mechanisms allowing transparency, there is little opportunity to gain a really
deep  insight  into,  for  example,  the  workings  of  the  Royal  Court  without
whistleblowers coming foreword. However, by utilising multiple sources, especially
diaries, government correspondence, and high level insight, this thesis has obviated, to
some extent, the usual hurdles. Indeed, there is much truth in Tilly's assertion of the
utility of focusing on sources as opposed to theories in order to find historical limits to
observations.1399 It would, of course, have been invaluable to have access to Saudi
documents detailing strategic decision making. To some extent this was possible; the
recent Wikileaks cables of Saudi correspondence did, for example,  confirm Saudi's
obsession  with  Iran.  However,  this  offered  merely  a  glimpse  into  the  Kingdom's
notoriously secret  political  machinations.  Future studies  of  repression will  still  be
hampered by these problems, yet continued attention to historical sources, and leaked
information such as that garnered through Wikileaks,  will  offer more insights into
government strategising in repression. However, methodological innovation should be
considered by those wishing to study repression in a more expansive way. 
Moving away from the state 
The approach of this thesis has shown that future studies of repression would benefit
from  being  less  state-centric.  Indeed,  'while  living  in  a  world  that  stresses  the
interconnection  and  dissolution  of  older  political  units  such  as  states,  scholars,
activists, politicians, and ordinary citizens interested in coercive government activity
are  consistently  attempting  to  refocus  attention  back  onto  relevant  actors'.1400 In
addition to the role of Britain and Saudi, repression in Bahrain is increasingly the
1398C. Davenport, 
1399 Cited in  B. Dill and R. Aminzade, 
1400C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', Annual Review of Political Science,
vol. 10, no. 1, 2007, p. 19. 
287 
result of a broad global network, whose stakeholders include international companies,
foreign governments, and non-state actors. Just as advocacy groups have turned to the
outside world to assist  in their  struggle, governments too seek assistance from the
outside world to repress dissent. Donatella Della Porta once explored the policing of
transnational  protest,  yet  in  Bahrain,  we  can  clearly  see  the  development  of  the
transnational  repression  of  local  protest,  and  transnational  protest  over  local
repression.1401 It would be interesting to examine these repressive networks  in the
future, examining where their power nodes lie, and what forms they take. Certainly,
focusing just on states is to miss flagrant examples of privateering or complicity in
repressive methods.
This  global  repressive  network  too  reflects  the  imperative  of  transnational
corporations in attempting to generate profit from instability, and the increasing roles
the government of Britain (as a relevant example) has in  facilitating that process.
From a social justice perspective, better regulation of the arms trade, and more robust
treaties  and  enforcement  are  required  to  temper  the  desire  to  secure  increasingly
lucrative arms deals that provide government's such as that of Bahrain with increasing
capacity  to  preserve  their  position  of  hegemony.  Certainly  in  a  transnational,
globalised  environment,  focusing  on  state  repression  is  not  necessarily  the  most
appropriate lens.  Indeed, it could be argued that such an approach feeds the dominant
paradigm about the value of sovereignty, which is used by states such as Bahrain to
denounce foreign 'interference' that could actually assuage certain types of repression. 
In this regard, authoritarianism as a concept is also problematic. While this
work departs from covariate analysis, attempting to find the nuance within a state
deemed  authoritarian,  the  multiple  agencies  involved  in  executing  repression  has
highlighted how the authoritarian framework perhaps focuses too much on the state.
By examining methods broadly, we can examine those authoritarian structures, and
those structures, as evidenced in Bahrain, stretch beyond the state. Perhaps scholars
studying the regime-state nexus may find much of use here. Indeed, the term regime
has been used throughout this work, and perhaps better reflects a confluence of actors
acting  together  to  attain  certain  power-maintenance  objectives.  However  this  can
make the term, as an analytical unit, somewhat slippery, for as the case of Bahrain has
1401 D. Della Porta, A. Peterson, H. Reiter, and D. Nelken (eds), The Policing of Transnational 
Protest, Aldershot, Ashgate.   
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demonstrated, shifting international politics has significantly altered the nature and
make-up of the regime. Furthermore, to place too much emphasis on authoritarian
regimes is to shift responsibility of repression away from sovereign states. This is
especially problematic when the states under scrutiny, such as Bahrain, benefit from
relationships with states not considered authoritarian – such as Britain. If,  as even
Bellin  argues,  authoritarianism  robustness  is  facilitated  by  foreign  support  of
militaries, then to what extent is examining the subordinate state missing the core
problems of authoritarian resilience? From the perspective of rectifying social justice,
this needs to be addressed.
Ever-expanding webs of control 
As well as the importance of non-state actors and international networks, rhizomatic
forms of control, through online or offline vigilantiism have demonstrated the power
of society in repressing dissent, especially when mobilised along ideological grounds.
This has been particular evident in the analysis of social media use. As this research
has shown,  social media can extend the repressive apparatus to citizens, and through
trolling, peer-to-peer surveillance, propaganda, and other means, those aligned with
the hegemonic order can facilitate control strategies. Not only does this problematise
the utopian potential of social media as a place of democratic emancipation, but it also
highlights the mixed role of technological determinism and social constructivism in
outlining how such technologies are used. This is not to deny the potential liberating
aspects of technology, but rather it emphasises the importance of doing future, case by
case research on the role of social media during unrest in specific countries. The role
of specific technologies in repression will certainly be contingent on socio-cultural
and political factors. 
Indeed, the relative merits of parsing up repression is that it opens up the door
to  more  interesting  theoretical  insights  into  the  nature  of  repression.  Rather  than
seeing repression as a monolithic  concept,  the proliferation of categories garnered
from numerous studies of similar phenomenon, coupled with inductive research, has
created a template that, while tailored to this study, may be useful for other scholars
wishing  to  examine  aspects  of  repression.  By using  levels  of  disaggregation,  this
thesis has demonstrated that the Bahrain regime has responded 'to different challenges
289 
with distinct repressive strategies', thus addressing a question posed by Davenport.1402
However,  the  expansive  definition  of  repression,  while  giving  scope  to  examine
multiple aspects of Bahrain's history has made it difficult to go into extreme depth on
any one facet of repression. Although depth has been achieved by focusing on just
Bahrain,  a  long  temporal  time  span,  coupled  with  a  broad  conceptualisation  of
repression, has made generalisations difficult.  Yet as Skocpol argues,  'interpretive
works can only be judged to be more or less successful at meeting the challenge they
set for themselves: finding the most compelling conceptual lenses through which to
mediate between meaningful happenings in the past and the concerns of present day
audiences'.1403 Repression is compelling, and highly relevant to Bahrainis and those
interested in  human rights.  The benefits  though,  should  not  be undersold,  and by
uniting disciplines through the concept of repression, this study offers a new approach
to the study of national histories.
Given  the  current  regional  climate,  and  the  New  Middle  East  Cold  War
between Riyadh and Tehran, the position of Bahrain's Shiʿa will likely remain bad.
Certainly  Saudi's  intervention  against  what  it  perceives  as  Iranian  and  Shiʿa
expansionism in Yemen has exacerbated regional tension, and the rise of ISIS is both
a catalyst and a symptom of escalating regional tensions. This defensive stance is only
likely  to  make  Bahrain  fall  more  under  Saudi's  control,  and  acts  such  as  the
provocative execution of Nimr Al Nimr suggest that Saudi are likely to adopt more
violent methods of coercion in the near-term.  The future for a more equitable sharing
of power in Bahrain is bleak. Trapped between Saudi and Iran, and of geopolitical
strategic importance for both the US and the UK, Bahrain's lack of independence has
impacted significantly on repression. British and American military interests in the
region equate to  transatlantic support for the authoritarian status quo, while  Saudi
military intervention  virtually  guarantee  that  even  armed  insurrection  would  have
little effect on regime change.  Unless, as Christopher Davidson argues, Saudi Arabia
collapses,  Bahrain's constellation of external allies will help stave off unrest.1404 
1402C. Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, p. 18. 
1403Skocpol, 19
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